

HISTORY OF INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

(BEING THE AUTHOR'S THESIS APPROVED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE).



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Preface

This book, which is being published under the title of History of Indian Epistemology, is the revised and enlarged text of my Thesis on Indian Epistemology approved for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Cambridge University, which was originally published in 1939 and is out of print now. I think the present title is more appropriate for this treatise as it gives a connected and systematic account of the origin as development of the Theories of Knowledge from the beginning of Indian Thought up to the modern times. It is based upon a first-hand study of such original texts as have been found important for this subject. As scholars of Indian Philosophy know, original Contributions to Indian Thought stopped centuries ago and therefore it is not possible to write upon what may be called modern development in Indian Epistemology, but, if I may strike a personal note in this connection, I have ventured to add a chapter at the end under this title in which I have given a summary of my own contribution to the Nature of Knowledge and Reality as contained in my Sanskrit Work *Tattva-darsana** published two years ago. This is the first book of its kind in Sanskrit which attempts a synthesis of the Indian and the Western Thought with the author's own contribution where possible. This work has already been read and appreciated by some of the prominent modern scholars of Sanskrit and Philosophy, and it is hoped that the chapter at the end based upon the same will be found interesting by the readers of this Treatise.

**Tattva-darsana*, Sanskrit Text with English Translation, published by the Shri Shivaji Loka Vidyapitha, Amravati, India, 1955.

Although the main object in writing this work has been to provide a systematic account of the epistemological thought as it is to be had in the works of Indian philosophers, the attempt to achieve this by means of a direct study of the authors has necessarily involved a discussion of the interpretation of a number of Sanskrit texts, especially because a good deal of difference of opinion has existed with regard to their exact philosophical import. Hence, side by side with an exposition of the subject proper there will be found in this work such discussions pertaining to the nature and a significance of texts as are relevant to our enquiry.

It has not been my aim to enter into chronological controversies, and consequently I have eschewed them for the purpose of this treatise. In most cases I have followed the latest accepted views on Indian chronology ; and where definite dates are not available, I have adopted such chronological order as has been suggested by the logical development of thought and has not been found improbable otherwise. Whenever I have happened to differ, however, from the usual view about the date of an important work or author, I have given reasons for having done so.

As regards the value of this work as an original contribution to the subject with which it deals, it may be said that, so far as I know, it represents the first systematic attempt to determine the origin and development of epistemological thought in Indian philosophy on the basis of the original Sanskrit texts, and to provide, in one place, an account of the views, on the subject, of the philosophers of the various schools so as to show their relations to one another in the history of this particular branch of study. In this treatise I have also made a serious effort to interpret the thought of some of the most important authors independently of their scholastic commentators, thus to avoid the common

pitfall of taking for granted that their interpretations were necessarily correct.

Besides the general treatment of the subject as a whole on the lines indicated above, the following are some of the main sections of this work which are original in the sense that they contain either matter first noticed and expounded as having a bearing upon the subject of epistemology, or discussions of certain views held by commentators and modern scholars on topics of epistemological importance with the object of arriving at a satisfactory solution of the problems concerned.

1. The philosophical back-ground of Indian epistemology in the early literature, including the Vedic, the Brāhmaṇic and the Upaniṣadic scriptures of the Hindus and the *Prajñā-pāramitās* of the Buddhists.

In connection with this subject the following views have been particularly discussed:—

(a) That some verses of Ṛgveda, I, 164 and X, 129 contain a doctrine of scepticism or agnosticism, the view held by Dr. Barua, Keith, Ranade, and others.

(b) That Ṛgveda X, 129, 5 signifies the recognition of a distinction between the words of appearance and reality, —the interpretation of the verse according to Deussen¹.

2. That the exposition of the theory of knowledge in the various Philosophical Sūtras may serve as an indication of their relative dates. In this connection, a discussion of the arguments given by Professors Jacobi and Woods for the late date of the *Yoga sūtras*².

1. The verse has been discussed by me in a separate article published in the *JRAS*, July 1929.

2. This section is published as an article in the *JRAS*, April 1930, under the title, *The Date of the Yoga-sūtras*.

3. That the doctrine of voidness (*śūnyatā*) as found in the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* of Nāgārjuna is one of absolute reality and not nihilism, or of relativity as held by Stcherbatsky.

4. A discussion of the significance of the terms *citta*, *vyrtti*, *vikalpa* and *smṛti* in the *Yoga-sūtras*, especially a criticism of the interpretation of *vikalpa* by the commentators as a forms of error.

5. The beginnings of the Nyāya epistemology as found in the *Caraka Saṃhitā*.

6. The following points in the theory of knowledge according to the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* :—

(a) Discussion of the significance of V. S. III, 1, 1 to III, 1, 19 with particular reference to the traditional view that they deal with the question whether sense-cognition is a true mark of the existence of soul or not.

(b) Cognition of substance, attributes, actions, and relations.

7. The following topics in the epistemology of the *Nyāya sūtras* :—

(a) A discussion of the significance of the definition of *prātpakṣa* as given in the *Nyāya Sūtras* with reference to the interpretations of important commentators.

(b) A discussion of the three kinds of inference mentioned in NS. I, 1, 5 with reference to the traditional views of the commentators and the interpretations of some of the modern scholars.

(c) The nature of *buddhi*, according to the Nyāya and the Sāṃkhya, with reference to the controversy as to whether it is permanent or temporary.

A discussion in this connection of NS. III, 2, 10 to III, 2, 18, which have been supposed to contain a discussion

of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. It is shown that they really contain a discussion of the nature of *buddhi*¹.

(d) A discussion of NS. IV. 2. 26 ff., which have been supposed to discuss the Buddhist doctrine of subjective idealism. It is maintained that they really refer to the cognition of the whole in relation to its parts.

8. The following points in connection with the theory of knowledge in the *Saṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra*—

(a) Definition of *pramā* and *pramāṇa* in SPS. I, 87 discussed with reference to the interpretations of the commentators.

(b) Significance of the definitions of *Pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* in the SPS.

9. Significance of the classifications of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* in the *Parīkṣa-mukha-sūtra* of Māṇikyā Nandī, and the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvalokalaṅkāra* of Deva Sūri

10. Vācaspati Miśra's real position with regard to the division of *Pratyakṣa* into *nirvikalpaka* and *Savikalpaka*.

11. The nature of *buddhi* according to the *Vṛtsikāra* quoted in the *Śabara-bhāṣya*, and a discussion of the text '*tasman na vyapadesya buddhiḥ*'...etc. (ŚB. p. 10)

12. A criticism of the interpretations of *āpta śrutiḥ* in *Saṃkhya-kārikā*, 5, according to Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra, and an explanation of *pramāṇa* according to Vācaspati Miśra with reference to Dr. G. N. Jhā's translation of *anadhigata-viśaya* under SK.

13. A criticism of the doctrine of knowledge (*vidyā*) and

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1. The subject has been discussed by me in an article in the JRAS, January 1930, under the title '*Discussion of the Buddhist doctrines of Momentariness and Subjective Idealism in the Nyāya-sūtras*'.

ignorance (*avidyā*) as expounded in the opening lines of Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras*.

14. A critical and comparative study of the problem of 'Acquaintance' or 'Simple Apprehension', (the Appendix).

Besides the above, the other chapters also,—especially those on Praśastapāda, Dinnāga, Dharmakīrti, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja,—will be found to contain a good deal of matter presented in such a way as to bring out the contributions of these authors in the history of Indian epistemology.

A list of the works which have been consulted in preparing this dissertation and to which there is a reference in the following pages is given separately. The reference in the texts have been invariably given either in the footnotes, or in the body of the work. Important texts have been always quoted in original ; and, in most cases, an English translation has also been provided.

As regards the selection of the sources for the purpose of this thesis, it may be said that mostly such literature has been chosen as has been found to be of basic importance and to have constructive value. Consequently, works of a purely dialectical nature with no constructive doctrines or criticisms to offer have been excluded. Similarly, such commentaries or sub-commentaries and manuals have also been left out as are only a belaboured elaboration or a compendium of what has been already said in the original works or the earlier commentaries.

In accordance with the aim of this work, the treatment has been confined to such material from the sources as has been found to be of epistemological value. Details of formal logic, such as forms of syllogistic inference and the classification of fallacies, have been eliminated as outside the

scope of the enquiry. Similarly, grammatical topics, such as discussions about the meanings of words and sentences, have also been left out.

In the arrangement of the various sections, I have departed from the usual practice of dealing with *all* the authors of one particular school in one place irrespective of their position in the general development of philosophical thought and their relations to the thinkers of the other schools. There could hardly be any excuse for adhering to this unscientific method of exposition, especially when the aim is to study the origin and development of one particular branch of study as a whole, and not only as it grew in the various schools. I have not followed also the other alternative of dealing with the various aspects of the epistemological enquiry, such as perception, inference, etc., each in a separate section; for, although it is a good plan in itself, it is ill-adapted to the purpose I have in view, viz. to trace not only the development of the particular problems of the theory of knowledge, but also to study the epistemological position of the important authors as a whole, so as to determine what contributions they have made, and in what relations they stand to one another in the history of the subject. Besides, discussions concerning the texts of the various works, of which there is quite a large number in this dissertation, could not have been appropriately and effectively inserted under any arrangement other than that which has been adopted here, viz. that of having separate sections for the various works or authors, and considering their doctrines and the relevant texts in one place.

I have also found it necessary to depart from the usual English terminology in translating certain Sanskrit technical terms. My aim has been to translate the terms as literally as possible, so as to retain their original shade of

meaning, and thus also to make it possible to use consistently one and the same rendering for one particular term throughout the work. The peculiar significance of a term in any particular work or author, if any, having been explained in its context. To quote an instance, I have always translated '*pratyakṣa*' as 'direct knowledge' rather than 'sense cognition', 'perception', or 'intuition'; for while it is a more literal rendering of the term, it has also the advantage of being applicable to all kinds of *pratyakṣa* both sensuous and non-sensuous. Similarly, *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka* are more correctly translated by 'reflective' and 'non-reflective' than by 'determinate' and 'non-determinate', or by 'mediate' and 'immediate', the terms which have been most used to express them. For a rendering of *upamāna* I have preferred the phrase 'knowledge by similarity' to the usual word 'analogy', in order to avoid the implications of this term as used in European logic; or to 'comparison' which is neither a good translation nor a correct interpretation of *upamāna*.

A complete list of the abbreviations used in the work is given in the end.

In the preparation of this dissertation I have had the benefit of guidance by Dr. E. J. Thomas, who was my supervisor at Cambridge. He has twice read the various portions of the Thesis, and his valuable criticisms have helped me a good deal in putting my thoughts into the form in which they are presented now. I am further indebted to him for his frequent suggestions with regard to the works on the subject by foreign authors and his readiness to help me in referring to them.

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PART I
INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The Problem of Epistemology and its Treatment in Indian Philosophy.

Man finds himself in the possession of certain convictions which, roughly speaking, he calls knowledge. Further he finds that all his convictions are not of the same value, and that he has to distinguish them as true and false. The awareness of this distinction naturally leads him to enquire into the origin and validity of all knowledge. Such a study, which, in the words of the late Dr. Ward, is a 'systematic reflection concerning knowledge, and which takes knowledge itself as the object of science', is epistemology. It will appear that while the acquirement of knowledge is common to all men, a systematic reflection about it has been the concern of a few. Even among philosophers it is not all who have been alive to the problem of knowledge as a distinct branch of study. In the history of European philosophy, the beginnings of a systematic study of the theory of knowledge may be traced to Locke's enunciation of the enquiry in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*,¹ and a definite formulation of it to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.² In

1. I, 1, 2 and 4 (*Pringle Pattison's Edition*).

2. *Introduction* (English Translation by Norman Kemp Smith, p. 46).

Indian philosophy, the first systematic treatment of the means of knowledge (the *pramāṇas*) is to be found in Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtras*, which also deal with the objects of knowledge (the *prameyas*). Later, this study concerning knowledge came to be gradually separated from that of the objects of knowledge, and thus there came into existence works on pure logic and epistemology. This departure is noticeable first in the works of the Buddhist and the Jaina philosophers, and may be said to have taken place about the time of Diṇnāga (about 450 A. D.). The logicians of the *Nyāya* School, who were most of them commentators on the *Nyāya-sūtras* for a long time, adhered to the old practice of treating epistemology as a part of metaphysics until the time of Bhāsarvajña (about 950 A. D.), who included only the study of the means of knowledge in his *Nyāya-sāra*. The New School of Logic (*Navya-nyāya*), however, founded by Gaṅgeśa (about 1250 A. D.), settled down to a very subtle and systematic study of the means of knowledge as an altogether independent and distinct branch of study ; and for a few centuries epistemology came to be regarded in India as not only an important but an indispensable part of the philosophic discipline. This separation of epistemology from metaphysics in the New School, however, did not necessarily mean any substantial advance in the study of the subject itself. The epistemological position of Gaṅgeśa and his successors is not very different from that of his immediate predecessors in the old

Nyāya School. The most distinguishing features of the new School really consist in a subtle dialectic and a highly complex technicality.

As a science of knowledge, which it is accepted to be on all hands, epistemology has to be considered in its relation to such other sciences as metaphysics, psychology and logic, which also treat of the same subject. In spite of a comparatively indifferent attitude of modern writers towards defining the exact nature and status of epistemological enquiry, I think, in order to understand and appreciate the standpoint of Indian philosophers on this subject, and also in view of the fact that there has been a radical difference of opinion concerning this topic among some of the older thinkers of the West, it is necessary to enter briefly into what may be called a critique of epistemology.

To begin with, let us consider what the datum of epistemology is. Can we take knowledge as its datum or not? In other words, does the study of epistemology start with the recognition of the fact that there is what, roughly speaking, we call knowledge, or is it supposed to question the very existence and possibility of knowledge, and claim to begin its enquiry without any assumptions whatsoever? It will appear that Kant, who represented the development of a line of thought on this subject started in Locke, thought, in any case, as Hegel understood him, that a critical enquiry concerning knowledge is to be an *altogether*

preliminary study ; and Hegel, disagreeing with Kant, repudiated such a conception of epistemology. 'A main line of argument in the Critical Philosophy', says Hegel, 'bids us pause before proceeding to enquire into God or into the true being of things, and tells us first of all to examine the faculty of cognition and see whether it is equal to such an effort. We ought, says Kant, to become acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which it is employed ; for if the instrument be insufficient, all our troubles will be spent in vain. The plausibility of this suggestion has won for it general assent and admiration ; the result of which has been to withdraw cognition from an interest in its objects and absorption in the study of them, and to direct it back upon itself ; and so turn it to a question of form. Unless we wish to be deceived by words, it is easy to see what this amounts to. In the case of other instruments, we can try and criticize them in other ways than by setting about the special work for which they are destined. But the examination of knowledge can be carried out only by an act of knowledge. To examine this so called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim.'¹ I need not add much to what has been said by Hegel in this criticism of a

1. *The Logic of Hegel*, (English Translation by Wallace, Second Edition), Introduction, p. 17.

conception of epistemology which would start without assuming the existence of knowledge. The very possibility of an examination of knowledge rests upon the assumption that first there is knowledge ; and in the very act of denying knowledge, even the most vehement sceptic or agnostic tacitly assumes that there is knowledge.¹ This fact was recognised by the philosophers of all the schools of Indian philosophy except those who represented the school of the Mādhyamika Buddhism, which held the doctrine that the whole world of experience, including knowledge and the means of knowledge, has only an illusory existence. Gautama Akṣapāda, the first systematic writer on logic in Indian philosophy, discusses the question whether it is possible to conceive the means of knowledge independently of knowledge and the objects of knowledge².

1. Cf. Bertrand Russell—'When however, we speak of philosophy as a criticism of knowledge, It is necessary to impose a certain limitation. If we adopt the attitude of a complete sceptic, placing ourselves wholly outside all knowledge, we are demanding what is impossible, and our scepticism can never be refuted. For all refutation must begin with some piece of knowledge which the disputants share : from blank doubt. no argument can begin' ; and again, 'Some knowledge, such as knowledge of the existence of our sense-data, appears quite indubitable, however calmly and thoroughly we reflect upon it'—*Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 234-35.

2. *Nyāya-Sūtra*, II, 1, 8 to 11 ; 1, 19.

He maintains that while the existence of the means of knowledge is proved by the fact that there is knowledge of objects, just as the existence of a (distant) drum is proved by the fact that there is sound produced out of it¹, their validity is proved by the means of knowledge themselves. In this respect he compares the means of knowledge to a lamp which illumines other things as well as itself.²

An examination of knowledge, such as epistemology undertakes, provides, however, a *method* of metaphysical enquiry and criticism ; and we find that, in the history of philosophy, whether consciously or unconsciously, it has been used as such. This is most true of our own times, when all metaphysical problems are attacked through an analysis of knowledge ; and again, all philosophical criticism is usually based upon epistemological ground. The same conception is implied in the term '*pramāṇa*' in Indian philosophy, which signifies both means of knowledge and means of proof. The beginnings of the analysis of knowledge in Indian philosophy, first psychological and then epistemological, were due to a need on the part of the thinkers to find means of proof for the beliefs which they had come to hold, for their own satisfaction, but still more, for producing conviction in others. This is evident from the fact that systematic logic in India took its rise from such rules and forms of debating as are found in some of the works of the early period.

1. *Ibid.* II, 1. 15.

2. *Ibid.* II, 1, 19.

Hence to regard epistemology as a mere formal analysis of knowledge is not only futile but also untrue to facts.

Considered from this point of view epistemology can be exactly distinguished from logic only in so far as the latter is treated in its purely formal aspect ; otherwise they are substantially the same. In practice, however, we find that while works on epistemology confine themselves to a general treatment of the means of knowledge and the criterion of truth, those on logic undertake a detailed analysis and classification of the forms of knowledge and error, such as rules of definition and division, syllogistic inference, the classification of fallacies ; although in this respect too the practice varies greatly. In Indian philosophy epistemology was always treated as a part of logic.

In order to discuss the validity of the various means of knowledge, epistemology has to depend upon an analysis of the mental processes leading to them, and hence it is intimately connected with psychology. It was because of this close connection between the two studies that in the earlier works of Indian philosophy an enquiry into the nature of the *pramāṇas* is of a mixed or rather confused nature ; that is to say, the distinction between the psychological and the epistemological aspects of the enquiry is not quite clear.

To come to the details of the analysis of knowledge in Indian philosophy, it may be said that the means of

knowledge (the *pramāṇas*) which have been considered possible and have been discussed (not necessarily accepted by all the schools) are : (i) direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), including sense-cognition and other direct means of knowledge ; (ii) inference (*anumāna*), (iii) knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*) ; (iv) verbal testimony (*śabda*), including scriptural testimony (*śāstra* or *āgama*) ; (v) presumption (*arthāpatti*) ; (vi) implication (*sambhava*) ; (vii) non-existence (*abhāva*) ; and (viii) tradition (*aitihya*). This is, however, the later stereotyped list. The first distinction in the analysis of knowledge, the signs of which are traceable even as early as some of the hymns of the *R̥gveda*, was that between knowledge of things immediately present to the senses (*pratyakṣa*) and those remote from the senses (*parokṣa*). Of these the latter were supposed to be known by divine testimony, or by reflection. According to the early Jaina logicians, however, the distinction between direct and indirect knowledge was different. They called the knowledge derived through the senses indirect, and that by intuition direct. The later Jaina writers on logic, however, gave up this peculiar division, and accepted the ordinary classification of the Hindu logicians. In some of the texts of the early Hindu and Buddhist literature we can trace the development of a psychological analysis which, in course of time, helped to shape the epistemological doctrines as found in the later literature of the *Sūtras* and other works. One of the earliest lists, it may be the earliest, of the means of know-

ledge is to be found in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, where they are said to be (i) codes of law (*smṛti*) ; (ii) direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), meaning by this sense-cognition ; (iii) tradition (*aitihya*) ; and (iv) inference (*anumāna*), a list which clearly belongs to an early period, for it includes tradition which was discarded later on by most of the schools as unreliable. The first treatment of the means of knowledge, which forms the nearest approach to the later systematic exposition of the same in the *Nyāya-sūtras*, is to be found in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* in which there is also a remarkable discourse on the limitations of sense-cognition and the need of having recourse to verbal testimony and inference. The classification of knowledge as found in the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* of the Jaina logician Umāsvāti and the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* of Buddhism are extremely complex, cumbrous and confused; and contribute very little to the development of the future epistemological doctrines even of the Jainas and the Buddhists.

In spite of all the doubts and differences of opinion as regards the exact relations between one school and another about the time of Diṇnāga and before him, one outstanding fact that can hardly be denied is that all the works of the *Sūtra* period, and those subsequent to them, bear the stamp of being influenced by the logic of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools, if not exactly of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*. So far as I can see, the developed Buddhist logic as

found in the works of Nāgārjuna, and the Jaina logic as represented by Siddhasena Divākara, have no antecedents in their own schools such as might justify us in assuming that they had an independent growth in the line of their own literature. In fact, the whole terminology employed by the Buddhist and the latter Jaina writers on logic is that of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools. Further a reference to logicians under the name of *takkin* or *takkika* in the Pāli Buddhist literature may indicate the presence of a logical school which was evidently non-buddhist, as the term *takkin* is used along with *Vimamsin* (Skt. *mīmāṃsin*)¹; and whatever logical terms are found in the earlier Buddhist writers were evidently imported from some other school. On the other hand, in the early Hindu literature, both logical and non-logical, there are no signs to show that the Hindu authors were aware of the existence of any such thing as an early school of Buddhist logic or even the beginnings of it; and this should be an indication of the fact that there was no such school. That the logic of the *Nyāya* school was influenced by that of the Buddhist writers after Nāgārjuna, and more particularly and effectively after Dīñnāga, is also a fact which can hardly be denied, and has already received acceptance at the hands of scholars. As regards the exact relations between one author and another, e. g., between Praśastapāda and Dīñnāga, nothing can be said 'definitely'; for, as Pro-

1. *Dīgha.*, 1, 16.

Professor Tucci has tried to show recently,¹ the authors who are supposed to have borrowed from each other, merely because of a similarity of terms or affinity of logical doctrines, may have derived their material from a common older source, of which we happen to be ignorant at the present time. After Diñnāga, the chronological order of the authors is almost definite, and in most cases exact dates are available. The one point to remember about the results of the influence of one school on another is that it was mostly the formal aspect of logic that was affected ; the main

1. *Buddhist Logic before Diñnāga*. JRAS, July, 1929. Professor Tucci has also tried to show in the same article that a number of *Tarka-śāstras* existed before Diñnāga, and presumably even before the time of the final reaction of the *Nyāya-sūtras*. One of these, he thinks, was the work of a Buddhist writer, but about the authorship of the others he is not sure. I hope Prof. Tucci does not mean to imply that '*Tarka-śāstras*' in the plural number refers to some particular works bearing that title as a proper name, and presumably written by Buddhist authors. The more probable explanation would be that it is just a common name referring to a class of works on logic, and is synonymous with the equally familiar '*hetu-śāstras*' or '*hetu-vidyā*'. If so, the term '*tarka-śāstras*' is more likely to refer to that literature of the earlier period, which is known to be preliminary to the developed form of the Nyāya school, than to any works of Buddhist writers about the existence of which there is no evidence so far.

epistemological doctrines of each school remained unchanged. Each school adhered to its own doctrines, and modified its logical form only in so far as it was consistent with its intrinsic epistemological and metaphysical position, and at the same time helped it to keep abreast of the progress in the formal logic of the times.

Besides works which strictly belong to the category of logic there were others which owed their origin to a different class of literature, but which also contain valuable matter on epistemology. Such are some of the works of the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta* schools. Not much epistemology can be found in the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta* Sūtras themselves, but the later exponents of their doctrines like Kumāṛila and Prabhākara of the *Mīmāṃsā* school, and Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja of the *Vedānta*, have made distinct contributions to epistemological thought ; and as they lived and wrote in times when the philosophical doctrines of the various schools had been more or less consolidated, and a zeal to defend them against the attacks of opponents was at its highest, some portions of their works contain acute metaphysical speculation, and show a fairly high standard of epistemological criticism.

Gaṅgeśa represents the culminating point in the development of the epistemological analysis in the *Nyāya* school ; although in his hands the study became rather formal, and it continued to be so in the works of his followers for a long time. There grew up, however, after, Gaṅgesa, another set of authors, who

tried to combine the logic of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools by writing short manuals, and reverted to the old practice of dealing with the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) along with the objects of knowledge (*prameya*). There is nothing original in these works and they only serve as compendiums of the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* philosophy.

A word may be added with regard to the epistemology of the *Cārvāka* school, especially because, for want of the original sources, it has not been considered in this work. The only sources of our knowledge of this materialistic system is the Chapter dealing with it in the *Sarva-darsana-saṃgraha* of Mādhvācārya and a few stray references in some other works.¹ From the account of the system in the *SDS*, we know that it accepted sense-cognition as the only means of knowledge. The other means of knowledge including inference were rejected on the ground that they could not establish a universal and necessary connection (*avinābhāva*) and could, therefore, provide no ground for such universal propositions as 'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire'. The usual idea of concomitance was explained as due to custom based upon past sense-cognition, or error.² This view was vehemently attacked by the writers of the other

1. These have been collected by Dakshinaranjana Shastri, in the Appendix to his works on the *Cārvākas-Chārvāka-shashthi*, Calcutta.

2. *SDS*. B. Indica, p. 5. It will appear that this view that

schools ; and the discourse in the *Caraka-samhita* on the limitations of perceptual knowledge is a typical example of the argument adduced on the subject by the opponents of the *Cārvāka* school.

While the most usual view about the Materialistic school is that it admitted self-cognition only as the means of knowledge, a passage in the *Nyāya-manjari*, which appears to be based upon the authority of some original work of the *Cārvākas* known to the author of the *Nyāya-manjari*, indicates that the exact position of a thorough-going *Cārvāka* materialist was that it is absolutely impossible to determine either the exact number or the exact character of the means of knowledge (*Pramāṇas*) and the objects of knowledge (*prameya*).

it is impossible to have a truly universal and necessary proposition corresponds to that of Hume's on the same subject.

1. *Nyāya-Mañjari*, pp. 36 and 64 ; also quoted in *Indian Thought*, vol. V, p. 319, "asakya eva *Pramāṇa-saṁkhyā-niyama* iti *susikṣita-cārvākaḥ*" p. 36.

'*Cārvāka-dhūrtas tu athātas tattvam vyākhyāsāma iti pratijñāya pramāṇa-prameya-saṁkhyā-lakṣaṇa-niyamāśakya-kāraṇīyatvam eva tattvam vyākhyātavān*', P. 64.

PART II

The Philosophical Background in the
Early Literature.

The Philosophical Background in the Early Literature.

1. THE VEDIC LITERATURE.

It is evident that no epistemology as such can be found in the literature of the Vedic and the Upaniṣadic periods. What we do find is certain notions about the nature of the universe and an effort to analyse them, which in course of time led to the formulation of definite ideas about the nature of consciousness and the ways and means of acquiring knowledge. At first the analysis was mostly psychological, and it was only as late as the period of the Philosophical Sūtras that something like an epistemological viewpoint was positively attained. It will be helpful, however, to trace the origin and development of this epistemological consciousness from the very earliest indications of it in Indian literature.

(i) The Earliest Signs of a Distinction between Direct and Indirect Knowledge in the R̥gveda.

The earliest texts which appear to be significant for our enquiry are some verses¹ in *R̥gveda*, I, 164 ;

1. The most important verses are : I, 164, 4 & 37 ; X, 82, 3 & 7 ; X, 129, 6 & 7.

X, 82 ; and X, 129. A study of these, as will be shown presently, indicates on the part of their authors a consciousness of the following facts : *firstly*, that there are two kinds of objects : (i) those that are immediately present to the senses ; and (ii) those that are not immediately present to the senses, that is to say, those that are remote ; *secondly*, that those which are immediately present to the senses are, of course, known through the senses ; but those which are remote are not known by means of the senses ; and hence there must be, if any, some other means of their knowledge ; and, *thirdly*, that the knowledge of these remote objects can be had either by means of divine testimony, for nothing is remote to God, or by reflection. Thus it will appear that we find in the texts of these verses the germs of the distinction between what came to be known later on as direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect knowledge (*pāroḥṣa*). It may be mentioned here that some of these verses, viz. I, 164, 4 & 37 ; and X, 129, 6 & 7 have been usually understood by scholars¹ to signify a sceptical attitude on the part of their authors, and hence they have discovered a doctrine of scepticism, or even agnosticism in these hymns of the *R̥gveda*. In X, 129, 5 Deussen read an indication of the fact that the author was conscious of a distinction between the world of appearance and that of reality, and that the verse contains a reference to the knowledge

1. For instance, Barua *HPIP.*, pp. 16 & 29 ; Ranade, *CSUP.*, pp. 3 & 149 ; Keith, *RPV.*, II, p. 435.

of these two kinds of reality.¹ This verse I have already discussed in a separate article² in which I have offered an explanation of my own; and have tried to show that Deussen's interpretation cannot be accepted. The other verses I shall consider presently, and shall try to prove that they do not signify a sceptical attitude as they have been supposed to do by some scholars.

Let us first take verses I, 164, 4 & 37.³ A perusal

1. *Gesch. der Phil.*, I. pp. 124, 125.

2. *JRAS*, July, 1929. pp. 586-99.

3. *Ko dadarśa prathamam jāyamānam
asthanvantam yad anasthā vibharti,
Bhūmya asur asṛgātma kva svit ko
vidvāṁsam upagāt praṣṭum etat. (I. 164, 4)
Na vijānāmi yadi vedam asmi
niṇyaḥ sannaddho manasā carāmi,
Yadā māgan prathamajā ṛtas-
yādidvāco aśnuve bhāgam asyāh. (I, 164, 37)*

Who has seen that the boneless bears the bony when being born first? Where may be the breath, the blood, the soul of the earth? Who would approach the wise to make this enquiry?

I do not know whether I am like this; ignorant, prepared I go about; when I partake a portion of this speech, the first products of truth come to me.

It may be mentioned that Sāyaṇa's rendering of the verses is slightly different, and that modern scholars have also differed from one another with regard to the exact significance of such terms as *asthanvantam* and *anasthā*, but it is necessary to discuss all the details

of the hymn (I, 164) to which they belong will show that it is one of such discourses as served the purpose of introducing discussions on the occasion of a sacrifice—the *brahmodyas* as they were called—by raising questions about the nature of the universe. In the first of the two verses (1, 164, 4) questions have been asked with regard to the origin and the vital principle of the universe : *firstly*, Who has seen the universe (the bony—the created universe) being evolved out

of interpretation here, as they are irrelevant to our enquiry.

In verse, I, 164, 4 Hillebrandt (*Vedische Mythologie* I, p. 338) interprets *asthanvantam* and *anasthā* as signifying the moon and the sun respectively ; and according to him it is said in the verse that the sun supports the moon—*asthanvantam yad anasthā vibharti*. This interpretation is mainly based upon Hillebrandt's supposition that the moon looks bony. But it will appear that in the second line of the verse there is a reference to the soul of the earth, and as in such other verses of the *Rgveda* as X, 90, 2; 3 and X, 121 the sun is spoken of as the soul of the universe, it is more likely that it is the sun who is meant by *asthanvantam*. This interpretation is still further strengthened by a text of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* : *hṛanyagarbham paśyati jāyamānam*, etc., (IV, 12) which is evidently an echo of this same verse of the *Rgveda*, as so many other texts of the Fourth Chapter of the *Śvetāśvatara* are of *Rgveda*, I, 164. Similarly, the earth, which has been referred to in the second line of the verse, has been called 'all-supporting' and 'mother-earth' in such verses

of its undeveloped state (the Boneless) ?; and, *secondly*, Is there any one who would go to a wise man and enquire what and where the vital principle (the breath, the blood, the soul) of this earth is ? The poet philosopher here tries to understand the origin and the life principle of the universe on the analogy of an animal body. The bony body of an animal is delivered of the boneless womb, or is developed from a boneless state and is believed to have a vital principle—breath, blood, or soul. Now the question is whether any one can explain how this universe came into

as *Atharva*, XII, 1, 5 & 6, and it is that which is naturally signified by 'anasthā'.

Geldner (*Der Rigveda Übersetzt und Erläutert* Gottingen, I, p. 206) follows Sāyaṇa interpretation of the verse.

A word may be said about my interpretation of *sannaddhaḥ* as 'ready' or 'prepared', which is a very usual meaning of this word. Sāyaṇa renders it as 'one who is fettered by actions resulting from ignorance and desire'. This rendering, so far as I can see, is inappropriate ; for, in the first place, it contains much more than the word *sannaddhaḥ* can mean : and in the second place, if it be accepted, the notion expressed by that word will be more or less a repetition of what is already signified by *niṇyah* which immediately precedes it. On the other hand, *sannaddho manasā* makes quite a good sense if taken to mean 'with a mind prepared (to learn)'; and it fits in very well with the context of the verse and the hymn.

being, and what and where its vital principle is. It will appear that such questions as mentioned above do not at all suggest an attitude of scepticism or agnosticism on the part of the author as they have been supposed to do by some scholars. Either they are simply meant to introduce a discussion, or at the most they indicate a confession of ignorance on the part of the individual who puts them. A study of the whole hymn shows that Dīrghatamas, its author, figures in it as an earnest and modest seeker after truth. He does not say (what would be scepticism) that it is impossible to find an answer to the questions concerning the universe, but confesses his own ignorance and also declares his readiness to be instructed by those who may be wise. For instance, in *Rgveda*, I, 164, 5 he calls himself 'unripe in mind' and 'in spirit undiscerning'¹; in I, 164, 6 'one unknowing', who would approach the wise to be enlightened.² The same notion is found in I, 164, 37, where he says first that he is ignorant and goes about seeking knowledge, and then that it was through the divine speech that the truth first began to appear to him. The view that Dīrghatamas was a sceptic would be further seen to be untrue from the fact that in some of the other verse of this same hymn, for instance, I, 164, 20 and 46, he has even to say something positive with regard

1. *pākaḥ prcchāmi manasāvijānan.*

2. *acikituṣāñ cikituṣas cidatra kavīn prcchāmi vidmane na vidvān.*

to the nature of spirit and the material universe. In I, 164, 20,¹ which is a well-known verse, he unmistakably refers, though metaphorically to the nature of the universal and the individual spirits and their relation to the material universe. In I, 164, 46 he emphasises the fact that it is one and the same being who is called by different names etc.²

The fact that God is the repository of knowledge and that he is the source of enlightenment to man is further emphasised in X, 82, 3.³ Assuming that Prajāpati Parameṣṭhin; the seer of X, 129, was also a sceptic like the Dīrghatamas of I, 164, Dr. Barua has held that *Rgveda*, X, 82 contains a refutation of his scepticism.⁴ It will appear, however, that it is as wrong to hold that the views contained in some of the verses of X, 129 represent a doctrine of scepticism as to say that Dīrghatamas was a sceptic.

Rgveda, X, 129, called the Nāsadīya hymn after the first two words in it, is the well-known cosmogonic hymn attributed to Parameṣṭhin. It has been translated and commented upon by every Vedic scholar. It is not my object here to enter into all the discussions

1. *Dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā samānam vṛkṣam pariśasvajāte, etc.,*

2. *Ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti, etc.*

3. *Yo naḥ pitā janitā yo vidhātā
dhāmāni veda bhuvanāni viśvā ;*

4. *Tam yo devānām nāmadhā eka
eva tam sampraśnam bhuvanā yantyanā.*

4. *HPIP., pp. 36 & 37.*

about its philosophical significance. As already mentioned, I have discussed the meaning of X, 129, 5 in a separate article, and have considered therein the propriety of the interpretations by various scholars including that by Deussen. Here I propose to consider verses 6 & 7¹ of the hymn and to show that they also represent the same trend of thought with regard to the knowledge of the universe as is to be found in some of the verses of *R̥gveda*, I, 164 and X, 82 referred to above. I shall also try to show that they do not contain a doctrine of scepticism or agnosticism as they have been supposed to do by most of the scholars.²

In these two verses, first a question is asked 'Who verily knows, and who can say whence this creation has come into being? etc., and then follows the answer, supported by a kind of argument, that as all beings, including the gods, came into being after the creation, it is only the creator who could have borne the universe before it was created, and who could

1. *Ko addhā veda ka iha pravocat
kuta ājātā kuta iyam visṛṣṭih,
Arvāg devā asya visarjane-
nātha ko veda yat ābabhūva
Iyam visṛṣṭir yat ababhūva
yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na,
Yo 'syādhyakṣaḥ parame vyomant
so aṅga veda yadi vā na veda.*

2. Barua, *HPIP.*, p. 16 ; Ranade, *CSUP.*, p. 3 ; Keith, *RPV.*, p. 435.

know how it was created.¹ It will appear that these two verses also provide an answer to the questions contained in *R̥gveda*, I, 164, 4. In X, 129, 4 it is stated that the sages found the bond of being (*sat*—the manifested universe) in non-being (*asat*—the unmanifested universe) by means of reflection.²

Now a careful study of the verses considered above

1. *Yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na ; so aṅga veda yadi vā na veda*
—These two clauses do not express doubt or ignorance, but mean, and that quite in accordance with idiom, that it is only He who bore it, and no body else, and it is only He who knows it, and no body else respectively. Those who translated them more or less as Griffith does viz., 'whether he formed it all, or did not form it,' and 'He verily knows it, or perhaps, He knows not,' are naturally apt to regard the verse as one expressive of doubt. But there is no evidence to show that in this hymn, or in any other cosmogonic hymns of the *R̥gveda*, or even later, there is ever expressed a doubt with regard to the divine origin of the universe and the omniscience of God. Prof. Keith, who also thinks that these verses are expressive of doubt, has a significant remark to make, which will support the view expressed here. Speaking about X, 129 he says : 'While much of its content is repeated in the latter philosophy, its spirit of doubt is wholly alien to the classical philosophical systems of India' (*RPV.*, II, 435). The fact is, as I have tried to show, that there is no spirit of doubt in this hymn. (Also compare Sāyaṇa's interpretation of the verse which agrees with that of mine).
2. *Sato bandhum asati niravindan hṛdi pratiṣyā kavayo manīṣyā.*

will show that consistently with the cosmogonic nature of the hymns to which they belong they raise questions about the nature of the universe, and then try to answer them. The answer mainly consists in asserting that as the creation of the universe took place at a time when neither men nor gods had come into existence, it is only the creator who knows about it ; and it is only from him, that is to say, by means of divine testimony, that we can expect to have knowledge of it. In X, 129, 4 there is just a mention of the fact that the sages understood the cause of the universe by means of reflection, which appears, in this apparently late hymn, to have been regarded by its author as another means of knowing about things which are remote. The view that the verses I, 164, 4 & 37 ; and X, 129, 6 & 7 contain the doctrine of scepticism is evidently based upon the superficial consideration that they contain questions about the nature of the universe and sometimes a confession of ignorance on the part of the author. But simply to raise questions, or to confess ignorance, about something which is beyond the range of the senses, e. g., the origin of the universe, is not scepticism or agnosticism.

**(ii) Conception of Mind as a Psychical
Faculty in the Vājasaneyā-saṃhitā
XXX-IV, 1-6.**

The development of psychological notions which, in course of time, led to the formulation of epistemological ideas, is traceable through the conception of

mind (*manas*) in the early literature. In the *R̥gveda* for example, in X, 129, 4 we read of mind as the cosmical principle of which desire is said to be the creative energy¹. In the six verses of the *Vājasaneyasamhitā* which I propose to consider here, mind appears as a distinctly psychical faculty. They contain, although in the form of a hymn, the most remarkable description of mind that I know of in the whole of the Vedic literature, and it is strange that they have remained unnoticed so far by scholars².

The text of the verses with an English translation is as follows :—

*Yaj jāgrato dūram udaiti
daivam tadu suptasya tathaiivaiti
Dūraṅgamam jyotiṣām jyotir ekam
tanme manaḥ śiva-samkalpam astu—1*

May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve, which is divine ; which goes out afar when I am awake, and which similarly comes back when I am asleep; that which goes far and wide, and is the light of lights.³ 1

1. *Kāmas tad agre samavartatādhi maaso retah prathamam yad āsīt.*

2. It was only a few years back that I, while collecting material for this work, noticed them and submitted a paper on their significance to the All-India Phil. Congress, Bombay, 1927.

3. The six verses discussed here have also been supposed to be a part of what Scheftelowitz has called the *Śiva-samkalpa Upaniṣad*, in which there are altogether 28 verses. As he also admits, the remaining other verses of the

*Yena karmāṇy apaso manīṣiṇo
 yajñe krṇvanti vidatheṣu dhīrāḥ,
 Yad apurvam yakṣam antaḥ prajā-
 nām tan me manaḥ śivasamkalpam astu.-2*

May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve with the aid of which wise and brave men diligently occupied perform their duties pertaining to sacrifice and war¹; that which is a unique sacred thing in the heart of beings. 2

*Yat prajñānam uta ceto dhṛtiśca
 yajjyotyir antar amṛtam prajāsu,
 yasmān na rte kimcana karma
 kriyate tan me manaḥ śivasamkalpam astu-3*

May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve,

Upaniṣad are of a different nature, and evidently a later addition (ZDMG., 1921, p. 201) It may be pointed out that the interpretation of *manas* as spirit by Scheftelowitz is rendered improbable by the fact that in this verse *manas* is described as going out during wakefulness and coming back during sleep, which could not be true of spirit. The further description of *manas* as given in the other verses also applies more appropriately to a psychological faculty than to a spiritual substance. These verses have also been translated and discussed by Weber in *Ind. Stud.* II, p. 51 ff.

1. *Vidatheṣu* may mean either 'in assemblies' or 'in wars', but the use of the word *dhīrāḥ*, which I think is used in the sense of 'brave' here, suggests that the latter meaning is more appropriate. To take '*dhīrāḥ*' in the sense of

which is intelligence, feeling¹ and resolution—the eternal light in the heart of all beings; that without which nothing can be accomplished.—3

*Yenedam bhūtam bhuvanam bhaviṣyat
parigrhītam amṛtena sarvam,
Yena yajñas tāyate sapta-hotā
tan me manaḥ śiva-samkalpam astu.—4*

May that mind be of auspicious resolve, which, being immortal, holds the past, the present and the future all together : that with the aid of which that sacrifice is performed in which seven persons take part.—4

Yasmin ṛcaḥ sāma yajumṣi yasmin

‘wise men’ would not be so happy, as the word *manīṣiṇo* has also been used in the same sense. Similarly *yakṣam* in the sense of ‘sacred’ or ‘wonderful’ suits the context better than in the sense of ‘spirit’ which, as I have already pointed out, is not meant to be described in these verses. (See Hillebrandt’s *Vedisch Yakṣa*, Festabe Richard Von Garbe, pp. 17-23 ; also Hertel’s *Die Arische Feuerlehre*, I).

1. In this verse the only word about the meaning of which there may be a difference of opinion is ‘*cetaḥ*’. It has been usually translated by some word or other which means ‘consciousness’ *Cetayati samyag jñāpayati tac cetaḥ*—explains Mahidhara. Griffith translates it ‘intellect’. I have translated it ‘feeling’, for the word is frequently used to signify the emotional aspect of consciousness, and here this meaning quite fits in with the context, where knowing and willing are already signified by ‘*prajñānam*’ and ‘*dhṛtiḥ*’.

pratiṣṭhitāḥ ratha-nabhāvivārāḥ
Yasminś cittam sarvām otam prajā-
nām tanme manaḥ śiva-samkalpam astu—5

May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve, in which the *R̥g*, the *Sāma*, and the *Yajur Vedas* are stuck up like spokes in the nave of a chariot, and in which the entire consciousness (thoughts) of beings is held together.—5

Suśārathir aśvān iva yan manuṣ-
yān nenīyate bhiṣubhir vājina iva,
Hṛtpratiṣṭham yad ajiram javiṣṭham
tan me manaḥ śiva-samkalpam astu.—6

May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve, which leads and controls men, just as a good charioteer does the horses with his reins ; that which residing in the heart of men is the swiftest, and free from decay.—6

A study of the above verses will show that in them all the essential characteristics of mind have been mentioned in one place, as if in a discourse on mental functions. Here mind appears as an entirely psychical faculty and the epistemological subject. It neither takes the place of soul or spirit, nor is it regarded as a mere physical sense-organ like the other sense-organs. It is one whole psychical unity with all the characteristics of the subject as the knower in relation to the object as the known. In the first place, it is described as 'that which goes out afar', and as the swiftest¹, the implication being that like the sense-

1. Verse, I above ;

organs it is unhampered in its activities by the limitations of time and space. In the second place, it is said to be intelligence, feeling and resolution¹, which correspond to the tripartite division of mental life. This description given in the third verse is distinctly borne out by what is said in the other five. For example, in the first verse, mind is spoken of as 'the light of all lights', that is to say, that which illuminates the sense-cognitions.² The same cognitive aspect of mental life is beautifully described in the fourth and the fifth verses, where mind is called the abiding and the unifying principle of knowledge—that which being eternal holds the past, the present, and the future, all together ; and 'that in which the *R̥g*, the *Sāma*, and the *Yajur* hymns are stuck up like spokes in the nave of a chariot, and in which the entire consciousness of being is held together.' The sixth verse brings out the volitional aspect of mind ;— 'that which leads and controls men as a good charioteer does the horses with the reins.'³ Similarly, in the second and the third verses: 'that

1 Verse, 3 above.

2. Cf. Mahīdharaś commentary : '*Yac ca mano jyotiṣām prakāśakānām śrotrādīndriyāṇām ekam eva jyotiḥ prakāśakam pravartakam ityārthaḥ*'. In later philosophical literature this quality of illuminating the senses is attributed to self or spirit.

3. This simile of the charioteer, the chariot, the reins, and the horses became very popular in later literature, e. g. *Kaṭha*. 1, 3, 3-4.

with the aid of which constant and wise men perform their duties pertaining to sacrifice and war' ; and 'that without which nothing can be accomplished'. Then at the end of each verse there is the prayer that the mind be of auspicious resolve.

Thus as we pass from the *R̥gveda*, X, 129, which I discussed in the last section, to this part of the hymn in the *Vājasaneyā-samhitā*, we find that notions about mind as a psychical faculty are assuming a systematic definiteness and its functions as such are classified under certain broad heads. It is interesting to see that Mahīdhara, while commenting on these verses, distinctly treats *manas* as a psychical faculty and not as spirit or soul.¹

The Beginnings of the Upaniṣadic Doctrine of Self and the Conception of Name and Form as Forms of Knowledge in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.

In the *Śatapath Brāhmaṇa*, X, 6, 3,² which is said to embody the views of a sage called Śāṇḍīlya,³ man is spoken of as a being possessed of understanding

1. These verses are frequently used in India as a prayer for the uplift of one's mind.

2. *Atha khalu kratumayo 'yam puruṣaḥ.....ha smāha Śāṇḍīlya evam etad iti.*

3. Śāṇḍīlya is a familiar name, after which we hear of *Śāṇḍīlya-vidyā*. This particular passage is repeated in the *Chāndogya*, III, 14, 4 with a slight difference in

(*kratumayaḥ*).¹ It is further said that the self, both universal and individual, has intelligence (*manomayaḥ*) and will (*saṃkalpa*). It is the duty of man, as a being possessed of understanding, to meditate upon the nature of self, and see that the individual self is identical with the universal self. One who realises this truth will be free from doubt.² The ideas underlying this teaching are clearly a development of the notions found in the Vedic hymns already referred to, and in their turn they are the precursor of the more elaborate doctrines to be found later on in the *Upaniṣads*. The doctrine of the identity of the individual and the universal self emerges distinctly, and knowledge of the self is declared to be the key to the knowledge of the whole universe. If one knows the self, nothing remains to be known, and consequently, there is no room for doubt. It may be pointed out that this solution of the entire problem of knowledge at one bold

language. *Śāṇḍilya-vidyā* is mentioned in Śamkara's commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*, III, 3, 31. Then we have the *Śāṇḍilya-vidyā*, which goes by the name of the same sage.

1. The word 'kratu' has also been translated as 'will', for example, by Max Müller (*Chānd.* III, 14, *SBE.*), but considering that there is a reference to meditation in the context, to take the word in the sense of understanding, as Eggeling also does, appears to be appropriate.
2. This teaching is also embodied in the *Śāṇḍilya-sūtras*, 31, where in the commentary a reference is made to the passage in the *Chānd.*, III, 14.

stroke in metaphysics is the characteristic feature of all Vedic thought, especially of the *Aranyakas* and the *Upaniṣads*. It implicitly rests upon the ground that from the knowledge of the whole or the universal follows the knowledge of the parts contained in that whole, or of the particulars subsumed under that universal,—upon a kind of deductive inference. And Brahman or self is this whole or the universal. It is thus mainly a kind of metaphysical epistemology that we find in this literature, the psychological analysis being usually vague and unsystematic.

Before I pass on to the next section, I would like to notice briefly another passage in the same *Bṛāhmaṇa* (XI, 2, 3, 1)¹, which is the earliest expression of the doctrine of name (*nāma*) and form (*rūpa*). Later,

1. *Atha brahmaiva parārdham agacchat tat parārdham gatvā aikṣata katham nvimān lokān pratyaveyam iti, tad dvābhyām eva pratyavaid rūpeṇa caiva nāmnā ca sa yasya kasya nāmasti tan nāma, yasyāpi nāma na asti yad veda rūpeṇa idam rūpam iti tad rūpeṇa etavād vā idam yāvad rūpam caiva nāma ca. Ye haite brahmaṇo mahatī abhve, sa yo haite brahmaṇo mahatī abhve veda mahad dhaivābhvam bhavati.*

Here I may make a few observations on the translation of certain words in the text, for there appears to be a difference of opinion about their meaning. The first of these is *pratyaveyam* with its another form *pratyavaid*. Eggeling translates the clauses containing these words in the above passage thus : 'How can I descend again into these worlds? It then descended again by means of these two : Form and Name', *SBE.*, Vol., XLIV, pp.

it is mentioned in some of the *Upaniṣads*, and figures conspicuously in Vedāntic thought. The passage when divested of its allegorical part, contains the following statements :—

27, 28 ; italics are mine). It will appear that this rendering is altogether inappropriate here ; for, in the first place, the phrase *imān lokān*—to those worlds, clearly refers to the *parārdha* where Brahman is said to have repaired, and there would be no sense in the question ; ‘How can I *descend again* into these worlds ?’, and in the report that he descended again, when Brahman is said to be already present in those regions ; and, in the second place, the idea of descending by means of form and name is altogether unintelligible. Perhaps a more acceptable, although incorrect, translation is by Muir : How can I pervade all these worlds ? He then pervaded them with two things:—with form and with name (OST., Vol., V, p. 388). But the sense of pervasion does not fit in with the general context of the passage which is distinctly psychological. Sāyaṇa is much nearer to the sense when he explains *pratyaveyam* as *pratyekam prāpnuyām*—how shall I *attain* each of them. It will appear, however, that the most suitable rendering of the phrases will be : How can I *know* each of these worlds ? He then knew them with these two : with form and with name. The root ‘i’ (*iṇ*) with the prefix ‘ava’ means ‘to know’, and the further prefix ‘prati’ makes the sense distributive. In a parallel passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (1, 4, 7) the world is spoken of as *avyākṛtam*—undifferentiated in the beginning, and then, it is said, that it is differentiated by the name and form—*tan nāma-rūpābhyām vyākriyate*. The same or similar, is the sense of the words ‘*pratyakeyam*’ and ‘*pratyavaid*’ in the passage of the *Śatapatha*.

(i) That every object is known either by its form, or name, or both.

(ii) That what may not be known by name, is known by its form.

(iii) That objects having name must also have form, but not *vice versa* ; and hence form is more important for knowledge than name.

(iv) That form is something which belongs to mind ; for it is by mind that one knows the form, and therefore, in a sense, mind itself is form.

(v) That name is something which belongs to speech ; for it is by speech that one utters a name ; and therefore, in a sense, speech itself is name.¹

(vi) That the whole universe is co-extensive with these two universal principles of form and name ; and he who understands these attains a comprehensive and universal knowledge of the universe, and acquires a very superior personal merit.²

The above is a fairly close analysis of the original passage, which, unless the language and the thought contained in it be regarded as a matter of happy chance, certainly appears to be of some philosophical merit. It is like an oasis in the arid deserts of the Brāhmaṇic literature, and an oasis, although rare,

1. *etad vai idam sarvam yavad rūpam caiva nāma ca.*

2. *sa yo ha ete brahmaṇo mahatī abhve veda mahad ha eva abhvam bhavati...*

is not an impossibility after all. The cognition of things by name and form, the superior importance of form ; the relation of form to mind, and apparently a recognition of these two as general principles of the universe and knowledge—all these indicate an acute power of analysis.

The doctrine of name and form, as has already been mentioned, is found in a number of *Upaniṣads*, and also in Buddhism. The one common idea underlying the various statements of the doctrine is that name and form constitute the principle of individuality. It is by its name and form that one individual is distinguished from another. According to those who hold the doctrine of absolute existence, the individuals lose their name and form as soon as they are merged in the absolute ; for instance, in *Brahman* :

*Yathā nadyāḥ syandamānāḥ samudre
'stam gacchanti nāmarupe vihāya,
Tathā vidvān nāma-rupād vimuktaḥ
parāt param puruṣam upaiti divyam.*

(*Mundaka*. III, 2, 8)

Just as the rivers flowing down merge in the sea having given up their name and form, so does a wise man attain the highest celestial being having become free from name and form.

In the *Upaniṣads* and Buddhism, however, the doctrine of name and form appears more as a metaphysical principle of individuality than as the epistemolo-

gical category of experience. In Buddhism *nāma-rupa* usually signifies mind-and-body.¹

(iv) Further Advance in Psychological Analysis, and the Doctrine of Mind dependent Reality in the Aitareya Āranyaka.

In the second chapter of the *Aitareya Āranyaka* we find a further advance in psychological analysis, and also a clear enunciation of an idealistic doctrine, according to which all reality is mind dependent ; in fact it is knowledge itself. A distinction is drawn between self as the real knower and mind as simply a sense-organ. The various mental states pertaining to knowing, feeling and willing are mentioned. Further the cognitive act is analysed into the knower, (*prajñā*), the intellect (*prajñā*), and cognition (*prajñāna*) including the object cognised. It is also maintained that all reality exists only in so far as it is known, and hence it is mind-dependent-*prajñā-netram prajñāne-pratiṣṭhitam*. The views expressed here have been attributed to Mahīdāsa Aitareya, who is supposed to be either the author or the compiler of the *Āranyaka*.²

In II, 3, 2, it is explained how the self of man is more developed in respect of understanding and

1. Cf. *Compendium of Philosophy (Abhidhammathasangaha)*. pp. 271-272.

2. See Keith's *Introduction to Aitareya Āranyaka*, pp. 15-26. According to him, the date of the *Second Āranyaka* must be somewhere about 600 B. C.

knowledge than that of other beings. 'The self is more developed in man,' says the author of the *Araṇyaka*, 'for he is most endowed with knowledge (*prajñānena sampannatamaḥ*). He says what he has known ; he knows tomorrow ; he knows the world and the non-world ; he desires the immortal by means of the mortal, being thus gifted. As for the other animals, their experience is confined to (the objects of) hunger and thirst. They do not speak out what they know, they do not know tomorrow : they know not the world and the non-world'.

Then the nature of the knowledge (*prajñāna*) is further described in II, 6. 'What is that self which is the object of our meditation ? Which is the self ? (It is) that by which one sees, by which one hears, by which one smells scents, by which one speaks, by which one discriminates between the tasteful and the tasteless. That which is the heart and the mind ; awareness (*saṃjñā*), comprehension (*ājñānam*), understanding (*viññānam*), knowledge (*prajñānam*), retentiveness (*medhā*), insight (*dṛṣṭiḥ*), resolution (*dhṛtiḥ*), opinion (*matiḥ*), memory (*smṛtiḥ*), reflection (*manīṣā*,

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1. *Sa hi, prajñānena sampannatamo viññātam vadati, viññātam paśyati, veda svastanam, veda lokālokān, martyeṇāmṛtam īpsaty evam sampannaḥ. Athetareṣāṃ paśūnām āśana-pipāse evābhiviññanām, na viññātam vadanti na viññātam paśyanti, na viduḥ svastanam na lokālokān ta etāvanto bhavanti yathā-prajñānam hi sambhavaḥ.*

impulse (*jūtiḥ*), will (*saṃkalpaḥ*), purpose (*kratuḥ*), life (*asuḥ*), desire (*kāmaḥ*), control (*vaśaḥ*), all these being the names of knowledge (*prājñāna*)'. Having thus described the psychical aspects of the self, the author proceeds to show the identity of the self and the universe, and declares that all reality depends upon knowledge. "That (self) is Brahman, Indra, Prajapati, all the gods, these five great elements: earth, air, ether, water, lights (fire); these and other small ones of a mixed nature, seeds of various kinds, those born of eggs, born from perspiration (heat), those germinated out of the ground, horses, cows, men, elephants, and all that breathes, whether it walks or flies, and that which moves not, all that is known by the intellect (*prajñā*); it is contained in knowledge (*prajñāna*); the world depends upon the intellect; is its seat or substratum (*pratiṣṭhā*); and knowledge is Brahman."¹

Commenting upon the above Professor Keith says: 'The question is whether this justifies an attribution to the author of the doctrine that knowledge alone exists. It is quite open to argue that we are only given the doctrine that the world is guided by knowledge, which leaves us with a final dualism. I think probably the author went further and intended to assert the origin of all from knowledge, cf. II, 4. If

1. While translating this passage I have had Keith's translation before me, but it will be found that I have differed from him in translating a number of terms. It is unnecessary to discuss at length the propriety of the various

so, he represents exactly the later *Bhāgavata* view, perhaps that of Bādarāyaṇa, of the nature of reality. The self, or god, is conceived as creating the material world as a reality, but the exact nature of the creation is left vague. The relation of *brahman* and *ātman* is likewise left vague, a mere identification such as may have been meant being of little value."¹ Elsewhere,² referring to the *Aitareya Aranyaka*, II, 1, 3 and II, 4, 6, he says: 'The doctrine of both *Upaniṣads* is purely pantheistic or cosmogonic (it is not possible, we consider, to separate these ideas in these early *Upaniṣads*).....To a Pantheist the world is the revelation of the divinity, to the Idealist it is the cloud which hides it. Indian Philosophy is not absolutely dominated by Idealism.'

Without at first giving any technical name to the

renderings, for the differences do not matter much so far as the general sense of the passage as a whole is concerned. I may simply say that in the last part of the sentence, I have treated *prajñā* and *prajnāna* as distinct from each other in sense, and have translated them as 'intellect' and 'knowledge' respectively. For the same reason, I have consistently translated '*prajñāna*' as 'knowledge' throughout the passage. Also cf. Ranade, *CSUP.*, p. 118.

1. The *Aitareya Aranyaka*, English Translation, p. 236.
2. *JRAS.*, 1906, p., 493; the reference to p., 590 of the same in Keith's *Aitareya Aranyaka*, p. 236 must be a misprint for p. 490.

philosophical views expressed in these passages, let us analyse their contents and see what conclusions we can draw from them with regard to the nature of reality and its knowledge. The following statements have been made :—

That self (*ātman*) is the knower ; it is the heart and the mind with all the psychical aspects or processes which can be attributed to them. (II, 3, 2 ; II 6 ; III, 2, 4).

Further, as the pure knower, It is not the object of knowledge,—*sa yo 'to 'śruto 'gato 'mato 'nato, 'dr̥ṣṭo 'vijñāto 'nādiṣṭah'*—that which is not heard, not reached, not thought, not subdued, not seen, not known, not defined (III, 2, 4).

That all the mental processes are only so many names of knowledge (*prajñāna*)—*sarvāny evaitāni prajñānasya nāmadheyāni bhavanti* (II, 6)

That the self is the whole created universe in all its forms,—from the gods down to inorganic things—*eṣa brahmaiṣa Indra eṣa prajāpatih*, etc. (II, 6).

That the whole created universe is known by the intellect (*prajñā*), and is established in knowledge (*prajñāna*)—*tat prajñā-netram prajñāne pratiṣṭhitam*' (II, 6).

That knowledge is Brahman, or *vice versa*,—*prajñānam brahma* (II, 6).

From the above statements, which are simply an analysis of the original texts, it is evident that accord-

ing to the author of the *Aranyaka*, all reality is knowledge. This he has said so often and in so many ways. Further, it is knowledge in the sense that it consists of either the knower, which is the self, or the psychical processes involved in knowing, or the objects known. In other words, all reality must be a reality in experience, and as a part of experience. This experiential character (if I may be allowed to use that word, for 'empirical' would not be correct) of reality, however, does not mean that reality, as we have it in the world of experience, has no objective existence. It is also plain that it is the self, which appears as the subject (*prajñā*), as the faculties of knowing, and also as the objects known ; and it is left open to regard it as something more and above these aspects of reality. It is a kind of cosmogonic pantheism that we have in the *Aranyaka*,—a pantheism which has not yet quite detached itself from the Vedic cosmogonic theism and is just on the border of a full-fledged idealism. It clearly recognises the mind-dependence of reality, and this recognition by itself, on its part, brings it quite within the class of idealism¹. It is an idealistic pantheism, so to say.

What is significant and epistemologically impor-

1, It need not be pointed out that there are various shades of idealism. The doctrine of mind-dependent reality is, however, an essential character of all idealism and a definite sign of it. Cf. Ranade, *CSUP.*, pp. 119-20, where he also compares this doctrine of the *Aranyaka* with that of Berkeley.

tant to note is that in this *Āraṇyaka* the whole experience—the subject, the process of cognition, and the object, is explained in terms of knowledge, and knowledge only, and thus one of the greatest difficulties of epistemology, viz., that of reconciling the disparity between the subject and the object does not arise at all. There is no trace of an antithesis between *ātman* (self) on the one hand, and *prakṛti* (matter) on the other. Thus we have in the *Āraṇyaka* notions of epistemology which are based upon a consistent metaphysics. But what proof is there to show that the metaphysical assumptions are correct? The only answer is that there is none except the testimony of the scriptures, or the revelation. However, an account of the epistemological position of the *Āraṇyaka* would be incomplete, if it were not mentioned again that, according to him, human reason has the power of not only remembering the past, but also of looking into the future, of penetrating into that which is not immediately present to the senses. In other words, besides perception, reasoning and inference seem to be recognised as means of knowledge.

(v) The Development of the Doctrine of Illusory Existence and the Notions of Knowledge (*vidyā*) and Ignorance (*avidyā*) in the Brhadaranyaka and the other *Ūpaniṣads*.

The doctrine of the identity of self and the universe which we found to be emerging gradually

through the texts of the *Śatapatha* and the *Aitareya Āranyaka* was bound to result, as it actually did, in the doctrine that the world of experience is illusory. For if self is the only reality, this apparent plurality and its materialistic appearances must be false. Such is the view of most of the *Upaniṣads*, and we find it enunciated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* by Yājñavalkya, a teacher of considerable reputation. Closely connected with this theory of illusory existence is that of knowledge and ignorance expressed by the terms *vidyā avidyā*¹ which appear conspicuously later on not only in the *Vedānta* but also in the other schools. It will be found, as we come across these terms in the later literature, that they have been both used for 'knowledge' and 'ignorance' as understood in the *Upaniṣads* and the *Vedānta*, and 'truth' and 'error', as used in the ordinary epistemological sense in the other schools.

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* II, 4 there is a dialogue between Yājñavalkya and his wife Maitreyī, in which the self is described much in the same way as in the *Aitareya Aranyaka*; that is to say, as that which is the cosmic principle of the universe, and by knowing which everything else in the world becomes known. 'It is the self, which ought to be seen, heard, thought (*mantavyaḥ*) and meditated upon (*nididhyāsitaḥ*); for it is by seeing, hearing, thinking, and understand-

1. *Isāvāsya*, 9, 10, 15; *Chānd.* I. 1. 10; *Bṛhad*, 4, 3, 20; 4. 3, 10; *Kaṭha*, 2. 4, 5; *Śvet.* 5. 1; etc.

ing the self that all this (world) is known, says *Yājñavalkya*¹. In the same dialogue the self is also described as the source of all knowledge and literature. It is said that all the *Vedas*, the legends (*itihāsa*); the *purāṇas*, the sciences, the *Upaniṣads*, poetry, aphorisms, comments and commentaries, have been breathed forth from that great being (the self)—‘*Atya mahato bhutasya niśvasitam etad*’². As the knower, the self is described as that which can never become an object of knowledge—‘whereby would one know that by which all this is known? Whereby would one know that which is the knower?’³

The unity of all reality as of the nature of the self is declared in a dialogue between *Yājñavalkya* and the philosopher king *Janaka*. ‘By the mind only is it (the self) to the perceived. There is no plurality here. One who perceives this as diverse gets one death after another. This unknowable enduring being should be perceived as one; this unborn, great and enduring self, which is spotless and beyond space. It is by knowing it alone, that a wise *Brāhmaṇa* should seek enlightenment. He should not devote himself to many words,⁴ for that is only a weariness of

1. *Bṛhad.* II. 4. 5 ; (cf. *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, II. 6 ; *Chānd.*, VI. 12, *Taitt.* II. 1. 98 ; II. 6 ; *Mund.* I. 1. 6).

2. *Ibid.* II. 4. 10.

3. *Ibid.* II. 4. 14.

4. The meaning seems to be that for enlightenment study is

speech.”

In another dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Gārgī² the categories of time and space, along with the self as the ultimate category, have been recognised ‘O, Yājñavalkya,’ asks Gārgī, ‘that which is above the sky, that which is between the two, the sky and the earth, these which the people call the past, the present, and the future,—across what is that woven warp and woof?’ And Yājñavalkya says in answer that it is space across which all this is woven wrap and woof; and on being asked further as to across what space is woven in its turn, he says that it is woven across the imperishable—(*Akṣara*).³

The above quotations represent the general trend of the Upaniṣadic thought as regards knowledge and reality. The chief remarkable point is the conception of self as the knower,—the epistemological subject, which never becomes an object, and which is

not of much use, which idea was not uncommon with those who laid stress upon meditation, cf. *Rgveda* I. 164 39, *Yastanna veda kimṛcā kariṣyati* ; also, *Chānd.* III. 18. 1 ; VII, 16, 17, *Kaṭha*, I, 2-22; I. 3-12. *Muṇḍ.* I. 13, 1, 4, 5 ; *Śvet.* I. 10 ; *Prasna*, I. 16 ; VI. 5.

1. *Bṛhad.* IV. 19-21.

2. *Ibid.* III. 8.

3. Adopted from my article in *JRAS*, July, 1929, pp. 595-96.

endowed with all the psychical faculties usually attributed to mind in modern psychology. Mind, in most of the *Upaniṣads*, as also later on, comes to be regarded as simply a physical sense-organ possessed of the power of thinking, and depending for its quality and efficiency upon food.¹ In some texts, however, it has been identified with Brahman or reality.² Self is to be known by meditation, which usually signifies both reflection and mystic concentration. Knowledge of the real nature of self is true knowledge (*vidyā*); to take its appearance in the form of the created universe for reality is ignorance (*avidyā*). The doctrine of appearance and reality is thus positively found in most of the *Upaniṣads*.³ However, it is to be noted that this doctrine of appearance and reality, and that of the allied theory of knowledge and ignorance as found in the *Upaniṣads*, although identical with that in the *Vedānta*, is different from that to be met with in the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools, for it does not refer to the ordinary cognitions of individual things like a man or a post, but to the knowledge of the universe as a whole. But, as will be seen in the sequel, the theory of truth and error as found in the Philosophical Sūtras was not altogether uninfluenced by this conception of knowledge and ignorance as found in the *Upaniṣads*. In fact, so far as one can

1. *Chānd*, VI. 5. i, vi, 5. 4 ; vi. 6, 1 and 2 ; VII, 26, 2.

2. *Chānd*. III. 18. 1 ; VII. 3. 1.

3. E. G., *Chānd*. V. I. 2-7.

see, it was this very conception which developed later into the epistemological notions of truth and error. One indication of this is to be found in the fact that the same Upaniṣadic terms, *xiz.*, *vidyā* and *avidyā* continued to be used in order to express truth and error in the *Sūtras*. In some of the comparatively later *Upaniṣads*, for instance, in the *Maitrī*¹, the use of such terms as *pramāṇa* *prameya* and *anumiti* is to be found.²

2. THE PRAJÑĀ-PĀRAMITĀ LITERATURE. The Doctrine of Voidness (*śūnyatā*) and the Denial of Knowledge in the *Prajñāpāramitās*.

Although the various texts constituting the *Pāramitā* literature belong to an altogether different school, from the point of view of both the style and the essentials of their doctrine they may be truly called the *Upaniṣads* of Buddhism. They form the basis of the

1. VI. 14, '*na vinā pramāṇena prameyasya upalabdhiḥ*

VI. 1. '*Bahirātmakṛyā gatyāntarātmano 'numīyate gatiḥ*'.

2. In order to avoid unnecessary repetitions, I have thought it fit, so far as the subject of this thesis is concerned, to take Aitareya and Yajñavalkya as the representative philosophers of the Upaniṣadic period. References to important parallel passages in the other *Upaniṣads* have, however, been given in the foot-notes. That some of the *Upaniṣads* differ from one another in their metaphysical doctrines I duly recognise, but so far as psychological analysis or epistemological notions are concerned, they are much the same in all of them.

Madhyamika-kārikās of Nāgārjuna, and should serve as a useful introduction to the philosophy of that work, which has been variously understood and described by scholars as nihilism, negativism, relativity, and so on. The main doctrine of the *Pāramitās*, as also of Nāgārjuna's *Kārikā*, is voidness (*śūnyatā*), which, I shall try to show, is not a theory of negation or nihilism, but one of absolute existence, very much corresponding to the Brahman doctrine of the *Upaniṣads*. The same earlier affinity between the *Upaniṣads* and the *Pāramitās* should explain the later similarity between the *Vedānta* and the *Madhyamika* School of Buddhism. In fact, the Vedāntists, especially of the school of Gauḍapāda, have been called Buddhists in disguise (*pracchanna bauddāḥ*) by the followers of the other Hindu schools. But it will appear from a careful comparative study of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Pāramitās*, that evidently the authors of the latter had followed the *Upaniṣads* both in style and thought with such modifications as were necessary to make their works conform to the essentials of the Buddhist doctrine. For instance, while describing the ultimate reality as an absolute existence, mostly in the *Upaniṣadic* sense, they only excluded the conception of self, because that would have been inconsistent with the Buddhist doctrine. Similarly, it will appear that later on Gauḍapāda's position was much the same as that of Nāgārjuna with the exception that while Nāgārjuna described the absolute existence as voidness, Gauḍapāda called it self or Brahman.

Consistently with their doctrine that the whole world of experience is unreal, or rather illusory, the *Prajñāpāramitās* hold that no real knowledge is possible; which theory was more elaborately worked out, later on, by Nāgārjuna by showing that all notions about the world of experience were either relative or contradictory, and hence devoid of truth.

One of the important works of the *Pāramitā* literature is the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*. The first chapter of this treatise deals with the 'knowledge of all forms'—*sarvākārajñatā*, and it is maintained that consciousness (*citta*), the various *skandhas*, signs (*lakṣaṇa*), and the objects signified (*lakṣya*)—are all unreal, literally, devoid of the forms and characteristics which they seem to possess. In a dialogue between Sāriputra and Subhūti, the nature of consciousness is discussed, and following a statement on the part of Subhūti that consciousness is non-consciousness, and that its nature is illumination (*prakṛitis cittasya prabhāsvarā*), Sāriputra asks Subhūti to explain further what he means by consciousness, which, according to him, is non-consciousness. Subhūti, having first elicited from Sāriputra the assertion that the quality of non-consciousness (*acittatā*) does not admit of the predication of being (*astitā*), says that it is something which does not admit of any modification (*avikārā*) or variation (*avikalpā*).¹ In another portion of the dialogue it is main-

1. *Aṣṭa*, pp. 5 and 6.

tained that the various skandhas¹ viz., *rūpa* (form and substance), *vedanā* (feeling), *saṃjñā* (cognition), *saṃskāra* (disposition), and *viññāna* (knowledge) are devoid of their respective natures. Similarly perfection of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*), omniscience (*sarvajñatā*), signs (*lakṣaṇa*) and the things signified (*lakṣya*) are also devoid of their respective natures. And, to make the doctrine complete, it is maintained lastly that the nature of things is itself devoid of its own nature—*svabhāvalakṣaṇenāpi svabhāvo vivahitaḥ*.²

In Chapter, XIII (*Acintyā-parivarta*) dealing with the 'inconceivable', the Lord says that all substances (*sarvadharmāḥ*) are inconceivable (*acintyāḥ*), incomparable (*atulyāḥ*); such as cannot be counted (*asaṃkhyeyāḥ*), and devoid of inequality or equality (*asama-samāḥ*). Then by way of an explanation it is asserted that they are inconceivable, because the intellect cannot get at them (*cittoparamatvāt*); they cannot be compared, because they are beyond comparison (*tulanā-samatikrāntatvāt*); and they cannot be measured, and do not admit of counting and the distinctions of equality and inequality, because they are beyond measuring, counting and comparing.

1. A rendering of the names of the *Skandhas* into English always presents a difficulty, for they are used in various senses. Some of these have been noticed by Dr. E. J. Thomas in his *The Life of Buddha as Legend & History*, pp. 194-95.

2. *Aṣṭa.*, p. 10.

The doctrines of suchness (*tathatā*) and voidness (*śūnyatā*) are expounded in Chapters XVI and XVIII respectively, and in spite of the paradoxical nature of the language, it is clear they represent a philosophy of absolute existence. Subhūti first asserts that the 'suchness', which really means the 'in-itselfness' of a thing, of the Tathāgata and his own are the same, and then goes on to say that the 'suchness' of all substances is the same as that of the Tathāgata ; and, is, therefore, like that of his, beyond all change and variation, and also all-pervading.¹ The identity of all 'suchness' is asserted in the most unequivocal terms when it is said that : that which is the suchness of the Tathāgata ; and that which is the suchness of all the substances—these are one and the same suchness (*ekaivaiṣā-tathatā*) which is non-dual (*advayā*), non-distinguishable as two (*advyaīdhikārā*), not a suchness (*advaya-tathatā*); that suchness is not to be found anywhere (*na kuvacit tathatā*) ; it is not from anywhere (*na kutaścit tathatā*), and it does not belong to anyone (*na kaśvacit tathatā*).¹

The doctrine of voidness is allied to that of suchness. It is dealt with in Chapter XVIII. In response to a request made by Subhūti to explain to him the

1. Aṣṭa., p. 307, 'Yathāca tathāgata-tathatā 'vikārā, nirvikārā, avikalpā, nirvikalpā, na kuvacit pratihanyate, evam sarvadharmā-tathatā avikalpā, nirvikāra, avikalpā, nirvikalpā, na kuvacit pratihanyate.

2. Aṣṭa, p. 307.

profound doctrine, the Lord said that the profound (*gambhīram*) and voidness were identical, and that whatever was without sign (*animitta*), unthought (*apraṇihita*), devoid of dispositions (*anabhisamskāra*), unproduced (*anutpāda*), without birth (*ajātiḥ*) ; non-existent (*abhāva*); free from attachment (*virāga*), of the nature of restraint, (*nirodha*), cessation (*nirvāṇa*). and the ultimate (*vigama*) all that is the same as the profound. This profoundness, the Lord said, belongs to all things including the *skandhas*, and it appears from his description that it is the same as the suchness and voidness of things. For, he said 'with regard to these, O, Subhūti, according as there is the suchness of *rūpa*, (*rūpa-tathatā*), so is there a profound *rūpa*, according as there is the suchness of *vedanā*. *saṃjñā* and *saṃskāras*, and as Subhūti, there is the suchness of *viññāna*, so is there a profound *viññāna*. O, Subhūti where there is no *rūpa*, that is the profoundness of *rūpa* ; where, Subhūti, there is no *vedanā*, no *saṃjñā*, no *saṃskāra*, no *viññāna*, there is the profoundness of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāras* and *viññāna*. Having heard this discourse, Subhūti says : 'O Lord, it is wonderful that my attention has been turned away from the forms and substances (*rūpataśca nivāritaḥ*) by a subtle method (*sūkṣmeṇopāyena*) and *nirvāṇa* has been taught to me (*nirvāṇam ca sūcitam*). Similarly, my attention has been withdrawn by a subtle method from *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāras* and *viññāna*, and *nirvāṇa* has been taught to me.¹ Another passage, in the same chapter,

1. Aṣṭa., pp. 341-42.

which throws light upon the doctrine of voidness is as follows : 'The Lord said, O, Subhūti, those things which are void are also without destruction (*akṣāyāḥ*); that which is voidness is also immeasurability (*aprameyatā*); therefore, then, O Subhūti, there is not perceived any real distinction or plurality among these. These are mere (distinctions of) words—mere words as spoken by the Tathāgata : (that voidness is) 'that which cannot be measured, that which cannot be counted, that which is without destruction, that which is without cause, that which is beyond thought, etc.'¹ Then it is further asserted that the character of all things is indescribable (*anabhilapyāḥ*) for the voidness of them is indescribable². At the end of the discourse Subhūti asks : 'O Lord, what is this, again, the highest perfect knowledge (*anuttara samyak-sambodhiḥ*) ? ; and the Lord answers ; 'Subhūti, it is this suchness which is the highest perfect knowledge. That suchness neither increases nor decreases'.³

The larger and the smaller *Hṛdaya-Sūtras* and the *Vajra-chedika* are three other treatises of the *Pāramitā* class. The first two appear to be simply an abridgment of the doctrines of such bigger works as the *Aṣṭa-sahasrikā*, and there is nothing new in them. In the *Vajra-chedikā* we come across some remarkable

1. Cf. *Chānd.* vi. 1, 4-6.

2. *Aṣṭa.*, p. 348.

3. *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, pp. 350-51.

passages about the nature of the Tathāgata and his teachings, which distinctly show that the *Pāramitā* philosophy stands for the doctrine of an absolute existence, very similar to that of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Vedānta*. The Tathāgata is said to represent the suchness of things (*bhūta-tathatāyā etad adhivacanam*), the nature of non-productiveness (*anutpāda-dharmatāyāḥ*); the cessation of form and substance (*dharmocchedasya*) and that which is altogether unborn (*atyantānutpannasya*). The Tathāgata is not to be supposed as having gone anywhere, nor as having come from anywhere. Finally it is said that those who think that the Tathāgata can be seen by means of form (*rūpa*), or can be heard by means of sound, are engaged in a futile effort.¹ It will appear that this description of the Tathāgata very nearly approaches the Vedāntic conception of the absolute self.

The following passage is another remarkable expression of a doctrine of absoluteness : — ‘And verily, again, O, Subhūti, the *dharma* which has been discerned, taught and thought out by the Tathāgata, admits neither of truth nor falsehood (*na tatra satyam na mṛṣā*). It is like this, Subhūti, that just as a man immersed in darkness would not see anything, in the same way, should the Bodhisattva, immersed in reality (*vastu-patitaḥ*), be looked upon, as one who gives away alms as one immersed in reality. And, O Subhūti, just as

1. *Vājra-chedikā*. Max Müller's ed. Oxford, XVII, XIX, XXVI.

a man immersed in darkness would not see anything, in the same way, should be Bodhisattva, immersed in reality (*vastu-patitaḥ*), be looked upon, as one who gives away alms as one immersed in reality. And O, Subhūti, just as a man with the eyes would see various kinds of forms on the passing away of night and the rising of the sun, in the same way should the Bodhisattva immersed in non-reality (*avastu-patitaḥ*), be looked upon, as one who gives away alms as one immersed in non-reality.¹ The passage evidently contains the doctrine, according to which, reality-in-itself is an undifferentiated homogeneous absolute, a darkness in which all cows are black, as Hegel puts it, and this experience, according to the *Vajra-chhedikā*, one has when one is actually immersed in reality. The opposite of it is the world of plurality and heterogeneity, and it is so to one who is not immersed in reality. The real world of the wise man is compared to night, and the unreal world of the layman to the state of wakefulness.² That the universe is further regarded as an illusion, a passing phantom, is evident from the last verse of the *Vajra-chhedikā*, which has been translated by Max Müller as follows:--

'Stars, darkness, a lamp, a phantom, dew, a bubble;
A dream, a flash of lightning, and a cloud--thus
We should look upon the world (all that was made)³

1. *Vajra-cched. XIV.*

2. Cf. The *Bhagavadgītā* :

"*Yā nisā sarva-bhūtānām tasyām jāgarti saṁyamī,
Yasyām jāgrati bhūtāni sā nisā paśyato muneḥ*".

3. *Tārakā timiram dīpo māyāvaśyāyabhubudam.*

Now to sum up, it will appear from the various quotations given above that according to the *Prajñāpāramitās*, (i) the suchness of things, that is, their intrinsic character (*tathatā*) is voidness (*śūnyatā*), and hence, all things of the world including consciousness (*citta*) and knowledge are devoid of the nature which they seem to possess (*Aṣṭa* I), (ii) the real nature of things is incomprehensible (*Acintya*) for it is beyond the reach of the intellect (*Aṣṭa*. XIII); (iii) suchness of things is an undifferentiated absolute existence (*Aṣṭa*. XVI); (iv) suchness, voidness and profoundness are indentical, and these constitute true or perfect knowledge, they are also indestructible (*akṣayāḥ*) and immeasurable (*aprameyāḥ*); the same are *nirvāṇa*; everything else is a matter of mere verbal talk (*abhilapyaḥ*) (*Aṣṭa*. XVIII). It must be clear from this description of voidness, suchness, or *nirvāṇa* that they are not the name of non-being but of an absolute ultimate entity, which, in the *Vajra-chchedikā*, has even been identified with the *Tathāgata*, and hence there is no reason to call the philosophy of the *Pāramitās* nihilism or negativism. The doctrine of the illusory nature of the phenomenal world and the consequent denial of knowledge in the *Pāramitās* is essentially the same as the *Māyā* and the *Avidyā* doctrine of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Vedānta*.¹ The former re-

Svapnam ca vidyudabhram ca evam draṣṭavyam saṃskṛtam.

1. It is usually maintained, and to a certain extent rightly too, that the conceptions of *māyā* and *Avidyā*, as found

appears in a developed form in Nāgārjuna, and the latter in Gauḍapāda and Saṃkara.

in the earlier *Upaniṣads*, are different from those found later in Śaṃkara's *Vedānta*, but it has to be remembered that the idea underlying the use of those terms both in the *Upaniṣads* and the later *Vedānta*, viz., the illusory nature of the phenomenal world, is essentially the same. Further in some *Upaniṣads*, which are not very late after all and much prior to Saṃkara. e. g., in the *Śvetāśvatara*, *Māyā* is actually called *prakṛti*, which notion of *Māyā* would distinctly correspond to Śaṃkara's.

In an article on the *Philosophy of the PP.* (JBTS. iv. iii) VB. quotes certain passages which show that according to the *Prajñāpāramitā* the appearance of the phenomenal world is due to a *Māyā* in the sense it is used in the *Upaniṣads*. The lord is said to have cited the example of a magician and to have declared that substances appear to have the various characteristics which they possess because of the character of *Māyā* '*dharmataiṣā sarvadharmāṇām māyādharmatām upādāya*'. Similarly *avidyā* has been described, in the Upanisadic sense, as that cognition which perceives things, which are not existent, as existent—*yathā Śāriputra na samvidyante tathā samvidyante evam avidyamānas tenocyante avidyeti*'. Unfortunately VB. did not say from which *Prajñā-pāramitā* he got these passages, and I have been unable to trace them to their source.

PART III

Epistemology of the Philosophical
Sūtras.

1. INTRODUCTORY

(i) The Philosophical Sūtras

The various shades of philosophical thought found in the early literature assumed definite shape in course of time, and gave rise to a number of schools. The doctrines of most of these were put together in works which have come down to us as the Philosophical Sūtras. Of the Hindu philosophical schools, it will appear that while the *Mīmāṃsā*, the *Vedānta*, the *Sāṃkhya*, and the *Yoga* owe their origin directly to the Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, and the Upaniṣads, the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya*, which represent a different type of thought, had their source in another kind of literature. That the texts of the Vedic literature form the basis of the doctrines of the *Mīmāṃsā*, the *Vedānta*, the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yoga* schools is a fact which now requires no proof. And again, that there is no appreciable basis for the essential tenets of the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya* schools in the Vedic literature is also evident and an admitted fact. This being so, it is only reasonable to expect that the doctrines of the *Mīmāṃsā*, the *Vedānta*, the *Sāṃkhya*, and the *Yoga* schools would have assumed a definite form earlier than those of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools, and that they really did so is evident from frequent mention of these four schools

in the early literature of the post-vedic period, and almost an absence of reference in it to the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools as such. Thus proceeding on the assumption that there was a tendency to put together the doctrines of a school in the form of *Sūtras* as soon as, or within a reasonable period after they had assumed a definite shape one may well expect that the *Sūtras* of the *Mīmāṃsa*, the *Vedānta*, the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yoga* schools would have been compiled first and much about the same period, while those of the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya* schools would have followed later on. This expectation, however, seems to be belied by the fact that the present *Sāṃkhya-sūtras* have been proved to belong to a very late period, as late as the fourteenth century A. D. ; and the *Yoga-sūtras* are now believed by a number of scholars, following Professors Jacobi and Woods, to be as late as the fourth or fifth century A. D. Now, while the gap of an early systematic work on the *Sāṃkhya* is filled up by the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, or it may be explained by surmise that there was an early *Sūtra* work, either a shorter form of the present one or altogether different from it, which is lost, the *Yoga-sūtras* are all that we have as a systematic exposition of the *Yoga* doctrines, and there is no reason to believe that they were preceded by another work of a similar nature. The question, then, is whether the systematization of such an early school of thought as the *Yoga* would have been postponed until as late as the fourth or fifth century A. D.; and until after

the systematization of the doctrines of even the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya schools, which began later on, and the *Sūtras* of which definitely contain a reference to the Yoga doctrines of mystic intuition and concentration.

The arguments adduced for the late date of the *Yoga-sūtras* are mainly those given by Professor Jacobi in his article on the dates of the Philosophical *Sūtras*¹, and these I propose to consider presently.

Professor Jacobi's arguments may be summarized as follows :—

1. A discussion of the Buddhist denial of the external world in YS. iv, 15 f., indicates that these *sūtras* refer to the Buddhist doctrine of *Vijñāna-vāda* and hence Patañjali must be later than the middle of the fifth century A. D.

2. That the Patañjali of the *Yoga-sūtras* is different from the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* bearing the same name, and hence "the only argument for the great antiquity of the *Yoga-sūtras* is fallacious".

3. There are certain doctrines in the YS. which are not countenanced by the Sāṃkhya and the early Yoga, and which hence have been adopted by Patañjali from other systems ; and this fact indicates that the YS. belong to a late period. The doctrines alluded to are explained by Jacobi as follows :—

(a) The doctrine of *sphoṭa* has been adopted from the *Vaiyākaraṇas*; it is expounded in the *Bhāṣya* on YS. iii, 17.

(b) The doctrine of the infinite size of the *antaḥkaraṇa* seems to have been adopted from the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It is given in the *Bhāṣya* on YS. iv, 10, and there ascribed to the "Ācārya".

(c) The atomic theory, which originally belonged to the Vaiśeṣika, is clearly referred to by Patañjali in YS. i, 40 (cf. *Bhāṣya* on iii, 44).

1. *Journal of American Oriental Society*, XXXI, 1911.

(d) The doctrine that time consists of *kṣaṇas*, which was first put forth by the Sautrāntikas, is clearly assumed in iii, 52, though the details are explained in the *Bhāṣya* only.

A CRITICISM OF THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS

The first argument is evidently based upon the assumptions that (a) there is a refutation of *Vijñāna-vāda* in YS. iv, 15 ff; and (b) that it is the *Vijñāna-vāda* of Vasubandhu which is refuted. As regards the first of these it will appear that it is only the *Sūtra*, *na caika-citta-tantram vastu tad aprāmāṇakam tadā kim syāt* which lends support to the view that *Vijñāna-vāda* is refuted. There is nothing either in the preceeding *sūtra* or the following one to indicate definitely that there is reference to *Vijñāna-vāda* in this context. The *Sūtra* iv, 15, is : *vastu-sāmye citta bhedaṭ tayoṃ viviktaḥ panthāḥ*, of which a faithful rendering into English will be, "because of the difference of the intellect (thoughts), the object being the same (or similar), the path of the two is different". It will appear that neither the Sanskrit commentators nor modern scholars have faithfully followed the wording of the *Sūtra* in commenting upon it, or translating it into English¹. The author of the *Bhāṣya* is prepossessed with the notions of *Vijñāna-vāda* and its refutation in this section of the YS., so much so that he starts a discussion on

1. E. g. Rajendarlal Mitra ; "Even in the sameness of object the course (courses ?) of the two are distinct, from diversity of the thinking principle." *Bibl. Indica* edition ; and Woods, "Because, while the (physical) thing remains the same the mind-stuffs are different, (therefore the two are upon) *distinct levels of existence*," "Yoga System of Patanjali", HOS.

In the above translations I find no justification for the renderings italicized by me.

the subject even in his comments upon the previous *Sūtra* ; iv, 14 : *pariṇāmaikatvād vastu tattvam*, which has not even the semblance of having anything to do with *Vijñāna-vāda* or its refutation, and hence the remark by Vāchaspati Miśra *tad evam utsūtram bhāṣyakṛd vijñānātirikta-sthāpana-yuktim uktvā sautrīṇ yuktim avatārayati*—, “so having thus gone beyond the *sūtra* in giving the reason for establishing something besides knowledge, now the author of the *Bhāṣya* introduces the argument as given in the *sūtra* itself,” i. e. in iv, 15. The interpretation of the first commentator has since been followed by the later ones, and by modern scholars. It will appear, however, that the *sūtra* in itself is evidently intended to say that the same or similar object of a certain nature (according to the combination of the three constituents—*guṇas* : *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*) affects different minds differently because of the difference in the nature of those minds ; the main point emphasized being not the *diversity of minds* but the *difference of mentality*. The term *citta-bheda*t in the *sūtra* may signify “difference of intellect (thoughts)” with reference to one and the same individual, or different individuals, as the case may be. For, one and the same individual may also be said to have different “minds” according as he happens to be in the mood of *sattva*, *rajas*, or *tamas*, and to be, therefore, affected differently by one and the same, or a similar object ; and such a case also is evidently covered by the *sūtra*. This interpretation is confirmed by the context of the two previous *sūtras*,¹ and is also supported by the example given by the commentators

1. YS. iv, 13 : *te vyakta-sūkṣmāḥ guṇātmanaḥ* ; and iv, 14 : *pariṇāmaikdvād vastu-tattvam*, in which an object is said to be composed of the three constituents of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*.

that the presence of a young woman affects different men in a different manner according to the character of those men. Similarly, *Sūtra* iv, 17 : *tad uparāgapekṣitvād asya vastu jñātājñātam* simply asserts that a thing is known according as it produces an impression upon the mind or not ; and there is no reference to *Vijñāna-vāda* in it, even according to the commentators. As has already been said, it is only *Sūtra* iv, 16 : *na caika-citta-tāntram vastu tad apramānakam tadā kiṃ syāt-*, "nor is an object dependent upon one intellect ; that being not a proof, what would happen then ?", which lends support to the view that there is a refutation of *Vijñāna-vāda* in this section, or in the *Yoga-sūtra*. Now, it is interesting to find that this *sūtra* has not only been not commented upon by Bhoja, the author of the *Rāja-Mārtanda-vṛtti*, but evidently not treated by him as a *sūtra* at all ; for it does not appear in the editions of his *Vṛtti* and *Sūtra* iv, 17, as found in the editions of the *Bhāṣya*, and Vācaspati Miśra's commentary has been numbered as *Sūtra* iv, 16 and so on. This omission of the *sūtra* by Bhoja clearly indicates that the copy or copies of the *Yog-sūtra* which he used did not contain this *sūtra*.¹ What could be the explanation then of the appearance of this *sūtra* in the editions of the other commentators ? Considering that Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra were the predecessors of Bhoja, it is improbable that he should not have known their commentaries, and should not have been aware of this *sūtra*, had it been regarded as a *sūtra* in his time ; and yet we have the commentaries on this *sūtra* by both Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra in the editions that have come down to us. The only explanation of this discrepancy is that the clause *na caika-citta tāntram vastu*

1. Cf. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, i. p. 233, note 1.

tad-apramāṇakam tadā kiṃ syāt was originally a line in the middle of the *Bhāṣya* on *Sūtra* iv, 15, immediately following the last sentence of what is now regarded as the *Bhāṣya* on iv, 15. viz. *ta etayā dvārā sādharmaṇatyaṃ bādhamānāḥ pūr-vottara-kṣaṇeṣu vastu-svarūpam evāpahnivate*, and the *Bhāṣya* on iv, 15, really ended with the last sentence of what is now regarded as the *Bhāṣya* on iv, 16. Similarly, the comment of Vācaspati Miśra on iv, 15 and 16, according to the present editions also originally must have formed one entire comment on iv, 15 ; and it was in this form that the *Yoga-sūtra* and the commentaries of Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra must have been known to Bhoja. It was only later on that either by mistake or otherwise, this particular clause in the *Bhāṣya* came to be treated as a separate *sūtra*, and the commentaries were also divided accordingly. This mistake, or misinterpretation, could not have been possible in the case of Bhoja's commentary, for it is of an independent nature and does not usually follow or repeat the texts of the previous commentaries ; and hence the edition of the *Yoga-sūtra* as found with his commentary may be regarded as authentic. This explanation of the discrepancy about *Sūtra* iv, 16, is rendered more than plausible by the further facts that : (a) the clause which is regarded as *Sūtra* iv, 16, now, does not read like a *Sūtra* at all ; (b) it quite fits in with the context if it is regarded as a part of the *Bhāṣya* immediately following the last line of the present *Bhāṣya* on iv, 15 ; and (c) the present commentaries of Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra on iv 15 and 16, if treated as commentaries only on iv, 15, and read together, form one continuous whole without the slightest indication that those latter portions which are supposed to belong to iv, 16, could not have been a part of the commentaries on iv, 15.

It is rather curious that this discrepancy about YS. iv, 16,

which is so important for the point under discussion, has not been mentioned at all by either Professor Jacobi or Professor Woods.

If what has been said above about *Sūtra* iv, 16, be true, there is no reason to believe that independently of the commentaries the *Yoga-sūtras* contain a refutation of *Vijñāna-vāda* at all. Further, even if there were a reference to *Vijñāna-vāda* in any of the *Yoga-Sutras*, no argument has been given by either Jacobi or Woods to show that it is the *Vijñāna-vāda* of Vasubhandhu which is meant. "We cannot it is true," says Professor Woods, "maintain that the *Vijñāna-vāda* here attacked by the *Sūtra* must be the idealism of Vasubandhu"¹; and then again he rightly admits that "there surely were idealists before him, just as there were pre-Patanjalian philosophers of Yoga"². All this admission, coupled with the fact that the very authenticity of the *sūtra* iv, 16, is extremely doubtful, takes away the force of the whole argument for a late date of the *Yoga-sūtras* based upon the fact that there is a reference to *Vijñāna-vāda* in them.

Before I pass on to the next argument I wish to utilize this opportunity of pointing out one thing about references to *Vijñāna-vāda* in particular and other doctrines in general. It will appear that in the Philosophical *Sūtra* when a certain doctrine other than its own is mentioned or criticized the name of the author or the school of thought to which it belongs is seldom mentioned. It is only in the commentaries that specific names are mentioned, and it is found that whenever there is the slightest scope for interpreting a *sūtra* as referring to, and providing a criticism of, what may be called by the

1. *Yoga System of Patañjali*, Introd., xvii.

2. *Ibid.*, xviii.

general name of *Nirālambana-vāda*, the commentators are only too eager to put it down as containing an argument against the *Vijñāna-vāda* or the *Śūnya-vāda* of Buddhism. Now the fact that in most cases the *Sūtras* were composed or compiled much earlier than the date of the commentators, and that their authors have not mentioned any particular names while criticising doctrines different from their own, should be a warning against reposing an unqualified confidence in the interpretations of the commentators. This should be the more so because most of the early commentators lived and wrote their commentaries at a time when the Hindu-Buddhistic polemics were at their highest, and the Hindu writers were only too glad to use anything which they could lay their hands on as a missile against their oponents. Let us take, for instance, general references in the *Sūtras* to an idealistic doctrine such as has been called *Vijñāna-vāda* in Buddhism, even where they actually exist. The usual tendency is to suppose, often without any arguments or proofs, that they must be to Vasubandhu's *Vijñāna-vāda*, although it is also admitted at the same time that there was *Vijñāna-vāda* in Buddhism even before Vasubandhu. Further, it seems to have seldom occurred to scholars that such *sūtras* may not refer to any particular school or author at all, and may simply have in view the idealistic position in general; or, again, they may refer to such idealism as is found in some of the early *Upaniṣads*. That besides the *Vijñāna-vāda* of Buddhism there was also an old Hindu theory of idealism, even of the type of the Buddhistic *Vijñāna-vāda*, in so far as the doctrine of mind-dependent reality is concerned, is a fact which has to be admitted, but which usually seems to be forgotten by scholars when discussing references to the idealistic doctrines in the *Sūtras* literature. For example, the philosophy of such an early work as the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* is as good a *Vijñāna-vāda* as any other could be. All things of the world are des-

cribed as knowledge (*prajñānam*) and having their existence only in and through knowledge—*sarvaṃ tat prajñā-netram, pajñāne pratiṣṭhitam, prajñā-netro lokaḥ, prajñā-pratiṣṭhā, prajñānam brahma*.¹ Similarly the denial of plurality and the doctrine of absolute existence in such Upaniṣads as the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* very much approximate the doctrine of illusory existence as found in the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism. Both these doctrines, as even they were to be found in Hinduism, would not be tolerated by such later realistic schools as were represented by the Philosophical *Sūtras*; and what wonder if, when the authors of the *Sūtras* discussed these, they should have had these Hindu doctrines only, or also, in view.

The second argument given by both Jacobi and Woods for the late date of the *Yoga-sūtras* is that the author of the *Yoga-sūtras* is different from that of the *Mahābhāṣya*. Now, even granting that this view about the authorship of the YS. be true,² I do not see how this by itself can prove that the date of the YS. is late, or cannot be earlier than the fourth or fifth century A. D. The question of the date of the author of the YS. still remains undecided and open. It may be late, or it may be early.

The arguments 3 (a) and 3 (b) based upon the presence in the *Bhāṣya* of a reference to the doctrines of *sphoṭa* and the infinite size of the *antaḥkaraṇa* are admitted by Jacobi himself to be weak, for no reference of this kind is to be found in the *Sūtras* themselves. Speaking of the first he says: "This theory is, however, not directly mentioned in the *Sūtra*, and its introduction rests entirely on the authority of the

1. *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, ii, 6; *Ait. Upaniṣad*, iii, 3, 3.

2. However, see Dasgupta on this point, *History of Indian Philosophy*, i, pp. 231-2.

Bhāṣya,¹ and about the second: "It is given in the *Bhāṣya* on iv, 10, and there ascribed to the '*Ācārya*'."¹ I have only to add that it is evident that these references prove nothing with regard to the date of the *Sūtras*.

The next arguments are 3 (c) and 3 (d), viz. that the atomic theory is referred to in YS. i, 40 : *paramāṇu-parama-mahattvānto* 'sya *vaśīkāraḥ* and the doctrine of *kṣaṇas* in YS. iii, 52 : *kṣaṇa-tat-kramayoḥ saṃyamād vivekajaṃ jñānaṃ*. In connection with these references Jacobi says : "The *Sphoṭa-vāda* and the *Mano-vaibhava-vāda* (1 and 2) may be later additions to the system, but the *paramāṇu-vāda* and the *kṣaṇika-vāda* must be ascribed to Patañjali and cannot be later than him."¹ Now again, even granting what Jacobi says here with regard to these references, I am unable to see how they can prove that the *Yoga-sūtras* belong to a late date, unless it could be shown that these doctrines belong to a late period. On the other hand, Jacobi's own statements in the article under discussion indicate, what is really true about them, that they can be traced back to quite an early period, in Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism. Speaking about the adopting of these doctrines by Patañjali he says : "That he did adopt them, directly or indirectly, from the *Vaiśeṣikas* and *Buddhists*, though of course not in their original form, presupposes that these doctrines had somehow ceased to be shibboleths of hostile schools, and that the general idea underlying them had been acknowledged by other philosophers too. We know that this has been the case with regard to the atomic theory which has also been admitted by *Buddhists*, *Jainas*, *Ājīvakas*, and some *Mīmāṃsakas*"¹ The conception of *anu* is expressly found in some of the earlier *Upaniṣads* also, e. g.

1. *JAOS.*, xxxi, p. 28; italics are mine.

in *Kaṭha* ii, 20, *anor aṇīyān*, or in *Munḍaka* ii, 2, 2, *yad anubhyo' nu*.¹ Similarly, about what Jacobi calls *kṣanika-vāda*, and what really is the use of *kṣaṇa* in the sense of a moment, he admits that "the *kṣanika-vāda*, in an altered and restricted form, has been adopted by the *Vaiśeṣikas*",² the *Sūtras* of whose school, according to Jacobi, are earlier than the *Yoga-sūtras*. Then, after having made all these statements, he concludes : "This adoption of originally heterodox doctrines by Patañjali therefore unmistakably points to a relatively modern time." Now, even if it be granted that Patañjali was the first to introduce these doctrines into the Yoga system, this fact does not prove that he belonged to a late date ; for the doctrines of *aṇu* and *kṣaṇa* have to be admitted to belong to quite an early period, even on Jacobi's own statements, and they might have been imported into the Yoga at any reasonable time even before the fourth or fifth century A.D. ; for instance at about the same time as they were imported into the *Vaiśeṣika* system.

Professor Woods' argument,³ based upon *Sūtra* ii, 52, of Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* does not prove anything definite. In fact, the TS. ii 52 : *aupapattika-carama-dshottamapuruṣa-saṃkheya-varṣyuṣo' napuartyāyuṣaḥ* cannot be said to refer to YS. iii, 22 : *sopakaramam nirupakaramaṃ ca karma tat-saṃyamād aparānta-jñānaṃ ariṣṭebhyo vā*. So far as the two *sūtras* are concerned they have neither the affinity of language nor of thought. The one (TS. ii, 52) discusses the period of life of the various kinds of beings, and the other (YS. iii, 22) attainment of a certain kind of

1. Also *Chānd*, iii, 14. 3; *Bṛhad*. iv, 1, 1, vi, 3. 13.

2. *JAOS.*, xxxi, p. 28.

3. *Yoga System of Patañjali*, Introduction.

yogic merit, *siddhi*. What we find is that Umāsvāti in his own commentary on TS. ii, 52, uses the terms *sopakrama* and *nirupakrama*, which are also found in YS. iii, 22, and uses the illustrations found in the *Yoga-bhāṣya* of this *Yoga-sūtra*. Now there can be two alternative explanations of this : either (1) Umāsvāti had in his mind this particular *Yoga-sūtra* and the *Yoga bhāṣya* on it while writing his commentary on TS. ii, 52; or, (2) he used the terms *sopakrama* and *nirupakrama* and the illustrations independently simply because they were known to him as apt and usual in connection with the topic which he was discussing, just as in logic so many of us use such familiar examples as "Man is mortal", "Socrates is a 'man'", etc. Now, if the first alternative be true, it only proves that Umāsvāti was later than the *Yoga-sūtras* and possibly also the *Yoga-bhāṣya* ; and the *Yoga-sūtras* might belong to any date before Umāsvāti, late or early. And, if the second alternative be true, which is more probable, it proves nothing with regard to the relation between Umāsvāti and the author of the *Yoga-sūtras*. Professor Woods, however, argues on the authority of Professor Stcherbatsky that, as Dinnāga (about A. D. 550, according to Woods' estimate) does not seem to know anything of Patañjali, he could not be much earlier. As regards this argument, it has to be noted, firstly, that our knowledge of Dinnāga and his works is still very imperfect and incomplete ; secondly, there might have been no occasion for Dinnāga to refer to Patañjali ; and thirdly, the clear implication of this argument, if it be accepted, is that Patañjali was later than Dinnāga, and consequently the date of the *Yoga-sūtras* is to be pushed still further to about the seventh century A. D. ! This goes against Professor Woods' own statement, in which he says : "The date for Siddhasena is set by Professor Jacobi (ZDMG, 60, 289, Leipzig, 1906 reprint, p. 3, *Eina Jaina-Dogmatik*) at the middle or end of the sixth century. Umāsvāti precedes him ; and Patañjali

the philosopher would not be later than A. D. 400 and might be much earlier”.

It is evident that very little can be proved about the date of the *Yoga-sūtras* by alluding to the presence in them of such philosophical doctrines as can be traced back to a very early period, or again by referring to such authors or works containing references to the *Yoga-sūtras* as belong to a late period. The arguments based upon both these kinds of references leave a very wide margin both for the earlier and the later limits.

Besides references to particular authors or doctrines, another criterion for determining the relative dates of certain works will be a comparison of their philosophical position with regard to such problems as may be common to them. For example, for determining the relative dates of the Philosophical Sūtras, one such problem may be the theory of the means of knowledge (the *pramāṇas*). We know that of all the Philosophical Sūtras it is to be found in the most developed form in the *Nyāya-sūtras*, and also that all the works which we definitely know to be later than the *Nyāya-sūtras*, and which have dealt with the *pramāṇas*, show evident signs of being influenced by the theory of the *Nyāya-sūtras*. On the other hand, the theory of the *pramāṇas* as found in the Sūtras of the other schools is clearly of a primitive nature. The *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta* Sūtras hardly contain anything which may be called the theory of the *pramāṇas*; the *Yoga-sūtras* are a little

better; and the position of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* appears to be just preliminary to the theory as found in the *Nyāya-sūtras*. Take, for instance, the definition of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) as given in the various Sūtras. It will appear that the definition of *pratyakṣa* as given in the Sūtras other than the *Nyāya* is simply psychological, viz. that knowledge which is the result of the contact of the sense-organs with the object, *indriyārtha-sannikarṣatpannam jñānam*, and it is only in the *Nyāya-sūtras* that the conditions *avyapadeśyam* (non-inferential, literally that which is not the result of a sign or mark), *avyabhicāri* (non-discrepant), and *vyavasāyātmakam* (definite) have been added, and then these have formed the basis of later definitions. Similarly it is in the *Nyāya-sūtras* that the three kinds of inference : *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* are first enunciated, and these are found in some form or other in most of the later works on logic. In the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* we just find in Sūtra, IX, 2. 1. what appears to be a preliminary statement of this classification of inference in the *Nyāya-sūtras*. The *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*¹ definitely assumes the three kinds of inference as given in the *Nyāya-sūtras*. The case of the *Sāṃkhya-sūtras* in this respect is rather curious for although they have been proved to belong to a very late period, the definitions in them of the means of know-

1. *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, 4

ledge (*pramāṇas*)¹, direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*)², and inference (*anumāna*) are of a peculiar nature. While one would have expected that these definitions in the *Sāṃkhya-sūtras* would have borne the marks of the latest developments in the theory of the *pramāṇas*, they show resemblance neither to the definitions of the *pramāṇas* in the *Nyāya-sūtras* and the later works nor to those given in the other *Sūtras* and the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*. All these facts about the theory of the *pramāṇas* in the Philosophical *Sūtras* go to show that (1) the *Nyāya-sūtras* are the latest of all the *Sūtras* except the *Sāṃkhya*; (ii) the *Mīmāṃsā*, the *Vedānta*, the *Yoga* and the *Vaiśeṣika* *Sūtras* are earlier than *Nyāya-sūtras* and probably succeeded one another in the order in which they are mentioned here; (iii) the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* is later than the *Nyāya-sūtras*; (iv) the *Sāṃkhya-sūtras* in the present form decidedly belong to a late date because of evidence other than that of the theory of the *pramāṇas*; but the peculiar nature of the definitions of the *pramāṇas* suggests a very probable hypothesis that these definitions originally belonged to an early *Sāṃkhya* work most probably earlier than the *Nyāya-sūtras*, which is either lost, or has been incorporated in the present *Sāṃkhya-sūtras*. From the point of view of the epistemological development of thought the

1. *Sāṃkhya-sūtras*, 1, 87

2. *Ibid.* 1, 89 .

Nyāya-sūtras form a very definite and convenient landmark for determining the relative position of the other works, and unless there be other reasons to prove the contrary, the chronological order suggested by the epistemology of the various *Sūtras* may be accepted as fairly correct. It will further appear that the conclusions arrived at by this method are also in accordance with the expectation that the *Sūtras* of the *Mīmāṃsā*; the *Vedānta*, the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yoga* schools should have been, in the ordinary course, compiled earlier than those of the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya*.

The same criterion may be applied to some of the early works of Jainism and Buddhism also. It will appear that Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* and the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* are earlier than the *Nyāya-sūtras*, for neither of them shows any signs of being influenced by the logic of the *Nyāya-sūtras*; and in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* the query about future logicians and the answer to it given in the prophetic style indicate that the *Nyāya* school was yet in the process of formation and had not attained the stage represented by the *Nyāya-sūtras*. Nāgārjuna's works, specially those on logic, definitely presuppose the philosophy of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, and hence he must be later than the *Nyāya-sūtras*.

(ii) The Development of the Nyāya Epistemology.

As has already been pointed out it is in the *Nyāya-sūtras* that we first find a systematic treatment of the means of knowledge. The doctrine of the *Nyāya-sūtras* was, however, the result of a series of previous developments in the earlier literature. The dialogues and discourses which were the characteristic features of the Upaniṣadic period naturally resulted, in course of time, in the formulation of definite methods of debating and forms of reasoning ; and these gave rise to a science, which was originally called *ānvīkṣikī*—the science of enquiry, then *tarka-vidyā*—the science of debating; or *hetu-vidyā*—the science of reasoning ; and ultimately, *Nyāya-śāstra* the science of logic. *Ānvīkṣikī* began as a science of general enquiry, which included in its scope both metaphysics and logic. Later on it assumed a more specific form and became the science of pure reasoning. This transition in its connotation can be discovered in the texts of such important works of the period as the *Mānava-dharma-śāstra*¹, the *Mahābhārata*², the *Rāmāyaṇa*³,

1. *MDS'*, *Hetu-śāstra*, II. 11, *Vāda*, VI, 50; *Tarka* II, 106, 111; *Ātma-vidyā*, VII. 43.

2. *MB. Sānti-parva*, 180, 47; 210, 22; 246, 18; *Aśva-medha*, 85, 27.

3. *Rām*, I, 13, 23;

and the *Artha-śāstra*¹ of Kauṭilya. It is rather significant with regard to the nature of *ānvīkṣikī* and also of the systems with which it is identified, that in the *Artha-śāstra*, the *Sāṃkhya*, the *Yoga* and the *Lokāyata* are said to be *ānvīkṣikī-Sāṃkhyam yogo lokāyatam cetyānvīkṣiki*. (I, 2) and it is further described as the light of all the branches of studies *pradīpaḥ sarva-vidyānām*. Thus it will appear that by the time of Kauṭilya² *ānvīkṣikī* had come to be regarded mainly as the science of logic, and not much later on, it actually became the *Nyāya-śāstra*. The fact that the name *ānvīkṣikī* had been applied to the *Sāṃkhya*, the *Yoga* and even the *Lokāyata* indicates the rationalistic character of the science probably as against the dogmatic nature of the other schools of thought. And we actually find that because of this rationalistic bent, the study had already fallen into disrepute with those who regarded the scriptures as the ultimate and unquestionable authority.³

Along with a mention of *ānvīkṣikī*, *tarka-vidyā* or *hetu-vidyā* we find in the literature of this period the use of certain technical terms signifying what came

1. Aś., 1, 2, 7. (N. B.) For most of these references I am indebted to V B.'s H I L.

2. Indian tradition would put the AS' in the fourth Century B. C. on the assumption that it was written by Cāṇakya during the time of Candragupta. According to most of the European scholars, however, it should belong to the third Century, A. D. See Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. III, pp. 517—24.

3. MDS., II, 11; MB, Śānti. 180, 47.

to be known as *pramāṇa*—means of knowledge, and *tantra-yukti*—forms of argumentation. The terms *smṛti*, *pratyakṣa*, *aitihya* and *anumāna* are found as early as the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka.¹ In the *Mānava-dharma-Śāstra*, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śāstra* are mentioned²; while in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, *aitihya*, *anumāna* and *śāstra* are described as the source of enlightenment. In the *Mahābhārata*, *pratyakṣa*, *kṛtānta* (*anumāna*), *aitihya* and *āgama* are mentioned, and it is said that according to the materialists *pratyakṣa* is the only reliable proof. Similarly such terms as *vāda*, *prayojana*, *chala*, *tarka*, *jalpa*, *vitandā*, *nirṇaya* and *yukti* are found in the *Mānava dharma-śāstra*, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*³. Kautilya mentions thirty-two technical terms called *tantra-yukti* in his *Artha-śāstra*, and these are repeated in the *Caraka*⁴ and the *Suśrūta*⁵ *Samhitās* with this difference that in the *Caraka-samhitā* the number is thirty-four. It is not necessary to go into the details of the meaning and the use of these terms here. What is important to note is that the presence of these terms in the lite-

1. I, 2; 1; The verse is as follows :—

*Smṛtiḥ pratyakṣam aitihiyam, anumānam catuṣṭayam,
Etairiāditya-maṇḍalam sarvair eva vidhāsyate.*

2. MDS'. XII, 105.

3. Cf. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, *HIL.*, chap. iv.

4. *Siddhānta-sthāna*, XII.

5. *Uttara-tantra*, LXV.

rature of the period, which does not yet represent systematic philosophy, shows how the whole system of logic and epistemology was just in the melting pot. So far as the earlier literature of the period is concerned, for instance the *Mānava-dharma-śāstra*, the *Mahābhārata*, and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, we find in it only an occasional mention of the means of knowledge or forms of argumentation. In the *Caraka-sāṃhitā*, however, there are a few sections in which we find a fairly systematic treatment of the nature of knowledge including a logical definition of the *pramāṇas* and a psychological analysis of experience¹. Besides a mention of the logical categories referred to above, we also find in this literature a distinct and frequent reference to the existence of the schools of the materialists, the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yoga*, which, it appears, had already acquired prominence.

(iii) The Beginning of Jaina and Buddhistic Epistemology.

About the same period as the *Nyāya* arose the schools of Jainism and Buddhism as the result of the teachings of the two great masters—Mahāvīra and

1. See *infra* Part III, 3 (ii).

Gautama Buddha. But just as we do not find any systematic treatment of Hindu logic and epistemology until the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya-Sūtras*, there is no sign of a regular system of logical doctrine in the history of Jainism until the time of Umāsvāti, and in that of Buddhism until Nāgārjuna. In the early works of both these religions we just find a mention of certain logical terms and rules of argumentation much in the same way as in the literature of Hinduism. For example, there is a description of *naya* or the relativity of knowledge in the *Bhagvati-sūtra*; the *Sthānaṅga-sūtra*, and the *Prajñāpanā-sūtra*; and a classification of the means of knowledge (*pamāna*) and knowledge (*ñāna*) in the *Sthānaṅga-sūtra* and the *Bhagavati-sūtra*. Similarly the terms *vitarka*, *tarka*, *pakṣa* and *chala*, the various kinds of example (*naa*), the expedients in as a debate (*vivāda*), and the defects of a debate also find a place in the *Sthānaṅga-sūtra*.¹ In the history of Buddhism there is practically no logic in the Pāli literature. In the *Tipitaka*, however, we find a classification of knowledge and also a reference to the existence of a certain class of logicians called *takkika*. In the *Brahma jāla-sutta* there is a reference to certain Śramanas and Brāhmaṇas who were *takki* and *vimamsi*.¹ In the *Milinda-panṇha*, Milinda is spoken of as one versed in *niti* or *nyāya*.² An explicit reference to logic as a distinct study begins only in the Sanskrit literature of Buddh-

1. *Digha Nikāya*, I, 16.

2. *Milindapañha*, p. 3.

ism, when in *Lalita-vistara*¹ it is mentioned under the name of *hetu-vidyā*.

(iv) Relation between the Hindu and the Non-Hindu Schools on the Subject of Epistemology.

It will appear from the following chapters that the works of the period of the Philosophical Sūtras—both orthodox and heterodox—contain reference to the doctrines of the various schools, although not to those of any particular works or authors. In the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* of Umāsvāti there is a reference to the six means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) admitted by the *Mīmāṃsā* school. The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* refers to the teachers of the *Sāṃkhya*, the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya*; and the works of Nāgārjuna clearly presuppose the *Nyāya* epistemology in their refutation of the validity of the means of knowledge. Similarly, most of the Hindu Philosophical Sūtras presuppose the existence of heterodox doctrines such as those of the Materialists, the Jainas, and the Buddhists; and the *Vedānta*, the *Vaiśeṣika*, and the *Nyāya-Sūtras* definitely contain a discussion and refutation of these. Throughout the history of Indian

1. XII, p. 179 also quoted in *HIL* p. 243.)

epistemology the orthodox and the hetrodox schools have influenced one another in the development of thought, although it is not possible now to determine exactly the priority or posteriority of particular authors or works during this period. In order to make a beginning, however, it will be consistent with the development of thought as we find it in the works of various schools during the period that the earlier Jaina and Buddhist epistemology be considered first and the epistemology of the Hindu schools afterwards.

2. THE EARLIER JAINA AND BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGY

(i) The Beginnings of Jaina Epistemology in Umāsvāti's Tattvādhigama-Sūtra.

The *TS.* begins with the assertion that the path to emancipation consists of (acquiring) right conviction (*Samyag-darśana*), right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*), and right conduct (*samyak-caritra*). (I, 1).

Knowledge (*jñāna*) is classified as *Mati*, *Śruta*, *Avadhi*, *Manah-paryāya*, and *Kevala* (1, 9). These are called the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*). The first two, that is, *Mati* and *Śruta*, are called indirect (*parokṣa*), and the rest direct (*pratyakṣa*). (1, 11 & 12)

Mati is either knowledge obtained through the five sense-organs (*indriya-nimitta*), or without the aid of the sense-organs (*antndriya-nimitta*), which latter may be either reflective knowledge (*mano-vṛtti*), or general undifferentiated knowledge (*ogha-jñāna*)¹—(I, 14, and the *Bhāṣya*). The terms *mati*, *smṛti*, *sāṃjñā*, *cintā* and *abhinibodha* are said to be synonyms (1, 13)

1. I have followed the editor of the *TS.* (Bibl. Indica) who, in a foot-note, explains *ogha* as *sāmānyam apravibhaktarūpam*. (p. 16)

mati knowledge is further sub-divided into *avagraha*, *īha apāya*, and *dhāraṇā*.

Avagraha is explained as an indistinct (*avyaktam*) apprehension and grasping of objects as they are in themselves (*yathā-svam*) by means of the sense-organs.¹ *Avagraha*, *grahaṇa*, *ālocana*, and *avadhāraṇa* are said to be synonyms.

Īhā is a desire to know more particularly and definitely about an object, after it has been indistinctly perceived first (*avagr̥hīta*)², *Īhā*, *ūhā*, *tarka*, *parikṣā*, *vicāraṇā*, and *jijñāsā* are said to signify the same thing.

Apāyā is the determination by means of reflection of the nature of the perceived object with regard to its perfection or imperfection (*samyag asamyag iti*) merits and defects (*guṇa doṣa vicāraṇā*)³. *Apāya* *apagama*, *apanoda*, *apavyādha*, *apeta*, *apagata*, *apaviddha*, and *apanutta* are synonyms.

Dhāraṇā is the (final) cognition of the object as it is⁴, and forming a definite notion about it in the mind. *Dhāraṇā*, *pratipatti*, *avadhāraṇa*, *avasthāna*, *niścaya*, *avagama*, and *avabodha* are the same.

1. *Tatrāvyaktam yathā-svam indriyair viṣayaṇām ālocanā-vadhāraṇam avagrahaḥ*, TS. p. 17.

2. *Avagr̥hīte viṣayārthaikadeśāc che'sānugamanam niścaya-viśeṣa-jijñāsā īhā.*, Ibid., p. 17.

3. *Avagr̥hīte viṣaye samyag asamyag iti guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇā-dhyavasāyapanodo pāyaḥ.*, Ibid., p. 17.

4. *Dhāraṇā pratipattir yathā svam matyavasthānam avadhāraṇam ca.*

The above kinds of knowledge may be further differentiated according as the objects perceived are many, or of various kinds, perceived quickly or slowly, and so on. (I, 16). They pertain to the objects of sense—(*arthasya*)—(I, 17).

The knowledge of *vyañjana*, which, as will appear from its description, evidently signifies an invisible object, can be had only through *avagraha* with the limitation that it cannot be perceived by sight nor by mind. (I, 18 & 19).

It is said that thus *avagraha* is of two kinds. (i) of *vyañjana*, and (ii) of *artha*. Of these the first does not take place through sight and mind, but it is possible through the rest of the four senses¹. Knowledge of the class *īhā* and the rest pertains only to *artha*².

The term *vyañjana* in I, 18 and the *Bhāṣya* is very obscure, and it has not been explained directly. It has been usually translated as (intermediating) sensation³, or as indeterminable object⁴; neither of which seems to represent the exact meaning of the author. Although the term has not been defined, it appears from the author's own commentary on *Sūtra*, I, 18 and 19, as explained above, that a distinction has been drawn between such objects of cognition as can be perceived by means of all the senses including

1. *Cakṣuṣā no-indriyeṇa ca vyañjanāvagraho na bhavati, caturbhir indriyaiḥ seṣair bhavatītyarthaḥ.*, p, 19.

2. *Ihāyāstu arthasyaiva.*, p. 18.

3. J. L. Jaini, *Outlines of Jainism*, p, 63.

4. *TS.* p, 27.

mind and those which can be perceived only by means of the four senses of touch, taste, smell and hearing. The former have been called *artha* and the latter *vyanjana*. The underlying idea in regarding knowledge called *īha* and the rest as applicable to *artha* only, and *avagraha* as applicable to both *artha* and *vyañjana* is that it is only the visible objects that admit of such determination and definiteness as is achieved by *īhā* and the rest, and invisible objects admit only of such indeterminate knowledge as is signified by the term *avagraha*. According to the author, these invisible objects cannot also be the object of mind or reflection.

Śruta knowledge is preceded by *mati* knowledge (1, 20). It is of two kinds : (i) That which is external to the *Aṅgas* (*aṅga vāhyam*), and (ii) that which is included in the *Aṅgas* (*aṅga-praviṣṭam*). And these are further sub-divided into a number of classes *Śruta*, *āptavacana*, *āgama*, *upadeśa*, *aitihya*, *āmnāya*, *pravacana jina vacana* are all synonyms.

The difference between *mati* knowledge and *śruta* knowledge is that while the former pertains to the objects existing at the present time, the latter pertains to the object existing in all the three times, and is also more pure (*viśuddhataram*). Further while *mati* knowledge is the result of the activity of the self as the knower, and is obtained either through the sense-organs or without them, the *śruta* knowledge, which is based upon *mati* knowledge is the result of communication from some reliable authority (*āptopa-*

deśād bhavati)¹.

Avadhi knowledge is not defined at all either in the Sūtras or the commentary.² It is said to be of two kinds: (i) that which belongs to gods and the denizens of the hell, in whose case it is innate, and (ii) that which belongs to man and other beings, in whose case it is acquired (I, 21—23). The latter kind of *avadhi* knowledge is further sub-divided into six kinds according as it lasts for a short time or long time, or as it tends to increase or decrease, etc. In the commentary on I, 26, while comparing *avadhi* knowledge with *manah paryāya*, the author says that *avadhi* knowledge has for its objects only some aspect of material substances;³ and this assertion is repeated I, 28.⁴ Further it has already been classed as direct knowledge. Thus it appears that *avadhi* is a kind of direct knowledge of material substances.

Manah-paryāya is of two kinds : (1) *rju-mati*, and (ii) *vipula-mati*. The difference between the two is that the latter is purer (*viśūdda-tara*) than the for-

1. p. 31.

2. It is interpreted by Jaini as visual or direct material knowledge (TS. SBJ., p. 39) ; as knowledge of the remote or past (*Outlines of Jainism*, p. 59) ; and as visual knowledge, direct knowledge of matter, limited as to (subject-matter), place, time and nature, i. e. without the help of the senses (*Jaina Gem Dictionary*, p. 29).

3. *Rūpi-dravyeṣy asarva-paryāyeṣy avadher viṣaya-nibandho bhavati*, p. 25.

4. *Rūpiṣy avadheḥ*, p. 26.

mer and while the former might cease (*pratipatati*), the latter cannot (*na pratipatati*), I, 24, 25. *Manah-paryāya* is compared with *avadhi* knowledge as follows :—

(a) *Manah-paryāya*¹ is purer than *avadhi*, for the material objects which are known by the possessor of *avadhi* knowledge are known in a purer form and mentally (*manogatāni*) by the possessor of *manah-paryāya*.²

(b) While *manah-paryāya* is confined to the universe inhabited by human beings, *avadhi* can extend to the whole universe.

(c) While *avadhi* knowledge can belong to all beings, whether of disciplined lives or not, and in all condition *manah-paryāya* can belong only to men with disciplined lives.

(b) While *manah-paryāya* has for its object material substances in all their aspects, *avadhi* has these only in a limited number of aspects.

Kevala knowledge is perfect (*paripūrṇa*), complete (*samagra*), unique (*asādhāraṇa*), absolute (*nirapekṣa*), pure (*viśuddha*), all-comprehensive (*sarva-bhāva-jñāpaka*), that which has for its object both the world

1. *Manah-paryāya* again has not been defined. It has been called mental knowledge' (TS. (SBJ.), p. 40) ; and 'mind-reading knowledge (O J. p. 64) ; direct knowledge of another's thoughts about matter (J. G. D. p. 66).

2. pp. 24, 25.

and the non-world (*lokaloka viśaya*), and infinite *ananta-paryāya*),—I, 30, and the *Bhāṣya*).

Summing up the author says that the objects of *mati* and *Śruta* knowledge are all the substances, but in all their aspects (*asarva-dravyeṣu asarva-paryāyeṣu*; of *avadhi* only material substances, but not in all their aspects (*rūpiṣveva dravyeṣu asarva-pariyāyeṣu*; *manah-paryāya*) is a purer and infinitely subtle knowledge of the material substances known by *avadhi*; and *kevala* has for its object all the substances, and in all their aspects (*sarva-dravyeṣu sarva-paryāyeṣu ca*) (1, 27—30, and the *Bhāṣya*).

Of the above four kinds of knowledge, *mati* *Śruta* and *avadhi* can be erroneous. Error (*viparyāya*) is that which is the opposite of knowledge, and consists in a failure to distinguish between that which is and that which is not (*sad-asator aviśeṣād*); as for example, to perceive a horse as a cow, and *vice versa*. (I, 32, 33, and the *Bhāṣya*).

Such is the classification of knowledge as found in the *T.S.* and its commentary by the author of the *Sūtra* himself. The terms employed are peculiar to the *Sūtras*, and their exact significance is far from being clear. The first point to be noted is that what is perceived through the senses is regarded in this earlier Jaina logic as indirect (*parokṣa*), and that which is perceived without the medium of the senses as direct (*pratyakṣa*). In this particular work, *mati* knowledge pertains to the objects of the senses, and is either perceptual or reflective,—the latter also covering know-

ledge by inference. *Śruta* is knowledge by testimony. *Avadhi*, *manah-paryāya* and *kevala* are forms of direct knowledge with such distinctions as have been explained above. *Avagraha* and the rest three kinds of *mati* are the various degrees of sense-cognition according to its clearness and definiteness.

The *nayas* have been described as the various ways of determining the nature of an object of perception, and have been classified in the usual way. It is not necessary to go into a detailed explanation of these ; for, in the first place, their meaning is obvious and in the second place, they are of little importance from the epistemological point of view.

The author of the *TS.* and the *Bhāṣya* is aware of the existence of the school of philosophy which holds that the *pramāṇas* include inference (*anumāna*), knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*), scriptural testimony (*āgama*), implication (*arthāpatti*), probability (*sambhava*), and negation (*abhāva*). It is maintained that all these are included in the *mati* and *śruta* knowledge, for they are based upon a contact between the sense-organs and the object. (*Bhāṣya*, I, 12). This fact indicates that probably Umāsvāti, while referring to these *pramāṇas*, had the *Mīmāṃsā* school in mind. He does not show any signs of knowing, or being influenced by the *Nyāya* school, and hence, as has already been suggested, he seems to have lived before the compilation of the *Nyāya-sūtras*. Siddhasena Divākars, the next important writer on Jaina logic and epistemology, is much later than Umāsvāti,

and as we shall see, he is distinctly influenced in his doctrines by the works of the Hindu and Buddhist writers.

(ii) The Doctrine of Knowledge and Reality in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.

In spite of the fact that the LS. is believed to belong to a comparatively later date (about 300 A.D.) the language and the thought of the work are not very different from those of the *Prajñā-pāramitās*. Although the LS. is mainly a work of the *Vijñāna-vāda*, it is not altogether devoid of the doctrine of *Śūnya-vāda*; for while it is maintained that the world is only knowledge (*Vijñāna*) or consciousness (*citta*)¹ on the one hand, it is also emphasised in several passages that knowledge and consciousness themselves are just as illusory as the objects of experience. In fact the doctrine of voidness (*sūnyatā*) is clearly taught in some of the passages². Similarly the doctrine of appearance and illusion (*samvṛti*) and that of reality

1. E. g. Chap. II, verse, 136 ; *citta-mātram yadā lokam prapaśyanti jinātmajāh*, etc; also verses, 139, 140 ff.

2. LS. (BI) Chap. II, pp. 73. ff. especially verse 137 *Deśemi śūnyatām nityam śāśvatoccheda varjitām, Saṃsāram svapna-māyākhyam na ca karma vinaśyati*.

and truth (*paramārtha*) is distinctly found in this work¹, and what is still more interesting is the presence of the notions of *samāropa* and *apavāda*² very similar to the latter *adhyāsa* doctrine of the *Vedāntā*. The fact that the classification of knowledge in this work, as will be seen presently, does not show any signs of the influence of the *Nyāya* school, and that there is a reference to the *tārkikas* and the *naiyāyikas* and their future³ just in the same way as in the older literature, goes to indicate that the *LS.* must be earlier than the *Nyāya sūtras*, and I am inclined to think that its date is not much later than that of the *Prajñā pāramitās*.

The classification of knowledge (*viññāna*) is found in a few passages of Chapter II. It is very complex and contributes little to the subsequent epistemology of Buddhism. It may be worth while, however, to state briefly what this classification is, especially because, so far as I know, it has not been presented in English in its exact form. It occurs in a discourse between the lord and Mahāmati-

According to the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, there is a

1. Ibid., II, 187, *Samvrti paramārthāśca tṛtīyam nāsti hetukam*, etc.

2. *LS.*, verse, 191 :

Nāsti vai kalpito bhāvaḥ para-tantras ca vidyate,

Samāropāpavādaṃ hi vikalpanto vinaśyati

Also cf. verses 149—160.

3. Ibid., Chap. II, verses, 2 : *Naiyāyikāḥ katham brūhi bhaviṣyanti anāgate.*

permanent basic consciousness called the *ālaya-vijñāna*, out of which all forms of knowledge arise. It does not disappear with the disappearance of the various forms of consciousness. The *ālaya-vijñāna*, as it is in itself, is called *sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa*. Two of the forms of the *ālaya-vijñāna* are called the *khyāti-vijñāna* and the *vastu prativikalpa-vijñāna*. The former is said to be the effect of the consequences of inconceivable innate impressions (*acinty -vāsanā pari-ṇāma hetukam*), and forms the subjective factor in experience ; while the latter is the result of sense-impressions and the activity of the subject. *Vijñāna* is again called *pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa* and *karma-lakṣaṇa*, which are evidently transitory states of consciousness as distinguished from the *sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa*, which is permanent and abiding. *Pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa vijñāna* is said to be both different and non-different from the *ālaya-vijñāna*. It is different from it in so far as it is a transitory form of the *ālaya-vijñāna*, and it is non-different from it in so far as it is caused by it. It appears to be the name of sense-cognitions. No definition or description of *Karma-lakṣaṇa vijñāna* is given¹. It is said that there is no cessation (*nirodha*) of *sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa-vijñāna*, but there is a cessation of *karma-lakṣaṇa vijñānas*. *Karma-lakṣaṇa vijñāna* may mean that knowledge which is the result of past deeds. 'Just as Mahāmati', says the lord, 'a lump

1. Vidyābhūṣaṇa translates the term as 'reminiscence' or 'impression' (i. e. past acts or states of knowing), in his edition of LS., p. 44.

of clay is neither different (*anya*) nor non-different (*ananya*) from the particles of clay, so also gold is neither different nor non-different from a gold ornament. O, Mahāmati, if the lump of clay were different from the particles of clay, it would not be made of them ; but as it is made of them, it is not different from them. On the other hand, if it were non-different from them, there would be no such distinction as between the particles of clay and the lump of clay. Similarly, Mahāmati, if *pravṛtti-vijñānas* were different from the *ālaya vijñāna* of the character of *jāti* (*ālaya-vijñāna-jāti lakṣaṇād*), they would have for their cause that which is not *ālaya-vijñāna* (which is absurd). On the other hand, if they were non-different (from the *ālaya-vijñāna*), the cessation of the *pravṛtti-vijñāna* would be the cessation of the *ālaya-vijñāna* : but there is no cessation of the *sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa*. Therefore, O, Mahāmati, there is no *sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa-nirodha* of *vijñānas* but *karma-lakṣaṇa-nirodha*. On the disappearance of the *sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa*, there would be the disappearance of the *ālaya vijñāna* ; and if the disappearance¹ of the *ālaya-vijñāna* is admitted, this doctrine would not be different from that of cessation held by the Tirthakaras ; for the doctrine of the Tirthakaras is that on the ceasing of the apprehension of the object, there is the cessation of the cognising activity (*vijñāna-pravṛtī-*

1. I have adopted the Tibetan version '*nirudhyamāne*' instead of '*nirūpyamāne*', (p. 39). The reason is obvious.

uparamaḥ)¹, and on the cessation of the cognising activity, there would be the cessation of the beginningless activity of cognition (*anādi-kāla-prabandha-vyucchitti*). The Tirthakaras describe the activity of cognition as due to cause, and do not attribute the visual knowledge (*cakṣur-vijñāna*), which appear because of colour and light, to anything other than cause. And the cause, Mahāmati, is the primordial matter (*pradhānā*), the spirit (*puruṣa*), time (*kāla*) and the verbal testimony (*anupravādāḥ*).’’²

The above quotation will bear out my interpretation of the various kinds of knowledge expounded in the *LS*. It is not quite clear which school of teachers is meant by the Tirthakaras. The description of their teachings as given above is applicable in a considerable degree to the *Sāṃkhya* system.

1. I have adopted ‘*Vijñāna-pravṛtṭy-uparmaḥ*’ according to the Tibetan version instead of *Vijñāna-prabandho-paramaḥ*’ (p. 39).

2. *LS*, Bib. Buddhica, pp., 37–39.

(iii) The Illusory Nature of Knowledge & the Doctrine of Absolute Reality in the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* of Nāgārjuna.

The only Sanskrit work of Nāgārjuna available to us is the *Mādhyamika-kārikās*. It is a work more on general philosophy than on logic and epistemology. There are a few sections, however, which indicate Nāgārjuna's attitude towards the problem of knowledge. The general philosophical position of the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* appears to be much the same as that of the *Prajñā pāramitās*, but the work suffers from a kind of verbal jugglery, which inevitably makes the thought obscure and confused. It is for this reason that there has been a good deal of difference of opinion with regard to the exact nature of Nāgārjuna's philosophy. It has been supposed to be a doctrine of nihilism by some, and that of relativity by others. It will appear, however, as will be shown presently, that the real doctrine of the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* is that of phenomenal existence (*samvṛti*) and real existence (*paramārtha*). The former is shown to be false or illusory by demonstrating that the notions pertaining to it are relative or contradictory ; and the latter is characterised as devoid of

all attributes and relations. The means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) as belonging to the phenomenal world are also regarded as illusory.

The Third Chapter of the *Kārikās* deals with the examination of the senses, and there an attempt is made to prove that there is no sense in maintaining that the various sense and their functions are real. It is argued that as the sense of sight cannot see itself it cannot see anything else (III, 1), and as neither the sense of sight sees, nor does that which is not the sense of sight, there is nothing which sees, and so there is neither the seer nor the object seen (III, 4, 6). Then follows a *Kārikā* which explains how knowledge is produced. It is as follows :

*Pratītyā mātāpitarau yathoktaḥ putra-sambhavaḥ
Cakṣu-rūpe pratītyaivam ukto vijñāna-sambhavaḥ.*

Just as the birth of a son is spoken of as due to the father and the mother, so is the production of knowledge spoken of as due to (the contact of) the eye and the object.

The Vidyābhūṣaṇa, while explaining the meaning of this *kārikā* says : 'The purport of the aphorism is that the objects signified by the terms father, mother and son, and the act signified by the term 'production' are not real, the existence of each being dependent on that of others. So also the eye, the colour, the seen and the act of seeing are merely relative terms, having no reality in themselves'¹. It will appear

1. JBTS., Part III, 1896, p. 5.

that so far as the text of the Kārikā goes, it does not admit of the interpretation that the eye, the colour, the seen and the act of seeing are merely relative terms having no reality in themselves. What is meant to be explained in this particular verse is the production of knowledge—*viññāna-sambhavaḥ*, and when it is read along with, and interpreted in the light of, the next two verses in the same Chapter¹, it appears that what the author says is that knowledge is produced by the contact of the sense—organs with the object. This is confirmed by the comments of Candrakīrti on these verses. He says : Thus knowledge arises on perceiving that which is to be seen (*draṣṭavyam*) and the act of seeing (*darśanam*). Contact with the object of sense is the result of the three² combining together. Feeling (*vedanā*) arises along with the contact with the object (*sparsa-sahajā*) and it is the cause of desire. Therefore, because of the existence of their effects (*kārya-sad-bhāvād*) that which is to be seen and the act of seeing exist (*draṣṭavya-darśane vidyete*)³. The meaning of the Kārika evidently is that just as the existence of a son can be supposed only on the assumption that there

1. III., 8 and 9. These do not appear in the text and translation as published by Vidyābhūṣaṇa in the *JBTS*. and form the last verses of Chapter III in the edition of *Bibl. Buddhica*, IV.

2. That is to say, *draṣṭavya*, *darśana* and *viññāna*.

3. *MK. Bibl. Buddhica*, pp. 118, 119.

are parents, so the existence of knowledge can only be admitted on the assumption that there are the object seen and the act of seeing. In other words, the existence of the object of sight and the act of seeing are presupposed by the existence of knowledge. What applies to the sense of sight, also applies to the other senses (III, 9).

Now unless the verses III, 8 and 9 be later interpolations, the conclusion of the author with regard to the senses, in this chapter anyhow, is not that they are not real, or that they are merely relative notions, but that while they, their functions, and their objects cannot be perceived directly, they are inferred from the existence of their product—viz. knowledge¹.

The Fourth Chapter deals with the *skandhas*, of which the first-*rūpa* is selected for discussion. Evidently two points are emphasised : *firstly*, that the forms (*rūpa*) and their cause go together² ; *secondly*, neither can it be said that the effect is like the cause, not that it is unlike it³. It is distinctly stated

1. Cf. Candrakīrti's introductory sentence to his comments on verse 7 : '*atraha vidyete eva draṣṭavya-darśane tat-kārya-sad-bhāvād*'—'So it is said here that the object to be seen and the act of seeing do exist, because of the existence of their product.' *MK Bibl. Buddhica*, p. 118.

2. *Rūpa-kāraṇa-nirmuktam na rūpam upalabhyate*

Rūpeṇāpi na nirmuktam dṛśyate rūpa-kāraṇam, IV, 1.

3. IV, 6. It will appear that Vidyābhūṣaṇa's translation

that no form can be conceived to be without a cause—*niṣkāraṇam punā rūpam naiva naivopa-padyate* (IV,5). What applies to *rūpa* also applies to the other *skandhas* (IV,7).

Now while it appears from the arguments in Chapter III and IV that reality and causation are not denied altogether, and that the principle of causation is rather emphasised in both of them, in Chapter V, which deals with the examination of the physical elements (*dhātu-parīkṣā*) we find an explicit denial of being (*bhāva*), non-being (*abhāva*), characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) and that which is characterised (*lakṣyam*)¹. That this denial refers to the phenomenal world is evident from the last verse of the Chapter in which it is said that those ignorant people, who perceive being and non-being, do not see the blissful nature of things (*sivam*) where there is a cessation of perceivability (*draṣṭavyopāśamam*)².

and explanation of IV, 7 and 8 are different from the comments of Candrakīrti. The latter's interpretation is quite consistent with the context and the language of the text, and it is evident that the former's is incorrect. I think it unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the comparative merits of the two explanations, as the verses have no direct bearing upon the subject of this thesis.

1. V, 5, 6, 7.

2. Here again there is a difference of reading between Vidyābhuṣaṇa's (*JBTS.*) and De La Vallée Poussin's editions, and also a difference of interpretation between

The Ninth Chapter deals with being in relation to the various senses. The question to be considered is whether there is being (*bhāva*) prior to the senses, or after them, or it is not at all. As against the argument that seeing, etc. cannot be possible unless there is some being prior to the senses, it is said that it is inconceivable that something should exist prior to the functions of the various senses. For, *in the first place*, if it be granted that an entity can exist prior to seeing etc. it might also be granted that seeing etc. can exist independently of being; and, *in the second place*, it is impossible to speak of the existence of a thing unless it is *known* by means of some sign or signs. Everything exists only as in relation to something else. Similarly, it is further maintained that being cannot be supposed to exist either simultaneously with or after the senses. Consequently, it does not exist at all '*na vidyateti nāstīti nivṛttāstatra kalpanāh.*'

The same conception of the relative dependence of being and the senses is expounded in the Tenth Chapter by the example of fire and fuel, which also depend upon each other for their existence.

Vidyābhūṣaṇa and Candrakīrti. In fact the text and translation as published in the *JBTS*. appear to be defective in a number of ways. Besides unsatisfactory readings, the verses from Chandrakīrti's commentary are mixed up with the *Kārikā* texts, and are apt to be taken as the *Kārikās* themselves, the more so as Vidyābhūṣaṇa apparently treats them as such,

In the Twenty-third Chapter which deals with misapprehension (*viparyāsa*), the illusory nature of the various objects of the sense is clearly expressed in the eighth *Kārikā* which is as follows :—

*Rūpa-Śabda-rasa-sparśagāndhā dharmāśca kevalāḥ,
Gandharava nagarākārā marîci-svapna-sannibhāḥ.*

Forms, sounds, tastes, touches, smells and objects of thought are only of the shape of a city of Gandharvas, and like a mirage or dreams.

And as these are only imaginary they do not admit of the distinctions of *śubha* (lit auspicious) and *aśubha* (lit. inauspicious)—XXIII, 9.

It will appear from the passages quoted and referred to above, and also from the rest that the *Mādhyamika-kārikās*, on the whole, aim at showing the inconsistent and illusory nature of the phenomenal world and maintaining that the ultimate reality is beyond comprehension and description. In other words, it is a reasoned continuation of the same line of thought as we find in the *Prajñā-pāramitās*. The philosophy of Nāgārjuna as contained in the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* has been called nihilism and, recently, the doctrine of relativity, but it will appear that it is really neither the one nor the other, it is a doctrine of absolute existence. What we find in the *Kārikās* is an attempt to show the illusory or unreal nature of the phenomenal world by bringing out the antinomies of empirical relations, and to emphasise that the ultimate and true reality can be only that which is free from these. What Nāgār-

juna says about the phenomenal world has been erroneously regarded by some as the doctrine of nihilism with regard to the nature of *all* reality ; and what he employs as a method, viz., to show that all things of experience exist as only in relation to one another, and that these relations lead to all kinds of inconsistencies and antinomies, has been regarded by others as the doctrine of relativity. Nāgārjuna would not say or admit that *all* is unreal, or *all* has a relative existence only. On the other hand, there are some explicit passages to show that, according to him; the real is the absolute, and therefore beyond the categories of being and non-being and the rest of the empirical relations. In other words, Nāgārjuna's doctrine is the same as that which maintains the distinction of the worlds of *samvṛti* and *paramārtha*. This is clear from the following verses of the *Kārikā*:—

*Dve satye samupāśritya Buddhānām dharma-deśanā,
Loka-samvṛti satyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ.
Ye 'nayo na vijñānanti vibhāgam satyayordvayoḥ,
Te tattvam na vijānanti gambhīram Buddha-śāsane.*

XXIV, 8 and 9.

The teaching of the doctrine of the Buddhas is based upon two kinds of truth ; that which is truth with regard to the conditional world and that which is true in the highest sense.

Those who do not know the distinction between these two kinds of truth do not know the profound truth in the teaching of the Buddhas.

In fact to call the doctrine of *Śūnyatā* a doctrine of relativity, as Stcherbatsky does, and following him others have done, is a contradiction in terms¹. A good deal of confusion has arisen by mixing up Nāgārjuna's views about the nature of the phenomenal world (*samvṛti jagat*) with those about the real world (*pāramārthika jagat*), and even in the case of the phenomenal reality relativity is more of a method with Nāgārjuna than a metaphysical doctrine. It is a method employed to show the illusory and inconsistent nature of the world of experience. The ultimate reality according to him, as according to his predecessors of the same school, is characterised by *śūnyatā*² which is the most expressive name for a thorough going absolute existence, an existence which has been described as *prapañcopaśamam śivam*—that auspicious condition in which there is a cessation of all phenomenal existence or as *darṣṭavyopaśamam*³—one in which there is a cessation of all perceivability. Such doctrine of absolute existence as this should be the last thing to be called the

1. *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, pp. 42—43. "Since we use the term 'relative' to describe the fact that a thing can be identified only by mentioning its relations to something else, and becomes meaningless without these relations, implying at the same time that the thing in question is unreal, we, safely, for want of a better solution, can translate the word '*śūnya*' by 'relative' or 'contingent,' and the term '*śūnyata*' by 'relativity' or 'contingency.'"

2. M.K., I. I.

3. M.K., V. 8.

doctrine of relativity. That the doctrine of relativity is not the ultimate creed of Nāgārjuna and Mahāyānism appears to have been seen by Stcherbatsky at times, but he seems to be too prepossessed by the notion that *śūnyatā* is the doctrine of relativity to hold any other view¹.

Consistently with his absolutism Nāgārjuna does not admit the validity of the *pramāṇas*. This is clear from his other works bearing directly upon the subject, such as *Pramāṇa-viśeṣaṇa* (or *Pramāṇa-vi-dhvaṃsana*), *Vigraha-vyāvartanī-kārikā* and *Upāyakaūśalya hr̥daya-śāstra*. The Sanskrit originals of these works are lost, and only Tibetan versions are available.²

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1. Speaking of the principle of relativity Stcherbatsky says :
 'This principle, the pivot of the system, is called upon in order to destroy all theories and to replace them, as we have seen above, by direct mystic intuition, not in order to replace it by a new theory. As a theory it is just as bad as the old ones, it is even much worse. "If something non-relative" says Nāgārjuna, "did really exist, we would then likewise admit the existence of the relative, but there is absolutely nothing non-relative, how then can we admit the existence of the relative (or the truth of Relativity)" CBN., p. 49.

2. Vidyabhusana *HIL.*, pp. 256—261.

3. The Earlier Hindu Epistemology.

(iii) Epistemology of the Yoga-sūtras.

I have already discussed the date of the *Yoga-sūtras*, and have tried to show that they appear to be earlier than the *Nyāya-sūtras*, and also the *Sāṃkhya-Kārikās*. Thus it will appear that they contain the earliest exposition known to us of the *Sāṃkhya* Yoga epistemology. The *Yoga-sūtras* begin by defining Yoga as the inhibition (*nirodha*) of the activity (*vṛtti*) of the intellect (*citta*). In order to correctly understand the epistemology of the YS. it is important that the exact significance of 'citta' and 'vṛtti' should be understood. A study of the use of 'citta' in the various *Sūtras* shows that its connotation in the YS. corresponds to that of 'buddhi' in the *Sāṃkhya*. This is evident from the use of 'citta' and 'buddhi' in the YS., iv. 20. '*Cittāntara-dṛśye buddhi-buddher atiprasaṅgaḥ smṛti-saṃkaraśca*'¹, and of *buddhi* in YS., iv. 21. '*citer-apratisaṅkramāyās tadākāra-pattaḥ svabuddhi-saṃvedanam*'², where the two terms are synonymous. In

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1. 'If one cognition be cognisable by another, there will result an excessive series of one cognition after another and also a confusion of memories.
 2. There is a consciousness of its own cognition when the cognition takes the form of the non-moving intelligence (*citiḥ*), (which is identified with *puruṣa*).

fact these are the only two *sūtras* in which the word 'buddhi' is to be found in the YS., the other term 'citta' being used elsewhere. What is to be remembered about 'citta' is that, like 'buddhi' in the *Sāṃkhya*, usually it denotes the cognitive faculty, but at times it also signifies cognitive acts.¹ The other term 'vṛtti', which is often used with *citta* in the compound 'citta-vṛtti', means 'activity'; *citta vṛtti* being the activity of the intellect.²

The activity of the intellect is said to be five-fold, viz., that pertaining to the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), wrong cognition (*viparyaya*), imagination (*vikalpa*), sleep (*nidrā*) and memory (*smṛti*).

It will appear that the above classification is peculiar to the YS., and does not show any signs of the influence of the *Nyāya vaiśeṣika* epistemology. It is also of the primitive type.

1. It will appear that such English rendering of 'citta' as 'mind-stuff' adopted by Woods or 'thinking principle' employed by Rajendralal Mitra are not quite intelligible. The term 'intellect', when the cognitive faculty is meant, and 'cognition' when the act of that faculty is intended, are the more straight-forward translations of 'citta'.
2. Here again such renderings of 'vṛtti' as 'fluctuation' by Woods, or 'modification' do not seem to be quite appropriate, for they really express the result of the interaction between 'citta' and its object *through vṛtti* rather than the activity of the *citta* itself.

The *pramāṇas*, according to the YS. are direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and scriptural testimony (*āgama*)—(YS., 1.7). These are simply mentioned and not defined. The list is the same as that found in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikās*, with this difference that in the SK. we have '*drṣṭa*' for '*pratyakṣa*' and '*āptavacana*' for '*āgama*'.

Viparyaya is defined as wrong cognition (*mithyā-jñāna*) which is based upon a form of the object which is not its own—*atadrūparatiṣṭham* (YS., 1.8). An example of *viparyaya* will be the perception of a rope as a snake.¹

Vikalpa is that notion which follows the knowledge of words—*śabdajñānupāti*, and is devoid of an object—*vastuśūnya*. The commentators, all of them, understand by '*vikalpa*' that notion which is the result of predicating an attribute of a subject in a proposition which does not express the real nature of the object denoted by the subject. The example which has been given to illustrate it is : 'The true nature of the spirit is intelligence'—*cāitanyam puru-*

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1. Here again the term '*viparyaya*' has been translated variously into English. Both Rajendralal Mitra and Woods translate '*viparyaya*' as 'misconception', which word is apt to suggest that '*viparyaya*' does not include the error of sense-cognition, and simply refers to an error of judgment. The word is not peculiar to the *Yoga-sūtras* and is always used in the sense of wrong cognition as opposed to right cognition.

śasya svarūpam.' It is said that although the proposition verbally conveys the sense that the attribute of intelligence belongs to the spirit, the spirit being intelligence itself '*citir eva puruṣah*'—YB., the notion resulting from the verbal proposition has no truth corresponding to it, the term '*vastu*' being evidently taken in the sense of truth or real fact. It is maintained that this kind of notion expressed by the term '*vikalpa*' is not included in either *pramāṇa* or *viparyaya*. It is evidently for this reason that Woods following the interpretation of the commentators,¹ has translated '*vikalpa*' as a 'predicate-relation.' Now the question is whether '*vikalpa*' is to be treated as a form of error, as the commentators treat it, or it is to be taken in the sense of imagination. The language of the *Sūtra* and the context strongly suggest that it is imagination which is meant. There is no reason why *viparyaya* should not be taken to cover all kinds of error *mithyājñānam*, including the kind of error which, according to the commentators, is meant to be expressed by *vikalpa*. The definition of *vikalpa* as given in the *Sūtra* says that it is something which follows the knowledge of (the meaning of) words, and is devoid of an object ; that is to say, it is a notion associated with the use of words without the presence of the object referred to by them. There is nothing in the text to indicate that the notion is of the nature of an error, or that the object referred to should not be real in the sense that it should not be

1. *Yoga System of Patañjali*, (HOS.)

existent. All that is meant is that the object is *not present along* (co-existent) with the notion. Such knowledge, it will appear, corresponds to what we call imagination in modern psychology.

The definition of sleep (*nidrā*) is : *abhāva-pratya-yālabhanā vṛttir nidrā* (YS., I, 10)—‘Sleep is that activity which rests upon the notion of non-existence.’ The commentators emphasise the point that the word ‘*vṛttiḥ*’ has been particularly used in the *Sūtra* to draw attention to the fact that sleep is a positive activity and not the absence of activity. The content of this activity is the notion of non-existence, that is to say not an absence of consciousness, but an awareness of non-existence, the existence of which becomes evident on waking.

The definition of memory is given in rather obscure language. It is : *anubhūta-viśyāsaṃpramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ* (YS., I, 11), the chief difficulty about which is the exact meaning of ‘*asampramoṣaḥ*.’ The *Bhāṣya* does not comment upon the text at all ; Vācaspati Miśra explains it as ‘non-stealing’ (*asteyaḥ*),¹ while Bhoja in *vṛtti* renders it as ‘retention in the intellect by means of an impression’ ‘*saṃkāra-dvāreṇa buddhāvupārohaḥ*’ Woods, following the interpre-

1. ‘*pramāṇādibhir anubhūte viśaye yo ‘sampramoṣaḥ asteyaḥ sā smṛtiḥ*’. Memory is the non-stealing with regard to an object which has been cognised by means of *pramāṇas* and other means ; that is to say, that which is due purely to impressions (*saṃskāras*) is memory.

tation of Vācaspati Miśra, translates the *Sūtra* as 'Memory (*smṛti*) is not-adding-surreptitiously (*asampramoṣa*) to a once experienced object.' Now it will appear that of the two renderings as given by Vācaspati Miśra and Bhoja, the one by the latter is the more straightforward and natural. Vācaspati Miśra's rendering is based upon a rather far-fetched notion, and simply emphasises the fact negatively that memory is exclusively due to past impressions, while Bhoja's interpretation lays stress upon the factor of retention which is the essence of memory. The definition as given in the *Sūtra* would thus be 'Memory is the retention (lit. not letting go) of an experienced object.'

An object is known or not known, according as it is reflected or not reflected in the intellect, (YS., IV, 16). As regards the question how the intellect is cognised, it is said that the intellect cannot cognise itself, for *firstly*, it is not the principle of knowing, but only an object which is knowable (YS., IV, 18); *secondly*, it cannot be occupied with both the object and itself at the same time (YS., IV, 19); and *thirdly* in case it be said that one cognition might cognise another cognition, there will be a *regress ad infinitum*, which is undesirable (YS., IV, 20). The intelligence of the *puruṣa* (*citiḥ*), however, becomes aware of its own cognition (*buddhi*) when it assumes its form (*tadākārāpattau*) in the act of cognition,¹ (IV, 21).

1. Here I have accepted the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya* and the *Tattvavaiśārādī*. Bhoja's interpretation according

The intellect is able to perceive things when it is reflected upon by both the seer and that which is to be seen, that is to say, when it is connected with both the self and the object to be perceived (YS., IV, 22).

That true knowledge is acquired by the practice of *yoga*, and that this knowledge is different from that obtained by the ordinary means called the *pramāṇas* including testimony is clearly indicated in YS., I, 48 and 49. It is said that as the result of *yoga*, the intellect (*prajñā*) becomes cognitive of truth (*ṛtambharā*—lit. truth-bearing), and that this yogic intellect has objects for its cognition different from those that are cognised by it through testimony and inference, for those objects are of a special nature.¹

Before I close this section on the YS. I want to point out that in the YS.² the term *avidyā* is used in its Upaniṣadic sense of *ignorance* with regard to the true nature of reality and not in the sense of *error*, which meaning also it acquires in the *Vaiśeṣika*³ and

to which it is said in the *Sūtra* that *buddhi* knows itself when it is reflected in the intelligence of the *puruṣa*, is evidently wrong, for it is inconsistent with the Yoga doctrine, according to which *buddhi* or *citta* is altogether devoid of intelligence and hence precluded from knowing anything by itself.

1. According to the *Bhāṣya* '*viśeṣārtha*' means particular objects as opposed to those which are general. But there is no reason to hold the view that, according to the author, the Yogic intellect cognises only particular objects, nor is there anything in the text of the *Sūtra* to suggest that meaning.

the *Nyāya Sūtras*¹. The term *viparyāya* is used for error. This is another indication of the fact that the YS. are one of the earlier *Sūtras*.

The YS. may also be regarded as the first systematic exposition of the nature of mystic intuition, which came to be recognised by almost every later school and as providing thus an epistemological basis for the doctrine of appearance and reality.

2. YS., II, 3—5 and 24. The definition is contained in II, 3—5 “*anitya-śuci-dukkhānātmāsu nitya-śuci-sukhātma-khyātiravidyā*.”

3. VS., IX, 10—12.

1. NS., IV, 2.4.

(ii) The Beginnings of the Nyāya Epistemology as found in the Caraka-Saṃhitā.

It is interesting to find that the Hindu medical writers like Caraka and Suśruta did not consider the treatment of their particular subject complete without devoting some sections of their work to the problem of knowledge and reality. In the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, especially, one finds a brief account of a complete system of philosophy. The *Saṃhitā* as it has come down to us has evidently passed through the hands of a number of medical writers beginning with Ātreya, who was probably the original author of the treatise, and who is believed to belong to about the Sixth Century B. C. It was revised by Caraka who is known to have been a physician at the Court of Kaniska, in about the Second Century A.D., and it is after his name that the treatise is now known. Further additions to it were, however, made by another medical writer called Dṛdhabala, who must have lived, according to Hoernele's estimate, in about the Eighth Century A.D.¹ He added the last two books and some Chapters in the Sixth Book. The

1. *Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India*, I, Osteology-Introduction. pp. 7—16; Also Keith, *History of Sanskrit Classical Literature* pp. 506—507.

philosophical sections of the *Samhitā* are mostly found in the *Sūtra-sthāna* First Book) the *Vimāna-sthāna* (Third Book) and the *Śarīra-sthāna* (Fourth Book), which, in any case, can be taken to be not later than the Second Century A. D. the date of Caraka. It is evident from the philosophical doctrines of the treatise that they belong neither to such an early period as the Sixth Century B.C., which is supposed to be the date of Ātreya, nor again to such a late period as the English Century A.D., the probable date of Dṛḍhabala. They may, therefore, quite reasonably be taken to belong to Caraka, who really seems to be the author or compiler of the major part of the *Samhitā*, and that is also why it goes after his name.

While the philosophical position of the CS. as a whole as will be shown presently, accords with that of the *Nyāya* school, the author appears to be quite conversant with the terminology and the notions of the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools. He freely employs such *Sāṃkhya* terms as *vyakta*, *avyakta*, *prakṛti*, *puruṣa*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, etc.¹ Similarly, he mentions and defines the *Vaiśeṣika* categories of *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya*.² The fact that Caraka's definitions on the whole are not elaborate as those of the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya* Sūtras indicates that he was prior to the compilation of these Sūtras, although he appears to

1. *Sarīra*—, I.

2. *Sūtra*—, I.

have belonged to a period when the doctrines of the various schools had assumed a fairly definite shape.

Professor Dasgupta, however, thinks that the VS. must be earlier than the CS., for the CS. quotes a VS. and the list of *Guṇas* in it includes the six attributes absent in the VS. but found later on in the *Nyāyā-vaiśeṣika* manuals. I have not been able to trace the reference to the VS. in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* (Śarīra, 39) as given by Professor Dasgupta, but his argument based upon the inclusion of the later six *Vaiśeṣikā Guṇas* in the list of the CS. seems to be quite plausible. There are some facts, however, which suggest that the author of the CS. was not aware of the VS. and its author. In the first place, in the opening verses of the *Sūtra-sthāna* names of a large number of sages are mentioned as those who have been the traditional inheritors of the knowledge contained in the CS., but the name of Kaṇāda is absent even where we ought to have expected it, that is in connection with the mention of the doctrine of *dravya, guṇa, karma*, etc., for the first time in the verses, *Sūtra-sthāna* I. 27 and 28, which are as follows :—

*Maharṣayas te dadṛśur yathāvaj jñāna-cakṣuṣā,
Sāmānyam cā viśeṣam ca guṇān dravyāṇi karma cā-27
Samāvāyam ca tājjñātvā tantroktam vidhimāsthītāḥ,
Lebhire paramam śarma jivitam cāpi nirgadam—28.*

In the second place, the statement '*samavāyam ca tājjñātvā tantroktam*' which alludes to *Samavāya*

as *tantrokta* in the above verses indicates that the source of this list of the categories, according to the author of the CS. is not VS. but some other books which probably dealt with the rules of debate. This is confirmed by the fact that this list of the six categories appears as a part of the various factors of debate mentioned in *Vimāna*. VIII. 24, where also the various means of knowledge are mentioned. It is clear that these categories in the CS. are not treated as metaphysical in the sense in which they are in the VS. Further, the definitions of these as given in the CS. *Sūtra* I do not show any definite signs that the author of the CS. was aware of the definitions of these as given in the VS. On the other hand, the description of 'Sāmānya' as that which is the cause of increase, and of 'Viśeṣa' as the cause of decrease in *Śarīra*. I. 43 is very peculiar and, so far as I know, has no basis in the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine. The verse is as follows:—

*Sarvadā sarva bhāvānām sāmānyam vṛddhikāraṇam,
Hrāsa hetur viśeṣaśca pravṛttir ubhayasya tu.*

Although the metaphysical doctrines of the CS. have been discussed, the epistemological aspects of its philosophy have not been considered so far, and it is these which I propose to bring out here. Of the sections dealing with the philosophical problems, the *Śarīra-sthāna* is the most interesting and important. It opens with a number of questions, asked by Agni-veśa, about the nature of reality and its knowledge, and these are followed by answers to them as given

by the sage Punarvasu, who appears to be one of the prominent teachers of the doctrines contained in the CS. Having first asserted that those who are conversant with the self (*ātman*) say that it is inactive, self-dependent, self-controlled, all-pervading, puissant, as also knower of matter and the witness of everything, along with other questions Agniveśa asks the following with regard to the nature of the knower and the known.

Which is prior, the knower of matter, or matter? Here is a doubt: Without the prior existence of matter which is to be known, it is not reasonable to hold that there should be a knower of matter. If again, matter be prior, the knower of matter cannot be regarded as eternal. (*Śarīra.*, I, 6—7).

Then speaking of self as one 'possessed of omniscience, aloof from all things, freed from connection with everything, existing above, tranquil and the soul of every being,' it is asked, 'What are those indications by which it can be known—*kair lingair upalakṣyate* (*Śarīra.*, I, 12).

Punarvasu, in answer to the above and the other

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1. For translation I have freely adopted Avinash Chandra Kaviratna's English translation of the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, with such alterations at times as I have considered necessary. It may be noted however that the numbers of verses as given in the translation differ very much from those in the original Sanskrit edition of the Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay, which I have used and to which references are given here

questions, deals with the matter of all the forms of reality and his statements which are scattered over, and have been repeated in several sections and verses, may be summed up as follows:—

All besides the unmanifest (*avyakta*) is known as the objective world (*kṣetra*), and the unmanifest is the knower of this world (*kṣetrājñā*)—(*Śar.*, I. 64). That which is manifest (*vyakta*) is of two kinds: (a) that cognisable by the senses ; and (b) that beyond the senses, but which can be grasped by inference (*Śar.*, I. 61).

The manifested reality which constitutes the born self (*puruṣa*) consists of twenty-four elements or principles, viz., the five physical elements, the intellect, the unmanifest, self-consciousness, the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, mind, and the five objects of the senses. Of these, twenty-three (excluding the unmanifest) have been called the objects of knowledge, while the unmanifest is the knower of these (*Śarīra.*, I, 62—64).

It is from the unmanifest that the *puruṣa* attains to the condition of being manifest, and from the condition of being manifest he once more reverts to that of being unmanifest. When dissolution comes, he is once more dissociated from the various forms of manifested reality, the union of which with him is the result of desire. (*Śarīra.*, I, 66 and 67). Desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, activity, consciousness, volition, understanding, memory and self-consciousness,

these are the indications of the great self (*paramātmānaḥ*).¹

All things are of two kinds: existent (*sat*) and non-existent (*asat*); and these can be examined in four ways: (1) Testimony or words of trustworthy teachers (*āptopadeśa*); (2) direct knowledge (*pratyākṣa*, in the sense of sense-cognition); (3) inference (*anu-māna*); and (4) argumentation (*yukti*). These are explained as follows:—

Testimony. The *Veda*; whatever else is not contrary to the import of the *Veda*, and has been affirmed by the observant, whatever has been approved by those called righteous; and all the declarations of the scriptures calculated to benefit the world, constitute testimony which is trustworthy. (*Sūtra.*, xi, 25).

Direct knowledge (pratyākṣa). That cognisance which takes place and displays itself vividly at the moment, in consequence of the soul, the senses, the mind, and the objects of the senses being all united together, is said to be direct knowledge. (*Sūtra* xi, 18).

The various factors in direct knowledge are further explained as follows:—

The senses. There are five senses, five materials that constitute the senses (the five physical elements); five resting places of the senses (the sense-organs);

1. 'paramātmāna' here is evidently not used in its usual sense of God, but in the sense of a soul (*Jīva*)

five objects of the senses (colour, taste, sound, etc.); and five kinds of cognitions obtained through these senses. (*Sūtra.*, VIII, 1). That particular sense into whose composition a particular element (earth, fire, etc.) enters, follows or apprehends that particular object which has that particular corresponding element for its essence, the reason being that both partake of the same nature and the one is invested with power over the other (*Sūtra.*, VIII, 10).

Mind. Mind is regarded as something different from the senses. Its functions pertaining to its objects depend upon the soul. (*Sūtra.*, VIII, 1). The attributes by which one may define mind are the presence and absence of knowledge, since, though the soul, the senses, and their objects might exist in a state of juxtaposition, yet when there is no attention on the part of the mind, there can be no knowledge, it is only in consequence of the mind being present that knowledge arises. Subtlety and oneness have been regarded as the two attributes of mind (*Śarīra.*, I, 16 and 17). It may be supposed that there is more than one mind in one and the same person in consequence of the variety that is observable in the objects of the mind, in those of the senses, and in the resolutions of the mind, as also in consequence of the union of all the three constituents, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* with the mind. In reality, however, there is no multiplicity of minds in one and the same individual. If the mind were more than one it could simultaneously attend to more than one object. (*Sūtra.*, VIII, 3).

The mind is unconscious and active. It is the supreme soul that makes it conscious. When the soul becomes united with the mind, it is then that actions are imputed to it (*Śarīra.*, I, 74). Since the soul is ended with consciousness, therefore is it regarded as the actor. In consequence of its being unconscious, the mind, even though active, is said not to be the actor. (*Śarīra.*, I. 75). The senses become capable of grasping their respective objects only when they are led by the mind (*Sūtra.*, VIII, 34). Mind thinks about objects (VIII, 13).

Conditions of perceptual knowledge. The self is the knower. In consequence of its union with the organs its knowledge springs. When those organs become stained, or are not united with it, knowledge does not arise (*Śarīra.*, I, 53). Of one competent to behold, no vision arises in a stained mirror, or in a turbid water. After the same manner, if the mind happens to be obstructed, no knowledge can arise. (*Śarīra.*, I. 54).

Limitations of perceptual knowledge. The question of the limitations of perceptual knowledge arises in connection with the problem of existence after death, and the discourse, a part of which is reproduced here, is remarkable both for its acute reasoning and terseness of expression. 'Hence arises the doubt' says the author, 'as to whether, there is a state of existence after death or no such existence. Respecting this topic, however, he that is endowed with intelligence should cast off unbelief and that

conduct which is likely to spring from unbelief. The reason for casting off unbelief is this ; the portion of things that are addressed to the direct cognisance of the senses is small ; while the portion that is beyond their direct cognisance, but in whose existence faith is placed in consequence of the declarations of the scriptures, of immediate inference, and of reasoning, is great. The very senses by whose aid we become cognisant of objects within their direct sphere are themselves beyond their cognisance. As regards the forms again, of all existing objects, it is known that if these be very close to the senses, or very distant from them, or covered by other objects, or if the senses be weak and deranged, or if the mind be otherwise engaged, or if any of those objects be mingled together with others of their class, or if any of them be overwhelmed by something of superior energy, or if any of them be very minute, they cease to be directly cognisable even though they are before the senses. Hence, if it be affirmed that only those objects exist that are addressed to the direct cognisance of the senses, and those that are not so addressed do not exist, it would be a statement unsupported by reason. (*Sūtra*, XI, 5—6).

The importance of the physiological basis of perception is also realised when it is said that in consequence of the excessive use, the absence of use and the impropriety of the use of the senses in relations to their objects, the senses including the mind falling away from their normal condition, become obstructive

to the perceptions of which they are the respective sources or channels. In consequence again of a judicious correlation of the senses with their objects, they preserve their normal condition, and maintain in their normal condition the perceptions or knowledge respectively derived through them. (*Sūtra*, VIII, 11).

Inference (anumāna). Inference, which is based upon previous direct knowledge, is of three kinds, as having reference to the present, the past, and the future. For example, the existence of concealed fire inferred from smoke, the fact of sexual congress from conception, and beholding that fruit is produced from seeds, men of intelligence infer future fruits of a similar nature from similar seeds (*Sūtra.*, XI, 19 & 20).

Argumentation (yukti). This is a peculiar means of knowledge in the CS. and its meaning is not very clear. The following verse contains the clearest description of *yukti* that we can get in the work :

*Buddiḥ paśyati yā bhāvān bahu-kāraṇa-yogajām,
Yuktis trikālā sā jñeyā trivargāḥ sādhyāte yayā.*

Sūtra., I. 23.

In the above verse 'bahu-kāraṇa-yogajām' is evidently a misprint for 'bahu-kāraṇa-yogajān'. The cognition which perceives things as the product of the combination of a number of causes is known as *yukti* belonging to the three times, by which the triad is achieved. The text gives as instances of *yukti*

the facts that crops grow because of water, ploughing, seed and the weather, or that conception takes place because of the combination of the six elements (*ṣaḍ-dhātu-saṃyogād*)—*Sūtra.*, I. 21.

The syllogistic form of inference is also recognised and explained in the *Samhitā* under the Technical Terms where '*pratijñā*', '*upanaya*', '*hetu*', '*draṣṭānta*' and '*nigamana*'—the five parts of a syllogism are defined and illustrated much in the same way as in the *Nyāya-sūtras* of Gautama. In the same section '*aupamya*'—knowledge, by similarity, and '*aitihya*'—tradition are also mentioned as means of knowledge. (*Vimānā.*, VIII. 24).

It would be of no great use from the point of view of our enquiry to go into the details of the definitions of the various technical terms. It is to be noted, however, that most of them, together with the examples given to illustrate them, are the same as those given in the *Nyāya-sūtras*.

The next important point to be noticed in connection with the analysis of knowledge as given in the CS. is a recognition of the various factors which constitute the subject (*adhyātma*) in experience. It is said that the mind, the functions of the mind, the intellect (*buddhi*) and the soul constitute, in brief, the substances and qualities that are known by the name of '*adhyātma*' (*Sūtra.*, VIII, 8.).

Now after having given a complete analysis of the philosophical position of the author of the CS. on the

basis of the statements, which are scattered over a number of sections of the work, I would point out that the doctrines contained therein are distinctly in the same line with, and a development of those that we find in the Vedic literature of the previous period. The two fold nature of the self—the one pure and the other cosmic, the two kinds of reality—the existent or manifested and the non-existent or un-manifested, the instruments of knowledge and the analysis of experience the distinction between the soul, mind and the intellect, the knowability of that which is beyond perception by reasoning through inference, and by testimony, are all substantially the same as we found in the *Śata-patha Brāhmaṇa*¹ the *Aitareya Aranyaka*² and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*³ and the other Upaniṣads, and the traces of which we can discover ever in the hymns of Dirghatmas, Viśvakarman and Parameṣṭhin. The psychological and the logical analysis is, however, much advanced—more acute and systematic, and one can really feel that in the sections to which I have referred, the author has definitely and consciously tried to consider the problem of reality and its knowledge, not only in its bearing upon the nature of the ultimate principle of the universe, as the authors of the Vedic period did, but also with reference to the objects of ordinary experience. As has already been remarked the sections

1. This work, Part II, (iii).

2. *Ibid.*, II, (iv).

3. *Ibid.*, II, (v).

in the *Samhitā* dealing with the philosophical problems are distinctly indicative of the fact that the foundations of the systematic period of Indian Philosophy had already been laid. With regard to the general nature of the *Caraka* philosophy it may be said that it represents a metaphysical system which has an appearance of the *Sāṃkhya* because of some of the later *Sāṃkhya* terms which it employs but, which, in reality is as much of Vedic theism as any other system could be. The epistemological aspect of *CS.* is distinctly of the type of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikā* school, although crude and such as appears to be preliminary to the more developed doctrine of the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya-sūtras*. That it is so will be seen clearly when we come to discuss the epistemology of these two works.

(iii). Theory of Knowledge in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.

Like most of the Philosophical Sūtras, the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* also start on their enquiry with a view to find the means of obtaining the supreme good. It is said that it is the knowledge of the essential nature of substance (*dravya*), attribute (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*), which brings about the supreme good. It is also added that this knowledge is the result of a special merit on the part of the knower (*dharma-viśeṣa-prasūta*), and is obtained by an observation of the resemblances and differences of the categories.¹ A comparison of this enunciation of the nature and the contents of enquiry in *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* with that of the NS.² indicates that while the subject of the VS. is mainly physical and metaphysical, that of the NS. is logical and epistemological ; although the metaphysical treatment is also included under 'the objects of knowlege' (*prameya*). Considered

1. VS., I., 1. 4. *Dharma-viśeṣa-prasūtād, dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyanām padārthānām sādharma-vaidharmyābhyām tattva-jñānān niḥśreyasam.*

2. NS., I, 1. 1. *Prāmāṇa-prameya-samśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntā-vayava-tarka-nirnaya-vāda-jalpavitaṇḍhetvābhāsa-chala-jāti-nigraha-sthānām tattvajñānān niḥśreya-sādhigamaḥ.*

from the epistemological point of view, the VS. definitely appear to be prior to the NS., for their treatment of the means of knowledge is not so elaborate as that in the NS. Definitions of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) in the VS. are still of a primitive type, although it is also evident, e. g. from the description of inference, that certain logical notions in the VS. are just preliminary to those of the NS. This comparison of the VS. with the NS. from the point of view of the theory of knowledge confirms the view, which has come to be accepted for other reasons also, that the VS. are earlier than the NS.¹

The most important topic in the epistemology of the VS. is the cognition of substance, and it will appear that its treatment is marked by a high standard of philosophical analysis. It forms the chief argument for maintaining the reality of substance as something independent of cognition. There are no signs, however, to show that the argument is meant to be a refutation of any particular school of subjective idealism.

According to the VS. there are strictly speaking only two means of knowledge: direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), and inference (*anumāna*). Knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*), presumption (*arthāpatti*), implication (*sambhava*) and non-existence (*abhāva*) are regarded as only modes of inference.

1. See Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, Introduction*.

We do not find any pointed definition of direct knowledge in the VS. like the one we have in the NS. However, it is clear from the description of direct knowledge as given in a number of sūtras, especially in III, 1. 18—*ātmendriyārthasannikarṣād yaṁ nispādyate tad anyat*, that one form of it is regarded as the product of the contact of an object with the senseorgans and the soul. The agency of mind as a faculty of attention and volition is also recognised (III, 2. 3). Knowledge is ultimately a quality of the soul as in the NS.

There appears to be a good deal of confusion about the interpretation of certain sūtras which are supposed to explain cognition and also the inference of the existence of the soul. VS. VIII, 1. 1.—*dravyeṣu jñānam vyākhyātam*, has been taken by the commentators to mean that 'cognition has been explained while dealing with the subject of substances,' and they think it refers to Sūtras, III, 1. 2—*indriyārtha-prasiddhir indriyārthe-bhyo 'rthāntarasya hetuḥ* and III, 1. 18 already quoted above. Then the whole section from Sūtra III, 1. 1¹ to III, 1. 19² is supposed to deal with the question whether sense-cognition is a true mark of the existence of the soul or not. Now the difficulties which present themselves in accepting the traditional interpretation are as follows : (1) texts of the sūtras, especially those of III, 1. 3 to III, 1. 8. do not at all admit of the interpretation put upon them by

1. *prasiddhāḥ indriyārthāḥ*.

2. *Pravṛtti-nivṛttiśca pratyaga ātmani dṛṣṭe paratra liṅgam*.

the commentators, and this is evident from the many assumptions which they have to make with regard to the nature of the *pūrva-pakṣa* and the *uttara-pakṣa* ; (2) the marks (*liṅga*) of the inference of the soul are distinctly enumerated elsewhere in III, 2-4 and the whole subject of proof of the soul is discussed in the subsequent sūtras, and hence we already have a section in the VS. which is entirely devoted to this subject ; (3) If the Sūtra III, 1. 1 to 1. 19 be taken to refer to a discussion about the inferential mark of the soul *only*, the reference in Sūtra, VIII, 1. 1 that 'cognition has been explained while dealing with the topic of *substances*' (*dravyeṣu*) will hardly be justifiable. The reference, if right, clearly shows that in these sūtras the subject of cognition has been discussed with reference to substance in general, and not with reference to any particular substance. Further, if Sūtras, III, 1. 2 and III, 1. 18 only be taken as an explanation of the nature of cognition, it will appear that they by themselves hardly contain any such explanation. Personally I think the Sūtra, VIII, 1. 1 does not refer to this section at all, and I shall give my reasons for holding this view in the sequel. Faddegon¹ has noticed the enigmatical nature of the sūtras in this section, but in the absence of a better alternative, he accepts the traditional view that they deal with the proof of the existence of the soul.

It will be seen from the following interpretation of the sūtras that they really deal with the value of

1. *The vaiśeṣika System*, pp. 300-302.

what may be called, in modern phraseology, the sense-data for the knowledge of substance by inference. A distinction is evidently drawn between the objects of the senses (*indriyārtha*) and objects of cognition in general (*artha*). The meaning of *artha* is explained in VIII, 2. 3 as substance; attribute and action—'*artha iti dravya-guṇa-karmasu*'. The objects of the senses are the well-known five qualities of colour, taste, smell, touch and sound, either singly, or in combination with one another.

Now it is said in *Sūtra*, III, 1. 1 '*prasiddāḥ indriyārthāḥ*' that the objects of the senses are quite familiar.¹ In *Sūtra*, III, 1. 2 *indriyārtha-prasiddhir indriyārthebbyo arthāntarasya hetuḥ*'—it is stated that this well-known familiarity with the objects of the senses is the mark of (the existence of) an object different from the object of the senses.

Now here no particular kind of object is mentioned, but it is said that familiarity with the objects of

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1. It is important that the exact significance of '*prasiddhiḥ*,' should be understood. 'Cognition' or 'experience' with or without the adjective 'universal' does not express the sense of 'familiarity' which is chiefly meant to be expressed here. It is not the cognition of the objects of sense, but a familiar association of the same with certain objects which is regarded as of value in them for serving as a mark of inference. A realisation of this point will further show the untenability of the view which regards these *sūtras* establishing the existence of the soul on the ground of the cognition of objects. Compare the *Sūtra*.

the senses is the mark of an object different from the objects of the senses. These other objects could, therefore, be substance (*dravya*) and action (*karma*); but as action, by its definition, does not possess qualities—*eka-dravyām aguṇam*; etc. (I., 1. 17), it is only substances of which it is said that familiarity with the cognised qualities forms a mark, and these may be either the soul or any of the rest.

In *Sūtra* III, 1. 3—‘*so napadeśaḥ*’-‘*saḥ*’ can only refer to ‘*hetuḥ* in the previous *sūtra*, and so the meaning of the *sūtra* is ‘that familiarity with the objects of the senses as a mark is no mark (of a substance). The reasons for this objection are given in the following three *sūtras*. Firstly, because the cause (of the objects of the senses, i.e., of the qualities) is not known—*kāra-ñjñānāt*’ (III, 1. 4); secondly, because, among the effects, some have (the quality of) knowledge, while others do not have (the quality of) knowledge—‘*kāryeṣu jñānāt* (III, 1. 5) and ‘*ajñānācca*, (III, 1. 6)¹. What is said by way of an objection to *pūrva-pakṣa* is that familiarity with the objects of the senses

III, 1. 14. ‘*prasiddhi-pūrvakatvād apadeśasya*’ in which it is said that an inferential mark is preceded by the existence of familiar relation, and *Sūtra* III, 1. 15, ‘*aprasiddho*’ *napadeśaḥ*, etc.’ that which is not familiar is not an inferential mark.

1. Cf. Candrakīrti Tarkālakāra, who treats these two aphorisms as one and explains it to mean that because cognition is found in one kind of effect e. g. the body and is not found in another kind of effect, e g. jar, etc.

cannot serve as a mark of any substance, for the cause of these qualities is not known; and if it be said that the nature of the cause can be inferred from the nature of the effects, the difficulty is that some of them have knowledge, while others are without it. The main point in the objection is that unless a certain mark is previously known to be associated with a certain object, it cannot serve as a mark of any definite object. It cannot be said definitely whether cognised qualities are the mark of the soul, or of any of the other substances; for we do not know what their cause is. And as regards the effects among material things, some e.g. the bodies, have (appear to have) knowledge, while others, e. g. a jar etc, are without it and so it cannot be said for certain that material substances like bodies cannot be the cause of these qualities.

Then, in case it be said that the mark is something different (from being the effect of a particular kind of cause), it is further urged that (such a mark) is no mark '*anyad eva hetur ityanapadeśah*'; for any one thing cannot be the mark of any other thing – '*arthāntaram hi arthāntarasya anapadeśah*'. That is to say, nothing can arbitrarily serve as a mark of anything else. The mark and the object of which it can be a mark must stand in some definite relations to each other, and these are discussed in the following sūtras from III, 1. 9 to III, 1. 17, the last three of these containing a classification and examples of false marks (*anapa-padeśa*). Then it is pointed out in III, 1. 18

that what is known by the contact of the soul, the senses and the objects is different from a false mark — '*tad-anyat*', and hence it can serve as a mark of the existence of the substances with which it is known to be associated. Thus it will appear that the whole section really deals with the value of sense-data for inferring the existence of objects, and is also calculated to establish a metaphysical realism as against a subjective idealism which would maintain that all that we have is simply ideas as the result of cognition or against a scepticism which would hold that there is no proof of the existence of any substance spiritual or material behind or beyond the sense-impressions.

The above interpretation easily fits in with the language of the sūtras and the general context, while it is evident that the traditional interpretation is extremely strained, and works out only by a number of assumptions and insertions which are altogether unwarranted by the text and the context of the sūtras. As Faddegon observes, the commentators, in the interpretation of these sūtras, have been actuated by the idea of finding in the VS. a parallel to the section in the NS. which aims at showing that cognition cannot belong to the body and in doing so they have extremely distorted the natural meaning of the texts.

It will appear that a detailed discussion of the subject of cognition is started in the Eighth Book, which begins with the Sūtra, '*dravyeṣu jñānam vyākhyātam*'. It has been mentioned that this has been taken by the commentators to mean that the

subject of cognition has been explained in dealing with the subject of substances, and they think it refers to Sūtras III, 1. 2 and III, 1. 18, which I have already quoted and discussed above. This interpretation, I think, is incorrect, for in the first place, neither in Sūtras, III, 1. 2 and III, 1. 18, nor in any of the others, do we find *an explanation of cognition as such*. The subject discussed in that section, as has been shown, is really the value of the sense-data as marks of inference and in the second place, the language of the text of the *sūtra* suggests more that the reference is to the explanation of cognition with reference to substances which is going to be undertaken in the Eighth book, rather than to a previous explanation which is to be found nowhere at all. The locative case in '*dravyeṣu*' does not mean 'in the course of dealing with substances', as the commentators take it, 'with reference to substances' just as it does in '*jñānanirdeśe*' in *Sūtra*, VIII, 1. 3—'*jñāna-nirdeśe jñāna-niṣpatti-vidhir-uktaḥ*', and '*dravye*' in *Sūtra* VIII, 1. 7—'*dravye dravyā-guṇa-karmāpekṣam*'. further the past participle '*vyākhyātam*' has been used in the sense of 'being explained with reference to the explanation of cognition of substances that follows in the chapter, rather than in the sense of 'has (already) been explained.' A parallel use of a past participle in this sense is to be found in the third *sūtra* of the same chapter, which has been quoted above, where '*uktaḥ*', even according to Saṃkara Miśra, is used in the sense of 'incipient

action', and what follows confirms this interpretation. That the *Sūtra*, VIII, 1. 1. refers to the discussion which follows in the chapter is further confirmed by the initial word of the next *Sūtra*, '*tatra atma mana-ścāpratyakṣe*'—of these (that is, among the substances '*dravyeṣu*') soul and mind are not known by sense-cognition. The commentators have altogether neglected or missed the force of '*tatra*', in the *Sūtra*.

After having introduced the subject of particular kinds of cognitions in VIII 1. 3, the explanation follows ; and it will be found that a fairly deep insight into the nature of cognition is evinced in this section of the VS. The following statements are made :

When qualities (*guṇa*) and actions (*karma*) are cognised the substance is the cause of their cognition. That is to say, according to the VS. the substance to which the attributes and actions belong makes an impression upon the mind through the sense-organs, and hence is a cause of cognition. Behind the sense-data there is a substance as the cause of their cognition (VIII, 1. 4).

It is also from substance that we have the cognition of generality (*sāmānya*) and particularity (*viśeṣa*), for they, respectively, have no generality and particularity (VIII, 1. 5)¹. Generality and particularity have been described as notions depending upon cognition '*sāmā-nyaviśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam* (I, 2. 3). The

1. '*tata eva jñānam*' should be translated according to the text as 'it is, also from that that there is cognition,' and not 'it is the cause of the cognition' as several commentators have done.

meaning is that the notions of generality, e.g. substantiveness, and particularity, e.g. earthness, are not cognised like other qualities, but are known by an observation of substances in which they are found exemplified.

The cognition of substance, attribute and action depends upon the cognition of generality and particularity (VIII, 1. 6). A substance, an attribute, or an action can be definitely cognised as this particular substance, this particular quality or this particular action only when their generality and particularity are distinctly marked out.

The cognition of a substance is dependent upon the cognition of substance, attribute and activity. For the cognition of substance it is necessary that its attributes and activity should be cognised, but a cognition of these by themselves will not constitute the cognition of a substance. They should be cognised as belonging to a substance, and hence the cognition of substance also has been included as one of the conditions (VIII, 1. 7). It might be noted that the example given by Śaṅkara Miśra to illustrate the meaning of this *sūtra*. viz. 'A white cow with a bell is going' is not a happy one ; for it by the cognition of substance as a condition is meant that there should be cognition of some particular object, like the bell, in connection with the substance to be cognised, it will appear that this need not be so ; for the individuality of a substance can very well be marked out by its special attributes, and another substance like a bell need not

always be present in combination with the substance to be cognised.

That a particular substance is not regarded as the cause of the cognition of another substance by the VS. is clear from VIII 1. 10—'*dravyeṣu anitaretarākāraṇāḥ*', which says that among the substances one is not the cause of (the cognition of) another substance; for each of them, in case a number of substances are cognised in succession, is cognised because of its own cause, and the cognitions follow one another because of the sequence in their causes and not because one substance is the cause of that which follows it in cognition. (VIII, I. 11).

In the case of attributes and actions, as they themselves do not possess other attributes or actions, the cognition of them does not depend upon the cognition of any other attributes or actions. In other words, they are cognised directly (VIII, I. 8). However, in the case of the cognition of a substance as possessing a certain attribute, e.g. a white object, the cognition is due to the presence of whiteness as a co-existent quality in the substance and the cognition of this whiteness (VIII, I. 9).

Relations, such as found in 'this man,' '(something) done by you', 'feed this man,' depend upon understanding, that is to say, they do not belong to the objects in themselves (VIII, 2. 1); and this is so because they exist only in so far as they are cognised, and do not exist when they are not cognised (VIII, 2, 2).

Non-existence is also cognised by contrast. The non-existence of that which has ceased to exist is cognised by the absence of the past perception of it and the remembrance of the past ; the non-existence of that which has become existent is cognised by the perception of its existence and the memory of its previous non-existence ; and similarly the cognition of the non-existence of one thing in another thing e.g. of a cow in a horse. That which was never produced is absolutely non-existent. (IX, 1. 6. 10).

A special kind of direct knowledge (*prātyakṣa*) is possible in the case of Yogins and those who have practised Yogic concentration, according to which even the soul can be known directly by being presented to the mind. To them other substances together with the attributes and actions are also revealed in their intrinsic nature. (IX, 1. 11-15).

From these sūtras it is evident that, according to VS., there is a distinction between the appearance and the reality of things—both spiritual and material. The appearance is open to the ordinary means of cognition, while the reality is disclosed only to the specially disciplined minds. The fact that while describing the direct knowledge of soul and other substances, also the actions and attributes of these have been mentioned as knowable directly by the disciplined minds shows that, according to the VS. there is a distinction between the appearance and the reality of attributes and actions as well. In other words, the reality behind its appearance is not attributeless ; and

this doctrine, although peculiar and difficult to understand, is nevertheless consistent with the conception of a substance that it should possess attributes and actions. The recourse to a Yogic mind for the acquirement of true knowledge both in the *NS.* and the *VS.* is rather significant ; and the implications of this doctrine, so far as I know, have not been realised. While in the *NS.* there is simply a mention of the fact that true knowledge is acquired by the practice of *Yoga*, in the *VS.* we have sufficient details to show that, according to it, behind the world of appearance there is another world of reality, and that while the former is cognisable by the ordinary means of knowledge, the latter is revealed directly (without the medium of the senses) to those who have acquired special powers of concentration. To say that, in the *NS.* for example, the only distinction between true and false knowledge in view is such as is to be found in the correct perception of a post and the wrong perception of it as a man, is evidently wrong ; for certainly one does not require the discipline of a Yogic practice to dispel such an error of perception as that of perceiving a post to be a man.

Inference is called cognition by means of a mark (*laingikam*), and is characterised by such relations as (i) this is its effect (ii) this is its cause, (iii) this is its conjunct, (iv) this is its contradictory, (v) this is its co-existent (IX, 2. 1)¹. The inference

1. *Asyedam kāryam, kāraṇam, samyogi, virodhi, samavāyi, ceti laingikam.*

based upon these marks is drawn by means of the premises of an argument (IX, 2. 2)¹.

It will be shown in the section dealing with the NS. that these distinctions of inference in the VS. correspond to the three kinds of inference as described in the NS., viz. *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*.²

Memory is explained as the result of a special contact between the soul and mind, and of past impressions (IX. 2. 6). Dreams are also explained likewise³.

(It may be noted that IX, 2. 5—*asyedam iti buddhyapekṣitvāt*, which has been taken by the commentators to mean that knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*). presumption (*arthāpatti*), implication (*sambhava*), etc. are included in cognition by inference, for they depend for their origin upon the cognition 'it is its', evidently does not mean all this, and simply contains an argument in support of the statement made in the previous *Sūtra*, IX, 2. 4 that '*hetu, apadesā, liṅga, pramāṇa* and *karaṇa* are not different from one another in this respect that all depend upon the cognition 'it is its', that is to say, upon a relation. This is another instance of a strained interpretation by the commentators)⁴.

Doubt is explained as the result of the cognition of the generality (*sāmānya*) of an object and the non-

1. *Asyedam kārya-kāraṇa sambandhaś cāvayavād bhavati.*

2. Cf. Jayanāṛāyaṇa's *Vivṛtti* on IX, 2. 1. which also compares these with the three kinds of inference in the NS.

3. Cf. NS. IV, 2. 34, *smṛti-saṃkalpavacca svapnaviṣayābhimānaḥ.*

4. Cf. Faddegon, *Vaiśeṣika System*, p. 310, who, I find after I had noted this point independently, also has to make the same observation on the interpretation of this *Sūtra*.

cognition of its particularity (*viśeṣa*), together with the remembrance of the particularity¹; e. g. when an object appears to be like something, or unlike something which has already been seen,² and we are not sure what exactly is. Doubt arises from both knowledge (*vidyā*) and ignorance (*avidyā*); that is to say, knowledge of the general nature of the object of perception and ignorance of its particularity. For instance, in the case of doubt with regard to a tall thing as to whether it is a post or a man, the tallness, which is the common property of a post and a man, is perceived, while the particular characteristics of a post or of a man, which will distinguish the one from the other, are not cognised.

It is to be noted that in the VS. the terms '*vidyā*' and '*avidyā*' are used in the sense of knowledge and error also respectively with regard to the ordinary object of perception. *Vidyā* is defined as knowledge free from defect or error—*aduṣṭam vidyā* (IX, 2. 12); and *avidyā* as defective knowledge—*tad duṣṭa-jñānam* (IX, 2. 11). This defective knowledge is attributed to the defect of the sense-organs, or that of the past impressions—*indriya-doṣāt saṃskāra-doṣāccāvidyā* (IX, 2. 10). As has already been pointed out, the use of the terms '*vidyā*' and '*avidyā*', in this sense, appears to be a new departure in the VS.

1. VS., II, 2. 17 "*sāmānya-pratyakṣād viśeṣāpratyakṣād viśeṣa-smṛteśca saṃśayaḥ*" Cf. NS. II, 1. 22.

2. VS., II, 2. 18 and 19.

(iv) Epistemology of the Nyāya-Sūtras.

As I have already said, and as one can see from the literature of the preceding period, the NS. represent a system, which was the result of a gradual development of the logical tendencies of the thinkers who lived during the post-Upaniṣadic period, and it, in its turn, became the basis of logic and epistemology as found in the later period. Thus the NS. occupy a very important place in the history of Indian epistemology. In them we find a reference to the views of a number of schools of thought, although no special names are mentioned, and this absence of particular names had led to a good deal of speculation on the part of the commentators with regard to the nature and significance of these allusions. Some sections of the Sūtras have been supposed to refer to Buddhist doctrines, and to contain their refutation, and on the basis of these references inferences have been drawn by modern scholars with regard to the date of the NS. I shall have to say something about the nature of such sūtras in the sequel. At first I propose to deal with the theory of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) in the NS.

According to the NS., there are four means of knowledge, and these are : direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*, in the sense of sense-cognition), inference (*anumāna*); knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*); and verbal testimony (*śabda*)¹.

1. NS. I, 1. 3

In the course of critical examination of the theory of the means of knowledge an objection is raised that direct knowledge and the rest cannot be regarded as the means of knowledge, for they cannot be shown to operate in any of the three distinctions of time. For, *firstly*, if the means of knowledge be conceived to operate prior to the object cognised, it cannot be maintained that direct knowledge results from the contact of the senses with the object cognised; *secondly*, if the means of knowledge operate after the object cognised, the existence of the object is not proved by means of them; and *thirdly*, if they operate simultaneously with the objects cognised, then, in as much as each cognition is restricted to its own object, there can be no sequence among cognitions, that is to say, the cognitions of various objects must be simultaneous, and this would be inconsistent with the character of mind, which can attend to only one thing at a time.¹

The above objection is answered as follows: If there be no means of knowledge, then the denial of them also cannot be established, for that cannot be shown to exist in any of the three distinctions of time. If what is denied, that is to say the means of knowledge, does not exist, its denial also cannot exist. Further, if there be no means of knowledge to establish the existence of a thing, there will be nothing to establish the denial of the means of knowledge.

1. NS., II, 1, 8-11.

On the other hand, if the denial of them be established on the basis of some means of knowledge, the existence of the means of knowledge also gets established *ipso facto*. Besides, it is not true to say that the means of knowledge cannot be shown to operate on the cognised object in any of the distinctions of time, for the existence of a cognised object and the operation of the means of knowledge can be proved in the same manner as that of a musical instrument by means of its sound. In other words, the existence of the means of knowledge is inferred from the fact that there is actually knowledge of the cognised object.¹

The following objections are further raised : (a) that if the means of knowledge are proved by other means of knowledge, these, in their turn, must depend for their proof upon still others, and thus there will be an infinite regress, and (b) that if for the cognition of the means of knowledge, other means of knowledge are not needed, then just as the cognition of the means of knowledge would be accomplished without the other means of knowledge, so would the cognition of the object also.² These objections are met by the assertion that the apprehension of the means of knowledge is similar to that of lamp-light, that is to say, just as the lamp-light illuminates other objects and the lamp itself, so do the means of knowledge : they are the means of the cognition of things, and also of

1. NS. II, 1, 12-16.

2. NS., II, 1, 17 and 18

themselves.¹

Before considering the definitions of the various means of knowledge, I would like to make a few observations concerning their general nature as it has been described in the NS. We do not find any definition of *pramāṇa* in the NS. The *pramāṇas* have simply been enumerated and explained. In so far as they prove the existence of an object, as it were by illuminating it, they have been compared to a lamp. It is to be remembered, however, that the term '*pramāṇa*' is an ambiguous term, and may mean either (a) the means of knowledge, or (b) the form of cognition, or again (c) the means of proof; and it is freely used to express any of these². The discussion of the nature of the means of knowledge with reference to the objects of knowledge as stated above is not very clear. The main object in introducing it appears to be to emphasise the important fact that the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge go together, and that they are inter-dependent for a proof of their existence. If it is the very essence of the means of knowledge that they have reference to some object, it is absurd to ask whether they are prior, or posterior to the objects of cognition. The assertion, however, that if the means of knowledge be

1. NS., II, 19. Cf. S. C. Chatterji, *The Nyāya Doctrine of Pramāṇa*, *Journal of the Department of Letters, Calcutta University*, XVI, pp. 43-44.

2. Cf. G.N.Jhā, *Ṣadholal Lectures*, p.28; also F.W.Thomas, *Aristotelian Society Proceedings* 1921-22 p. 29, where he calls the *pramāṇas* the "means to truth".

supposed not to exist, their denial also is not possible, is clearly based upon a confusion between an existential proposition and a factual existence. For the denial of a mere existential proposition, e.g. that the means of knowledge exist, it is not necessary that there should be first a factual existence of them.

Direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) is defined in NS., I, 1. 4 : '*indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyaavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam*'. Before translating the *Sūtra* it is first necessary to discuss the exact significance of the terms *avyapadeśyam*, *avyabhicāri*, and *vyaavasāyātmakam* used in the definition. To me the *Sūtra* appears to contain one of the most remarkable definitions of direct knowledge by means of sense-cognition that I know of, and also, at the same time one which has been most misunderstood by the commentators and other later writers. The first part of the definition, viz., *indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam*—'knowledge produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the object', is the usual form of the definition of sense-cognition as found in the earlier literature. It is the last three epithets which form the characteristic feature of the definition in the NS. The first of these is '*avyapadeśyam*', about the meaning of which the commentators have differed from one another.

Vātsyayāna, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra have all of them discussed the meaning of '*avyapadeśyam*' in their commentaries. The first two of these

hold that it means 'unnameable'¹, while the third maintains, or rather explains the view, that it is impossible to have a sense-cognition which is not connected with a name, and that the word '*avyapadeśyam*' means that which is not the result of an inferential mark.'

Vātsyayāna says that 'the name is not operative at the time of the apprehension of the object, it is employed only for the sake of expression (*vyavahāra-kāle tu vyāpriyate*). Therefore the cognition of an object produced by the contact of sense-organs with it is non-verbal (*aśābdam*).²

Anticipating Vācaspati Miśra's explanation of '*avyapadeśyam*', Uddyotakara said : 'Some commentators explain that the qualification '*avyapadeśyam*' is added with a view to exclude inferential cognition. This is not right. Why ? Because the definition already mentions the qualification 'produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object.' As a matter of fact, inferential cognition does not proceed from the contact of the cognised object with the sense-organ ; hence the definition³ could not apply to inferential cognition.⁴

The following extracts from Vācaspati Miśra's *NVTT*. clearly bring out his interpretation. First he

1. Dr. Rüben in his recent edition of the *Nyāya-sūtras* (Leipzig, 1928) appears to follow this, 'nicht im Worte zu fassen', but he gives no discussion.

2. NB., I. 1. 4.

3. That is to say even without the qualification *avyapadeśyam*.

4. NV., I., 1. 4 (*Indian Thought*, Vol. V, No. 1. pp. 40, 41).

shows that all sense-cognition must be connected with name. He says: 'every object has a name ; there is nothing that is devoid of name ; this establishes the identity of the thing with its name ; the name is not the means by which the object is known ; as the object cow, when perceived, is perceived as 'this is cow', where there is a distinct co-ordination between the *this* and the *cow*, both of which are in the same case ; thus things being identical with the name, the perception of things must involve the perception of the name also ; hence there can be no perception devoid of verbal expression. Next he explains how *avyapadeśyam* has been used in the *sūtra* to exclude inferential cognition : When, from the contact of the sense-organ with objects we infer the motion of the sense-organ, the inferential cognition of this motion is also 'produced by the contact of the sense with an object', as it is from this contact that the inferential cognition proceeds. And it is with a view to exclude such inferential cognitions from the category of sense-cognition that the qualification '*avyapadeśyam*' has been added. '*Apadeśa*' is the statement of the reason or premise ; '*vyapadeśa*' is the correct statement of the premise ; '*ayaadeśyam*' is that cognition which is obtained from the said '*vyapadeśa*' or the statement of the premise ; and '*avyapadeśyam*' is that cognition which does not follow from the statement of the premise ; thus then '*avayapadeśyam*' is equivalent to 'non-inferential'¹.

1. Both the extracts are also quoted in *Indian Thought* under NS, I, 1. 4.

Now in order to determine the meaning of '*avyapadeśyam*' according to the author of the NS. we have to consider the use of '*vyapadeśa*' and '*apadeśa*' elsewhere in the older literature, and then the significance of the form '*avyapadeśyam*' as found in this particular aphorism. The term '*apadeśa*' occurs in the *Tantrayukti* as given in Kauṭilya's *Artha-sāstra*. Then we find it in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* IX, 2. 4 in which it is said that *hetu*, *apadeśa*, *liṅga*, *pramāṇa* and *karma* are not different from one another in sense : *hetur apadeśo liṅgam pramāṇam karaṇam ityanarthāntaram*. It is actually used in the sense of an inferential mark. In VS. III, 1. 14—*prasiddhi pūrvakatvād apadeśasya*. Its contradictory '*anapadeśa*' is used in VS. III, 1. 3, III, 1. 3, III, 1. 7 and III, 1. 8 in the sense of that which is not an inferential mark. In VS. IX 1, I and IX, 1. 3 we find the word '*vyapadeśa*' itself : '*kriyā-gua-vyapa-de ābhāvād prāg asat*' and '*asataḥ kriyagunna-vyapa-deśābhāvād arthāntaram*'. In the NS. themselves, besides '*avyapadeśyam*', which has been used only once in the aphorism under consideration, '*apadiṣṭa*' and '*apadeśa*' have been used in other aphorisms. The meaning of '*apadeśa*' in all its form is 'name', 'mark' or 'sign', including the inferential sign called '*hetu*' or '*liṅga*'.

It will appear that the controversy of the commentators over the meaning of *avyapadeśyam* is based upon a failure to understand the correct nature of the definition of direct knowledge as given in the NS. In the first place, it is wrong to think that the three

epithets *avyapadeśyam*, *avyabhicāri*, and *vyavasāyātmakam* are meant to express something in addition to what is said in the phrase '*indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam*.' They simply bring out what is implied in that phrase ; that is to say, the whole clause is an analytic proposition. Thus, even though the phrase '*indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam*' might exclude inferential knowledge the term '*avyapadeśyam*', in the sense of 'non-inferential' will not be out of place in so far as it brings out the implication of that phrase. In the *second place*, the term '*avyapadeśyam*', as we have seen, may mean that which is not the result of both name and inferential mark.; and this meaning would be quite consistent with at least one view of the nature of direct knowledge, viz., that which regards it as both non-descriptive and non-inferential—knowledge corresponding to our modern conception of 'simple apprehension' or 'acquaintance', and which came to be known as *nirvi-kalpaka pratyakṣa* later on. Vācaspati Miśra's objection to Vātsyāyana's and Uddyotkara's interpretation of '*avyapadeśyam*' is evidently based upon the view that there cannot be any non-descriptive knowledge, which, although, one which is held by some of the thinkers even in modern times, there is no reason to believe, was held by the author of the NS. On the other hand, as will be shown presently, the other two epithets also '*avyabhicāri*' and '*vyavasāyātmaka*' indicate that direct knowledge, as defined in the NS. corresponds to what is called 'simple apprehension,' or

‘acquaintance’ in modern terminology.¹

Even if we consider the three epithets as indicating the nature of direct knowledge over and above what is said in the phrase ‘*indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam*’, the term ‘*avyapadesyam*’ in the sense of ‘that which is not the result of a mark or sign’ will serve the purpose of distinguishing between sense-cognition on the one hand, and inference and verbal testimony on the other. For it will appear that in inference and testimony also there is a contact of sense-organs with their objects, although not with the particular object which is said to be inferred or known by testimony. But all that is said in the *sūtra* is ‘the contact of a sense-organ with its object’—‘*indriyārtha-sannikarṣa*’, and this by itself will not exclude inference or testimony from the definition. In the knowledge of fire by noticing smoke, there is the contact of the eye with the smoke; and the knowledge of fire is the result of this contact of a sense-organ with its object. Similarly, in knowing, on the testimony of the reports which appeared in the papers, that the king was ill, there was the contact of my eye with the words of the reports that I read in the papers, or of my ear with the words of the report which might have been read out to me by some other

1. In my paper on ‘Is there Acquaintance or Simple Apprehension?’ I have discussed the nature of this kind of knowledge from the point of view of both European and Indian philosophers. (See the Appendices)

person ; and the knowledge of king's illness was the result of such a contact. The knowledge of fire by inference, or of king's illness by testimony as described above, however, is the result of a certain mark or sign—'apadeśa', or 'vyapadeśa' which is meant to be excluded from the definition of *pratyakṣa*; and hence the condition that it should be *avyapadeśyam*.

That 'vyapadeśyam' was used in earlier literature to denote that which is the result of an inferential mark, and that *pratyakṣa* was regarded by some early philosophers as 'avyapadeśyam' in the sense that it is not the result of an inferential mark is conclusively corroborated by a passage in the *Śabara-bhāṣya* under MS., I, 1. 5, where it is shown that while all cognition is known by inference as the result of a mark in the form of the cognised object, and is, therefore, 'vyapadeśya', *pratyakṣa* is direct apprehension of an object and hence 'avyapadeśya'¹.

The next term to be considered in the definition of direct knowledge is 'avyabhicāri', which means 'non-discrepant', and has been taken to signify that direct knowledge is non-erroneous. 'Atasmins tad iti tad vyabhicāri ; yat tu tasmins tad iti tad avyabhicāri pratyakṣam iti', says Vātsyāyana in *Bhāṣya* on NS., I, 1. 4. Although the connotation of *avyabhicāri*—'non-discre-

1. Na cārtha-vyapadeśam antareṇa buddheḥ rūpopalambhanam ; tasmān nāvyapadeśyā buddhiḥ, avyapadeśyam ca nāpratyakṣam —SB., (BI.), p. 10. This text has been discussed by me under *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, *Śabara-bhāṣya*.

pant' is not strictly the same as that of *abhrānta*—'non-erroneous', which term was later on used by Dharma-kīrti in his definition of direct knowledge, there is no reason to believe that the author of the NS. did not use it in the sense of 'non-erroneous': for the term '*avyabhicāri*' appears to have been quite freely used as an equivalent of '*abhrānta*' by quite a good number of early authors¹. The main object in laying down the condition that direct knowledge should be 'non-erroneous' is to emphasise its epistemological nature as a *pramāṇa* as distinguished from the mere psychological process of sense-cognition as it was defined to be by the earlier authors.

The third term : '*vyavasāyātmakam*' also explains one of the essential characteristics of direct knowledge, viz., that it is definite ; that is to say, what is perceived directly is of a definite character so far as it goes. For example, if I hear a sound, it is bound to be of a definite pitch and of a definite quality, although I may not know nature of its source.

Thus the definition of *pratyakṣa* in the NS. would be : 'that cognition which is the product of the contact of the sense-organs with the object ; which is non-inferential and non-descriptive ; non-discrepant and definite'. This corresponds to the later *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* in Indian philosophy, and to 'simple apprehension' or 'acquaintance' in the systems of some modern thinkers, with this exception, which I think

1. *Śabara-bhāṣya*—pp. 7 and 8.

is correctly made, that according to the definition in the NS. *pratyakṣa* is said to be definite, while, the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* has been supposed to be vague' in character.

Those who drew a distinction between the *nirvikalpaka* and the *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* later on have tried to find a support for this division in the definition of *pratyakṣa* in the NS. by suggesting that the term 'avyayadeśyam' implies the *nirvikalpaka*, and 'vyavasāyātmakam' the *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*. The construction of the *sūtra*, however, does not in the least admit of the interpretation ; for evidently 'avyapadeśyam' and 'vyavasāyātmakam' do not signify two alternative characteristics of *pratyakṣa* in the *Sūtra*.

In the course of an examination of the nature of direct knowledge in the NS. an objection is raised that all sense-cognition is a case of inference ; for it takes place by means of the cognition of only a part of the cognised object.¹ This is met by the assertion that only so much of the cognition is direct knowledge as is cognised directly'.² This statement is a clear indication of the fact that, according to the author of the NS., direct knowledge is only that sense-cognition which is simple apprehension, or mere acquaintance with the sense-data. All complex perception, such as was called *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* later on, and is called

1. NS. II, 1. 30. *pratyakṣam anumānam ekadeśa-grahaṇād upalabdheḥ.*

2. *Ibid.* II, 1. 31. 'Na, *pratyakṣeṇa yāvat tāvadapyupalam-bhāt.*

knowledge by description in modern philosophy, has an inferential element in it.

Inference is defined as that which is preceded by direct knowledge, and is said to be of three kinds: *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.¹ Much ingenuity has been spent by the commentators upon the interpretation of '*tat pūrvakam*' and the three kinds of inference. There is no difficulty about the meaning of '*tat-pūrvakam*' for in the preceding *sūtra* we have a definition of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*),² and '*tat*' naturally refers to that. Whether it is one act of direct knowledge that precedes an inference, or more than one, does not matter. The terms '*pūrvavat*' and '*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*' are really obscure ; and the explanations given by the commentators, as will be seen presently, are conflicting and inconsistent.

To take Vātsyāyana only, who is the earliest commentator known to us, the explanation of the three kinds of inference, according to him is as follows:—

(1) 'The *pūrvavat* inference is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause; e.g., 'when we see clouds rising, we infer that there will be rain.'

The *śeṣavat* inference is that in which the cause is inferred from the effect ; e.g. 'when we see that the water of the river is not like what it used to be, the stream is full and the current swift, we infer that there

1. अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववच्छेषवत् सामान्यतो दृष्टं च ॥ अ० १

आ० १ सू० ५.

2. व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम्.

has been rain at the source' (up the river).

'The *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa* inference ; e.g., we have observed in all cases that we see a thing in a place different from where we saw it before, only when it has moved; and this is found to be so in the case of the sun ; therefore, we infer that the sun moves, or has moved, although we cannot cognise it directly.

'Or (another explanation may be as follows) :—

The *pūrvavat* inference is that in which out of two things as cognised by sense on some former occasion, the one that is not perceived (at the time of inference) is inferred from the sense-cognition of the other; e.g. when fire is inferred from smoke.

The word '*śeṣavat*' means remainder; hence, the *śeṣavat* inference is that in which with regard to an object some of the likely properties being denied (eliminated), and this elimination being not applicable to other likely properties, we have the cognition of those that remain (thus uneliminated); e. g. with regard to sound we find that it is an entity (*sad*), and is transient (*anityam*); and as these two properties are found to be common to substance (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*), and actions (*karma*) only, their presence is sound distinguishes it from the remaining categories of generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inference (*samavāya*).¹ Then their being a doubt as to whether sound is a substance, or a quality, or an action, (we reason as follows) : Sound cannot be a

1. All of which three are entities (*sad*) but eternal (*nityam*).

substance, because it inheres in a single substance (*eka-dravyatvāt*) ; it is not an action, because it is the cause of another sound (*śabdāntara-hetutvāt*) ; therefore sound is seen to be quality which is the only alternative left by elimination.

The *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference is that in which the relation between the probans (*hetu*) and the probandum (*sādhya*) being imperceptible, the imperceptible probandum is inferred from the similarity of the *probans* to something else; e.g. when the self is inferred from desire; desire, etc. are qualities, and qualities always inhere in substance; therefore that which forms the substratum of these¹ is the self (*ātmā*).²

After Vātsyāyana, uddyotkara has still more ingenious explanations to offer. According to him, the three kinds of inference may mean: *firstly*, (1) inference by agreement (*kevalānvayi*) (2) inference by difference (*kevala-vyatireki*), and (3) inference by agreement and difference (*anvaya-vyatireki*); or *secondly*, they mean *the conditions of all inference* : (1) *Pūrvavat*—that the probans (*hetu*) should be invariably accompanied by the probandum (*sādhya*) ; (2) *Śeṣavat*—that the probans (*hetu*) must have been noticed as invariably accompanied by the probandum (*sādhya*)

1. That is to say desire, etc.

2. In translating the *Bhāṣya* I have mainly followed Dr. Jhā's English Transl. (*Indian Thought*) with such alterations as I have considered necessary.

in other cases (*śeṣa*); and (3) *sāmānyātodrṣṭa*, which is '*sāmānyataḥ*' and '*adrṣṭa*'—that the probans (*hetu*) not common to the probandum (*sādhya*) and that which is not-probandum (*sādhyaḥbhāva*). It is further said that the implication of '*ca*' in the *sūtra* is that (a) the inference should not be opposed to sense-cognition (*pratyakṣa*), and (b) it should not be opposed to the scriptures (*āgama* ; *thirdly*, the three kinds of inference may denote what the *Bhāṣya* has said in the first explanation, although the example of the sun as given by Vātsyāyana to illustrate the *sāmānyātodrṣṭa* does not meet Uddyotakara's approval. According to Uddyotakara, *sāmānyātodrṣṭa* is that general case in which the relation between the probans and the probandum is not causal, and yet the inference is valid. For example, from the appearance of cranes at a certain spot it may be inferred that there is water near it.

Uddyotakara has still more explanations to offer, and after him Vācaspati Miśra too has his own. They are so many, so varied, so divergent, so long, and in some cases, so of the the text of the NS. that neither is it possible, nor is it worth while, to mention all of them.

All modern scholars, like Garbe,¹ Jacobi,² Keith,³

1. *Sāṃkhya und Yoga*, p. 13, and *Sāṃkhya Philosophie* pp. 153 ff.

2. *Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1895, p. 204.

3. *ILA.*, pp. 88-90.

and Rüben,¹ usually follow Vātsyāyana's first explanation of the three kinds of inference, although several of them have noted the unsatisfactory and uncertain nature of the interpretations of the commentators.

According to Garbe's interpretation, inference is of three kinds : it may proceed from cause to effect (*pūrvavat*), or contrariwise (*śeṣavat*), or it may proceed from the general concept (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*) in such a way that one infers a characteristic observed in the case of one object also in the case of another object which falls under the same concept. The last kind of inference was formerly regarded by Garbe (in *Saṃkhya Philosophie*) as *inductive*, but later on (in *Saṃkhya und Yoga*) he accepted Jacobi's view that it is *deductive*. Keith has followed Vātsyāyana's interpretation, although he points out the incoherence of Vātsyāyana's explanation of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* with the examples given in NS. II, 1, 37 and 38. Rüben translates *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as inference by analogy, which phrase represents more his interpretation of this kind of inference than a translation of the term *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.

What strikes one most about these interpretations is that they are not, in most cases, in accordance with the significance of the technical names given to these inferences and the examples cited in the examination of inference in the NS.² The inge-

1. *Die Nyāya-sūtras*, Leipzig, 1928.

2. NS., II 1. 37 and 38.

nious explanations given by the various writers may be all very good as the possible forms of inference, and yet they may not represent the view of the author of the NS. For example, Uddyotakara's attempt to show that these names do not represent three different kinds of inference, but three *conditions* of all inference, is certainly not accordance with the meaning of the NS. where it is distinctly said that inference of three kinds : '*tri-vidham anumānam pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭam ca*'. The various alternative and divergent explanations of the commentators are a distinct proof of the fact that they could find nothing as a sure guide of the determining of the exact significance of the three kinds of inference according to the author of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, I venture to offer an interpretation of my own, which I think is consistent with the examples given in the *Nyāya-sūtras* II, 1. 37 and 38, and has its support in *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* IX, 2. 1, which contains the marks of inference according to the author of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. The three examples cited in the course of the examination of inference should naturally refer to the three kinds of inference enumerated along with the definition of inference and the marks of inference mentioned in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* should be a better guide to the interpretation of the three kinds of inference given in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* than an exposition of the same subject by writers and commentators who were far more removed in time than the author of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, and who were influenced in their writings by schools of philosophy

more divergent in their doctrines than the *Vaiśeṣika* school. Let us first consider the terms themselves. Uddyotakara has raised the question of the meaning of these in the *Nyaya-vārtika*. He says : “The term ‘*pūrvavat*’ has been used. What is the denotation of ‘*pūrvavat*’ then ? Does it denote an effect or a cause ? If ‘*pūrvavat*’ means that which has an antecedent, then it denotes an effect (*kārya*) and in that case it becomes a contradiction to say that it (*pūrvavat*) denotes an inference from a cause to effect. We do say (hold) that ‘*pūrvavat*’ is that which has an antecedent (*purvam asyāstīti pūrvavat*), but it does not signify an effect. What is it then (which it signifies)? It means cognition (*jñānam*), that there is an antecedent object to cognition (*jñānasya purvam viṣayaḥ*) ; and thus *pūrvavat* signifies the inference of an effect. Similarly, *śeṣavat*, etc. apply to the cognition of their objects. Or, the affix in *pūrvavat* may be taken as ‘*vati*’ (denoting ‘similarity’ and not ‘possession’ as *matup*’), the meaning being that an object is cognised by inference just as it was known by inference, and hence it is known as before (*pūrvavad dr̥ṣṭo bhavati*).¹

The above attempt by Uddyotakara at determining the derivative meaning of the various terms is unfortunately as vague and rambling as that at explaining the various types of inference denoted by them. ‘The aphorism in which the terms occur is : *Athā tat-pūrvakam tri-vidham anumānam pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānya-*

1. NV. p. 852.

todṛṣṭam ca. Here the plain syntax is that the three words : *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭam* qualify *anumānam* the meaning being that inference (*anumāna*) is that which has an antecedent (*pūrvavat*), that which has a remainder (the implication by antithesis being 'that which has a consequent'—*śeṣavat*), and that which has been commonly seen (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*) as the object of cognition. Uddyotakara also admits that '*pūrvavat*' means 'that which has an antecedent', but then his interpretation that it might refer to the inference of an effect is unjustifiable both from the point of view of the text of the *sūtra* and the general context. The other interpretation, which he puts forth following Vātsyāyana, that '*pūrvavat*' signifies a cognition by inference similar to one previously obtained by sense-cognition is in no way applicable to '*pūrvavat*' inference only, for all kinds of inference by their very nature and definition are *pūrvavat* in that sense; that is to say, they are based upon, and are according to, a connection between the probans and the probandum previously cognised by sense-cognition. It will appear that the plain and straightforward interpretation suggested by me finds its support not only in the *Nyāya-sūtras* themselves, but also in a few reliable authorities outside them. Now in the *Nyāya-sūtra* II, 1. 37 the first two examples are those of embankment (*rodha*) and damage (*upaghāta*) with a view to show that the swelling of a river may be due to an embankment and not to the falling of rain, and the carrying off of eggs by ants may be due to a

damage to their nest rather than it be an indication of the approach of rains. In other words, the first example refers of the inference of an antecedent—of a cause, from the observation of a consequent—of an effect; and the second, to the inference of a consequent—of an effect, from the observation of an antecedent. The carrying of eggs by ants may be taken as an antecedent sign of the rain, but whether it can be reckoned as a cause is questionable.¹ The first of these is, therefore, *pūrvavat* and the second *śeṣavat*. It will appear that in the *Vaiśeṣika* IX, 2. 1—‘*asyedam kāryam kāraṇam saṃyogi virodhi samuvāyi ceti laiṅgikam*’, we have a mention of three kinds of inferential marks in the order of (1) this is an effect of this, (2) this is a cause of this, and (3) this stands in the relation of conjunction, contradiction and inherence to this.

It will be seen that the *pūrvavat* and the *śeṣavat* inference in the *Nyāya-sūtras* correspond to the first and the second in the above *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. The relations of conjunction, contradiction and inherence as mentioned in this VS. evidently refer to the relation of co-existence both in its positive and negative aspects and we shall see that the *sāmānyato-dr̥ṣṭa* of the *Nyāya-sūtra*, is much the same. The terms means ‘that seen or known by common experience’, that is to

1. Cf. G.N. Jhā, *Indian Thought*, VIII, pp. 238 & 239 note.

say, an inference based upon a well-known relation of co-existence or the absence of co-existence. For instance, to take the example given in NS. II, 1. 37, 38 from the screaming of a peacock we infer the presence of a peacock, for the screaming of a peacock and a peacock are known to co-exist.¹ Thus it will appear that while the *pūrvavat* and the *śeṣavat* refer to the relations of antecedence and consequence respectively, the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* refer to that of co-existence or concomitance. This interpretation fits in with the examples of inferences given in the *Nyāya-sūtras* themselves, and also with the description of the inferential marks in the VS. IX, 2. 1.² The *Vārtika*, while commenting upon NS. II, 1. 37, curiously enough admits that the examples

1. To take the screaming of a peacock as a sign of the approach of clouds or rain, as some have done, would not be a specific example of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, for that may as well be an example of *śeṣavat*. In the *Sūtra* itself we have simply '*sādrśya*'.
2. Also cf *Vṛtti* on II, 1. 37 where it gives an alternative explanation which exactly corresponds to that given by me. 'Or, in the *Sūtra* containing the definition *pūrvavat* is that whereby an antecedent probandum is inferred; *Śeṣavat*—that whereby a consequent probandum is inferred; and *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*—that whereby a present or concomitant probandum is inferred'.

Also cf. *Caraka-Saṃhitā*, *Sūtra-sthāna* XI, 19, 20 where inference is classified as referring to the present, the past and the future. The discussion about the reality of the distinctions of past, present and future in NS. II. 1,

given the *Sūtra* illustrate the three kinds of inference mentioned in NS., I, 1, 5. It says: what inference is has already been explained in *Sūtra*, 1, 1. 5. The following are the examples of the three kinds of inference *pūrvavat*, and the rest (enumerated under *Sūtra*, I, 1. 5): (1) The full river (leading to the cognition its having rained up the river); (2) the running about of ants with their eggs (leading to the cognition of coming rain); and (3) the scream of the peacock (leading to the cognition of the presence of the peacock). It will be found, however, that this interpretation here is inconsistent with its comments upon NS., I, 1. 5.¹

39-43, immediately following the examination of inference also lends support to the same interpretation of the three kinds of inference.

1. Dhruva in a paper : *Trividham Anumānam* or A study in *Nyāya-sūtra* I, 1, 5 (Proceedings of the First Oriental Conference, Poona) first shows the unsatisfactory nature of the explanation of the three kinds of inference as given by the commentators including Vātsyāyana, and then tacitly assumes that Vātsyāyana's explanation was correct. About Vātsyāyana's explanation he says first 'The two sets of explanations together with their illustrations are so radically different from each other that the writer evidently seems to be groping in the dark for the real meaning of the *Sūtra*' (p, 253), and then at another place, he asserts : Vātsyāyana, when he says that *Pūrvavat* and *Śeṣavat* may mean, respectively, inference from

In the examination of the definition and classification of inference an objection is raised that the conclusion of an inference may be vitiated by the existence of the plurality of causes, or the similarity of a co-existent sign. For example, the swelling of a river may be due to a local embankment instead of the falling of rain up the river; ants may be carrying off their eggs out of fear because of damage to their nest; and lastly, the supposed screaming of a peacock may be only a mimicking of the same by some man. These objections are answered by the assertion that the real grounds or signs of inference are different from the false ones; or in other words, the plurality of causes is denied, and it is maintained that the relations of cause and effect, or those of the marks of inference and that which is inferred, are reciprocal; and; therefore, of a unique nature.

Knowledge by similarity (upamāna) is defined as the cognition of an object by means of its resemblance to something well-known¹; as for example, to know that a certain animal is *bos gavaeus* by virtue of its resemblance to a cow, which is a well-known

cause and inference from effect, is doubtless in possession of the real meanings of the terms as used in the Sūtras, (p. 262). Professor Dhruva, curiously enough, neglects altogether the examples of inference as given in the NS. II, 1. 37 and 38, and does not explain how and why one of the explanations as given by Vātsyāyana may be accepted as correct.

1. NS. I, 1. 6.

animal.

In the examination of knowledge by similarity as a means of cognition the following objections are raised :—

(a) That knowledge by similarity does not provide any sure basis for right cognition in so far as neither a complete similarity, nor a considerable similarity; nor again a partial similarity can establish the identity of an object.¹

(b) Knowledge by similarity is not different from inference, for both of them seek to establish the existence of something unperceived by means of that which is perceived.²

The above objections are answered by the assertions: (a) that knowledge by similarity depends upon a well-known similarity—'*prasiddha-sādharmyād upamāna-siddheḥ*³, and not on degrees of similarity; and (b) that in cognition by similarity it is not that some-

1. NS. II, 1. 44.

2. NS., II, 1. 46.

3. To translate this text as 'through similarity in a high degree', as Vidyābhāṣaṇa has done, NS (SBH., p. 35) is evidently wrong both from the point of view of the language and the context. For 'similarity in a high degree' is not different from 'considerable similarity' mentioned in NS. II, 1. 44, and the answer to the objection contained in that sūtra means to suggest a different kind of similarity as the basis of similarity viz. *prasiddha-sādharmya*—a well-known similarity.

thing unperceived is cognised by that which is perceived, but that the object known by similarity is also perceived, and hence knowledge by similarity is different from inference. Further, the use of 'so' (*tathā*) in the act of comparing shows that it is different from inference (where the word 'because' would be used).¹

It will be seen that knowledge by similarity has not been recognised as an independent means of knowledge by several schools. The essential value of knowledge by similarity appears to consist in a definite identification of an object as so and so called by a certain name. So far as mere sense-cognition is concerned, it can certainly be complete without a comparison—a *bos gavaeus* can be completely cognised as something without comparing it with any other object, but the definite knowledge that it is this particular animal would depend upon the act of comparison with reference to some kinds of similarity.²

Verbal testimony is defined as the assertion of a reliable person and is said to be of two kinds: (1) that which refers to things seen, and (2) that which refers to things unseen.

In the examination of verbal testimony an objection is raised that it is only a case of inference, and

1. NS. II, 1. 45, 47, 48.

2. Cf. *Tātparya* on NS., II. 1. 46—"So that in cognition by similarity, the cognition of the perceived bull gives rise to the cognition of the animal bearing the name of 'gavaya' which is not perceived".

not a separate means of knowledge; for just as in inference, so in verbal testimony, something unperceived is known by means of a sign or a mark, which is the word, and that the relation between a word and that which it signifies is of the same kind as that between an inferential mark and that which is inferred.¹

In answer to the above objection it is denied that the relation between a word and what it signifies is of the same kind as between an inferential sign and the object inferred. The former is said to be conventional as distinguished from the latter which is natural. Further the ultimate ground of verbal testimony is to be found not in the word itself, but in the reliability of the person from whom it proceeds.²

A further objection that the testimony of the Veda is unreliable because it is vitiated by the faults of untruth, contradiction and tautology is answered by the assertion that these are not defects of the Veda, but that untruth is due to some defect in the act, the sacrificer, or the materials of sacrifice; that the so-called contradiction is not contradiction but an assertion of certain alternatives, and that the so-called tautology is a repetition on purpose.³

It will be seen that like knowledge by similarity verbal testimony also has not been recognised as an

1. NS., II, 1. 49-51 ; 54

2. NS., II, 1. 52, 53, 55, 56,

3. NS. II, 1, 57-61.

independent means of cognition by some schools of philosophy.

The NS. thus admits direct knowledge, inference knowledge by similarity, and verbal testimony as four independent means of knowledge. Tradition (*aitihya*) is regarded as included in verbal testimony; and presumption (*arthāpatti*), implication (*sambhava*), and none-existence (*abhāva*) are treated as cases of inference.¹

The various factors involved in sense-cognition are the soul, the mind, the senses and the object of cognition. It is the soul to which knowledge belongs: the mind and the senses are only the instruments of acquiring knowledge.²

The soul is defined as that which is characterised by desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition.³ It is shown that the soul is different from the senses and the body by a number of arguments, the chief of them being that it acts as a uniting and permanent factor in knowledge, which neither the senses nor the body could do.⁴ The materialistic view that desire and aversion belong to the body, inasmuch as activity and forbearance are seen to belong to it, is met by the assertion that these belong to the body in the same sense as they belong to such implements as an

1. NS. II, 2. 1-12.

2. NS. III, 2. 19-42.

3. NS. I, 1, 10.

4. NS. III, 1, 1-15.

axe and so on. Further, we do not find these in such material things as pots, etc.¹

Mind is that which is characterised by the non-production of simultaneous cognition.,² For the same reason it is one and atomic (*anu*).³

The senses and their objects are defined in the usual way. They are material and composed of the various elements which they respectively perceive.⁴

Buddhi, according to the NS., is identical with apprehension (*upalabdhi*) and knowledge (*jñāna*). This is a temporary mental act rather than a permanent faculty as the *Sāṃkhya* school regards it to be. This topic is discussed at length in a section of the NS. where the *Sāṃkhya* view about *buddhi* is criticised.⁵ The one point in connection with all controversy about the nature of *buddhi* between the *Nyāya* and the *Sāṃkhya*, which was usually overlooked by the disputants in the past, and which is, I think, overlooked even now, is that the dispute between the *Nyāya* and the *Sāṃkhya* is really about two different things called by the same name. The *buddhis* (cognitions) of the *Nyāya* are really equivalent to the *functionings* (*vr̥tti*) of the *buddhi* (the intellect) of the *Sāṃkhya*, and about the correspondence of these there can hardly be any dispute bet-

1. NS. III, 2, 37-40.

2. NS. I. 1. 16.

3. *Ibid.* III, 2, 57-60.

4. *Ibid.* III, 1, 63, 64.

5. *Ibid.* III, 2, 1-49.

ween the two schools. Thus a good deal of this controversy about *buddhi* is merely verbal and irrelevant, and it is futile to go into its details at length.

Two sections of the NS, viz. Sūtras, III, 2, 10 to III. 2, 18, and IV. 2, 26 and the following sūtras, which respectively deal with the temporary nature of cognition (*buddhi*) and the cognition of the whole (*avayavī*) in relation to its parts, have been regarded by the commentators as dealing with the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism respectively. I have discussed the whole subject in a separate article,¹ and have tried to show that the interpretation of the commentators and the views of modern scholars based upon them are unjustifiable.

The whole of the Second Chapter of the Fourth Book deals with the acquirement of true knowledge, and the result of the whole discussion is that (1) cognitions (*upalabdhi*) may be right or wrong; (2) that a wrong cognition is destroyed by the appearance of right cognition '*mithyopalabdhi vināśas tattva jñānat*'²; (3) a wrong cognition is detected by seeing a contrast between the real object and its counterpart³, e. g. by seeing the distinction between a real man and a post that appeared to be a man. And then as the question finally turns upon the way to acquire true knowledge,

1. Discussion of the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism in the Nyāya-Sūtras, JRAS January, 1930.

2. NS., IV, 2, 35.

3. NS., IV, 2, 37.

the subsequent sūtras suggest various means of developing the powers of one's mind, which include practice of meditation and academic discussions.

To sum up, in the NS. we find a systematic and critical exposition of direct knowledge, inference, knowledge by similarity, and verbal testimony. Direct knowledge in the NS. is yet only sense-cognition, and, as I have tried to show, of the nature of simple apprehension, very much like the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* of the later works. The definition and classification of inference are clearly a development of the doctrine of inference as found in the *Caraka-Saṃhitā* and the VS. The exact significance of knowledge by similarity and verbal testimony is brought out in explaining how they are different from inference. The *pramāṇas* are regarded as means of knowledge, or forms of cognition, or again as means of proof; but I am inclined to think that it is the first meaning which is the most usual. The possibility of doubt and error is admitted. Doubt arises out of a conflicting sense-datum or testimony, and is removed by definite cognition. The presence of error is detected when a contrast is revealed to us between a false appearance and the true reality of an object; e. g. when one finds that what one took to be a man was really a post. But this is evidently arguing in a circle. The question, 'What is true reality, and how to be sure that one knows it?' Still remains to be answered. The whole world may be a life-long dream; and, therefore, as unreal as the dream

world of our sleep. The *Nyāya-sūtras* do not offer any further criterion of truth beyond the *pramāṇas*, but enjoin a life of moral and intellectual discipline; e. g. *Yoga* practices and academic discussions, which alone, according to it, can give powers of philosophical insight.

Before I close this chapter on the NS. I would say, and this has been felt by a many a scholar now,¹ that the original philosophy of the NS. has been grossly obscured by the confusion created by the distinguished commentators beginning with even the first of them, *Vātsyāyana* or *Pakṣila-svāmin*, and it needs the devoted labours of a competent scholar to dig it out and present it in its original form. Certain assumptions on the part of the first commentator have simply been accepted by the subsequent writers, and as certain anomalies due to those assumptions could not be explained, fresh assumptions have been made and new theories have been put forth to overcome the difficulty. Examples of some of these have been given in this chapter, but many more can be found by a more intensive and independent study of the whole work.

1. Cf. Hara Prasad Shastri, *JASB.*, (1905) pp. 245 ff.
Vanamali Chakravarti, *JASB.*, (1910) pp. 289 ff.

CHAPTER V.

Epistemology of the Sāṃkhya system as found in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā and the Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra.

The two main works of the Sāṃkhya system are the Sāṃkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra attributed to Kapila. Although the SPS. is believed to belong to a very late date, one curious fact about it, which one cannot help noticing, is that its definitions of right cognition (*pramā*); direct knowledge (*pratyākṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) are of a very peculiar nature. They are different from those given in any other work including the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, and do not indicate any signs of the influence of any of the authors who are supposed to be earlier than the SPS. This peculiarity of the definitions together with the fact that the commentators do not appear to be quite sure of the exact significance of the *sūtra*, which contains the definition of *pramā*, probably because a definite traditional meaning had been lost to them, strongly suggests that the *sūtrās* in question are the relics of an ancient work on the Sāṃkhya which was earlier than the Sāṃkhya-kārikā and even the NS.¹ The Sāṃkhya doctrine of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) as

1. Cf. Weldon, *American Journal of Philology*, 35 ; (1914) p. 34 ff.

contained in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* was developed by Gauḍapāda in his *Bhāṣya* on the SK. and still more by Vācaspati Miśra in his *Sāṃkhya-tattva kaumudī*. But the SPS, which is supposed to be later than either of these, does not show any signs of the influence of these developments in the *Sāṃkhya* theory. On essential points the epistemological position of the SPS. is the same as that of the SK.; and to treat the theory of knowledge as contained in the SPS. as posterior to Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra seems to be altogether preposterous. Hence I have thought it fit to deal with the epistemology of the SK. and the SPS. in one place. That I am not altogether unjustified in holding that some of the sūtras pertaining to the theory of knowledge in the SPS. might belong to an early period will be seen in the sequel. I shall deal with the SK. first.

The *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Like most of the philosophical treatises in Indian Philosophy, the SK. also starts with the assertion that desire for knowledge arises out of the need of ending misery. It is further pointed out that a scientific knowledge of the unmanifested, and the manifested nature, and of the knower (the spirit) is preferable to any other kind of knowledge, such as revelation or popular opinion.¹

A *pramāṇa* is defined as that by which an object is proved to exist ; and it is of three kinds : sense-

1. SK., 2.

cognition (*dr̥ṣṭa*); inference (*anumāna*) and reliable testimony (*āpta-vacana*). The rest of the *pramāṇas* accepted by other schools¹ are regarded as forms of one or other of these.

Sense-cognition is a definite knowledge obtained through the sense-organs. Inference is cognition based upon the relation of the mark and that to which that mark belongs, and it is of three kinds.² Reliable Testimony is the word communicated by trustworthy persons (*āpta-śrutiḥ*).³

Objects beyond the senses are known by means of the inference called *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*; and the transcendent reality, which is not cognised even by this, is proved by reliable testimony.⁴

The causes of the non-apprehension of objects by means of the senses are excessive distance, extreme proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, inattention, minuteness of the object, obstruction, predominance of objects other than that to be perceived, and inter-mixture of the object with similar objects.⁵

The intellect (*buddhi*) emanates from nature (*prakṛti*) and is defined as 'determination' (*adhyava-*

1. SK., 4.

2. Viz. *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.

3. SK., 5. '*āpta-s'rutiḥ*' need not mean 'true revelation' as Gangānātha Jhā, following the *Tattva-kaumudī* translates it, and considering the rationalistic attitude of the *Kārikā* it is better to translate it literally as 'the word of a trustworthy person.' Cf. *Kārikā* 2 and 6.

4. SK., 6.

5. SK., 7.

sāya). It is said that virtue (*dharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), dispassion (*virāga*), and power (*aiśvarya*) are its forms when it is of the nature of *sattva* ; and the reverse of them when it is of the nature of *tamas*.¹

In the above description of the intellect, the term ' *adhyavasāya* ' has been variously translated. The best alternative is to take it in its usual meaning of 'determination', for it fits in with the functions of the intellect as the faculty which determines both knowledge and action. This is evident from the description of *buddhi* which follows in the *karikā*. As in the other schools, so here, the acquirement of knowledge has been regarded as purposive, as something which leads to action with a view to achieve the highest goal. Hence, it is said that if the intellect is prompted by ' *sattva* ' it leads to virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power ; and if prompted by ' *tamas* ' to the opposite of these. The intellect in the *Sāṃkhya* is material, and hence characterised by the three constituents (*guṇas*) of matter. The enumeration of virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power is evidently not based upon any principle of logical division, and the words have their ordinary meaning.

The next internal sense is egoism (*ahaṅkāra*) which is defined as self-consciousness (*abhimāna*). From consciousness proceeds self-consciousness, but it has to be remembered that both of them are the evolutes of matter. From egoism proceed the eleven

1. SK., 23.

sense-organs and the five subtle elements (*tanmātrāṇi*). It is evident that in this process of evolution, although the psychical functions are recognised, they are regarded as the result of and as dependent upon a physical evolution of the primordial matter.

The *Kārikā* follows the usual classification of the sense-organs, and regards mind as a sense-organ of double nature-viz. as one both of knowledge and action. It is the organ of reflection. Although one, it appears to be many and diverse because of the particular modifications of the *guṇas*-‘*guṇa pariṇāma-viśeṣāt*’¹.

The phrase ‘*guṇa-pariṇāma-viśeṣāt*’ here is rather ambiguous. Does the word ‘*guṇa*’ here mean the special *Sāṃkhya* constituents of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*? ; or does it signify the ordinary qualities of *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, etc. ? Gauḍapāda has taken it to mean the latter ; for he says : ‘so mind becomes various from its connection with the eye or any other organ, being identified with it, and being diversified by the modification of the function of sight, and the rest of the organs’,² Vācaspati Miśra also appears to hold the same view. But, howmuch-soever plausible this interpretation may be, considering the peculiar sense in which the words ‘*guṇa*’ and ‘*pariṇāmā*’ are used in the *Sāṃkhya* system, it is highly improbable they have been used here in a different sense. Further the view that mind should

1. SK., 27.

2. Translation from Davies’ *Hindu Philosophy*, p, 64.

appear many and different because of the particular modifications of the three constituents *guṇa-pariṇāma-viśeṣāt* is only consistent with the general *Sāṃkhya* doctrine that the diversity and individuality of things is determined by the peculiar and particular modifications of the three *guṇas*.

There are altogether thirteen organs, viz. the three internal organs of *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *manas*; and ten external organs—five sense-organs and five organs of action. Of these the three internal organs are applicable to all kinds of objects, and in all the three distinctions of time; while the others are of use only with reference to the object of sense and those which pertain to the present. The intellect is the most important of all, and it is to it that the external sense-organs present their respective objects.¹

The above is all that one can find in the *SK.* itself by way of the analysis of knowledge; and it is evident that there is not much of epistemological value in it. The *SK.* is mainly a treatise on metaphysics. There is a mention of five forms of error²—*viparyaya-bhedāḥ*; but, if we accept the interpretation of the commentators, they are not logical errors, but forms of a wrong attitude towards the world.

It must be noted, however, that this particular notion of error, expressed variously by the terms, '*avidyā*', etc. is not only present in the *VS.* and the

1. *SK.*, 32-36.

2. *SK.*, 47.

NS, but forms in them also, the main and ultimate antithesis to knowledge.

The Theory of Knowledge in the Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra.

As I have already pointed out, in spite of the fact that the SPS. has been regarded as a work of late date, the theory of the means of knowledge as found in it points to the great probability that the sūtras pertaining to this topic belong to an earlier work. As in the other works, so here also, the problem of knowledge is raised in connection with a discussion of the various ways of obtaining salvation.

Knowledge (*pramā*), and the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), have been defined in a rather obscure sūtra; *dvayor ekatarasya vāpi asannikṣṭārtha-paricchittih pramā, tat-sādhakam yat tat tri-vidham pramāṇam*¹, which has been interpreted differently by Aniruddha and Vijñāna-bhikṣu. According to the former, 'dvayor' refers to sense and object, in the case of sense-cognition²; and 'ekatarasya' to a mark or a word, in the case of inference or verbal cognition. In place of 'vā api', he reads 'ca api' and takes 'asannikṣṭārtha-paricchittih' to mean 'the determination of objects not previously determined'.³ Thus the meaning of the first clause, according to Anirud-

1. SPS., I. 87 ; in place of 'vāpi' another reading is 'capi'.

2. *Indriyārthayor vidyamānayoḥ pratyakṣe*.

3. *aparicchinnārtha-paricchittih*'.

dha, is : *Pramā* is the determination of undetermined objects as the result of both (the sense and the object), (in the case of perception), and of either of the two (a mark or a word, (in the case of inference or verbal cognition). According to Vijñāna-bhikṣu, '*dvayoḥ*' refers to *buddhi* and *puruṣa*¹ and '*asannikṛṣṭārtha-paricchittiḥ*' means 'the ascertainment of objects which are not present in, or known to (*buddhi* and *puruṣa*).² The definition of '*pramā*' in the *sūtra*, according to Vijñāna-bhikṣu, is thus the ascertainment of objects which are not already present in, or known to both (*buddhi* and *puruṣa*), or either of them.

Now my objections to the above interpretation are as follows: *Firstly*, the interpretation of '*dvayor-ekatarasya*', according to both Aniruddha and Vijñāna-bhikṣu is entirely arbitrary. Neither the language of the present *sūtra*, nor a use of the same or of a similar phrase elsewhere, lends any support to the interpretations of the commentators which are themselves entirely different from each other, and are an indication of the fact that both the commentators had nothing by way of a reliable tradition or authority to go by. According to Aniruddha's interpretation, the *sūtra* contains a definition not only of *pramā*, but also of all the three *pramāṇās*. It is to be noted, however, that a definition of the respective *pramāṇās* is given subsequently in *sūtras*, I, 89, 100 and 101 ;

1. '*dvayor buddhi-puruṣayoḥ*'.

2. '*asannikṛṣṭaḥ pramāṭary anārūḍho nādhigataḥ iti yāvat*'.

and the present *sūtra* is meant only to give a general definition of *pramā* and all that Aniruddha has to assume and insert in interpreting '*dvayor ekatarasya*' so as to make the phrase applicable to the particular *pramāṇas* is as uncalled for as it is unwarranted by the text of the *sūtra*. Vijñāna-bhikṣu's interpretation that the phrase refers to *buddhi* and *puruṣa*, or either of them, and that *pramā* is that which belongs to both of them or either of them, is evidently not in accordance with any definite view of cognition including that of the *Sāṃkhya*; and the various explanation of *pramā* and *pramāṇa*, which he gives in his *Bhāṣya*, are indicative of the fact that he himself was not quite sure of the exact definition meant to be given in the *sūtra*.¹ It is evident that according to the *Sāṃkhya* doctrine, the act of cognition (*vr̥tti*) belongs to *buddhi*, and this, in its turn, is illuminated by the intelligence of *puruṣa*. Cognition cannot result without the co-operation of both the *buddhi* and the *puruṣa*.² Where then is the room for interpreting the *sūtra* so as to mean that cognition belongs to *either* both of them or one of them? Secondly, although there could be no objection to the statement

1. The text of the *Bhāṣya* beginning with '*atra-yadi pramā-rūpam phalam* and ending with '*paramparayaiva sarvatheti bhāvaḥ*'.
2. Cf. The *Bhāṣya* "*sā ca vr̥ttir arthoparaktā prativimbarūpeṇa puruṣārūdha satī bhāṣate puruṣasyāpariṇāmitayā buddhivat svato arthākāratvāsambhāvāt*".

that cognition is the ascertainment of that object which is not already present or known to the mind, 'anadhigatārtha gantr̥ pramāṇam' as Aniruddha calls it, it is difficult to see how the compound 'asannikṛṣṭārthā-paricchittih̐' means the same here. The interpretations of 'dvayor ekatarasya' and 'asannikṛṣṭārthā-paricchittih̐' depend upon each other, and for the meaning of the whole clause it has to be decided in what grammatical relation the second phrase stands to the first.

Dvayoh̐ and 'ekatarasya' literally mean 'of both', and, 'of one of them' respectively. There is no mention of any two objects in any of the immediately preceding or the following sūtras to suggest what two particular objects might have been referred to in the sūtra under consideration. However, the very expression 'dvayor ekatarasya' has been used in two other sūtras, viz. I, 75—*pūrva-bhāvitve dvayor ekatarasya hāne 'nyatara-yogah̐* and III, 65—'*dvāyor ekatarasya vāudāsīnyam apavargah̐*', in both of which the phrase, at the commentators themselves agree, clearly refers to *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Now this parallelism strongly suggests that also in this sūtra under discussion the phrase might refer to '*puruṣa* and '*prakṛti*' and we have to see whether this interpretation of the phrase can be justifiable consistently with the use of the other terms in the sūtra and an intelligible definition of *pramā*. The next phrase is '*asannikṛṣṭārthā-paricchittih̐*', which I take as a *Bahuvrīhiḥ* compound to

mean 'that ascertainment or determination in which the object (of cognition) is not in contact with or is not directly presented (to the senses)', the phrase being governed by '*dvayor ekatarasya*', and case in apposition with '*pramā*'. The meaning of the whole clause will thus be : '*pramā*' is an ascertainment of both (*puruṣa* and *prakṛti*), or of one of them (either *puruṣa* or *prakṛti*) in which the object (to be cognised) is not directly presented (to the senses). Now this, I think, forms a fairly intelligible definition of *pramā* from the *Sāṃkhya* point of view. The whole object of knowledge, according to the *Sāṃkhya*, is the ascertainment of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, and this act has been called *pramā* in the *sūtra*. That this is the meaning here is further corroborated by SPS, I, 102, which, at the end of the present section dealing with *pramā* and *pramāṇas*, says that the subject of *pramāṇa* has been explained here because it is by means of *pramāṇa* that both (*puruṣa* and *prakṛti*) are proved—'*ubhaya-siddhiḥ pramāṇāt tad upaadeśaḥ*'. Further, neither *puruṣa* nor *prakṛti* is directly presented to the senses; and hence the act of cognition, through which their existence is ascertained, is defined as '*asannikṛṣṭārtha*' with reference to them, although the *pramāṇa*, which brings about that ascertainment—*tat sādhakam*, may be, as it really is, in the case of all the forms, that in which there is a contact of the sense-organs with the objects of the manifested universe.¹ The condition of '*asannikṛṣ-*

1. Cf. The *Bhāṣya* on SPS., I, 103—*atra hi pratyakṣa*—

tārtha’ would further distinguish the ordinary human cognition of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* from such direct knowledge of the same as is possible to the Yogins. This is the best sense that I can make out of the *sūtra* consistently with the language of the text and the *Sāṃkhya* doctrines. The main difficulty is to find a suitable interpretation of ‘*asannikṛṣṭārtha*’, which according to the ordinary usage of the terms, ‘*sannikarṣa*’ and ‘*artha*’, should mean ‘the object not in contact’. This sense quite fits in with the interpretation according to which the reference in the *sūtra* to the cognition of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*; they being signified by the phrase *dvayor ekatarasya*’. It is to be admitted that such a definition of *pramā* is rather unusual, but it would not be incorrect, if it is remembered that right cognition strictly interpreted according to the notions of the *Sūtra* period should pertain to the ultimate and intrinsic forms of reality—viz. *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* in the *Sāṃkhya*. The use of the word ‘*paricchitiḥ*’ in the *sūtra*, which strictly means ‘*limitation*’, instead of the usual term *jñānam*’ is also significant, and lends support to the view that what is meant by *pramā* in this *Sūtra* is what has been called *viveka* ‘discrimination’ elsewhere in the SPS, that is to say, knowledge which defines the

siddham etc. which says : ‘after apprehending the fact, which is proved by sense-cognition, namely, that a house and such other things exist for the sake of the body, etc. on the basis of the manifested nature (*pradhāna*) inference is drawn about the existence of *puruṣa* who is different in nature from it.’

limits between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.

That which leads to right cognition has been called *pramāṇa*, and this is of three kinds : direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) inference (*anumāna*), and verbal testimony (*śabda*). These include the rest which are regarded as separate *pramāṇas* by some of the other schools.¹

It is rather striking that as in the case of the definition of *pramā*, so also in the case of the definitions of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, the language used in the SPS. is very different from that used in the earlier works including the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, and one begins to think that the significance of the definition is not the same as of those in the other works. The definition of *pratyakṣa* is 'yat sambaddham sat tadākāro-
llekhi vijñānam tat pratyakṣam (I. 89), which translated literally will mean : 'that knowledge, which being connected (or related), portrays the form thereof, is *pratyakṣa*. The special feature of this definition seems to be to emphasise two points : (1) that the knowledge called '*pratyakṣa*' is regarded more as an act than as a product, which is the implication, for example, in the *Nyāya* definition ; and (2) that it is the form of the object (*tadākāra*) which is cognised, and not the object itself ; and it is probably for this reason that instead of employing some such words as '*artha-sannikarṣa*' etc. which denote a contact of the object cognised, the term

1. SPS., I, 88.

'*sambaddha*' has been used in this Sūtra, and *asannikṛṣṭārtha-paricchittiḥ* has been included in the definition of *pramā* as given in I. 87. It is maintained that this definition of *pratyakṣa* is not faulty with reference to the *pratyakṣa* of Yogins; for, in the first place, it is not meant to be applicable to it, that perception being not external; and in the second place, even in the Yogic perception, there is a peculiar relation of the Yogin's mind to the object perceived (I. 90 and 91).

Inference is defined as knowledge of that which stands in a certain relation, on the part of one who sees (knows) that relation—'*prati-bandha drśaḥ pratibaddha-jñānam anumānam*'. Here again, the terms '*pratibandha*' and '*pratibaddha*' used in the definition are peculiar to the SPS., while the inclusion of *prati-bandha-drśaḥ*' emphasises the essential feature of inference that it ultimately depends upon the mental activity of a person who knows the relation of the *vyāpaka* (expressed by the major term) and the *vyāpya* (expressed by the minor term).

Verbal testimony is defined in the usual way as the word of a reliable authority.

As has already been pointed out, it is said that an exposition of the *pramāṇas* has been given, because it is through them that *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are proved.¹ It is further stated that this proof ultimately depends upon the *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* inference, which proceeds on the basis of the principle of causation.

1. SPS., I, 102.

The definition of *buddhi*¹, *aṅkāra*², *manas*³ and the *indriyas*⁴ are the same as given in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*; and the same functions and importance are attributed to each of them as in the *Kārikā*.

The nature of reality and illusion is discussed with reference to the views of the Buddhists, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Vedāntists and Naiyyāyikas; and what has been called *sad-asad-khyāti* is maintained to be the right doctrine, according to which an object is real (*sad*) or unreal (*asad*) according as it is not proved to be false, or proved to be false by subsequent experience (V. 52 to 56).

What strikes one most in the SPS. is the importance attached to *śruti* (scriptures), which is regarded as the highest unimpeachable authority—*śrutyā siddhasya nāpatāpas tatpratyakṣa bādhāt* (I. 147)—‘that which is proved by the scriptures is not to be denied, for it supersedes (the authority of) sense-cognition⁵; and then again ‘*nija-śakty abhivyakteḥ svataḥ prāmāṇyam*’—there is the self-validity (of the Vedas) because of the manifestation of their own

1. *Ibid.*, II, 13.

2. *Ibid.*, II, 16.

3. *Ibid.*, II, 26.

4. II, 19. 20.

5. The commentators have interpreted the *Sūtra* a little differently, but the sense emphasised here is not affected, and so I do not enter into a discussion of their rendering.

power.¹

The SPS. is one with the other systems in regarding knowledge (*jñāna*) as the means of salvation—‘*jñānān muktiḥ*’ and in further holding that this knowledge, which is also called discrimination (*viveka*), is acquired by the practice of *yoga* and renunciation (VI, 29).

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1. Aniruddha takes this *sūtra* to refer to all the three *pramāṇas*, but considering that the immediately preceding *sūtras* contain a discussion about the authority of the Vedas the context demands that the reference here is also to the same subject.

PART IV.

EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE SCHOLASTIC PERIOD.

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The Philosophical Sūtras were followed by a number of commentaries and sub-commentaries, which, though they apparently aimed at only explaining their meaning, added much to what the Sūtras had contained, and not infrequently, also altered their original significance. The reasons for those additions and alterations on the part of the commentators were twofold: *firstly*, they wanted to insert fresh matter on certain subjects with a view to keeping their own systems abreast of the developments in the other systems and *secondly*, they were anxious to find an authority in the original authors for whatever they had to say by way of refutation of the doctrines of their opponents. An example of the first of these is to be found in the fact that the epistemological theories of *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta* had their origin in the works of the commentators on the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta* Sūtra; and of the second in that most of the refutation of the Buddhist and the Jaina doctrines in behalf of the Hindu Schools is the work of the commentators on the Philosophical Sūtras.

During the period under consideration while the Buddhist logic and the Jaina logic are evidently the result of the influence of the Hindu logic of the previous period, they, in their turn, are the occasion of some of the scholastic developments in the later

logic and epistemology of the Hindu writers. The positive theory of epistemology as found in Diñnāga and Dharamkīrti is a contrast to Nāgārjuna's denial of the means of knowledge, and is certainly a fresh departure in Buddhist philosophy. That the Hindu and the Buddhist writers did influence each other is evident from such affinity of doctrines as is to be found between Praśastapāda and Diñnāga. Similarly, such facts as the introduction of epistemological discussions into the *Mīmāṃsā* system by Prabhākara and Kumārila ; or into the *Vedānta* by Gauḍapāda, Saṃkara and Rāmānuja : or again the development of a more theoretical and exclusive treatment of logical and epistemological subjects in the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* School, which ultimately led to the creation of the New School of logic (*navya-nyāya*), were all the result of the existence of strong schools of the Buddhist and the Jaina logic during this period. The following sections dealing with the important authors of each of the schools will bear out the truth of these remarks.

1. THE LATER BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGY.

(i) A Positive Theory of Buddhist Epistemology according to Diñnāga.

Ācārya Diñnāga, the Buddhist logician may be said to have inaugurated a new era in the history of logic and epistemology in so far as, by treating the theory of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) as a subject by itself, he departed from the usual

practice of the previous Hindu schools of dealing both with the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge (*prameya*) together. In the history of Buddhist epistemology itself, his positive theory of knowledge presents a striking contrast to Nagārjuna's denial of the means of knowledge. None of Diñnāga's works exists complete in Sanskrit ; but several are preserved in Tibetan translation¹; and a few Sanskrit fragments²; are found in the works of the Nyāya Commentators. The account of Diñnāga's epistemology as given here is mainly based upon the Sanskrit fragments.

According to Diñnāga, there are only two means of knowledge: direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*); for knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*) are, according to him, cases of either direct knowledge, or of inference. Knowledge by similarity is shown to be a case of verbal testimony, and this, in its turn, of direct knowledge, or of inference—*pratyakṣagamābhyām nopamānam bhidyate*, etc.³ The position of Diñnāga on the subject and its refutation by Uddyotakara are found as follows in the *Nyāya-vārtika*:

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1. A summary of some of these has been given by VB. in his HIL.
 2. These have been collected by H. N. Randle in his monograph on *Fragments From Diñnāga* (Royal Asiatic Society publication); and some of them have also been noticed by Vidyābhāṣaṇa in his HIL.
 3. *Nyāya-vārtika*. p. 60, quoted in FD., pp. 48 and 49.

“Knowledge by similarity is not distinct from sense-cognition and testimony. How so ? Because when a person sees both the cow and the gayal, in that case, it is by sense-cognition that he apprehends that this is like that, and when he is told that the gayal is like the cow, in that case, it is just on the hearing of this that the knowledge arises in his mind that some of the qualities of the cow are found in the gayal and others are not; as otherwise the word ‘like’ would not have been used by the speaker; and he apprehends a preponderant sameness of the qualities of the gayal with those of the cow. For this reason, knowledge by similarity is not distinct from sense-cognition and verbal testimony. On this account of the matter, what the person apprehends is (in the latter case) the resemblance of the cow to the gayal, or (in the former case) the existence of the gayal (as qualified by resemblance to the cow).”

‘What understanding the Buddha shows of the nature of the *pramāṇa*’ says Uddyotakara. ‘The *Sūtra*¹ really means that as a result of apprehending the resemblance of the gayal to the cow, the person realises the relation of the name ‘gayal’ to this particular object. Therefore, what is urged is irrelevant and arises from ignorance of what the *Sūtra* means’.² This criticism of Diñnāga’s view on the subject is characteristic of the Nyāya School which maintains that neither sense-cognition nor verbal testimony by

1. Nyāya-sūtra, 1, 1, 6.

2. Transl. as in *FD.*, pp. 49 and 50, with slight alterations.

itself will enable a person to identify the animal gayal as gayal.

The following quotation found in the NVT, with regard to verbal testimony has been identified by Vidyābhūṣaṇa from the Tibetan versions as being a passage in the Second Chapter of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*¹: *Āpta-vakyāvisamvāda-sāmānyād anumānatā*, 'it (verbal testimony) is of the nature of inference, because it is based upon the common character of corroborativeness belonging to the words of a reliable person'. Vācaspati Miśra commenting upon the NV. in connection with this subject says: 'Here Diñnāga, not putting up with (the view which regards) verbal testimony as a separate *pramāṇa*, attacks the definition² by means of a dilemma which is this: 'Reliable testimony means either the reliability of a trustworthy person, or the truth about an object. If it means the reliability of the person, then knowledge is obtained by inference; if it means the truth of the object, this is obtained by sense-cognition, for the truth about a thing is known (only) when a person apprehends the object by means of sense-cognition.'

According to Diñnāga direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) is that which is other than imagination (*Kalpānābodham*), and is unconnected with name, genus, etc. (*nāma-jāty-ādy asaṃyutam*)³. It will appear that this definition of direct knowledge omits the usual

1. HIL. p. 288; FD., pp. 17 and 18.

2. As given in NS. I, 1, 7.

3. This description of direct knowledge as found in Chap.

condition of the contact of the (five) sense-organs with the objects of cognition, which is found in the earlier definitions of direct knowledge. This omission has evidently been made in order to include in the definition such forms of direct presentation as mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*), self-consciousness (*ātma-samvedana*) and mystic cognition (*yogi-jñāna*), which came to be distinctly recognised by Dharmakīrti as forms of direct knowledge in his *Nyāyabindu*. Further, the condition in the definition that direct knowledge is other than imagination restricts its application, in the case of sense-cognition, to knowledge by mere presentation, such as was called *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* by the later *Nyāya* logicians. In fact, it was some such definition of direct knowledge as is found in *Diñnāga* which must have provided the Hindu logicians an occasion for distinguishing direct knowledge as non-reflective and nondescriptive (*nirvikalpaka*) and reflective and descriptive (*savikalpaka*). This definition of *pratyakṣa* has been vehemently criticised by Uddyotakara in his *NV. I, 1, 4*. It will appear though that most of his criticism is off the point. For example, Uddyotakara observes: "Secondly (as regards the definition itself), if the expression '*alpanābodham*' is meant to denote direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), then the defi-

I of the Tibetan version of *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* has been rendered into Sanskrit by VB. (*HIL. p. 277*) as follows:

*Pratyakṣam kalpanābodham,
Nāma-jāty-ādy-āśaṃyutam-*

dition involves a self-contradiction¹. And, if direct knowledge is not denoted by the phrase *kalpanāboḍham*, then the use of the phrase is altogether useless. Further², the statement: '*pratyakṣam kalpanāboḍham*' is in the form of a sentence. Now, what is expressed by this sentence? If it is direct knowledge which is expressed by it, there is the same self-contradiction. How so? Because direct knowledge is actually expressed, ex-hypothesi, by the phrase *kalpanāboḍham* and yet it is called 'inexpressible' (*na abhidheyam*); who else except the Buddha can make such a statement? If, on the other hand, the phrase does not mean sense-cognition, then the assertion: *pratyakṣam kalpanāboḍham* becomes a mere utterance of (meaningless) words". The whole of this criticism is misdirected. It is based upon a confusion between the statement which constitutes the definition of direct knowledge and the act of cognition to which it refers. The definition of direct knowledge is not the act of cognition, and the fact that the definition is expressed in language does not mean that the act of cognition is thereby denoted by name or language and hence a contradiction arises as Uddyotakara would have us believe.

Although Uddyotakara strongly criticises Diñnāga's definition of *pratyakṣa* for its laying down

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1. That is to say, *pratyakṣa* has been defined as that which cannot be expressed by a name, and yet it is expressed here by the phrase '*kalpanābodham*'.
 2. Now speaking about the definition as a whole.

the condition that it should be unconnected with name, he has nothing to say against the definition of *pratyakṣa* as contained in NS., I. 1. 4, which also, according to him, anyhow, requires that direct knowledge should be unnameable—*avyapadeśyam*.¹

According to other fragments which presumably belong to Diñnāga,² direct knowledge is described as that which determines its object (*paricchēdākam*), represents the individual nature of that object (*viṣaya-svarūpānuvidhāyi*) and is cognised or proved by itself (*ātma-samvedyam*, or *pratyakṣenaiva siddhyati*).

While criticising the definition of direct knowledge as given in the *Nyāya-sūtras*,³ Diñnāga maintains, against Vātsyāyana, that the author of the *Nyāya-sūtras* did not include mind (*manas*) among the sense-organs⁴, and the omission to do so is inconsistent with regarding pleasure and pain as objects of cognition. This is expressed in the following couplet which is found in NVT, I, 1. 4., and has been identified by VB. by means of the Tibetan with a verse of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*⁵ :—

1. *Yad idam anupayukta-śabdārtha-sambandhasya viṣaya-bhedānuvidhāyi vijñānam, tat pratyakṣam.* etc. NV. (B. Indica) p. 38.
2. FD., p. 9—N V. and NVT.
3. Viz. *indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam jñanam*, etc.
4. That is to say in NS, I, 1. 12. *Ghrāṇa-rasana-cakṣustvak śrotrāṇindriyāṇi bhūtebhyah.*
5. VB., HIL., p. 280; FD. p. 13.

*Na sukhādi prameyam vā mano vāstīndriyāntaram,
Aniṣedhād upāttam ced anyendriya-rutam vrthā.*

Either pleasure, etc, are not objects of cognition ; or else, mind is an additional sense-organ. If it be maintained¹ that it has been taken as a sense-organ (because in the NS.) there is no denial of it as such, then the mentioning of the other sense-organs is useless.²

The following fragment³ found in NVT. refers to the *Vaiśeṣika* account of direct knowledge as given in VS. IV, 1. 6 “*yadi rūpaṃ evā cākṣuṣam tato na dravyaṃ caksuṣam syāt tathā ca mahad-āneka⁴ dravya-samavāyād rūpāc copalabhaddir iti dravya-cākṣuṣa-tvābhīdhānam vyāhanyate*”—if colour only is the object of sight, then substance cannot be the object of sight; and thus there will be a contradiction in the assertion of the visibility of substance which has been made in the sentence: ‘*tathā ca mahad-aneka-dravya-samavāyād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*’. As has been pointed out by the NVT., according to the *Vaiśeṣika*, only those substances, viz. earth, water and fire, are cognised⁵, which possess colour; not that only colour

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1. As has been maintained by Vātsyāyana in his NB.
 2. That is to say, the other sense-organs could as well have been left unmentioned.
 3. FD. p. 16.
 4. VS., IV, 1. 6 reads *mahatyaneke* etc. according to all the editions that I have been able to consult. Cf. *Praśastapāda*, p. 186 (Vizianagram S. S.), NVT., p. 129.
 5. The word in the text is ‘*upalabdhiḥ*’, which literally means ‘apprehension’.

is cognizable. That is to say the substance is cognised along with and through its colour, although it will be true to say that it is only colour which is seen (*cākṣuṣam*). There is a clear distinction between visibility (*cākṣuṣam*) and apprehension or cognition (*upalabdhiḥ*), which does not appear to have been made either by Diñnāga, or his critics, while considering this text.

In the NV. the text: '*apare tu bruvate nāntarīya-kārtha-darśanam tad vido' numānam*,'—others again say the cognition of a thing is (the instrument of) inference for one who knows that it is inseparably connected¹ probably refers to Diñnāga's definition of inference. In Chapter, II of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, Inference is divided into two kinds: inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and inference for others (*parārthānumāna*). Inference for oneself is defined as the knowledge of an object obtained through a mark or sign which has three characters: (1) effect (*kārya*) that is to say, the mark may be an effect of that which is inferred, (2) identity (*svabhāva*), the mark may be in essence identical with the thing to be inferred, (3) non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) the non-cognition of a mark may be indicative of the non-existence of that which is to be inferred.

According to Diñnāga, who takes the usual example of fire and smoke, it is neither the fire, nor the connection between the fire and the hill, which is

1. NV., p. 56, quoted in FD., p. 21.

2. HIL., p. 280.

inferred; it is the fiery hill which forms the object of inference. His argument is that the connection between fire and smoke is already known, (that is to say, before the inference), and there is nothing new to be inferred. As regards the inference of the connection between the fire and the hill, he says that only the hill is visible, and not the fire, and hence there can be no conclusion about the connection between the two. Hence, it is the fiery hill which is inferred.

The above contention of Diñnāga is not right for the following reasons:

(1) What is inferred in a particular case is not the connection between smoke and fire in general, which, Diñnāga says, is already known; but the connection between the particular column of smoke, which is seen at a particular time and place, and the fire which is the cause of it.

(2) In order to establish a connection by inference it is not necessary that both the objects which are connected with each other should be visible. If both of them were visible, it would be a case of sense-cognition. Hence on seeing the smoke arising out of a particular hill, the presence of fire on that hill can be inferred.

(3) I do not see the distinction which Diñnāga proposes to draw between the hill as considered in connection with fire and the fiery hill. If the inference of fiery hill means simply the fact that from the observance of smoke it is inferred that the hill has

fire on it, then it is the same thing as to infer a connection between the hill and the fire—which inference Diñnāga does not admit. If by 'fiery hill' is meant the hill as seen to have fire, the case would be one of sense-cognition of both the hill and the fire, and not that of inference¹.

Inference for others (*parārthānumāna*) is the demonstration to others of what has been cognised by oneself—*parārthānumānam tu svādr̥ṣṭārtha prakāśanam*².

The *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* further deals with the various possible forms of syllogistic inference, which it will be out of place to mention here³.

(ii) *Theories of Direct Knowledge and Inference in the Nyāya-bindu of Dharma-kīrti.*

The next important development in Buddhist epistemology is to be found in Dharma-kīrti's *Nyāya-bindu*. The special feature of this work is the four-fold classification of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) which includes three kinds of non-sensuous direct cognition. The influence of the *Nyāya* school on the epistemology of this work is evident from the fact that, in the definition of direct-knowledge, the condition that it should be non-erroneous (*abhrānta*), which was absent in Diñnāga's definition, has been

1. Cf. NVT. 1., 1. 5. p. 120.

2. Quoted in the *Ślokavārtika Tīkā*, p. 252., *HIL.*, p. 282; *FD.*, p. 28.

3. *HIL.*, pp. 282-287.

included; and the test of the reality of a thing (*vastu*) has been accepted to be the same as that in the *Nyāya* school, viz., that it could serve some purpose—*arthakriyā-sāmarthyam*.

The *Nyāya-bindu*¹ is a small work consisting of three chapters. The first chapter deals with the nature of direct knowledge. It begins with the assertion that all the objects of man's life are accomplished by means of right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*), and inference (*anumāna*). Of these direct knowledge is defined as that which is non-reflective (*kalpanā-poḍha*) and non-erroneous (*abhrānta*); the term '*kalpanā*' being explained as 'the cognition of an appearance which might be connected with words'—*abhilāpa-saṃsarga-yogyā-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ*².

1. The work is available with its commentary *Nyāya-bindu-tīkā* in Peterson's edition (*Bib. Indica*), and Stcherbat-sky's edition in the *Bib. Buddica Series*. I have used Peterson's edition for reference.
2. Vidyā-bhāṣaṇa understands '*kalpanā*' to mean error (*HIL.* p. 310). He says: 'Preconception refers to the experience of false images which appear real as if they were capable of being addressed and touched; e. g. the shadow of a tree may appear as the tree itself, or a rope may appear as a snake'. It is clear from Dharma-kīrti's own explanation of *kalpanā* that he does not mean by it 'false images' but a cognition which can be expressed by words. Cf. *NBT.* p. 10, *abhilāpyate 'neneti' abhilāpo-vācakaḥ śabdaḥ*; then '*abhilāpa-saṃsargāya yogyo' bhidheyābhāso yasyām prātītau sātathoktā*.

The examples of error are such as arise from darkness, quick whirling motion, journey by a boat, and shaking, etc. This definition of direct knowledge is the same as that given by Diñnāga with the addition of the condition that it should be free from error.

Then follows a classification of direct knowledge. It is said to be of four kinds: (1) sense-cognition (*indriya-jñāna*); mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*); self-consciousness (*ātma-samvedana*), and mystic cognition (*yogi-jñāna*).

There is a disparity between the construction adopted by Peterson in the published Sanskrit text of the *Nyāya-bindu* and that followed by the author of the *Nyāya-bindu-tīka*. It is rather curious that Peterson, who edited both the text and the commentary for the first time and in one and the same volume, should not have noticed this disparity between the construction of the text which he had adopted and that followed by the commentator. In order to make the disparity clear, and discuss the interpretation of the text in question, it is necessary to quote the Sanskrit original as it is published in Peterson's edition.

Tac catur-vidham. Indriya-jñāna-sva-viṣayānantara-viṣaya-sahakāriṇendriyajñānena samanantara-pratyayena janitam tat. Manovijñānam sarvam citta caittānām ātma-samvedanam bhūtārtha bhāvanā prakarṣa-paryantajam yogi-jñānam ceti.

The construction followed by the author of the *NBT*. as follows.

Tac caturvidham. Indriya-jñānam; svā-viṣaya...janitam tan mano-vijñānam; sarvam citta-caittānām ātma-samveda-nam; bhūtārtha...yogi-jñānam ceti.

Now the definitions of the four kinds of *pratyakṣa* would be different according to the reading adopted in the text. It is evident that Peterson did not attempt to divide the passage in question into all the possible sentences, for he has only two divisions of the passage, and these include four definitions. Further to treat '*indriya-jñāna*' as a part of the following compound '*sva-viṣaya*' etc. is clearly a mistake, and we should read '*indriya-jñānam*'. Hence, the unsatisfactory nature of the text in this edition is evident; and a mere disparity between the construction found in this text and that followed by the commentator would be no argument to question the definitions as understood and explained by the author of the *NBT*.¹

The following are the definitions of the various kinds of direct knowledge according to the *NBT*.

1. *Sense-cognition* (*indriya-jñāna*) is that which belongs to the senses, or which depends upon the senses.²

2. *Mental-cognition* (*mano-vijñāna*) is that which is caused by an immediate and cognate condition³ (in continuation) of a sense-cognition supported by an object, which is immediately contiguous to the

1. Stacherbatsky follows the *NBT*. in determining the division of the text for the purpose of defining the four kinds of inference.

2. *indriyasya jñānam indriyajñānam indriyāśritam yat. NBT.*, p. 12.

3. '*samanantara pratyayena*' which is thus explained by *NBT*. '*samas*' *cāsau jñānantareṇa anantaraścāsāvavyavahitatvena sa cāsau pratyayaśca hetutuāt samanantara-pratyayaḥ*.

object which is its own (i. e. of the sense-cognition). This definition is explained by *NBT.* to mean that mental cognition is the grasping of an object the next moment after, and in continuation of the object of sense-cognition,¹ and further that it is regarded as *pratyakṣa* (of the nature of *mano-vijñāna*) after the sense-organ² has ceased in its operation; for so long as it is in operation the cognition depends upon the sense³ only.

3. *Self-consciousness (ātma-samvedana)* is all that which belongs to *citta* and *caitta*, the former being explained by the *NBT.* as that which simply grasps the object—*artha-mātra-grāhi*; and the latter as those, such as pleasure etc. which grasp particular (mental) conditions. '*caitta-viśesāvastha-grāhīṇaḥ sukhādayaḥ*'. The commentator further asserts that there is no state of *citta* in which the cognition of self would not be *pratyakṣa*, and that form of cognition by which the self is known is *pratyakṣa* called '*ātma-samvedanam*'—*yena hi rūpeṇātmā vedyate tad rūpam ātma-samvednam pratyakṣam*.

4. *Mystic cognition (yogi-jñāna)* is that which is produced by the extreme limit of mediation upon the

1. "tathā ca satīndriyajñāna-viśaya-kṣaṇād uttara-kṣaṇe ekasantānāntārabhūto grāhīṇaḥ" *NBT.* p. 13.

2. The text of the commentary mentions only the eye *cakṣuḥ*.

3. "etac ca mano-vijñānam uparata-vyāpāre cakṣuṣi pratyakṣam iṣyate. Vyāpāra-vati tu cakṣuṣi yad rūpajñānam tat sarvam cakṣurāśritam eva" *NBT.* p. 13.

nature of reality. According to *NBT.*, the extreme limit of meditation is that stage where reality just falls short of being revealed fully¹.

The above are the definitions as explained by the author of *NBT.*, and, following him, by the later writers. If we are to follow the Sanskrit text as found in Peterson's edition, what is taken to be the definition of mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) by the author of the *NBT.* would be the definition of sense-cognition (*indriya-jñāna*), and it is not clear, anyhow from the text, what in that case would be the definition of mental cognition and self-consciousness. It is evident, however, that what has been treated by Peterson in his text as the definition of sense-cognition is not so; for the words: '*indriya-jñānena samanantara-pratyayaena janitam tat*'—'that which is produced by a cognate and immediate sense-cognition'² clearly indicate that the definition or description contained in this clause refers to something other than sense-cognition, viz. that which is produced by sense-cognition, and it is mental cognition (*mano-vijñānam*) which is meant.

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1. '*sampūrṇāvasthāyaḥ prāktanyāvasthā sphuṭābhātva-prakarṣaparyantā ucyate*'. *NBT.* p. 15.
 2. Although the *NBT.* does not take '*samanantara pratyayaena*' as an adjective qualifying '*indriya-jñānena*', it recognises that sense-cognition is said to be the cause of mental cognition according to this description—'*tad anenaika-santānāntara-bhūtayor evendriya-jñāna-mano-vijñānāyor janya-janaka-bhāve manovijñānam pratyakṣam ityuktam bhavati*' *NBT.*, p. 13.

The object of direct knowledge is an entity as possessed of its own nature (*sva-lakṣaṇa*). An entity is said to be possessed of its own nature, when its proximity or remoteness makes a difference to its apprehension¹, that is to say, when it is actually presented. This is also called real existence (*paramārtha-sat*), for a real thing (*vastu*) is that which can serve some purpose—*artha-kriyā-sāmarthyā-lakṣaṇa-tvād*.

This direct knowledge is the result of *pramāṇa*; for it consists of the apprehension of the object; while the *pramāṇa* itself is correspondance (of cognition) to the object, for it is through it that the apprehension of the object is established².

Such is the definition, the classification and the nature of direct knowledge as contained in the First Chapter of the NB. With regard to the definition of direct knowledge, as has already been pointed out, the condition that it should be free from error (*abhr-ānta*) has been added to Dīnāga's definition of the same. The explanation of this addition is evidently to be found in the realistic position of Dharma-kīrti, according to whom, things are truly real, and can, therefore, be also perceived as such by means of the *pramāṇas*. The definition of *pratyakṣa* given here agrees in the respect with that of the NS., according

1. *Yasyārthasya saṃnidhānāsaṃnidhānābhyām jñāna-pratibhāsa-bhedas tat sva-lākṣaṇam*, NB., p. 103.
2. *Artha-svārūpyam asyām pramāṇam tad-vaśād artha-pratīti-siddher iti*.

to which also *pratyakṣa* is to be non-erroneous (*avyabhicāri*). In respect of the test of reality and the relation between cognition and the object cognised too, Dharma-kīrti's position is the same as that of the *Nyāya* school, viz. that an object is real in so far as it can serve some purpose, and it is cognised correctly in so far as the cognition corresponds to the object. In other words, it is a theory of representative perception which the author of the *NB*. holds. Cognition resembles the object by which it is produced; as for example, that which is produced by blueness resembles blueness. This resemblance is called its form (*ākāra*), as also its appearance (*ābhāsa*)¹—says Dharmottara, the author of *NBT*. while commenting on the text. The main difficulty of Dharma-kīrti's position is the same as that of any theory of representative perception, viz. the unwarranted assumption that cognition corresponds to reality.

According to Dharma-kīrti, while direct knowledge reveals the individual nature of an entity (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), inference has for its object the general nature (*sāmānaya-lakṣaṇa*) of it. This is evidently so, because in inference, the object is not presented, and whatever is known about it can be only of a general nature.

1. *Yasmād viṣayāḥ jñānam udeti tad-viṣaya-saḍṛśam, tad bhavati, yathā nīlād utpadyamānam nīla-saḍṛśam, tac ca sādṛśyam ākāra ity ābhāsa ity apivyayadiśyate. NBT. p. 18.*

Inference is of two kinds: (1) that for oneself (*svārtha*), and (2) that for others (*parārtha*).

Inference for oneself is the cognition of the object to be inferred by means of a middle term, which possesses three characteristics. These are as follows:

(a) That it should be present in the object denoted by a minor term (*anumeye sattvam*).

(b) That it should be present only in such objects as are of the same nature as that denoted by the major term (*sapakṣe eva sattvam*).

(c) That it should be absent from such objects as are of a different nature from that denoted by the major term (*asapakṣe cāsattvam eva*).

For example, in the following argument:

The hill has fire on it,

Because it has smoke on it,

Like a kitchen, but unlike a lake,

the inference is based upon (a) the presence of smoke on the hill; (b) the presence of smoke only at such places, like a kitchen, where there is fire, and (c) the absense of smoke from such places, as a lake, where there is no fire.

The Later Jaina Epistemology.

Like the later Buddhist epistemology, the Jaina epistemology also of the scholastic period shows evident signs of the influence of the Hindu schools.

The definitions and classifications of the various kinds of knowledge as found in the works of such important Jaina logicians as Siddha-sena Divākara, Māṇikya Nandi and Deva Sūri present a remarkable contrast to those in Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra* of the previous period. The definitions of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*) as found in these later Jaina works are altogether different from those given by Umāsvāti, and are in accordance with the definitions of these kinds of knowledge as given by the Hindu logicians. Direct knowledge comes to be defined as that which pertains to objects presented to the senses; and indirect knowledge that which has to do with objects beyond the senses. Similarly, the usual classification of knowledge in these later Jaina writers is more in accordance with the terminology found in the works of Hindu logic than with that found in the TS.

(i) Later Jaina epistemology as found in the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara.

The first work in which we find the later modified epistemology of Jainism is Siddhasena Divākara's *Nyāyāvatāra*. It is a short treatise containing in outline the logical and the epistemological views of its author.

The work opens with defining *pramāṇa* as that knowledge which is free from obstruction (*bādhavivarjita*), and which illumines itself and other things

(*sva-parābhāsi*). In accordance with the objects known by means of *pramāṇa*, it is either direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) or indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*).

Of the above, direct knowledge is that which takes cognisance of objects which are not beyond the senses; and indirect knowledge is that which is of a different kind. It will appear that the definition of direct knowledge as given here is the opposite of that found in the earlier Jaina works, which called knowledge obtained through the senses indirect.

Inference is that knowledge which determines the major term (*sādhya-niścāyaka*) through a mark (*linga*—the middle term), which is inseparably connected with the major term. Like direct knowledge (*samakṣat*), being a means of knowledge inference is also free from error (*abhrānta*).¹

Verbal testimony is defined as knowledge arising from words, which taken in their proper acceptance, express reality not inconsistent with what is established by direct knowledge.²

Scriptural testimony (*śāstram*) is the knowledge possessed by a reliable person, which is not to be transgressed (*anullanḡhya*), which is not contradictory to that established by direct knowledge, which communicates truth, which is universal (*sarva*) and which is destructive of the evil path.³

1. NA., 5.

2. NA., 8.

3. NA., 9.

By its very definition and nature a *pramāṇa* is to be taken as free from error. It is a contradiction to say that *pramāṇa* is erroneous (*bhrānta*).¹ As it is not proved that the whole word of appearance is a matter of error, it is evident that *pramāṇa*, as determining itself and other things, serves to establish the reality of both.²

Direct knowledge and inference are sources of both knowledge for oneself (*svārtha*) and for others (*parārtha*). Like the acts of direct cognition and inference, the statements which express them are also called by those names, for they are means of communication to others.³ It will appear that this division of inference has also been imported into Jaina logic from the Hindu logic.

Then after the nature of syllogistic inference and the fallacies incidental to it have been explained in detail, the author draws a distinction between the ordinary means of knowledge and the absolute direct knowledge (*kevalam pratyakṣam*), which latter is defined as that which is free from all obstruction (*sakalāvaraṇa-muktātma*), and which constantly illumines the essential nature of all things (*sakalārthatma-satata-pratibhāsanam*)⁴.

The result of the means of knowledge is the removal of ignorance (*ajñāna-nivartana*), of absolute

1. NA., 6.

2. Ibid., 7.

3. Ibid., 10-13.

4. NA., 27.

knowledge (*kevalasya*) bliss and equanimity, and of the rest (kind of knowledge) the notion of selecting or rejecting an object (*ādāna.hāna-dhīh*).¹

The doctrine of *naya* is introduced by the twenty-ninth verse. It is said that an object has various aspects, (*anekāntātmakam*), and all of them are the object of all-sided knowledge, while one particular aspect of it is the object of (knowledge called) *naya*. In other words the *nayas* are the ways of looking at an object from a particular point of view.

Knowledge which determines the complete meaning of an object from the point of view of the various *nayas*, or in other words, which looks at an object from all the points of view, is called *Syād-vāda-śruta*. The *nayas* and *syād-vāda* are explained in detail in the commentary *Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛttiḥ*.²

The soul is described as the knower (*pramātr*); that which illumines itself and others (*svānya-nirbhāsin*); the doer, the enjoyer, the changing (*vivṛttimān*); that which is proved by its own self-consciousness (*sva-samvedana-saṃsiddha*); one different in nature from the earth and the other elements.³

In the last verse it is said that the system of *pramāṇa* etc. is without a beginning or an end, (*anādi-*

1. NA., 28.

2. The doctrines of the *nayas* and *syād-vāda* are well-known; and, hence, I have considered it unnecessary to deal with them here.

3. NA., 31.

nidhanātmika) which according to the commentator, implies that the world is eternal.

The next two important works on Jaina logic and epistemology during this period are the *Parikṣa-mukha-sūtra* of Māṇikya Nandi and the *Pramāṇā-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra* of Deva Sūri. Both of them are written on similar lines, and differ in certain respects from Siddhasena Divākara's *Nyāyāvatāra* in their theory of knowledge.

(ii) Theory of Knowledge in the *Parikṣa mukha-sūtra* of Māṇikya Nandi.

Pramāṇa is defined as that definite knowledge of an object which was not definitely known to oneself previously.¹ It takes the form of such a sentence as 'I know the jar by myself,'² which implies the apprehension of an object, the agent, the instrument and the act (of cognition).³ Like a lamp it illumines both itself and other things.⁴ It will appear that this definition and description of *pramāṇa* exactly corresponds to that of the Nyāya School as found in the NS. and Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-bhāṣya*. The condition that the object of knowledge should not be known to oneself

1. I, 1. *Svāpūrvārtha vyavasāyatmakam jñānam pramāṇam*, The 'apūrvārtha' is explained in I, 4 as 'anīścito pūrvārthaḥ.
2. I, 8. *Ghatam aham ātmanā vedmi*.
3. I, 9. *Karma-kartr-karaṇa-kriyā-pratīteḥ*.
4. I, 1. 12. *Pradīpavat* ; I, 1, 13., *Tat-prāmāṇyam evataḥ parataś ca*.

previously (*svāpūrvārtha*) in the definition of *pramāṇa* here is just an equivalent of 'knowledge of that which is not known' (*anadhigatagantṛ*) used by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* writers later on.

Pramāṇa is divided into direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*) just as in the *Nyāyāvatāra*; and these are also defined in the same way. Indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*) is further subdivided into memory (*smṛti*); recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*); argumentation (*tarka*); inference (*anumāna*); and scriptural testimony (*āgama*).¹

Memory is of the form of 'that is so', and is due to the awakening of past impressions; for example, the recollection : 'He is Devadatta'.²

Recognition is the ascertainment of an object (*samkalanam*) by means of perception through recollection (*darśana smaraṇakāraṇakam*), and takes such forms as 'this is the same' (*tad evedam*); this is like that (*tat-sadrśam*); 'this is different from that' (*tad-vilakṣaṇam*); 'this is the counter-part of that, 'etc. (*tat-pratīyogītyādi*); as for example, 'this is the same Devadatta'; 'the gayal is like a cow'; 'the buffalo is different from a cow'; 'this is far from that'; 'this is a tree', etc.³ It will appear from this definition of recognition that it includes what has been called knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*) in the Hindu schools.

1. III, 2.

2. III, 3, 4.

3. III, 5 and 6.

Argumentation, which is called *tarka* or *ūha*, is the knowledge of pervasion (*vyāpti jñānam*) based upon the presence or absence (of one thing in relation to another), and takes the form: 'If this is, that is, (If A is, B is)'; 'If this is not, that is not, (If A is not, B is not); 'as for example, If there is smoke, there is fire; If there is no fire, there is no smoke.¹ It will appear that this kind of reasoning is equivalent to what in Western logic is called a hypothetical—catagorical syllogism, in which a conclusion is obtained by (a) affirming the antecedent, or (b) by denying the consequent, in the minor premise. For example :

(a) If there is smoke, there is fire ;

There is smoke ;

There is fire ;

or (b) If there is smoke, there is fire ;

There is no fire ;

There is no smoke.

Inference is the knowledge of the major term (*sādhya*) by means of the middle term (*sādhana*).² The canon and the various parts of a syllogistic argument are defined in the usual way.

Scriptural testimony is that knowledge of objects which depends upon reliable utterance, etc ; for specially qualified persons, etc. (*viśiṣṭādayaḥ*) are the

1. III, 7 and 8.

2. III, 9; '*sādhanāt sādhya-vijñānam anumānam.*'

cause of the cognition of the real nature of objects because of inspiration due to their natural capacity.¹

The objects of knowledge are either general or particular in character.² The general are of two kinds : cross-wise (*tiryak*) and vertical (*ūrdhvatā*).³ The cross-wise general is a homogeneous attribute in a number of individuals of the same species; e. g., cowhood in a number of cows.⁴ The vertical general is a homogeneous substance in a number of prior and posterior transformations in it (*parāpara-vivarta-vyāpidravvyam*), e.g., clay in different things made of clay.⁵

The particular is also of two kinds: successive particulars (*paryāya*), and dissimilar particulars (*vyatireka*). The successive particulars are those which appear one after another is one and the same substance e.g. pleasure and pain in the soul⁶. The dissimilar particulars are those dissimilar forms which appears in different objects ; e. g. cows, buffaloes, etc.⁷

1. III, 94 and 95.

2. IV. 1. *sāmānya viśeṣātmā tadārtho viśayaḥ*.

3. The terms 'cross-wise' and 'vertical' as translations of '*tiryak*' and '*ūrdhvatā*' have been suggested to me through a paper by Prof. F. W. Thomas on '*An Indian Doctrine of Perception and Error*' in *ASP.*, 1921-22, pp. 31 and 32.

4. IV, 4.

5. IV, 5.

6. IV. 8. *ekasmin dravye krama-bhāvināḥ pariṇāma-paryāyā ātmani harṣa-viśādādivat*.

7. IV, 9. *Arthāntara-gato viśadrṣa pariṇāmo vyatireko go-mahiṣādivat*.

It is clear that the two kinds of 'generals' refer to the generality of attribute and of substance respectively; and the two kinds of 'particulars' to the particulars in one and the same substance, and those which represent different substances. The former kinds of particulars would thus be attributes as distinguished from the latter which would be substances¹.

This division of generals and particulars is, therefore, evidently based upon the distinctions of substance and attribute rather than upon any other principle². It appears to be introduced for the first time into Jaina epistemology by Maṇikya Nandi, probably because of the influence of such Hindu writers as Prabhākara and Kumārila, who also discussed the subject in their works at about the same period. In *PMS.*, VI, 56 and 57, in connection with

1. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's renderings of the two kinds of generals (*HIL.*, p. 192) as homogeneous (*tiryak*) and heterogeneous (*urdhvatā*) are neither correct translations of the terms, nor are they indicative of the right interpretations of them. To speak of a 'heterogeneous general' is a contradiction in terms. Similarly his description of the particular called '*paryāya*' as 'relating to *action* such as pleasure, pain etc., experienced by the soul' as absolutely unjustifiable; for there is nothing in the text to suggest that this kind of particular pertains to *action*, and, further it is absurd to talk of pleasure and pain as *actions*.
2. This subject has been further discussed in the next Chapter in connection with a similar division by Deva Sūri in his *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāñkāra*.

a discussion about the number of *pramāṇas*, there is a reference to the Lokāyatika, the Buddhist, the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, the Prabhakara, and the Jaimini Schools, which would indicate that the author of the *PMS*. was in close touch with the developments in the Hindu schools of logic and epistemology, and had them in mind while writing this work.

(iii) Deva Sūri's *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkārā*.

The definition and classification of knowledge in *PNT*. are very similar to those in the *PMS*. of Māṇikya Nandi and also to those in the *TS*. of Umāsvāti and the *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara. *Pramāṇa* is said to be definite knowledge which illumines itself and other objects, and is opposed to the super-imposition of one thing on another (*samāropaparipanthi*)¹. Knowledge is either direct (*pratyakṣa*) or indirect (*parokṣa*)². Of these the former is called clear and vivid (*spaṣṭa*) and the latter not clear (*aspaṣṭa*). Direct knowledge is divided into knowledge in the ordinary sense (*saṃvyāvahārika*) and knowledge in the highest sense (*pāramārthika*)³. The direct knowledge in the ordinary sense is further subdivided into the sensuous (*indriya-nibandhana*)⁴ and the non-sensuous (*anindriya-nibandhana*). Both of these again are of the nature of *avagraha*, *īhā*,

1. I. 2, 7.

2. II. 1.

3. II, 4.

4. II, 5.

avāya, and *dhāraṇā*¹, which as has already been explained in the chapter on Umāsvāti's *TS.*, are four grades of cognition according to the definiteness of knowledge. The direct knowledge in the highest sense depends for its production exclusively upon the soul (*utapattāvātma-mātrāpekṣam*)², and is of two kinds: (i) *vikala* (limited and defective), which includes *avadhi* and *manaḥparyāya*; and (ii) *sakala* (complete and correct) equivalent to *kevala*³. It will be seen that this division of direct knowledge is a combination of the classifications of knowledge as found in the *Nyāyāvatāra* and the *TS.*, with this difference that while sensuous knowledge is regarded as indirect in the *TS.*, it is called direct in this work.

Indirect knowledge is classified⁴ as memory (*smaraṇa*); recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*); argumentation (*tarka*); inference (*anumāna*); and scriptural testimony (*āgama*); and these are explained in the same way as in the *PMS*.

Superimposition (*samāropa*), which is the opposite of knowledge, is defined as the cognition of a thing in another which is different from it⁵. It is of three

1. II, 6.

2. II, 18.

3. II, 19-23. *Avadhi* and *manaḥ-paryāya* have been defined in the same way as in *TS*.

4. III, 1, ff.

5. I, 8. *atasmins tad adhyavasāyaḥ samāropa iti*

kinds: (i) error (*viparyaya*); (ii) doubt (*saṁśaya*) and (iii) uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*).¹ The example of error is the cognition of silver in mother of pearl; of doubt—whether the object is a post or a man; and uncertainty while a person is passing by, just an awareness that something (like arrow) has been touched². It will appear that the definition of *samāropa* is strictly applicable to *viparyaya* only; that is to say, to the case of an actual error in cognition. In the case of doubt or uncertainty there is no superimposition of a thing on another different from it; and hence they should fail outside the scope of '*viparyaya*' as it has been defined here.

Scriptural testimony (*āgama*) is defined in the same way as in the *PMS*.

In *PNT*, also the objects of knowledge are distinguished as general (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*)³. The former is divided into cross-wise (*tiryak*) and vertical (*ūrdhvatā*); and the latter into (a concomitant) attribute (*guṇa*) and successive attribute (*paryāya*).

The cross-wise general is a homogeneous development in each of a number of individuals; for example, cowhood in a spotted cow and those born from her⁴.

1. I, 9.

2. I, 14, 15, "Kim ity ālocana-mātram anadhyavasāyaḥ; yathā gacchat tṛṇa-sparśa-jñānam iti".

3. V, 1.

4. V, 4. *prati-vyakti tulyā pariṇatis tiryak sāmānyam, śa-bala-śābaleyādi-piṇdeṣu gotvam yathā*.

The vertical general is a substance common to the prior and the posterior transformations of it; for example, gold persisting in a bangle; a bracelet; etc¹. The distinctions of the two kinds of 'general' in this work also are based upon the principle of attribute and substance respectively².

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1. V, 5. *pūrvāpara-pariṇāma-sādhāraṇam dravyam ūrdhvatā-sāmānyam kaṭaka-kaṇkaṇādy-anugāmi-kāñcanavat.*
 2. In a paper on 'An Indian Doctrine of Perception and Error' (ASP. 1921-22, pp. 31 and 32) Prof. F. W. Thomas, refers to this distinction in the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokā-lanḥkāra*, V. 3-5, and observes thus: 'In thus discriminating two kinds of universal, of which one depends upon difference of individual and the other upon difference of time, the Jains would seem to have the support of a passage in Mr. Bradley's Logic (I. C. VI, §§ 30)'. It will appear from Prof. Thomas's own translation of the *sūtras*, however, that the two kinds of generality refer to the generality of attribute and substance. His rendering is as follows :

'Generality is of two kinds, cross-wise generality and vertical generality.

Crosswise generality is a similar development in several particulars; for example, 'oxness' in bodies spotted and brindled.

'Vertical generality' is substance common to prior and posterior developments, for example, 'gold' persisting in armlet, ring, and so forth''.

Thus it is not 'the difference of individuals' which forms the distinguishing feature of crosswise generality ; for in a case of vertical generality also there is a 'difference of individuals'. Armlets, rings, etc made of gold are as distinct individuals as spotted and brindled oxen. Similarly, in the case of vertical generality, it is not the

The division of particulars into *guṇa* and *paryāya* is different from that in *PMS*. where they are divided into *paryāya* and *vyatireka*. The *paryāya* is common to both the works, and is defined in the same way, viz. as successive particulars such as pleasure and pains in the soul *paryāyas tu krama bhāvi yathā tat-raiva sukha-duḥkhādiḥ* (V, 8). The *guṇa* particulars of the *PNT*. are, however, different from the *vyatireka* of the *PMS*. They are defined as concomitant attributes; as for example, consciousness, individuality, power, etc., in the soul—*guṇaḥ saha-bhāvī dharmo yathātmāni vijñāna-vyakti-śaktyādiḥ* (V, 7). Thus this division of particulars is based upon the principles of concomitance and succession ; and appears to refer to attributes only. It is, therefore, not so satisfactory as that in the *PMS*. which includes both particular attributes and substances.

difference of time which really matters but the persistence of one and the same *substance* (*dravya*), e. g. gold, through a number of things made out of it ; although there will be a difference of time also if one and the same lump of gold is considered in relation to different forms into which it is moulded successively. It is evident, however, that this kind of generality will apply also to a number of gold ornaments existing at the same time, simply because all of them are made of gold. The examples of the two kinds of generality ; viz. oxness in a number of oxen ; and 'gold, persisting in armlet, ring and so forth' respectively clearly indicate the principle of classification. In the definition of the vertical (*ūrdhvatā*), the very word '*dravyam*', is used—'*purvāpara-pariṇāma sādharmaṇam dravyam*', etc.

3. Later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Epistemology

(i) Analysis of Knowledge in Vātsyāyana's Nyāya-bhāṣya.

I have already discussed Vātsyāyana's interpretations of the *Nyāya-sūtras* dealing with the theory of knowledge in the chapter on the *Nyāya-sūtras*. Vātsyāyana has not much to say on the subject of epistemology independently. He, however, supplements the treatment of the doctrine of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) in the *NS.* by giving an analysis of cognition, defining right cognition, and discussing briefly the comparative value of the various means of knowledge.

According to Vātsyāyana, the means of knowledge have reference to an object (*arthavad*), for it is only when objects are cognised by means of them, that it is possible to make an effort to achieve them¹. He analyses knowledge into: (i) the knower (*pramātṛ*), who is prompted to action by a desire to acquire or discard an object; (ii) the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), that by means of which the object is known; (iii) the cognised object (*prameya*); and (iv) the form of cognition (*pramiti*), which constitutes the knowledge of the object (*artha-vijāna*). It is asserted that a knowledge of the real nature of an object depends upon these four factors.

1- 'Pramāṇato' rtha-pratipattau prevṛtti-sāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam.

In answer to the question as to what constitutes *right knowledge* it is said that it is to know an existent (*sad*) as existent, and not the contrary of it; and to know a non-existent (*asad*) as non-existent, and not the contrary of it¹. This is followed by an explanation that a non-existent is perceived by means of its absence; for if it were present, it would have been perceived through the means of knowledge as the existents are.

Under NS. I, 1, 3, the applicability and the relative value of the various means of knowledge are discussed, and it is said that, while in some cases more than one of them can be applied; e.g. in the case of the soul, in others only one of them is applicable; e.g. in the case of thunder. Direct knowledge, by which sense-cognition is meant, is said to be the most convincing of all; for even after employing inference, knowledge by similarity, and verbal testimony, there is always a desire on the part of the cogniser to know the object directly.

Vātsyāyana's interpretation of NS. III, 2, 10 to III, 2, 18, which deal with the nature of cognition, and IV, 2, 26 ff. which discuss the cognition of the whole in relation to its parts, have been discussed by me in a separate article in the *JRAS.*² in which I have maintained that these two sections of the NS. do not deal with the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism respectively as

1. *sataśca sad-bhāvo, satascāsad-bhāvaḥ*, etc.

2. *JRAS.*, January. 1930.

Vātsyāyana and, following his other commentators have held.

(ii) Development of the Vaiseṣika Theory of Knowledge in the Bhāṣya of Prasastapāda.

The *Prasastapāda-bhāṣya* is the earliest known commentary on the VS. Unlike Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-bhāṣya* on the NS. the PB. does not closely follow the NS. Although it claims to expound the doctrines of the VS., it had added much to the matter found in the original work, and, therefore, it is usually considered as a work by itself. Another name for the PB. is the *Padārtha-dharma-saṃgraha*.

The section dealing with the theory of knowledge in the PB. opens with almost a quotation from the NS. I, 1, 15, which asserts that the terms 'budhi' 'upalabdhi', 'jñāna' and 'pratyaya' all are synonyms. Cognition (*buddhi*), it is said, although of a manifold nature according to the objects cognised, may be divided into two kinds: right cognition (*vidyā*) and wrong cognition (*avidyā*). Then each of these is of four kinds:

Right cognition is direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*laiṅgika*), memory (*smṛti*), and inspired knowledge (as of the sages-*ārṣa*).²

1. *Buddhir upalabdhir jñānam pratyaya iti paryāyāḥ. PB.* p. 171. Cf. NS., 1, 1. 15 : *Buddhir upalabdhir jñānam ity anarthānantaram.*

2. In the PB. the four kinds of wrong cognition (*avidyā*)

Direct knowledge¹ is defined as mere undifferentiated apprehension consequent upon the knowledge of the generic and the specific properties of an object². This is free from other means of knowledge. Another alternative definition of perception is given thus 'that non-erroneous and non-inferential knowledge of things which is produced by the mutual contact of four, viz. soul, mind, sense-organs and the object'.³. Direct knowledge may be either ordinary or mystic. The former is obtained through the sense-organs; and the latter by the direct contact of the soul and mind with their objects.

Inference is that knowledge which is produced by noticing a sign or mark. This definition is the same as found in VS.

Then the inferential mark or sign (*liṅga*) is defined as that (i) which is associated with that which is to be inferred (*yadanumeyena sambaddham*); (2) which is known to be found in all positive

are explained first. The use of '*vidyā*' and '*avidyā*' in the sense of knowledge and error is to be positively found here.

1. The word '*pratyakṣā*' is explained as *tatrākṣam akṣam pratityutpadyate iti pratyakṣam*. Cf. Vātsyāyana NB. on NS. I, 1, 3, "*akṣasyākṣasya prativīṣaym vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam*".
2. *Sāmānya-viśeṣe jñānotpattau avibhaktam ālocana-mātram pratyakṣam*, p. 187.
3. *Athavā sarveṣu padārtheṣu catuṣṭaya sannikarṣād avitatham avyapadeśyam yaj jñānam utpadyate tat pratyakṣam pramāṇam*.

instances (i. e. in instances where the probandum is to be found) (*prasiddham ca tad anvite*) ; and (3) that which is not found in negative instances (*tad-abhāve ca nāsty eva*).

An inferential mark which does not conform to the above condition is fallacious, and *Praśastapāda*, while explaining the fallacies, refers to *VS. III, 1, 15*¹. This reference also clearly shows that the allusion to *Kāśyapa* in this connection is to the author of the *VS*².

According to *Praśastapāda*, inference is of two kinds: (1) *drṣṭa* and (2) *sāmānyato drṣṭa*. *Drṣṭa* inference is that where the species of the known instance (*prasiddha*) and that of the probandum (*sādhya*) are identical. For example, having observed that a dewlap is to be found only in a cow, on seeing a dewlap in another animal elsewhere, it is inferred that that animal must also be a cow,

1. *Aprasiddho 'napadeṣo 'san sandigdhas' cānapadeśaḥ* (*PB.* p. 204).

2. *PB.* p. 200—*viruddhāsiddhā-saṁdigdham alīṅgam kāśyapo 'bravīt'*. Some writers like Keith (*ILA.* p. 94) have regarded the reference to *Kāśyapa* in this verse as covering the subject of both the valid and the invalid marks of inference. But considering that the name is mentioned in the second of the two verses, which gives a classification of invalid marks only, the reference to *Kāśyapa* is evidently with regard to this topic only. This is confirmed by *Praśastapāda*'s later reference to the author of the *Sūtras* (*ity etad evāḥ sūtra-kāraḥ*), (*PB.* p. 204), exactly in connection with the same topic.

Sāmānyatodrṣṭa inference is that where the species of the known instance and that of the probandum are entirely different from each other, and the inference is based upon the presence of a common nature which can be inferred by means of the inferential mark. For example, having observed that the conduct of a farmer, a tradesman or a soldier is purposive, it is inferred that the conduct of those who observe the injunction prescribed for the various castes and orders (*varṇāśramiṇām*) must also be purposive¹.

It will appear that the *drṣṭa* and the *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* inference of Praśastapāda are meant, as he himself explains in the *Bhāṣya*, to cover the inferential relations mentioned in VS., IX, 2, 1; the *drṣṭa* inference being apparently meant to correspond to the *pūrvavat* and the *śeṣavat* inference of the *Nyāya-sūtras* and the *pratyakṣato drṣṭa-sambandha* of the *Mīmāṃsā* as explained in the *Śabara-bhāṣya*; and the *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* to the inference bearing the same name in the *Nyāya-sūtras* as explained by Vātsyāyana. The example of *drṣṭa* inference, however, as given by Praśastapāda is not happy; for it suggests that the *drṣṭa* inference is knowledge by similarity; the animal which is cognised as a cow being itself perceived through the senses. In the case of an inference about the existence of fire on a hill on the other hand, it is only the smoke-the mark, which is perceived. His example would, however, be correct,

1. PB. p. 206.

if only the dewlap of the animal could be visible, and the phrase *deśāntare 'pi sāsṇāmātra-darśanād'* probably signifies that. But the appearance of only dewlap without the other parts of the body is not at all a normal experience.

Then inference is further distinguished as inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and inference for others (*parārthānumāna*). It is usually assumed that Praśastapāda was the first to make this distinction. Inference for oneself consists of two premises and a conclusion as follows :—

Wherever there is smoke there is fire; (*apadeśa*)

There is smoke on this hill ; (*anūsandhāna*)

∴ There is fire on this hill ; (*pratyāmnāya*)

Inference for others consists of five propositions:

Wherever there is smoke, there is fire; (*apadeśa*)

As for example, in the kitchen ; (*sādharmyeṇa nidarśana*)

And wherever there is no fire there is no smoke, as in a pond ; (*vaidharmyeṇa nidarśana*)

There is smoke on the hill ; (*anusandhāna*)

∴ There is fire on the hill ; (*pratyāmnāya*).

Of the above terms *apadeśa* corresponds to *hetu* ; *anusandhāna* to *upanaya* ; both the kinds of *nidarśana* to *udāharaṇa*; and *pratyāmnāya* to *nigamana* of the Nyāya School.

Verbal testimony, knowledge by similarity, presumption, implication, non-existence, tradition, all these are shown to be cases of inference ; for in all

of them, it is maintained, cognition is the result of some mark.¹

Wrong cognition (*avidyā*) is also of four kinds : (1) 'doubt (*saṁśaya*) ; (2) error (*viparyaya*) ; (3) uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*) ; (4) dream (*svapna*). Of these the first two are explained in the same way as in the NS. and the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*. Uncertainty means failure to determine the exact nature of an object, and may pertain to perception or inference. Dream is explained as knowledge arising from the contact of the mind and the sense-organ without the presence of objects.

Memory is defined in the usual way ; and what has been called *ārṣa-jñāna* and put down as the fourth form of right cognition is substantially the same as the *yogi-jñāna* which has been described as a kind of direct knowledge.²

In the above account of the various means of knowledge according to *Praśastapāda* the following points are worthy of notice :—

(1) *Praśastapāda* gives two alternative definitions of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*). In the first of these he refers to the cognition of the generic and the specific properties of the object of cognition, which we find both in *Māṇikya Nandi's PMS.* and *Deva Sūri's PNT.* and in fact in the works of all later writers, especially in those of *Prabhākara* and

1. *PB.*, pp. 213-230.

2. *PB.*, pp. 256 and 258.

Kumārila. In the second definition, he expressly includes soul (*ātman*) and mind (*manas*) as factors in cognition, which were absent in the definition of *pratyakṣa* as given in the NS., and which omission had provided Diñnāga an occasion to criticise Vātsyāyana in this connection. Further the omission of 'the contact of sense-organs with the object' *indriyārtha-sannikarṣa* in the first definition is analogous to the same omission in the definitions as given by the Buddhist and the Jaina writers beginning with Diñnāga, and is certainly a fresh departure on the subject in the *Nyaya-vaiśeṣika* School. As has already been pointed out, this modified form of the definition of direct knowledge is meant to include such other kinds of *pratyakṣa* as mental cognition, self-consciousness, etc.

(2) The classification of inference as *drṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* is intended to be an improvement upon a mere description of the various kinds of inference as contained in the VS., IX, 2, 1 and three kinds of inference enumerated in the NS. although these two kinds of inference in the PB. are meant to cover the same distinctions as specified in the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya Sūtras*. The division of inference into *svārtha* and *parārtha* is also a fresh departure in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory of knowledge, and is found in the works of all later logicians beginning with Diñnāga.

(3) The division of wrong cognition (*avidyā*) into four kinds, viz. doubt (*saṃśaya*), error (*vipar-*

yaya) ; uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*) ; and dream (*svapna*), appears to find its echo in Deva Sūri's division of superimposition (*samāropa*) into error (*viparyaya*) ; doubt (*saṁśaya*) and uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*),

(iii) Classifications of sense-contact and inference ; and the theory of verbal knowledge in Uddyotakara's Nyāya-Vārtika

Uddyotakara's comments on the NS. dealing with the definition of sense-cognition and the classification of inference have already been discussed in the chapter on the NS. and his criticism, of Dīnāga. Besides these comments and criticisms, the following topics discussed by Uddyotakara in his NV. are important for our purpose :—

(i) His explanation of the different kinds of contact of the sense-organs (*sannikarṣa*) in sense-cognition.¹

(ii) His classification of inference as (a) *anvayin*; (b) *vyatirekin* ; and (c) *anvaya vyatirekin*.²

(iii) His theory of verbal knowledge.³

(i) The contact of the sense-organ with its object is of six kinds : (a) conjunction (*saṁyoga*) ; (b) conjoined inherence (*saṁyukta-samavāya*) ; (c) conjoined inherent inherence (*saṁyukta-samaveta sam-*

1. NV., I, 1, 4.

2. NV., I, 1, 5.

3. NV., II, 2, 55 and 65.

avāya ; (d) inherence (*samavāya*) ; (e) inherent inherence (*samaveta-samavāya*) ; (f) the relation of qualification and the qualified (*viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva*). For example, (a) when a jar is cognised, the contact of the eye with the jar is a case of conjunction (*saṁyoga*) ; (b) when the colour of the jar is cognised, the contact of the eye with the colour, which inheres in the jar, is a case of conjoined inherence (*saṁyukta-samavāya*) ; (c) when 'colourness' is cognised, colourness is that which inheres in the colour which, in its turn, inheres in the jar ; hence this is a case of conjoined inherent inherence (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*) ; (d) when sound is perceived, it is a case of inherence (*samavāya*), for the sound inheres in the ear-cavity ; (e) when soundness is cognised, it is a case of inherent inherence (*samaveta samavāya*), for soundness inheres in the ear-cavity ; (f) when the non-existence of an object is perceived by means of the particularisation of a spot which could be occupied by it, it is a case of the relation of qualification and the qualified (*viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva*).

(2) According to Uddyotakara, inference is knowledge based upon relation between the middle term (*liṅga*) and the major (*parāmarśa*) term aided by a remembrance of that relation—'*smṛty-anugr̥h̥to liṅga-parāmarśo anumānam*'¹. For example, the knowledge that the hill has fire on it is based upon the relation between smoke and fire and the rememb-

1. *NV.*, pp. 47, 48.

rance of that relation. While explaining the three kinds of inference mentioned in NS., I, 1, 4 as has already been said, Uddyotakara called them (a) *anvayi*. (b) *vyatireki* and (c) *anvaya-vyatireki*, which names have been variously translated into English¹. *Anvayi* is that inference in which the 'the probans subsists in the subject and other objects of its kinds, *vivakṣita-taj-jātīya-vṛttitve sati*, and there is, in regard to it, nothing in which the probandum is known to be absent ; e.g. when one, who holds that all things are transient, argues that sound is transient, because it is a product ; for there is nothing in which the probandum (here, transient character) does not exist. Such an inference would be best called *inference by agreement*. *Vyatireki* is that inference in which the probans subsists in the subject; where there is nothing besides the subject in which the probandum is known to be present, and where the probans does not subsist in anything where the probandum is absent—*vivakṣita-vyāpakatve sapakṣābhāve sati vipakṣāvṛttiḥ*, e.g., the living body is not without a soul, for if it were soulless, it would be lifeless. This kind of inference should be most suitably expressed by *inference by difference*. Lastly *anvayatireki* is that inference in which the

1. Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his *HIL.*, (pp. 130, 131) calls them exclusively—affirmative, exclusively-negative and affirmative-negative respectively. Gangānātha Jhā translates them as the universal-affirmative, the universal-negative, and the universal affirmative-negative. (NS. *Engl. Transl. in Indian Thought; NV.*, I, 1, 5).

probans subsists in the subject and other objects of its kinds, and does not subsist in objects which are of a different kind, (that is to say, those in which the probandum does not exist)—*vivakṣita-taj jātiyopapattau vipakṣāvṛttiḥ*', e. g. sound is transient because while possessing generality and particularity (*sāmānya-viśeṣavattve sati*) it is cognised by the external sense-organs of human beings like ourselves, like a jar. Here the qualities of sound are to be found in transient things, and are absent in non-transient things, and the inference is drawn upon this basis of agreement and difference of qualities¹. Hence the proper name for this kind of cognition will be *inference by agreement and difference*.

Uddyotakara calls the inference by agreement *vīta* and that by difference *avīta*². The terms recur

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1. There is evidently a mistake in Gaṅgānātha Jhā's English Transl. (Indian Thought. NS., p. 163), of the NV. where it defines the *anvaya-vyatireki* inference. The translation is : 'The Universal Affirmative Negative is that in which the probans, which subsisting in the subject and other objects akin to it (wherein the probandum resides), subsists in those where the probandum is known to reside'. Here the portion underlined is just the opposite of what is ought to be, viz. 'does not subsist in those where the probandum is not known to reside—*vipakṣā-vṛttiḥ*. The foot-note, in which Dr. Jhā explains the example, represents the correct meaning.
 2. NV., p. 126. Uddyotakara explains the distinction between *vīta* and *avīta* thus : '*tatra sva-rūpeṇārthaparicchedakatvam vīta-dharmaḥ ; avītaḥ punaḥ para-pakṣa-pratiṣedhenaiva pravartate*'.

in the *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra, where *vīta* is explained as a positive inference covering the *pūrvavat* and '*sāmānyātodrṣṭa*'; and *avīta* as a negative inference equivalent to the '*śeṣavat*' of the *Nyāya-sūtras*.

Another important topic discussed by Uddyotakara under NS., II, 2, 55 and II, 2, 65 is the theory of what has been called verbal knowledge, that is to say, of the denotation of words. How does a word, which consists of a number of letters, come to denote a thing; and, then what is the nature of this denotation? The *sphoṭa* doctrine of the grammarians and the *apoha* theory of the Buddhists are refuted. It is important to draw a distinction which is evidently overlooked by several writers between such verbal knowledge and what has been called verbal testimony as a means of knowledge. The former simply deals with the theory of language, and has to do with the significance of words irrespective of the truth or falsity of what they denote; while the latter is treated as a regular *pramāṇyā*, which is concerned with the *validity* of knowledge conveyed by words. Even in the original works of Sanskrit writer the two topics seem to be mixed up; but the distinction between them is clear.

Also see Jacobi, *Fetgabe Garbe Richard von Garbe*, p. 8, ff.; Keith *ILA.*, pp. 90 and 91.

(iv) Distinctions of the non-reflective (nirvikalpaka) and the reflective (savikalpaka) direct knowledge, and the explanation of the theories of error in the Nyāya Vārtika-tātparya-tīkā of Vācaspati Miśra.

Besides Vācaspati Miśra's comments upon the texts of the NS. the *Bhāṣya* and the NV., which have already been noticed in the chapter on the NS., the special feature of his commentary on the NV. on the subject of epistemology is his distinction, for the first time in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School, between the non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) and the reflective (*savikalpaka*) direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*). In this work he also explains the various theories of error as held by different schools.

While introducing the subject of the two kinds of direct knowledge referred to above, Vācaspati Miśra observes that the authors of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* and the *Nyāya-vārtika* did not mention and explain this distinction because they considered it to be too evident. There is no reason, however, to believe that this assertion of V M's is true. He further declares that he has introduced the distinction of the two kinds of knowledge in his commentary following his own preceptor named Trilocana¹. It is difficult to say exactly with whom this division of direct

1. *NVTT*. p. 87.

knowledge began. The earliest author we know of as making this distinction is either Prabhākara or Kumārila, whoever may be earlier. I have shown that the definition of direct knowledge as given in the NS. is really applicable to the kinds of knowledge called *nirvikalpaka* later on, and the definitions of direct knowledge as given by Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti clearly exclude such knowledge as is associated with reflection and the use of language. Now those later writers, who could not deny the existence of such direct knowledge and still wanted to maintain that sense-cognition associated with reflection and language is also direct, naturally drew this two fold distinction of *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*. Prabhākara and Kumārila especially emphasise the point that the reflective sense-cognition (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) is also direct knowledge, and they evidently do so against the theory of the Buddhist logicians, according to whom only the non-reflective cognition is direct knowledge.

In the history of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika School, Vācaspati Miśra explains the twofold distinction of the non-reflective direct knowledge (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) and the reflective direct knowledge (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*), and tries to find support for it in the text of NS. I, I, 4. According to him, the term *vyāvasāyātmaka* in this *sūtra* denotes the reflective direct knowledge (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*); that is to say, 'that which is definite or certain', point-

ing to something specified by its genus and name ; while the word '*avyapadeśya*', which means 'that which cannot be expressed by words', refers to the non-reflective direct knowledge (*nirvikalpaka pratya-kṣa*), for it is not specified by a genus, and is, therefore indefinite¹. As has already been pointed out while discussing the definition of direct knowledge in the chapter on the NS. there is no justification whatsoever for holding the view that the terms *avyapadeśya* and *vyavasāyātmaka* in NS. I, 1, 4 refer to two kinds of direct knowledge ; and none of the commentators before Vācaspati Miśra has interpreted them in that way.

It will further appear that Vācaspati Miśra has also explained how a sense-cognition cannot be considered apart from its expression in language, and how *avyapadeśya* in the NS. I, 1, 4 means 'that which is not the result of an inferential mark'. Now there will be a flagrant inconsistency, if this interpretation of *avyapadeśya* and the distinctions of *nirvikalpaka* and the *savikalpaka* knowledge be both considered as representing Vācaspati Miśra's own view. The fact is that so far as one can see from his commentary, neither of these interpretations is

1. NVT, p. 84.

तद्गृहीतसंकेतस्य प्रथममिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादालोचनेन शब्द-
संसर्गरहितेना लोचितेऽर्थमात्रे तस्यार्थस्य शब्दभेदेन संबन्धा-
च्छब्दविषयसंस्कारः प्रबोध्यते स प्रबुद्धशब्दस्मृतिं जनयति।

claimed by him as his own. Vācaspati is too much of a faithful commentator to put in any of his own notions. What he has done in commenting upon the NV. is that he has simply brought out the meaning of the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika*. Thus his explanation of how direct knowledge can be regarded as always associated with some name is merely a statement of the position of the objector referred to in the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika* when it is said : 'With regard to this direct knowledge produced by the contact of the sense organ with objects' the *Bhāṣya* has represented an objector as putting forward the objection that 'every direct knowledge is called after the name of its object, etc.'¹ Similarly, his explanation of how '*avyapadeśya*' means 'that which is not the result of an inferential mark' is simply a comment upon the NV. when it says : 'some (commentators) explain that '*avyapadeśya*' is added with a view to exclude inference. This is not so, etc'².

While commenting on NS. I, 1, 2 in connection with the distinction of right cognition (*pramā*) and wrong cognition (*apramā*), Vācaspati Miśra explains the various theories of error (*viparyaya*) according to the different schools. These may be classified as (1) *Ātma-khyāti*, usually held by the Yogācāra

1. NV. p. 38 *tac cendriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam viṣaya-nāmadheya-nābhidhīyate iti bhāṣyam.*

2. Ibid. p. 38, 39, '*apare tvavyapadeśyam ity anenānumānam nirākurvanti, tac ca naivam*'.

School of Buddhism, according to which, a concept which exists only in the mind wrongly appears as a real thing in the external world ; (2) *Asat-khyāti*, where an unreal thing, e.g. a piece of silver, which does not exist, appears as real, although it is only a piece of shell which exists ; (3) *Anirvacanīya-khyāti*, where an object is cognised in such a way that it is possible to define it as either real or unreal ; e.g. when a piece of shell cognised as silver, what is cognised is neither the piece of shell nor a piece of silver ; (4) *Akhyāti*, that wrong knowledge where the distinction between that which exists really and that which is cognised is not perceived. The illusion is partly remembrance and partly apprehension ; but owing to the fact that this act of remembrance is not consciously taken note of at the time false apprehension, the illusory perception also appears to be as true and valid as a correct perception¹. This theory is held by the Prabhākar School of Mīmāṃsā. (5) *Anyathā-khyāti* or *viparīta-khyāti*, held by the Nyāya School, according to which wrong cognition consists in mistaking one thing for another, e. g. a piece of shell is mistaken for a piece of silver. The peculiar qualities of the object which actually exists, and of that which is wrongly perceived, are not noticed. A certain feature, or features, common to both is noticed ; for example, the glow common to a piece of silver and a conch-shell ; and by the accidental

1. I. IP. p, 121.

remembrance of a piece of silver in seen the past, the present object of perception is also taken to be a piece of the same metal. This fact of remembering a piece of silver, however, is not taken note of at the time of the illusion. The theory holds that in addition to a failure to distinguish between the object, which actually exists, and that which is wrongly perceived, in every illusion there is also a positive false identification of the one with the other, for example, of a piece of silver with a piece of conch-shell. The *Akhyāti* theory of the Mīmāṃsā School does not recognise this last positive element¹.

Jayanta's *Nyāya-mañjarī* (880 A.D.)-a commentary on the NS. and Sṛīdhara's *Nyāyā-Kandalī* (990 A.D.) on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* are not other important works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School during this period subsequent to Vāchaspati Miśra. Neither of them has any constructive value. They are full of polemics against the Buddhists. The *Nyāya-kandalī* contains a refutation of some of the Mīmāṃsā doctrines of epistemology as found particularly in Prabhākara and Kumārila.

The Mīmāṃsā Epistemology.—As has already been observed, it is in the work of the commentators on the MS. that we find the origin and development of the theory of knowledge according to the Mīmāṃsā School. Of these Śabarasvāmin is the oldest commentator whose work, the *Śabara-bhāṣya*, is available

1. IIP. p. 120, 121.

now; although it is evident from the quotations from the work of a Vṛttikāra in the *Śabara-bhāṣya* that it is not the first commentary on the MS. Śabarasvāmin was followed by Kumāṛila and Prabhākara, who further developed the epistemological doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā School. A study of these authors, as will be seen presently, shows that while the existence of the theories of knowledge in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist Schools must have provided a stimulus for the origin and growth of a theory of knowledge in Mīmāṃsā, this, in its turn, had its influence in determining the subsequent epistemology of the Jaina and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. For instance, in the quotation from the Vṛttikāra in the *Śabara-bhāṣya*, the definition of direct knowledge and classification of inference show distinct signs of the influence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School; while the discussion with regard to the view that cognition is identical with its object, or that cognition exists independently of an external object, is expressly undertaken with reference to the Buddhist doctrines of *Śūnya-vāda* and *Nirālambanavāda*. On the other hand, the distinction of the two kinds of direct knowledge the non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) and the reflective (*savikalpaka*), which was adopted later on by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School, is known to us to exist first in the works of Kumāṛila and Prabhākara. Similarly, the discussion of the nature of the general (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśeṣa*) with reference to the theory of cognition is first found prominently in the

work of the same two authors.

With regard to the relative dates Kumārila and Prabhākara it is difficult to say which of them was really senior to the other; but a comparative study of the epistemological doctrines of the two suggests that Prabhākara may have written his works after Kumārila. For instance, if Kumārila had been posterior to Prabhākara one would expect him to particularly refer to such of Prabhākara's views as were different from his own, e.g. the non-acceptance of *abhāva* as a means of knowledge on the part of Prabhākara; or again the doctrine of *Tripuṭi-pratyakṣa*, which has been particularly emphasised by Prabhākara and his followers. As in my treatment of the Mīmāṃsā epistemology here I have dealt with the Prabhākara School as a whole, it has seemed most suitable that the chapter dealing with the theory of knowledge according to this school should come after that dealing with Kumārila. It is well-known that according to tradition Prabhākara was a pupil of Kumārila.

(i) The Theory of Knowledge in the *Sabarabhāṣya* of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras.

The fourth aphorism of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*¹ contains a kind of definition of direct knowledge (*pratyak-*

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1. *Sat-samprayoge, puruṣasyendriyāṇām buddhi janma tat pratyakṣam animittam vidyamānopalambhanatvāt.* It may be mentioned that Kumārila, in his *Śloka-vartika*, objects to regarding the first part of the *sūtra* as a definition

kṣa) and declares that it cannot be the means of knowing duty (*dharma*) for through direct knowledge that only is known which is present. Direct knowledge is that apprehension which is produced by the contact of the sense-organs of man with something which exists. It is maintained by the commentators that inference (*anumāna*), knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*), and presumption (*arthāpatti*) are also implied in the MS. which contains the definition of direct knowledge, as they depend upon direct knowledge. Verbal testimony (*śabda*) and non-existence (*abhāva*) are referred to in MS. 1. 1. 5. Thus, according to Śabarāsvāmin and Kumārila, six means of knowledge are recognised by the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, viz., direct knowledge, inference, knowledge by similarity, verbal testimony, presumption and non-existence. Of these it is only the verbal testimony which can be relied upon for knowing duty. It may be noted that the definition of direct knowledge as given in the MS. itself is analogous to those found in the earlier works ; for in it also direct knowledge is defined simply as that which is produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the object, and this fact should confirm the view, which is already held,

of direct knowledge; for, according to him that would make a defective definition, which one would not expect from the author of the MS. The *Vṛttikāra*, quoted by Śabara, has, however, taken it as a definition of direct knowledge, and, in any case, this is all that one can find in the MS. about the nature of direct knowledge.

that the *MS.* are earlier than the *NS.*

The *Bhāṣya*, however, by means of a quotation from the *Vṛttikāra*, elaborates the definition of direct knowledge as given in the *Sūtra*, and asserts that freedom from error is one of the essential conditions of direct knowledge is not erroneous ; that which is erroneous is not direct knowledge-*yat pratyakṣam na tad vyabhicarati, yad vyabhicarati na tat pratyakṣam*. Further it explains the distinction between right apprehension and wrong apprehension as follows : when the mind is obstructed by the eye, etc., or the sense-organ by darkness, etc., or the external object because of minuteness, etc., then there is wrong apprehension ; for right apprehension is (only) when there are no obstructions (*anupahateṣu hi samyak-jñānam*) ; and the mutual contact of the sense-organ, mind and the object is the cause of right apprehension. When there are defects about these, the apprehension is false. But how does one know about it ? One knows about it when a right cognition is obtained by the removal of the defects (*doṣāpagame śampratipatti-darśanāt*). But then how to discriminate between what is defective and what is not ? (*The answer is*) that if on careful investigation we do not find any defect, in the absence of any proof (for the presence of a defect) we presume that there is no defect. Therefore, only that apprehension is false (*asamīcīnaḥ pratyayaḥ*), and none other, which has defective cause (*yasya ca duṣṭam kāraṇam*) and where it is perceived that it (the apprehension) is false (*yatra ca*

*mithyeti pratyayah.*¹⁾

Another important section of the *Śabara-bhāṣya* on the subject, which is also supposed to be an extract from the commentary of the *Vṛttikāra*² is that directed against those who would identify cognition with the object cognised. They would say we do not find any distinction of form (*ākāra bheda*) between the object and its cognition, and it is our cognition which is directly apprehended (*pratyakṣā ca no budh-
hiḥ*). Therefore we see that there is no object apart from it. 'This would be so', says the *Vṛttikāra*, if cognition be of the form of the object (*yady arthākā-
rā buddhiḥ syāt*) ; but our cognition is without a form (*nirākāra*) ; it is the external object which has form ; and it is that as related to the external world (*bahir-deśa sambaddha*) which is directly apprehended ; for direct apprehension has some thing for its object (*artha-viśayā*) and not another cognition, and the reason for this is that it is momentary (*kṣanikā*) and, therefore, would not last until the appearance of

1. *Mīmāṃsā Darśana* (Śabara-bhāṣya) Bib. Indica, Vol. 1, p. 8.

2. I agree with Jacobi (JAOS, xxxi) in holding that all the passages beginning with *vṛttikāras tu anyathemam grantham varṇayāmcakāra*' on p. 7, and ending with *bādarāyaṇa grahaṇam uktam*' on p. 18 of the *Śabara-bhāṣya*, are quotations from the *Vṛttikāra*. The editor of the *Bhāṣya* also holds the same view, as it evident from his footnote p. 18.

another cognition. If it be said that it (cognition) is known as it is being produced, and makes known another object, like a lamp ; this is not so, for, no one apprehends cognition without an object being known (first), and when it (the object) is known, one knows (cognition) by inference (*jñāte tv anumānād avagacchati*) ; therefore, it is not right to maintain that it is known simultaneously (with the cognition of the object). Verily, we say that an object is known only when cognition is produced, and not until it is produced ; and, therefore, cognition is produced first, and the object is known afterwards ; yes, it is true that cognition is *produced* first, but not that it is *known* first. Sometimes it happens, however, that although an object is known, it is said to be unknown¹. The form of cognition is not apprehended without an object serving as a mark-*nārtha-vyapadeśam antareṇa buddheḥ rūpopālabhanam*. Therefore there is no cognition which is not (apprehended as) the result of a mark or sign, and nothing is *non-pratyakṣa* which is not the result of a mark or sign ; and hence cognition is not *pratyakṣa*².

It is further argued that if it be maintained that

1. 'bhavati hi kadācid etat yat jñāto py arthaḥ san ajñātaḥ ity ucyate'. The significance of this assertion in the present context is not quite clear.

2. The text as published in the B. I. edition vol. I, p. 10 is 'tasmān na vyapadeśyā buddhiḥ, avyapadeśyam ca nāpratyakṣam, tasmād apratyakṣā buddhiḥ'. The editor suggests in a footnote that for *nāpratyakṣam* we should

cognition and the object cognised are identical, it will mean the non-existence of cognition, and not of the object which is existent and directly apprehended (*pratyakṣaya sataḥ*). And it is not true that they are identical; for cognition, which is without form, is *inferred*, while the object, which has form, is

read '*na pratyakṣam*'. It is evident that the reading suggested by the editor is incorrect; for if it be adopted the text would mean: 'that which is' '*avyapadeśya*' is not '*pratyakṣa*,' which, whatever be the meaning of '*avyapadeśya*' is just the opposite of what '*pratyakṣa*' has been usually understood to be. As the text stands, it means 'that which is *avyapadeśya* is not *non-pratyakṣa*', that is to say, it is *pratyakṣa*, and this is quite correct according to the well known definition of '*pratyakṣa*' in the NS., and elsewhere. However, while this clause, as it stands in the text, is correct, the one preceding it, viz. *tasmān na vyapadeśyī buddhiḥ* is certainly incorrect; and should read as '*tasmānna avyapadeśyā buddhiḥ*; for, as it stands, it means: 'therefore, cognition is not the result of mark or sign', which is opposed to the view of the author expressed in the immediately preceding clause, which gives the reason for what is meant to be asserted in the present clause, viz., 'the form of a cognition is not apprehended without an object serving as a mark' and in another clause before that in the same paragraph, viz., no one apprehends cognition without an object being known (first), and when it (the object) is known, one knows (cognition) by inference'. It is evident what the author means to say is that there is no cognition which is not (apprehended as) the result of a mark or a sign, and this will be expressed by taking the text as *tasmān na avyapadeśyā buddhiḥ*'.

directly apprehended. Hence, apprehension has an object for its cause (*arthātambanaḥ pratyayaḥ*). It is seen that the apprehension of cloth, which has a definite cause is possible only when the threads are cognised. Otherwise, it could happen, that sometimes the cognition of threads might give rise to the apprehension of a jar also, even in the case of a person who does not suffer from any defect in his sense-organs. But this does not happen, and hence an apprehension is not without a cause, and for the same reason, direct knowledge is not erroneous¹. The theory that cognitions are without an external object as their basis like the cognitions of a dream—*sarva eva nirālambanāḥ svapnavat pratyayaḥ*, is refuted by pointing out that there is a difference between the cognitions of a dream and those of the waking state in so far as the former entirely vanish on waking up, while the latter do not.²

According to the Vṛttikāra, in the ŚB., 'inference is the cognition of an object not in direct, contact and forming one of the two sides to a known relation, one of which is directly apprehended'³. It is of two kinds: (1) That based upon a directly-apprehended relation (*pratyakṣato drṣṭasambandha*), and (2) that based upon a commonly-known relation (*sāmānyato*

1. ŚB. p. 10.

2. ŚB., pp. 8 and 9. The theory criticised here, although no name is mentioned, appears to be *Vijñāna-vāda*.

3. *Anumānam jñāta-sambandhasyaika deśa-darśanad eka-deśāntare 'sannikṛṣṭe' rthe buddhiḥ*, ŚB. p. 10.

dr̥ṣṭasambandha). An example of the first will be the cognition of fire by apprehending smoke, and that of the latter one's being reminded of the sun having moved from a certain position, by virtue of one's previous knowledge that a person—say Devdatta, could get to another place only by having moved from his previous position.

Scriptural testimony (*śāstram*) is the cognition of an object not in sense-contact by means of the knowledge of words¹.

Knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*) also (which means) resemblance, produces knowledge of an object which is not in sense-contact, e.g. the perception of a gayal reminds one of a cow.

Presumption (*arthāpatti*) is the surmise about an object on the ground that something which has been seen or heard cannot be possible otherwise²; e.g. the surmise that a person, say Devadatta, must have gone outside, a fact which is not directly apprehended on finding that he is not at home and on the assumption that he is alive.

Non-existence (*abhāva*) characterised by the absence of any other means of knowledge denotes something which is not in sense-contact and does

1. 'śāstram śabda-vijñānād assannikṛṣṭe 'rthe vijñānam'.
ŚB. p. 10,

2. *Arthāpatti* .api dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vā 'rtho nyathā nopapadyate
ity artha-kalpanā,

exist (lit. 'is not'—*nāstīti*).

The definitions of the various means of knowledge and the examples according to the *Vṛttikāra*, as given in the *Śabara bhāṣya*, clearly indicate similarity to those found in the *Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya* of the NS., especially the example of the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference. This shows that the *Vṛttikāra* belonged to a period when the usual examples of the various kinds of *pramāṇas* had already come into vogue, and *Vātsyāyana*, illustrating the NS., simply adopted them from such authors as the *Vṛttikāra*. The definition of knowledge by similarity as given in the *ŚB*, is different from that of the Nyāya School, in so far as it is supposed to refer to what is not present to the senses and is similar to what is actually perceived. The refutation of the views that objects are identical with cognition and that cognitions exist independently of external objects clearly refers to a definite established doctrine which denied the existence of external objects. The language of the *Vṛttikāra* suggests that the refutation refers to the *Nirālambana-vāda*¹ and the *Śūnya-vāda*².

1. *Nanu sarva eva nirālambanaḥ, svapna-pratyayaḥ, pratyayasya hi nirālambanatā*—p. 8.

2. *Śūnyas tu, katham, artha-jñānayor ākāra-bhedām nopalabhāmahe iti*. p. 9. See Jacobi, *JAOS*. XXXI, pp. 18-24.

(ii) The Mīmāṃsā Epistemology according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

The Mīmāṃsā theory of knowledge as developed by Kumārila is to be found in some sections of his *Śloka-vārtika*, which is a commentary on the Tarka-pāda of the *Śabara-bhāṣyā*. He discusses the nature of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) under MS. I. 1. 4¹. That the original *sūtra* did not contain a satisfactory definition of *pratyakṣa* as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and that Kumārila tried to find a basis of his own definition of direct knowledge in this *sūtra* is evident from Kumārila's own treatment of the subject in the *Śloka-vārtika*. At first he tries to show that this *sūtra* does not contain a definition of direct knowledge, for, in so far it is too wide and applicable to erroneous cognitions also, it would be faulty in its present form, and the respected author of the MS. could not have formulated a faulty definition². Later on, however, he finds an alternative interpretation, according to which the *sūtra* may be regarded as containing a definition of direct knowledge. He says that 'sat-samprayoge' in the *sūtra* instead of being taken to mean simply 'on the contact with reality', should be interpreted to signify, on the

1. 'Sat-samprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇām buddhi-janma
tat pratyakṣam animittam vidyamānopalambhanatvād
iti'.

2. MŚV. verses, 1-37 ; (pp. 132-145).

right (*sam*) functioning (*prayoge*) with reference to reality or objects (*sat*)'. Thus the definition of direct knowledge will be that knowledge obtained by a person, which is the result of the right functioning of the sense-organs with reference to their objects.¹ Such a definition will exclude such erroneous cognition as that of silver in mother-o'-pearl.

Kumābila, probably for the first time in the history of Hindu epistemology, introduces the distinction of the two kinds of direct knowledge thus: 'At first, there is cognition, which is mere apprehension (*ālocana-jñānam*) and non-reflective (*nirvikalpakam*), which resembles the cognition of a child or the dumb; and is caused by the mere object (*śuddha-vastu-jam*) (V. 112. p. 168.) At the time of such a cognition neither particularity nor generality is perceived; it is only the individual object, which forms the substratum of both these (*tayor ādhāra bhūta*), which is cognised. (V. 113, p. 169). It is maintained, however, that both the particularity (*viśeṣa*) and generality (*sāmānya*) of an object are implicitly present even in the non-reflective cognition as forming the character of the object; although the knower perceives the mere object only, that to say, as devoid of these characteristics² (V, 118, p. 171).

1. MŚV. 38-39 (p. 145).

2. 'Nirvikalpaka-bodhe pi dvayātmakasyāpi vastunaḥ,
Grahaṇam lakṣaṇākhyeyam jñātrā śuddham tu grhyate
(K. 118, p. 171)

Such an object is not cognised as particular (*asādharaṇatvena*), for in the cognition other objects are not excluded; nor is it cognised as general (*sāmānyam iti nāpi*), for there is no inclusion of other objects in such a cognition (*viśeṣānugamā 'klṛpteḥ*) (V. 119). Subsequent to this, that cognition also by means of which the object is characterised by such attributes as generality, etc. (*jātyādibhiḥ*) is to be regarded as direct knowledge (*pratyakṣatvena sammatā*), (V. 120, p. 172). It is emphasised that all cognition which is the result of the contact of the sense-organs with the object, whether it be non-reflective or reflective is to be regarded as direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), and that which is not the result of sense-contact is not to be called direct knowledge (K. 124, p. 173). The point in emphasising this is that the fact in the reflective direct knowledge there are other factors besides that of mere sense-contact does not preclude it from being *pratyakṣa*. It is further maintained that the general character, etc. perceived in reflective direct knowledge are to be treated as an integral part of the cognised object, and not as something simply imposed upon it by the understanding '*sthitam naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi naḥ*' says Kumārila K. 141, p. 178), which Pārthasārathi Miśra explains thus in his *Nyāya-ratnākara*. The three (categories) viz. the general character, etc.¹, are

1. The other two being attribute (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*).

not altogether different from the individual. It is a matter of universal experience that an individual cow is perceived only as possessed of the generic character of cowhood¹ and this cognition could not be so if the general character were altogether different from the individual. In fact, it is this cognition (of the generic character as a part of individual) which is the only proof of the generic character². This cognition reveals the individual as always possessed of the generic character, and as there is nothing to contradict this identity between the generic character and the individual, it is really true and not false³.

As against an alternative explanation, such as given by the Vaiśeṣika School, that there is an inseparable relation (*samavāyā-sambandha*) between the generic character and the individual, it is argued that no such relation can exist between entities which are always found to be inseparable, nor can such relation exist between entities which do not exist yet (*aniṣpanna*—lit. not accomplished), and if they already exist (*niṣpattau*), then there is inseparability⁴.

As regards the nature of substance it is maintain-

1. 'Gaur iti gotvātmikaiva vyaktiḥ pratīyate'; p. 178.

2. 'Iyam eva ca pratītir jatau pramāṇam nānyat'; p. 178.

3. 'paramārthikam eva tadātmyām iti nāpramāṇyam iti.

4. Na ca yuta-siddhānām sambandhivena kalpanā.

Naniṣpannasya sambandho niṣpattau yuta-siddhatā.

K. 146 p. 180.

ed that it is not an aggregate of properties like a forest which is a mere collection of trees. It is that to which the properties belong; which persists in and through the qualities which appear and disappear¹, and which can be apprehended before the cognition of the properties² (K. IV. 152). Hence the substance which is perceived as possessing a certain generic character, etc. is not to be regarded as unreal or of a different form (K. 153, p. 182).

The reality of substance is further maintained by denying that a thing is cognised only as identical with the word which signifies it. The thing and the word although related to each other, are essentially different from each other, and the notion of a thing can be produced through cognition independently of the word³ (K. IV. 172 ff, esp. 175, 176, pp. 188-189). It is pointed out that the cognition of the character of a cow is in the form of a dewlap, etc., and that of the name cow (Sansk' go) in the term of the letters 'c' etc. (in Sansk. 'g' etc.), while the act of cognising both these is without a form. Hence all these three are different from one another (K. IV. 185, p. 191). Further if the form of a thing be identical with its

1. *Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva-dharmakeṣu-anuyāyi yat.*

2. '*Yatra vā jñānam prāg dharma-grahaṇād bhavet*'. Jhā has evidently missed '*yatra vā jñānam*' in translating this verse—see *Ślokaṁ*, Engl. Transl. p. 94.

3. *Na cāvikalpitaḥ śabdād-iti vācya na gṛhyate.*

Tenāgrhīta-śabdopi gotvādīn prati padyate—K. IV. 176, p. 189.

name, the various things denoted by one and the same word would be identical, which they are not (K. IV. 186 pp. 191—192).

This description of the nature of substance by Kumāṛila is evidently in defence of the reality of substance against the view of those who would identify it with either its qualities, or its cognition, or again its name. No particular names of schools or thinkers, whom Kumāṛila might have had in mind, have been mentioned.

While Kumāṛila admits non-reflective direct knowlege (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) as preliminary to the reflective one (*savikalpaka*), he insists that the latter should not be denied the name of direct knowledge, as the Buddhists have done, simply because there are other factors in it besides sense-cognition, such as memory, etc. 'It is no command of a king or the *Veda*', says Kumāṛila, 'that only that (cognition) is *pratyakṣa* which takes place before remembrance'. All cognition which is produced from the contact of the sense-organs with the object, whether before or after remembrance, is to be regarded as *pratyakṣa*².

Kumāṛila begins his exposition of the doctrine of inference with a consideration of Śabarsvāmin's definition of inference in his *Bhāṣyā* viz. 'Inference is the cognition of an object not in direct contact, and

1. K. IV. 234-235 (p. 203).

2. K. IV. 236-237 (p. 203).

forming one of the two sides to a known relation, one of which is directly apprehended'¹. He says that the 'known relation' (*jñāta-sambandha*) mentioned in the definition refers to the invariable concomitance of the character of the mark (*liṅga*—the middle term) with that which possesses the mark (*liṅga*—the major term); and it is through the middle term that the major term is proved. (K. V. 4, p. 348). The object of inference, according to Kumāṛila, is the thing denoted by the minor term as qualified by the attribute signified by the major term; e.g. the place as associated with fire (K. 47—48, p. 359).²

Kumāṛila objects to Śabara's classification of inference as (1) that based upon a directly apprehended relation (*pratyakṣato dṛṣṭa-sambandha*), and (2) that used upon a commonly known relation (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭā-sambandha*); for he says that all inference is equally based upon some observed relation in particular cases, and that a general proposition such as that which forms the major premise is, in all cases, arrived at by a repeated observation of particular similar instances. The relation between motion and the change of position in the case of the sun³ is as much based upon the direct apprehension of the cases of motion and the change of position in the

1. *anumānam jñāta sambandhasyaika-deśa-darśnād ekadeśāntare 'sannikṛṣṭe' rthe buddhiḥ* ŚB. p. 10.

2. *Tasmād dharma-viśeṣasya dharmiṇaḥ syāt prameyatā sā deśasyāgni-yuktasya.*

3. Which is an example of the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference.

case of particular persons such as Devadatta and others, as that between smoke and fire on the mountain¹ is upon the direct apprehension of the concomitance of the two in such particular placed as the kitchen etc. (K. V. 138-140, pp. 390-391).

Kumārila devotes a long section of the *Śloka-vārtika* to the discussion of verbal testimony as a means of knowledge. As against such Buddhist logicians as Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti, and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers he maintains that verbal testimony is distinct from inference; for it is devoid of the three conditions of inference (*trairūpya rahitatvena*), and the object of inference is different from that of verbal testimony (*tādr̥g-viṣaya-varjanāt*), (K. V. 98, p. 378). He points out that what is meant by verbal testimony as a means of knowledge is not cognition by means of a word, which may be the object of inference, but the meaning of a sentence, and this cannot be the object of inference², for it is not arrived at by means of invariable concomitance (K. 108-110. pp. 432-433).

Following Śabarāsvāmin, Kumārila also maintains that the object of knowledge by similarity is neither the objects remembered, e. g. the cow, nor the object perceived e. g. the gayal, nor the mere similarity

1. This being an example of the *pratyakṣto dṛṣṭa* inference.

2. *Pramāṇam anumānam vā yady api syāt padānumitiḥ Vākyārthasyāgamārthatvād doṣo nāgama-vādinām*'. (V. 108 p. 432).

noticed in the object perceived e. g. the horns in the gayal, but the object remembered as qualified by similarity, e. g. the cow as qualified by similarity to the gayal, or similarity as associated with the object remembered¹. The reason for this view is that in so far as the identification of a gayal is due to the information given by another person that it is similar to a cow, it is a case of verbal testimony; in so far as the gayal and the marks of similarity are actually cognised by the senses, it is a case of sense-cognition; and in so far as a person is reminded of a cow, it is a case of memory. It is only the cow as qualified by similarity which is not cognised by any other means; and hence it is the object of knowledge by similarity². Knowledge by similarity is not a case of inference, for similarity is not known as a property before it is cognised through resemblance and hence it cannot provide a middle term, which is essential for all inference³.

Presumption (*arthāpatti*) is the supposition of something unseen (*adr̥ṣṭam*) in order to avoid a contradiction which would be involved in accepting a cognition obtained by any of the six means of

1. *Tasmād yat smaryate tatsyāt sādṛśyena viśeṣitam,*
Prameyam upamānasya sādṛśyam vā tadanvitam.
 (V. Up. 37, p. 444).

2. *Viśeṣṭasyānyato 'siddher upamāna-pramāṇatā.* (V. Up. 38, p. 445)

3. V. Up. 43, (p. 446).

knowledge¹. Accordingly, Kumāṛila gives instance of presumption based upon sense-cognition, inference, verbal testimony, knowledge by similarity, etc. For example, the presumption that fire has the property of burning things is based upon the cognition that it burns things that the sun has got the power of moving from one place to another is based upon the inference that it has actually moved from one place to another, and so on². The stock example of Devadatta or Caitra that he must be out in case he is alive and not to be found at home, is a case of presumption based upon negation. It is shown at length that presumption is an independent means of knowledge, and not a case of Inference, the main argument being that in the case of presumption we cannot find a suitable middle term. For example, in the above instance of the presumption that Devadatta must be out in case he is alive and not at home, it is maintained that, the house as qualified by Devadatt's absence cannot be predicated as a property of that which is denoted by the minor term (viz. Devadatta) for at the time of making such an assertion Devadatta is not recognised as qualified by absence in the house³. The presumption that one must be eating

1. "Pramāṇa ṣatka-vijñāto yatrārtho nānyathā bhavet, Adṛṣṭam kalpayed anyam sārthāpattir udāhṛtā. p. 450. (V. Arthāp. 1).

2. (V. Arthāp. 3-7, (pp. 451-452).

3. Tad-abhāva-viśiṣṭam tu grham dharmo na kasyacit, Grhābhāva-viśiṣṭas tu tadāsau na pratīyate—p. 453. K. 12.

at night in case one is fat and does not eat during the day is a case of verbal presumption (*śrutā-rthāpatti*), and it is shown that it is neither a case of verbal testimony nor of inference¹.

The next means of knowledge recognised by Kumāṛila is non-existence (*abhāva*). It is the only mode of knowledge to establish the existence of a thing where the other five means of knowledge fail. Non-existence is of four kinds: (1) prior non-existence (*prāg-abāva*). e. g. the non-existence of curd in milk; (2) non-existence after destruction (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*), e. g. the non-existence of milk in curd; (3) mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*), e. g. the non-existence of a horse in a cow, and vice versa, and (4) absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*), e. g. the non-existence of horns on the head of a hare². It is pointed out that if non-existence be not accepted as a means of knowledge, we shall have to grant the existence of curd in milk, of milk in curd, of the jar in a piece of cloth, of horns in a hare, of intelligence in the earth, etc., of shape in the soul, of odour in water, of taste in fire, and so on.³ Further, if the classification of non-existence into prior non-existence etc. be not accepted as true, it will not be possible to draw a distinction between a cause and

1. p. 463, K. 51 ff.

2. p. 473, K. 1-4.

3. p. 473, K. 5-6.

an effect¹. The same classification also shows that non-existence is to be regarded as a real entity (*vastu*), for an unreal entity cannot admit of such classification². A further proof of the fact that non-existence is a real entity like a cow is that it can be apprehended as applicable or non-applicable to things and is the object of cognition³.

Following Śābarasvāmin Kumārila admits the six means of knowledge explained above. Implication (*sambhava*) is regarded as a case of inference, for it is maintained that in such cases as the inclusion of the notion of 'one hundred' in that of 'a thousand', the knowledge is due to an invariable concomitance (*aviyuta-bhāvāt*), and, therefore, the cognition is inferential. As regards tradition (*aitihya*) it is pointed out that a good deal of it is found to be untrue, and hence, it is not a valid means of knowledge; and whatever tradition is true it is a case of scriptural testimony⁴.

1. p. 474, K. 7.

2. 'Na cāvastunā ete syur bhedās tenāśya vastutā'.

3. *Yad vānuvṛtti-vyāvṛtti buddhi-grāhyo yatas tva ayam, Yasmād gavādi-vastu prameyatvāc ca gamyate*—p. 475. K. 9. G. N. Jhā translates '*anuvṛtti-vyāvṛtti-buddhi-grāhyaḥ*' as 'capable of forming the object of the nations of collective affirmation and differentiation', which I am unable to understand.

4. p. 492, K. 58.

Kumārila undertakes a long dialectical refutation of the doctrine that cognition have no external objects as their basis (*nirālambana-vāda*). He begins his criticism of the theory by declaring that 'proof and non-proof (*pramāṇatvāpramāṇatva*); virtue and vice together with their consequences; the assumption of the objects of injunctions, enlogistic passages, mantras and names, etc., will be out of place if cognitions were to be regarded as devoid of objects¹. Therefore, those who want to acquire, merit should try to examine the problem of the existence and non-existence of things by means of the accepted means of knowledge.

As against the view that the external world may be supposed to have an illusory reality (*saṃvṛti*) and that thus it will serve all the purposes of a real external world, Kumārila pertinently points out that there can be no reality about illusory reality and hence, it cannot be a form of reality; if it is real, it cannot be illusory; and if it is illusory, it cannot be real². Whatever does not exist, is not real; and that which exists is real. Reality cannot be assumed to be of two kinds: that which is real and that

1. *Sarvam ityādy ayuktam syād artha-śūnyāsu buddhiṣu.*
(p. 217, K. 1-3).

2. *Samvṛter na tu satyatvam satya-bhedaḥ kuto nvayam*
Satyam cet saṃvṛtiḥ keyam mṛṣā cet satyatā katham.
p. 218 K. 6.

which is false¹.

The reality of the external word is maintained against both the subjective idealists of the Yogācāra School and the Śūnya-vāda School of the Buddhists by mainly examining the nature of cognition and pointing out: firstly that in all cognitions there is present the distinction between the cogniser, the cognition and the object cognised, and that one and the same thing cannot be all the three; secondly, that cognition is not cognised by itself, but that it is inferred through the object which is cognised; and thirdly, if the idea of an object were identical with the object, the object would be present along with the idea of it in memory².

Kumārila argues that all the various means of knowledge should be regarded as self-valid; for if self-validity does not belong to them as an inherent

1. *Tasmād yan nāsti nasty eva yat tvasti paramarthataḥ Tat satyam anyan mithēti na satya-dvaya-kalpanā*, p. 219, K. 10.

2. Long and complex dialectical arguments are put forth by Kumārila under *Nirālambana-vāda* and *Śūnya-vāda* of *Sloka-vārtika* against the *Vijñāna-vāda* and the of *Śūnya-vāda* schools of Buddhism, which it is unimportant to reproduce here; for they have no constructive value, and they are mainly an expansion of the much briefer and clearer refutation as given in the *Śabara-bhāṣya*.

power, it cannot be had from any other external source¹. If validity of cognition be regarded as something dependent upon the verification, there will result a regress *ad infinitum*; for the cognition of each such verification will stand in need of another verification, and so on.² Therefore, cognition is to be regarded as valid simply by virtue of its being a means of knowledge, and it is to be set aside as invalid only on the discovery of a discrepancy in its cause³.

Invalidity (*aprāmāṇyam*) is of three kinds: (1) falsity of cognition (*mithyātva*); (2) non-perception or ignorance (*ajñāna*); and (3) doubt (*saṁśaya*). Of these the falsity of cognition and doubt are positive entities, and hence (*vastutvād*) they are due to some defect in the cause of cognition (*duṣṭa-kāraṇād*); and non-perception or ignorance is simply due to the absence of the cause or conditions of cognition. Invalidity is discovered through the cognition of its contradictory, that is to say of the real object; e. g. the invalidity of the cognition of silver in the mother-o'pearl is discovered by the cognition of the mother-o'pearl⁴.

The nature of generic character, which is called

1. *Svataḥ sarva-pramāṇānām Prāmāṇyam iti gamyatām, Na, hi svato satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena śakyate*, p. 59, K. 47.

2. pp. 60-61, K. 49-51.

3. p. 61, K. 53.

4. p. 62, K. 57.

jāti, *ākṛti*¹, *sāmānya*, or *śakti*, is discussed under direct knowledge (*pratyākṣa*), *Akṛti* and *Vanavāda*. The main point emphasised about it is that it is to be found in the individuals, and is perceptible by the senses like other particular qualities. In fact the individual and the generic characters are inseparably related to each other, and the cognition of the one would not be possible without the other². All individual objects are cognised as having a twofold aspect—one that which distinguishes them from other objects—the specific character; and the other that which brings them under a common class—the generic character; and this twofold aspect would not be cognised if it did not belong to those objects. It is argued that if an object be perceived merely as a particular, there would be no idea of the generic character; and, on the other hand, if the generic character, alone were perceived, there would be no ground for perceiving the particular³. A large number of generic characters beginning with that of being are found in an individual object, and they are different from the specific characters such as the possession of a dewlap, etc. in the case of a cow.⁴

1. *Jātim evākṛtim prāhuḥ*; p. 546 also *sāmānyam ākṛtir jātiḥ śaktir va so bindhīyatām*, p. 550.

2. *Anyo nyāpekṣitā nityam syāt sāmānya viśeṣayoḥ*.
viśeṣāṇām ca sāmānyam te ca tasya bhavanti hi. 9 p. 547.

3. *Sarva-vastuṣu budhiś ca vyāvṛtty-anugamātmkā*,
Jāyate dvyātmakatvena vinā sā ca na siddhyati, K, 5.
Viśeṣa-mātra iṣṭe ca no sāmānya matir bhavet,

(iii) Epistemology of the Prabhākara School of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā

No original work of Prabhākara has been published so far. The only first-hand source of his philosophy is the *Brhatī*, a manuscript of which is to be found in the Library of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, and which has been used by Dr. Gangānātha Jhā in his exposition of the Prabhākara School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Next to the *Brhatī* is the *Prakarana-pañcikā* of Śālikanātha Miśra, a work which is still the main source of the philosophy of the Prabhākara School.

According to the Prabhākara School, knowledge is of two kinds; valid and invalid. Of these the first is called cognition (*anubhūti*), and the second memory (*smṛti*) which is different from cognition¹ in so far as it is produced entirely by the impressions left by a previous cognition (*pūrva-vijñāna-sāṃskāra-mātrajam*). Following his predecessors in the Mīmāṃsā School, Prabhākara also held the doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge. 'It is strange, indeed', says he, 'how a cognition can

Sāmānya-mātra-bodhe tu nir-nimittaviśeṣadhīh. 6

p 546.

Piṇde sattādi-jatīnam bahvīnām samavetatā

Tābhyo viśiṣyate gotvam sāsnādibhir asaṃśayam, 3, p. 614.

1. 'pramāṇam anubhūtiḥ; na ca smṛteḥ prāmāṇyāpattir iti darśayati, sā smṛter anyā'. P. Pañcikā, p. 42.

be said to apprehended an object and yet be invalid'¹.

While discussing the view of *Vijñāna-vāda* that cognitions are directly perceived, and that they are identical with the objects of cognition, Prabhākara also, following Śabara-svāmin, maintains that cognitions are not perceived directly, but that they are known through inference. In this connection he draws a distinction between an object of direct cognition (*saṃvedya*) and an object of indirect cognition (*prameya*). The former being an object, the form of which is immediately apprehended through the sense-organ; and the latter that which is cognised indirectly without its form being immediately apprehended. For example, fire as perceived by the eye is *saṃvedya*, and as inferred through the perception of smoke is *prameya*².

Prabhākara differs from his predecessors with regard to the number of the valid means of knowledge in so far as he rejects 'non-existence' (*abhāva*) as a separate *pramāṇa*. Direct knowledge is defined by Prabhākara as direct apprehension (*sākṣāt-pratītiḥ*), which involves the cognition of three factors: (1) the apprehended object (*meya*); (2) the apprehending subject (*mātr*); and (3) the act of

1. *Bṛhatī*, MS, p. 3, quote in PPM. p. 21; also *P. Pañcikā*, pp. 32 ff.

2. *Bṛhatī*, MS, p. 7 ff; *Rjuvimalā* pp. 54-61 (quoted in PPM, p. 26); also of, *P. Pañcikā*, pp. 63 and 64.

apprehension (*pramā*)¹. This analysis of sense-cognition into three factors has been called '*tripuṭi-pratyakṣa-vāda*'; which is regarded as particularly distinctive of the Prabhākara School. A corresponding analysis of cognition is found, as we have already seen, in Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-bhāṣya* on NS. I, i, i,—"*arthavati ca prāmāṇe pramātā prameyam pramitir ity arthavanti bhavanti*", but it is not maintained by Vātsyāyana that the apprehending subject is cognised directly in the act of cognition itself.

According to the Prabhākara School, direct knowledge pertains to substance, generic character and qualities². The division of direct knowledge into non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) and reflective (*savikalpaka*) in the Prabhākara School is the same as in the Bhaṭṭa School. The difference between the two schools as regards the nature of non-reflective perception is that while according to Kumārila³, the particular and the generic character, although present implicitly, are not perceived at the first moment; according to Prabhākara, they are perceived, but not as particular and generic characters; for the object cognised is not yet compared with other objects⁴.

1. *P. Pañcikā*, p. 52, '*pratyakṣasya viśeṣamāha, meya mātṛ-pramāsu sā*'.
2. *Dravya-jāti-guṇeṣu indriya-samyogotthā sā pratyakṣā pratītiḥ*, *P. Pañcikā*, p. 52.
3. *MŚV*. IV, 113.
4. *P. Pañcikā*, pp. 54 and 55.

This view, it will appear, is practically the same as Kumārila's; and that it is not really meant to be different from Kumārila's view is evident from the assertion in the *Prakaraṇa-pañcika*: "nirvikalpakam asāmānya-viśeṣa-viśayam"¹, 'non-reflective (knowledge) is that which has not the particular and the generic characters as its object', which is just parallel to the text of the *Śloka-vārtika*: "na viśeṣo na sāmānyam tadānīm anubhūyate"², at that moment neither the particular nor the generic character is apprehended³. It will appear that later on Rāmā-

1. *P. Pañcikā*, p. 55.

2. In *ŚV. IV*, 113.

3. The text of *P. Pañcikā* which suggests that there is a difference between Prabhākara and Kumārila on this subject is: 'tasmāt sāmānya-viśeṣau dve vastunī pratipadyamānam pratyakṣam prathamam upapadyate kintu vastvantarānusandhāna-śūnyatayā sāmānya viśeṣarūpatā na pratiyate'. But here also it is clearly said that the properties are not cognised as specific and generic, and hence the text practically does not mean anything different from what Kumārila has said in *MŚV IV*, 113. G. N. Jhā thinks that there is a real difference between the two schools, when he says (*PPM.* p. 38) "Here in also lies the chief difference of the Prabhākara from the Bhaṭṭa view etc...."

Keith appears to favour the view I have expressed here. He says (*K. Mīmāṃsā*, pp. 25, 26). 'There does not appear to be any very real difference between the view of Prabhākara and that of Kumārila, through their verbal expression differs...'

nuja¹ has described non-reflective direct knowledge in the same way (Chapter IV, iii) as we find it in the *Prakarana-pañcikā*.

All knowledge implies a subject (*mātr*) which is cognised directly; for no cognition or remembrance of an object is possible without a subject, which is the self.² In all cognitions there is present the consciousness 'I know', not that 'something else knows'³.

The definition and classification of inference as given by the Prabhākara School are essentially the same as those formulated by Śabarāsvāmin and accepted by Kumārila⁴. There is a difference, however, between the Bhaṭṭa and the Prabhākara Schools as regards the nature of the object of inference; for, according to the former, it is something not previously known⁵; while, according to the latter,

1. Rāmanuja's Śrī-bhāṣya.
2. *Yāvatī kācid grahaṇa smaraṇa-rūpā pratītiḥ tatra sākṣad ātmā pratibhāti, na hy ātmany anavabhāsamāne viṣayā bhāṣante. P. Pañcikā, p. 56.*
3. *sarvā hi pratītiḥ evam upajayate 'ham jñānāmitti, na punar jñānāmitti kācid buddhir asti. P. Pañcikā, p. 56.*
4. *Laiṅgikaikadeśa-viṣayam sambandha-niyamam smartaḥ. puruṣasya niyata-sambandhaika-deśa-darśanād yā buddhiḥ tad anumānam. P. Pañcikā, p. 72.*
5. *Kecit tu bādhita-viṣayatvam ivāsādhita-viṣayatvam apy anumāna-kāraṇam āhuḥ .., tat prabhākara-matānusāriṇo nānumanyante. P. Pañcikā, p. 76.*

it is something already known¹. According to the Bhaṭṭa School, although the general concomitance between smoke and fire is known, the particular fire existing at a certain particular spot, e. g. on the mountain, is not previously known, and it is this fire which is the object of inference.

Verbal testimony is called scriptural testimony (*śāstram*) in the Prabhākara School, and is defined as the cognition of an object, which is not in contact with the sense-organs, through the interpretation of words². Only the testimony of the Vedic texts is regarded as reliable; for the words used by a man are always liable to convey erroneous information³. In this respect there is a difference between the Bhaṭṭa and the Prabhākara School; for the former classifies verbal testimony as (1) human (*pauruṣeya*) and (2) non-human (*apauruṣeya*), and regards both of them as reliable⁴.

The Prabhākara School agrees with the Bhaṭṭa School with regard to the definition and nature of

1. *Sāstram śabda-vijñānād asannikṛṣṭe 'rthe budhiḥ*. P. *Pañcikā*, p. 87.

2. *Na śāstra-vyatiriktam śābdam asti śabdāddhi yad vijñānam asannikṛṣṭe tac chāstram syāt; na ca veda-vyati-rekeṇa tat sambhavati;...laukikam hi vākyaṃ nārthe svyam niścayam āpādayati laukika-vacasām anrta-bhūyiṣṭhatvād artha-vyabhicārasya śamkitvāt*. P. *Pañcikā*, p. 94.

3. *Sāstradīpikā*, p. 51.

knowledge by similarity¹.

Presumption (*arthāpatti*) is defined as that assumption without which a certain known fact cannot be seen to be consistent. According to the Prabhākara School, knowledge by presumption differs from inference in so far as the ground of presumption is doubtful, while that of inference is devoid of doubt. When a certain person, say Devadatta, is not found at home, it is doubtful whether he is alive, and is therefore out; he may be dead². According to the Bhaṭṭa School, there is no doubt in the ground of knowledge by presumption; for if it be doubtful, it will not be possible to have knowledge by presumption; at all. If it be not known for certain that a person, who is not at home, is alive, there cannot be any reason to believe that he is out.

Non-existence (*abhāva*), which is accepted by Kumārila as a means of knowledge, is rejected by the Prabhākara School on the ground that the means of knowledge can be considered only with reference to some object to be cognised—'*sarvam pramāṇam prameyāvinā-bhāvi*'. As there is no object of cognition in the case of cognition by non-existence, it is

1. *Sāṃkhya-darśanottham jñānam sāṃkhya-viśayakam upamānam*'. *P. Pañcikā*, p. 110.

2. *P. Pañcikā*, pp. 113-118.

"*Vinā kalpanayārthena dṛṣṭenānupapannatām.*

Nayatā dṛṣṭam ārtham yā sārthapattis to kalpanā."

not to be regarded as a means of knowledge.¹

The Prabhākara School agrees with its predecessors in rejecting implication (*sambhava*) and tradition (*aitihya*) as means of knowledge.

That the problem of the nature of generic character (*jāti*) was regarded important by the later Indian philosophers is evident from the discussions concerning it in the works of almost every one of them. We have already seen what Kumārila and some of the Jaina thinkers had to say on the subject. In the *Prakarana-pañchikā*,² we find a classification of the various views held by philosophers about the nature of the generic character. It is said that (1) according to some, the generic character is simply a fiction (*vikalpa-vilasita*); (2) according to others, although it is real, it is not different from those things which form its substratum (*āśrayebhyo abhinnām anumanyante*); (3) according to a third class of thinkers, it is different from its substratum, and is cognised by inference (*bhinnām apy anumeyām āhuḥ*); while (4) according to a fourth class of philosophers, it is both different and not different from the things which form its substratum (*bhinnābhinnām icchanti*). According to Prabhākara, says the author of the *P. Pañcikā*, the generic character is different from its substratum, and is the object of direct knowledge. It is the product of reflecting over previous forms of

1. *P. Pañcikā*, p. 118.

2. Ibid, p. 17 ff. 'Bahudha jāti-viṣaye vivadante vipaśc-
itaḥ'. etc.

things¹ ; that is to say, it is the result of comparison. Prabhākara and Kumārila agree in so far as both regard the generic character as something perceivable by the senses ; and they differ from each other in so far as, according to Kumārila, the generic character is not different from the particular things which form its substratum². According to the Prabhākara School, the generic character is found in each individual of a class, and is eternal. It does not appear or disappear with the appearance and disappearance of the individuals. It is only the relation of the generic character with the individual which is established when the individual comes into existence, and ceases when it is destroyed.

The argument that the external world is not real for it is like the world of dreams is refuted by Prabhākara thus : 'We are justified only in assuming from a well-known effect a cause that would make the effect possible, and not one that would destroy it ; what we find in a dream is that there is cognition of an external object ; this effect can justify us in assuming—not indeed the absolute non-existence of the external object—but the real existence of such an object, as without this the cognition would be an impossibility. As a general law we know it to be

1. *Jātir āśrayato bhinnā pratyakṣa-jñāna-gocarā.*
Pūrvākārāvamarśeṇa prabhākara-guror matā.

P. Pañcikā, p. 17.

2. MŚV. *Ākṛti*, 52-62, and *Vana-vāda*, 75-76.

true that that without which something else is not possible is the *cause* of this latter ; from this it follows that the cause of dream-cognition is some object in the external world'¹. It is not exactly clear against which particular school this refutation of the doctrine is directed, though we know that the doctrine refuted here is identical with that of Śūnya-vāda of Buddhism.

It is pointed out in the *Prakraṇa-pañcikā* that the term '*pramāṇa*' is ambiguous. It may mean either cognition (*pramiti*) itself, or it may signify the means of cognition (*karaṇa*). In case it is the first, the result (*phala*) of *pramāṇa* is the taking or the rejecting etc. of an external object². If it is the second, it means the contact of the mind, the sense-organs, and the object ; and the result is the cognition itself³. This applies both to direct knowledge and inference⁴.

1. *Bṛhati* MS. p. 5 b. (quoted in *PPM*. p. 25).

2. '*Mānatve samvido bāhyam hāna-dānādikam phalam*'.
P. P. p. 64.

3. *Apekṣikam ca karaṇam mana indriyam eva vā*.
Tad-artha-sannikarṣo vā mānam cet pūrvakam phalam.
P. *Pañcikā*, p. 64.

4. P. *Pañcikā*, p. 82.

The Development of Sāṃkhya Epistemology in Gaudapāda's Bhāṣya and Vācaspati Miśra's Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī on the Sāṃkhya-kārika.

The Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge was developed by Gaudapāda and Vācaspati Miśra in their commentaries on the *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, especially by the latter. There is no external evidence to prove or disprove the supposition that the Gaudapāda, the author of the Bhāṣya on the S.K., was the same person as the author of the *Māṇḍūkya—kārikā* bearing that name; but the thought, language and style of the two works suggest that it is very improbable that they were written by the same person. It is a well-known fact now that Gaudapāda's Bhāṣya is mostly based upon an earlier commentary on the SK. called the *Māṭhara-vṛtti*, the date of which is believed to be about 500 A. D. The Bhāṣya must, however, be earlier than the *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra, for it does not show any knowledge of the comments of Vācaspati Miśra on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikās*, and is decidedly of a primitive style.

(i) Gaudapāda's Bhāṣya on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā.

Under SK. 4, Gaudapāda refers to the Mimāṃsā list of the six means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*), and states that according to the Sāṃkhya presumption

1. See S. K. Belvalkar, *Bhandarkar Commemorative Essays*, 1917, pp. 172, 174.

(*arthāpatti*) is included in inference ; and implication (*sambhava*), non-existence (*abhāva*), guess (*pratibhā*¹), tradition (*aitihya*) and knowledge by similarity (*upamā*) are included in verbal testimony.

The only point worthy of consideration from the point of view of the theory of knowledge in Gauḍapāda's *Bhāṣya* is his explanation of the three kinds of inference. He says : 'Inference is said to be of three kinds: *śeṣavat*, *pūrvavat*, and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*. That which has a previous (instance) is called *pūrvavat-pūrvam asyāstīti pūrvavat* ; for example, rain is inferred from the appearance of clouds, because of the previous experience (*pūrvadṛṣṭitvāt*) ; *śeṣavad*, for example, having found that a drop of water from the sea is salt, (it is inferred) that the rest (of the sea-water) must also be salt. *Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* ;— having observed that they have shifted from one place to another, it is inferred with regard to the moon and the stars that they must be moving like (a person, say) Caitra: Just as having noticed that a person named Caitra has got from one place to another, it is inferred that he must be moving ; so in the case of the moon and the stars also (that they

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1. This is an uncommon term found in Gauḍapāda's commentary. He explains it thus : *pratibhā yathā dakṣiṇena vīndhyasya sahyasya ca yad uttaram pṛthivyām āsamudrāyām sa pradeśo manoramah, evam ukte tasmin pradeśe śobhanā guṇāḥ sántīti pratibhotpadyate*. The *Bhāṣya*, Colebrooke and Wilson's edition, Bombay 1897, p. 25.

must be moving). Similarly, having seen that the mango tree is in blossom at one place, it is inferred by means of *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*, that mango trees must be in blossom at other places also. This is *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*. What next is meant by saying that inference is based upon a mark (*liṅga*) and that which bears the mark (*liṅgi*) ? That (inference) is based upon a mark (*liṅga-pūrvakam*), in which the bearer of the mark (*liṅgi*) is inferred by means of the mark ; for instance, a mendicant by means of his staff. That (inference) is based upon the bearer of a mark, in which the mark is inferred by means of that which bears the mark, e. g. having seen a mendicant it is inferred that the triple staff (*tri-daṇḍam*) must belong to him¹.”

It will appear that in his explanation of the three kinds of inference while Gauḍapāda agrees with some of the Nyāya commentators with regard to the meaning of *pūrvavat*, he has his own peculiar interpretations of *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* which very much resemble such explanations of them as are found in *Māṭhara-vṛtti* and *Anuyogadvāra*, both very early works². This is another indication of the fact that the author of the Bhāṣya belonged to an early period.

Gauḍapāda's explanation of 'āpta-śrutiḥ' as

1. SKGB. pp. 29, 30.

2. See Dhruva, *Trividham, Anumānam*, *Proceedings of the First Oriental Conference*, Poona, 1919.

āptaśca śrutisca āptaśrutīḥ is evidently wrong ; for the text in *Kārikā* (5) is clearly '*āpta-śrutīḥ*' and I do not see how the compound can be expounded in the way Gaudapāda has done. He explains 'āpta' as meaning preceptors like Brahman and others '*āptā acāryā brahmādayaḥ*', and 'śruti' as signifying the Veda- '*śrutir vedaḥ*'. The meaning of '*āpta-śrutīḥ*' is given in the *Kārikā* itself that it signifies the utterance of a reliable person *āpta-śrutir āpta-vacanam tu.*' We shall see that Vācaspati Miśra's explanation of '*āpta-śrutīḥ*' is different from that by Gaudapāda, although both have tried to include the authority of the Veda as a form of Verbal testimony.

The theory of knowledge in the *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra.

The *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* is VM's commentary on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, and is more important as a work on the *Sāṃkhya* than even the original work of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Under K. IV. VM explains a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) thus : *Pramāṇa* is that by which a thing is measured (known), and hence it is the cause of right cognition (*pramā*)¹. It is a functioning of the intellect, which is free from doubt and self-contradiction, and has for its object something unknown.² This knowledge belongs to some person ; the result of it is right cognition ; and the means of acquiring

1. *Pramāṇam prati karaṇatvam avagamyate.*

2. *Tac cāsandigdḥāviparītānadhigata-viśaya citta-vṛttiḥ.*
Dr. G. N. Jhā translates this sentence thus : 'This definite right notion is a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful, self-contradictory or unknown.' It will appear that '*anadhi-gata-viśayā*' does not mean 'that free from the contact of all that is unknown' as Dr. Jhā's translation puts it, but 'that which has for its object something not (already) known, which condition, as is well-known was included in the definition of cognition by the later writers on logic in order to exclude memory ; and here too the last sentence in the paragraph '*et ena saṃśaya-viparyayasmṛtisādhaneṣu aprasangah*' clearly shows that '*anadhigataviśayā*' is meant to exclude memory (*smṛti*).

it is the *pramāṇa*. This description of *pramāṇa* precludes the application of the name to such cognition as is the result of doubt, error and memory.

The various factors in cognition are explained thus : The element of *buddhi* is without consciousness, for it is material ; and for the same reason its determinations (*adhyavasāya*) are also devoid of consciousness like a jar, etc. Similarly, pleasures, etc. also, which are the various modifications of *buddhi* are also insentient ; while the *puruṣa*, who has no relation to pleasures, etc is sentient. This *puruṣa* appears to be possessed of cognitions and pleasures, etc. (*jñāna sukhādimān iva*) on account of these being present in the element of *buddhi* and thus reflecting themselves in the *puruṣa*, while the *buddhi* and its determinations, although insentient in themselves, appear as if they are sentient on account of the reflection of the *puruṣa*¹.

The next point worthy of notice in the *STK*. is the division of inference into '*vīta*' and '*avīta*'. *Vīta* is that inference which affirms something on the basis of agreement². This is of two kinds. (i) *pūrvavat*, and (ii) *sāmānyato-arṣṭa*. Of these, the *pūrvavat* is that which has such an object for its inference the characteristics of the species of which are

1. *STK*. (G. N. Jhā's edition) p. 10.

2. '*Anvaya-mukhena pravartamānam vidhāyakam vītam*'.

already known,¹ e. g. the inference of fire on a mountain from the existence of smoke, where the characteristics of fire (as a species) are already known from one's experience of it in the kitchen. The *sāmānyato-dr̥ṣṭa* is that which has such an object for its inference the characteristics of the species of which are not known² ; e. g. the inference of sense-organs from the cognitions of colour, etc., where although one has the idea of general causation from such experiences as the cutting of a tree with an axe, the particular cause of the perception of colour etc. viz. the sense-organs, has never been perceived before.

Avīta is the *śeṣavat* inference which is explained thus : 'śeṣa' is that which remains' ; and the inferential knowledge which has this remainder for its object is called 'śeṣavat.' Then quoting Vātsyāyana it is said that 'the cause in question being eliminated, and the other alternatives being found irrelevant, the idea of the remainder is 'pariśeṣa'³. An example of this kind of inference is given under SK. IX, where it is proved that 'the cloth is not different from the threads, since it is a property characteristically inhering in the latter. An object differing in essence from another can never inhere in it ; as the cow does not inhere in the horse ; but as the cloth is inherent

1. *dr̥ṣṭa-sva-lakṣaṇa-sāmānya-viśayaṃ yat tat pūrvavat.*

2. *Adr̥ṣṭa-sva-lakṣaṇa-sāmānya-viśayam.*

3. 'prasakta-pratiśedhe, anyatrāprasaṅgāt śiṣyamāṇe sampratyaayaḥ pariśeṣaḥ'.

in the threads, it is not different from it in essence. It will appear that the essential characteristics of *vīta* and *avīta* inference according to Vācaspati Misra, as explained here, are the same as those according to Uddyotakara ; that is to say, one is based upon agreement, and the other upon difference.¹

As regards verbal testimony, after having explained how it comes after inference in order, VM. says that it is self-evident (*svataḥ pramāṇam*) ; for it is free from all discrepancies and doubts on account of its proceeding from the *Veda*, which is not the work of a human being. For the same reason, knowledge which is the result of the texts of the *Smṛtīs* and the *Purāṇas* etc., which are based upon the *Veda*, is also true.

It is to be noted that the self-validity which VM. attributes to the knowledge of the *Veda* and its dependent scriptures does not represent the view of the author of the SK., as it is inconsistent with *Kārikā* II where it is said that 'the revealed knowledge is like the obvious, since it is characterised by impurity, decay and excess'². In his comment on this *Kārikā*, VM. has explained this condemnation of the Vedic

1. *anvaya-mukhena pravartamānam vidhāyakam vītam ;
vyatireka-mukhena pravartamānam niśedhakam avītam.*
STK. on SK. 5 (p, 12).

2. *d, r̥ṣṭavadānuśravikaḥ sa hy aviśuddhikṣayātīśaya-
yuktaḥ'.*

authority by saying that it refers only to the ritualistic portion of it; but there is nothing in the text of the *Kārikā* to suggest that it is so. Further in *Kārikā* V, 'āpta-śrutiḥ' is explained as 'āpta-vacanam' the utterance of a reliable person, or as VM. explains it, 'true utterance,' which fact indicates clearly that by 'śrutiḥ' the author of the *Kārikā* did not mean the *Veda* and the dependent scriptures. VM. himself has explained 'śrutiḥ' as knowledge of the meaning of a sentence produced by words' śrutiḥ vākya-janitam vākyaārtha-jñānam.

It is shown that verbal testimony is not a case of inference by pointing out that when the meaning of a sentence is the object of cognition (*prameya*), the sentence or the word does not serve as a mark (*liṅga*); for it is not its property (*na tu tad-dharmaḥ*); nor does a sentence, while signifying something, stand in need of the cognition of a relation such as is needed in the case of inference.

After having explained direct knowledge, inference and verbal testimony VM. proves how the rest of the *pramāṇas* treated by some other schools of thought as separate from these are included in them. Knowledge by similarity, he explains, is a combination of verbal testimony, inference and direct knowledge; for the knowledge produced by the statement: 'The gayal is like a cow' is a case of verbal testimony; the knowledge that the word 'gayal' signifies an animal resembling the cow is a case of inference; and

lastly, the cognition of resemblance of the animal called gayal to a cow is a case of direct knowledge. Presumption (*arthāpatti*) too is not a distinct means of knowledge ; for, to take the usual instance, the fact that a person, say Caitra, must have gone out if he is alive and not found at home, is a matter of inference ; a particular finite object, when not found in one place, must be found elsewhere.

Non-existence (*abhāva*) is shown to be a case of direct knowledge ; for the negation of a jar at a certain spot is merely a particular modification of that spot characterised by the absence of the jar. All forms of existence are changing every moment except the power of consciousness (*citi-śaktiḥ*) ; and as all of them are perceptible by the senses, there is no object which does not fall within the scope of direct knowledge. Therefore, there is no need of postulating any other form of *pramāṇa*.

Implication (*sambhava*) is a case of inference ; for the knowledge, for example, that lesser weights are included in the greater ones, is based upon the general known principle that greater quantities contain smaller ones.

Tradition (*aitihya*) is no mode of knowledge ; for it is simply a rumour, the origin of which is not known and hence it is not reliable.

The objectivity of the material world is proved

under SK. XI¹ as against the subjective idealists, who say that there is nothing besides knowledge (*viññāna*). It is maintained that the manifested world (*vyaktam*) is objective (*viśayaḥ*), that is to say, perceptible and something external to knowledge. For the same reason it is 'common' (*sāmānyam*), that is to say, it is perceived in common by many persons.² If it be accepted that everything is only knowledge, then as knowledge is not common, that is to say, it is not shared by different individuals, material things also would not form the object of common experience. But this is not so ; for, says VM., we find the glances of a dancing girl form the object of attention to many people at a time

Under *Kārikā* XXVII, while discussing the nature and functions of mind as a sense-organ, VM. explains the distinctions between non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) and reflective (*savikalpaka*) direct knowledge pointing out that it is mind which supplies defi-

1. *Tri-guṇam aviveki viśayaḥ sāmānyam acetanam prasava-dharmi.*

Vyaktam tathā pradhānam tad-viparītas tathā ca pumān.

It will appear that all that is said in the *Kārikā* is that matter both manifested and unmanifested (*pradhāna*) forms the object of knowledge (*viśaya*) as opposed to the spirit, which is the subject, and the *Kārikā* by itself does not appear to aim at a refutation of *viññāna-vāda*. It simply draws a distinction between the characteristics of matter and spirit.

2 *tān praty āha 'viśaya' iti, viśayo grāhyaḥ ; viññānād vahir iti yāvat ; aṭa eva "sāmānyam" anekaiḥ puruṣair grhītam ity arthaḥ, STK. p. 27.*

nitensness to the object of perception and distinguishes it from other objects. He says : 'First there is only the presentational knowledge which is indeterminate, like that of a child or of those who are deaf, etc. produced by an undefined object (*mugdha-vastujam*). Subsequently, the object is invested with its properties, genus, etc., and this cognition which introduces these is also regarded as direct knowledge (*pratyakṣatvena sammatā*). This reflective function which belongs to mind distinguishes an object from others of the same and different species, and forms the characteristic feature of mind.¹ This description of the two kinds of knowledge exactly corresponds to that found in Kumāṛila's *Mimāṃsā-śloka-vārtika*.

The Vedānta Epistemology according to Gaudapāda, Saṃkara and Rāmānuja.

Unlike the other schools of philosophy the epistemology of the Vedānta as found in these important authors is of a divergent nature. In fact, so far as their doctrines of knowledge are concerned they may have as well belonged to three different schools. Gaudapāda practically adopts the epistemology of the Mādhyamika School in so far as he denies knowledge and reality in the ordinary sense. Śaṃkarācārya makes an attempt to find a middle way between a complete denial of the knowledge and reality of the external

1. STK. pp. 46, 47.

world and an unqualified acceptance of its reality by propounding his peculiar doctrine of *māyā* and *avidyā*. Rāmānuja undertakes a trenchant criticism of Śaṃkara's theory of illusion and maintains that both knowledge and its objects are real. In doing so he gives an analysis of the various means of knowledge, especially of the non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) and the reflective (*savikalpaka*) direct knowledge. Both Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja criticise the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism.

(i) The doctrine of illusory existence and illusory knowledge according to Gaudapada.

Gauḍapāda, whose work was the precursor of Śaṃkara's Vedānta, has been called the first systematic writer on the Vedānta metaphysics. His *Māṇḍūkya-kārika* is in part a commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and in part an original treatise expounding the philosophy of absolute reality. As has already been noticed by the students of the *Kārikā*, both the language and the thought of the author bear ample evidence to the fact that he was greatly influenced by the writings of Buddhist writers, especially of those who belonged to the *Mādhyamika* School.¹ In fact some of his *Kārikās* bear striking resemblance to the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* of Nāgārjuna, and except for the fact that Gauḍapāda has substituted '*Brahman*'

1. Cf. Dasgupta HIP. I, pp. 420-429 ; Rādhakrishnan, IP. pp. 452-453 ; J. Prasad, IIP. p. 128.

for Nāgārjuna's '*Śūnyatā*' there is hardly any difference between the philosophical positions of the two.¹

The work is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is mainly an interpretation of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, and in his *Gauḍapāda* explains the four aspects of self. *Firstly*, as the *vaiṣvānara ātman* the self as conscious of the world in the state of waking ; *secondly*, as the *taijasa ātman*, the self as conscious in the state of dream ; *thirdly* *suṣupty ātman*, the self as in the state of deep sleep when there is no determinate knowledge, and the self stands in its own pure consciousness and pure bliss ; and *fourthly*, the self as beyond all perception, relation, comprehension, definition, expression, etc., that which is characterised by the extinction of phenomenal reality (*prapañcopaśamam*). This last is the true nature of self. In the second chapter, *Gauḍapāda* explains how the world of experience is unreal. He attributes the perception of all phenomena to illusion (*māyā*). In fact, there is no relation of cause and effect, nor is there any bondage or liberation. The third chapter elaborates the same idea of illusory appearance as due to *māyā*. The fourth chapter is mainly devoted to the discussion of the relation of cause and effect, and it is pointed out by means of a dialectical form of argument, very much like that found in the *Mādhyaṃika-kārikās*, that there is only the appearance of change and production in things, and that the

1. Cf. JRAS. 1910, pp. 136 ff.

ultimate reality is unproduced, unchangeable, non-substantial and completely unmoved.¹ There is no analysis of the various means of knowledge in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, the reason probably being that these are regarded as illusory.

The world of waking experience is shown to be as unreal and illusory as that of dreams—‘*svapna-jāgarite sthane hy ekam āhur manīṣinaḥ*’ (II. 5). Just as the objects experienced as real in a dream are found to be illusory on waking up, so the objects experienced as real in the state of wakefulness are found to be unreal by those who wake up in the state of absoluteness. Having raised the question as to how the world of experience has come into being, how it appears to be diverse, and how the illusion is to disappear, Gauḍapāda says in quite unmistakable terms that it is *ātman* which conjures up all the diversity by means of its own magical powers, and it is the appearance of true knowledge which dispels this plurality and illusion :

*Kalpayaty ātmanātmānam ātma-dehaḥ sva-māyayā
Sa eva budhyate bhedaṁ iti vedānta-niścayaḥ*²

II. 12.

That one whose self is its body, by itself conjures up its own self by means of its own magical power. It is that again which knows distinctions (among things). Such is the established doctrine of the Vedānta.

1. J. Prasad, IIP. pp. 128-129.

2. Also cf. II, 13 and ff.

Aniścītā yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpitā
Sarpa-dhārādibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpitaḥ
 II. 17.

Niścītāyām yathā rajjvām vikalpo viniivartate,
Rajjur eveti cādvaitam tadvad ātma-viniścayaḥ
 II. 18.

Just as a rope, being not distinctly perceived in darkness, is falsely imagined to be such things as a snake, a stream of water, and so on ; in the same way is the self imagined to be (different from what it is).

Just as on a rope being definitely perceived as such, the false image disappears, and there appears the single perception that it is a rope only ; similarly, on the self being definitely ascertained as such (the plurality of existence disappears).

It will appear that while scholars have prominently noticed the other sections of the *Kārikā* which bear resemblance to Buddhistic philosophy, the particular section from which the above verses have been quoted has received little attention. I regard these verses important in so far as they clearly and conclusively establish the fact that Gauḍapāda, as he appears in the *Kārikā*, is as good a Vedāntist as his successor and well known champion of the system, Śrī-Śaṅkarācārya. In so far as Gauḍapāda recognises *Brahman* as the universal cosmic principle, he is as distinctly a Hindu philosopher and different from a Buddhist as any one can be. That there is very great resemblance between the monistic Vedānta as found in some of the *Upaniṣads* and as developed

later on to its fullest extent by Gauḍapāda and Saṃkārācārya on the one hand, and the Mādhyamika School of Buddhism on the other, no one will deny, but the distinction too between the two systems is unmistakable in so far as the one clearly recognises the existence of self, while the other as clearly denies it. Now Gauḍapāda, in his *Kārikā*, makes use of most of the points common to Mādhyamika Buddhism and the Vedānta in so far as they support the proof of the illusory nature of the mental and the material world ; but, at the same time, sticks to the fundamental position of the Vedānta that self is the ultimate reality¹.

The fourth chapter of the *Kārikā*, called the *Alātaśānti* 'Putting out the Fire-brand', proves the illusory nature of the mental and the material world with all its relations of substance and attribute, cause and effect, etc., and in doing so most of the dialectical arguments of the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* of Nāgarjuna have been repeated. The chief points about Gauḍapāda's doctrine of knowledge and reality as found in the *Kārikā* are : (1) That the world of waking experience is as unreal and illusory as that of dreams ; (2) That the objects of experience are in no way different from the ideas of the same ; (3) That these ideas themselves are illusory. In accepting (1) and

1. The *Kārikā* is full of verses speaking of *Brahman* and *ātman* as the ultimate reality. Besides those quoted above cf. III. 1-12.

(2) Gaudapāda agrees with the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra Schools respectively ; and in maintaining (3) he goes beyond the Yogācāra doctrine. There is a good deal of repetition and ambiguity about Gaudapāda's arguments, just as we find in those of the *Mādhyamika-kārika*. It is clear, however, that they are mainly based upon the relation of cause and effect. He starts with the premise that dreams are unreal. They being unreal, their cause which is to be found in the world of waking experience must also be unreal. The world of waking experience being unreal, the ideas of it must also be unreal. Thus all the relations, including that of cause and effect, must also be unreal. The verses like the following are typical of Gaudapāda's arguments :

*Asaj jāgarite dr̥ṣṭvā svapne paśyati tanmayah,
Asat svapne 'pi dr̥ṣṭvā ca pratibuddho na paśyati*

IV. 40.

*Nāsty asadd-hetukam asat sad-asadd-hetukam tathā,
Sac ca sadd-hetukam nāsti sadd-hetukam asat kutaḥ.*

IV. 41.

Having seen unreal objects when awake, one sees the same in dreams being invested with them (*tanmayah*) ; and having seen unreal objects in dreams also, one does not see them when one wakes up.

The unreal has not for its cause the unreal ; likewise the real has not for its cause the unreal ; the real has not for its cause that which is real ; and then how can the unreal have for its cause that which is real ?

In the above verse the statement that the real has not for its cause that which is real is evidently based upon the denial of the principle of causation altogether. The last statement, viz. that the unreal cannot have for its cause that which is real, is the main argument employed by Gaudapāda to prove the unreality of all knowledge and being on the basis of the universally accepted unreal nature of dreams.

(ii) Saṃkara's Theory of Knowledge and Reality.

We do not find a systematic treatment of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) in any of Saṃkara's works. His theory of knowledge can, however, be deduced from some portions of his works, especially his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras*, II, 2. The background of Saṃkara's whole philosophy, and so also of his epistemology, is the well-known distinction between the world in the ordinary sense (*vyāvahārika-jagat*), and the world in the highest sense (*pāramārthika-jagat*), corresponding to which there are ignorance (*avidyā*) and knowledge (*vidyā*) respectively. This doctrine of twofold reality is not at all peculiar to Saṃkara; for, as we have seen already, it is found in such Buddhist works as the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*¹

1. LS. II, 187, where the terms *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* are used. Dr. E. J. Thomas has drawn my attention to the presence of the same distinction also in *Kathāvatthu-P. Pakaraṇa-Atthakathā* (JPTS. 1889, p. 10)—“*Sammuti-sacca paramattha saccāni vā ekato katvā pi evam āha*”.

and the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* of Nāgārjuna¹. It is also present in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* of Gaudapāda². What is peculiar to Śamkara is his conception of *māyā* which, according to him, is something positive (*bhāva-rūpa*) and yet inexplicable (*anirvacanīya*). It is the cause of the world in the ordinary sense; and the disappearance of it through enlightenment unveils true reality, which is *Brahman*. It will appear that while Śamkara's position with regard to the nature of ultimate and true reality is the same as that of Gaudapāda, he differs from him and the *Mādhyamika* School in so far as, while maintaining the illusory character of the phenomenal world, he still holds that it is not unreal in the sense that it is identical with knowledge, or does not exist at all. This rather paradoxical doctrine Śamkara is able to hold, although as we shall see presently, inconsistently with his fundamental position, because of his peculiar conception of *māyā*. To him *māyā* is a positive entity, and hence the phenomenal world of which it is the cause has also a positive existence. But as *māyā* is also illusion, therefore, the world of ordinary experience is also illusory.

1. MK. XXIV, 8 and 9, where the terms '*loka-saṃvṛti-satyam*' and '*paramārtha-satyam*' have been used (This Thesis p.)

2. IV. 57, *Samvṛtyā jāyate sarvaṃ śāśvataṃ nāsti tena vai, Sadbhāvena hy ajaṃ sarvaṃ ucchedas tena nāsti vai.*

Now all the above doctrines are, in the first instance, based, according to Śaṃkara, upon the authority of the revealed scriptures, especially the *upaniṣads*, and this in fact is sufficient to establish their truth. Reasoning by itself is no sure guide to truth, and has to be employed only to prove the truth of that which is already vouchsafed by the revealed testimony. Accordingly, we find that in order to establish his own constructive tenets of philosophy, Śaṃkara constantly and assiduously refers to the scriptural texts for proof, and it is only against his opponents that he uses argumentation.

In the analysis of cognition Śaṃkara holds a position very similar to that of the *Sāṃkhya*; for according to him also, it is the self which knows, and it is the intellect which acts, and the functions of the two are confused because of the reflection of the one on the other. It is because of the self that knowledge is possible. It is known by itself and does not form an object of knowledge like other objects. It is the ego characterised by the sense of I¹. Cognition results from the conjunction of the self, the internal organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*), the sense-organs and the object. Under *Ved. S. II, 3, 32* Śaṃkara explains how this internal organ is variously called *manas*, *buddhi*, *vijñāna* and *citta* according as it functions in one way or another, and how its function being atten-

1. *Ātmabodha* 25, 27, 28, 33, 34.

tion it is an indispensable factor in all cognition. It is called *manas*, when its function is doubt, etc.—‘*saṁśayādi-vṛttikam mana ity ucyate*’ *buddhi* when its function is certainty etc.—‘*niścayādikam vṛttir iti*’.

Śaṁkara raises the problem of knowledge and error in the opening lines of his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras* by pointing out that in ordinary experience man fails to distinguish between two such opposite entities as the subject (*viṣayin*) and the object (*viṣaya*); and that this superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the qualities of the one upon the other is due to ignorance (*avidyā*)¹. Superimposition he defines as the apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing—‘*smṛti-rūpaḥ paratra pūrva-dr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*’ or simply, as ‘the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing’—‘*anyasya anya-dharmāvabhāsatā*; as for example, ‘mother-of-pearl appears like silver’; or ‘the moon although one only appears as if she were double’. ‘This kind of superimposition’, says Śaṁkara, ‘learned men consider to be ignorance (*avidyā*) and the ascertainment of the true nature of an object by discrimination they call knowledge (*vidyā*)’²... ‘It is on this mutual superimposition of

1. *Tathāpy anyonyasminn anyonyātmaktam*.....
loka-vyavahāraḥ.

2. ‘*tad-vivekena ca vastu-svarūpāyadhāraṇam vidyām āhuḥ*’.

self and non-self (*ātmānātmanoḥ*) that all such practical conventions as the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge are based¹, as also all scriptures, whether those concerned with injunctions and prohibitions, or with salvation. But how is it that the means of knowledge such as perception, etc. and the scriptures should treat of that which is dependent upon ignorance ? The answer is that the operation of the means of knowledge is not possible unless there be first a notion of the subject ; and this is not possible without the erroneous notion that the sense of 'I' and 'mine' belongs to the body and the senses, etc. For, without the employment of the senses, sense-cognition and the other means of knowledge cannot operate ; and without a substratum (*adhiṣṭhānam antareṇa*)² the senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act without considering the body as superimposed by the nature of self. Nor can, in the absence of all that (superimposition), self, which, in its own nature, is free from all relations (*asaṅgasyātmanoḥ*), become a knowing subject. And without a knowing subject, there is no scope for the operation of the means of knowledge. Hence, sense-cognition and the other means of knowledge, as also the scrip-

1. *sarvā-pramāṇa-pramēya-vyavahārā laukikāḥ pravṛttāḥ.*

2. This should be the body, although the *Bhāmātī* takes the word to mean 'superintendence or guidance' and this would be attributed to the soul. See Thibaut's Transl. I (SBE) p. 7 (note).

tures treat of those objects which depend upon ignorance¹".

The purport of the above paragraph is that the ordinary human knowledge, which is the result of the *pramāṇas*, pertains to the world in the ordinary sense which has only an illusory existence, although within this phenomenal existence also we have distinctions of knowledge and error, e. g. the perception of a rope as a snake. That Śaṃkara regards the world in the ordinary sense as illusory and the result of error just in the same way as a snake, while there is a rope only, and also as something which can be sublated by the appearance of true knowledge, is clear from all his writings here and elsewhere. Hence, his position in this respect is in no way substantially different from that of Gauḍapāda, and he cannot consistently draw a distinction between the world of dreams and that of ordinary experience, in so far as both of them are illusory according to his own admission. His observation while commenting on *Ved. S. II. 2. 29*, that the things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness, while those of which we are conscious in our waking state are *never* negated in any state² is not consistent

1. I have adopted Thibaut's translation here and elsewhere with such alterations as appeared to be necessary.

2. 'Naivam jāgaritopalabdham vastu stambhādikam, Kas-yāṃcid apy avasthāyām bādhyate'.

with his well-known view that the world in the ordinary sense is the result of *avidyā* or *adhyāsā*, which can be removed by true knowledge. All that Śaṃkara can say consistently with his position is that the world of waking state is relatively real; and Gauḍapāda was right when he said that the world of dreams is as real or as false as the world of waking experience real in so far as there is all the appearance of reality, false in so far as it is negated by another experience¹.

Analysis of cognition according to Śaṃkara is to be found in his criticisms of the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism in his commentary on *Ved. S. II. 2*. His refutation of the first of these is based upon his epistemological arguments for the permanence of the knower (*upalabdhr*), and that of the second upon the invariable presence of an objective reference in all sense-cognition.

His arguments against the doctrine of momentariness may be summarised as follows :

(i) The philosopher, who maintains that all things are momentary only, would have to extend that doctrine to the knower (*upalabdhr*) also. That is, however, not possible on account of the remembrance which is consequent on the original perception—*'upalabdhim anūtpadyamāṇam smaraṇam eva anu-smṛtiḥ'*. That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to the same person who previously made

the perception ; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed in the sentences : 'I saw that thing, and now I see this (same) thing', if the seeing person were not in both cases the same ? As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance, the Vaināśika (the Bauddha) has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentariness¹.

(ii) Should the Buddhist maintain that the recognition of the subject as one and the same takes place on account of the similarity of *different* self-cognitions, each, however, being momentary only it is to be noted that the cognition of similarity is based upon two things ; and that, for this reason, the advocate of universal momentariness, who denies the existence of one permanent subjectable mentally to grasp the two similar things, simply talks deceitful nonsense when he asserts that recognition is founded on similarity only.

(iii) Should it be said that the cognition 'this is similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent upon the apprehension of the earlier and

1. This and the following paragraphs are in the main extracts from Śaṃkara's commentary itself ; and the English translation has been mostly adopted from Thibaut's Translation (SBE) with slight alterations.

later momentary existences—‘*na pūrvottarakṣaṇa dvaya-grahana-nimittam*’, this is to be refuted by the remark that the fact of different terms—viz. ‘this’ and ‘that’ being used, points to the existence of different things (which the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar entities), the expression ‘this is similar to that’ would be devoid of meaning ; we should, in that case, rather speak of ‘similarity’ only. Further, the hypothesis of ‘mere similarity’ being cognised does not explain the ordinary recognition of things, for, in recognising a thing, we are conscious of it being that which we were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that.

(iv) While it may be admitted that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that, or merely is similar to that, for mistakes may be made concerning what lies outside our minds, with regard to the knower (*upalabdhr*) there is never a doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself ; it is rather distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation.

Śamkara’s refutation of *Vijñāna-vāda* that there are no external objects and that only ideas are real is again based mainly upon epistemological grounds. It is contained in his commentary on *Ved. S. II. 2.*

28.31. The main arguments are as follows :—

(i) The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it be a post, or a wall, or a piece of cloth, or a jar ; and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist. 'Why should we pay attention' says Śaṃkara, 'to the words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward thing, and that no such thing exists, any more than we listen to a man who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied ?

(ii) If it be said that the subjective idealist does not affirm that he is conscious of no object, but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of consciousness, the answer is that the existence of a thing as something apart from consciousness has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. No body, when perceiving a post or wall is conscious of his perception only, but all men are conscious of posts, and walls, and the like as objects of their perception. This is clear from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external things bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an internal object of cognition appears like something external.

(iii) If it be said that the assertion that the idea is like something external does not mean that there is really something external, for external things are impossible, the answer is that the possibility or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) ; while, on the other hand, the operation and non-operation of the means of knowledge are not to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities. Possible is whatever is apprehended by direct knowledge, or some other means of knowledge ; impossible is that which is not so apprehended. Now, the external things are, according to their nature, apprehended by all the means of knowledge, and are therefore real.

(iv) That the idea is distinct from the thing is further true for the following reasons :

(a) The fact that ideas have the form of objects, which is admitted by the subjective idealist, can be explained only on the assumption that there are objects apart from the idea which are the cause of that form. Similarly, the fact that there is an invariable concomitance of idea and the thing shows that they are related to each other as cause and effect¹.

(b) When there is a perception of two objects,

1. 'asati viṣaye viṣaya-sārūpyānupapatteḥ, bahirupalabdhes' ca viṣayasya ; ata eva sahopalambha-niyamopi pratyaya-viṣayayor upāyopeya-bhāva-ketukaḥ.

e.g. of a white and a black cow ; or of two qualities of one and the same object, e. g. the smell and the taste of milk ; or again, when we have the perception of a jar and also a remembrance of it, we can see that there are two kinds of ideas involved in these acts, viz. the general ideas of a cow, milk and a jar ; and the particular ideas of a white and a black cow ; of the smell and the taste of milk and of the jar perceived through the senses. These latter, that is, the particular ideas refer to the existence of things.

(v) If it be said that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike, the objection is that the two sets of ideas cannot be treated on the same footing, for they are different in character. The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. Similarly, the things of which we are conscious when under the influence of magic or illusion are negated by our normal consciousness. Those things on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like, are never negated in any state. Further the visions of a dream are acts of remembrance, while the presentations (*darśana*) of the waking state are immediate cognition (*upalabdhi*). The distinction between remembrance and immediate cognition is directly known by everybody in so far as the

is characterised by the absence of the object, while the other by the presence of it¹.

(vi) If it be said, as the Buddhists hold, that the variety of ideas can be explained by the variety of mental impressions (*vāsanā-vaicitryāt*), without any reference to external things, the objection is that the variety of impressions cannot be explained without admitting the existence and perception of external things. How could various impressions originate, if no external things were perceived².

In case it be said that the mental impressions do not need an external cause, but that they are caused by one another in beginningless series, the objection is that such a view would lead to a baseless regress *ad infinitum* and would make life impossible (*vyavahāra-lpoinī syāt*).

Besides the existence of external objects of experience, Saṃkara establishes the existence of self also on the ground that there should be a permanent uniting substratum to the various mental impressions and ideas. He says : 'For unless there exists one conti-

1. "smṛty-upalabdhyoś ca pratyakṣam antaram svayam anubhūyate artha-viprayoga-samprayogātmakam". Commentary on Ved. S. II. 2. 29.

2. *arthopalabdhī-nimittā hi pratyartham nānā-rūpa-vāsanā bhavanti, anupalabhyamāneṣu tv artheṣu kiṃnimitta-vicitrā vāsanā bhaveyuh*". Commentary on Ved. S. II. 2, 30.

nuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future, an absolutely unchangeable entity (*kūṭastha*) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition etc., which are based upon mental impressions dependent on place, time and cause¹.

1. *Na hi kāla-traya-sambandhiny ekasminn anvayiny asati kūṭasthe vā sarvārtha-darśani desa-kāla-nimittā-pekṣa-vāsanādhīna-smṛti-pratisandhānādivyavahārah sambhavati.*
Commentary on *Ved. S. II, 2, 31*.

(iii) Analysis of Knowledge in the Sri-Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja and his Criticism of Śaṃkara's Doctrine of Knowledge and Reality.

The Vedānta as taught by Rāmānuja is known as *Viśiṣṭādvaita*—Modified Monism ; and he differs from Śaṃkara on very essential points. While according to Śaṃkara, the ultimate reality called Brahman is a homogeneous impersonal absolute, and the world of experience an illusion ; according to Rāmānuja Brahman is a personality which comprehends within itself all the plurality of the world of experience, which, as a manifestation of Brahman, is real and not illusory. Further, Brahman, instead of being attributeless, has all the qualities of perfection. It is both the cause and the content (effect) of the world¹. As there is no such antithesis as between true reality and false reality in the system of Rāmānuja, there is also, according to him, no corresponding opposition between knowledge and ignorance such as we find in Śaṃkara's philosophy.

In the introduction to his commentary on *Ved. S.* I. 1. 1. Rāmānuja examines Śaṃkara's Vedānta at considerable length ; and in the course of doing so deals with some epistemological topics of importance.

As against those who like Śaṃkara maintain that

1. Cf. *Vedānta-dīpa*—'*sūkṣma-cid-acid-vastu-śarīrah para-mātmā kāraṇam, sa eva pramātmā sthūla-cid-acid-vastu-śarīrah kāryam iti*', *Śrī B.* pp. 4 and 5.

the ultimate and true reality is mere being without attributes (*nirviśeṣa vastu*), Rāmānuja maintains that such attributeless reality is inconceivable, and cannot be proved to exist by any of the means of knowledge. His arguments might be analysed as follows :

1. The objects proved by the various means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) are all characterised by attributes and hence no object devoid of attribution can be proved to exist by means of them.¹

2. If it be said that mere being does not depend upon any means of knowledge for its proof, but that it is immediately intuited by one's consciousness (*svānubhavasiddham*), the answer is that even in such an intuition the notion of attributes is always present both in the case of consciousness itself and the object intuited². It is the nature of consciousness that it is self-illuminating and has the characteristic of illuminating other objects, and hence it is not mere (attributeless) being³. Similarly, whatever is intuited by consciousness is characterised by some determination—'This is so', and consequently it also is not devoid of attributes (*viśeṣa*).⁴

1. *saviśeṣa-vastu-viśayatvāt sarva-pramāṇānām. Śrī B. p. 28.*

2. *so 'py-ātma-sākṣika-saviśeṣānubhavād eva nirastaḥ. Śrī B. p. 28.*

3. *dhiyo hi dhītvam svayam-prakāśatā ca, jñātur viśaya-prakāśana-svabhāvatayopalabdheḥ'. Śrī B. p. 28.*

4. *Idam aham adarśam iti kenacid viśeṣeṇaviśiṣṭayat-vāt sarveṣām anubhāvānām.*

3. To take the case of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), it will appear that both the reflective (*savikalpaka*) and the non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) direct knowledge have for their objects things characterised by attributes. That in cases of reflective direct knowledge things are always cognised as possesses of some attributes is admitted by all. It will appear, however, that even in the case of non-reflective direct knowledge things are cognised as possessed of their individual attributes. 'Non-reflective direct knowledge' says Rāmānuja, 'is the apprehension of an object as devoid of *some* attributes, but not as devoid of *all* attributes ; for a cognition of that kind is, in the first place, not found ever to take place ; and in the second place, it is impossible¹. All cognition takes place as characterised by some qualification—'This is so' etc., for no object can be cognised apart from such individual configuration as e.g. the triangular face, dewlap, etc. (in the case of cows). Thus the non-reflective direct knowledge is the apprehension of the first individual (instance) out of a number of things belonging to the same class—'*eka-jatīya-dravyeṣu prathamapiṇḍa-grahaṇam*' ; while the reflective direct knowledge is the apprehension of the second individual (instance), the third and so on—'*dvitīyādi-piṇḍa-graha-*

1. *Nirvikalpakaṃ nāma kenacid viśeṣena viyuktasya grahaṇam na sarva-viśeṣa-rahitasya, tathābhūtasya kadācid api grahaṇādarśanāt, anupapatteś ca.* Śri B. p. 29.

nam savikalpakam ity ucyate'. Thus in the cognition of the first instance, there is no apprehension of the pervasiveness of (the generic character of) cowhood etc. ; and it is only when the second instance, or the third and so on, is cognised that there is an apprehension of the pervasiveness (of the generic character). The cognition of the second and the subsequent instances has a determinate character, because it is characterised by the pervasiveness of (the generic character) cowhood, etc. in the configuration of a thing as a result of the connection (of the present cognition) with the first cognition, which (pervasiveness of the generic character) can be ascertained only on the cognition of the second instance¹. The cogni-

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1. *Prathama-pratīty-anusamhita-vastu-samsthāna-rūpa-gotvāder anuvrtti-dharma-viśiṣṭatvam dvitīyādi-piṇḍa-grahaṇāvaseyam iti dvitīyādigraṇasya savikalpa-katvam. Śri. B. p. 29.*

According to Thibaut (Engl. Transl. *SBE.*) and *Viurtti* (*BSS*), the word '*piṇḍa*' means 'individual', while according to Raṅgācārya, it means 'outline-perception'. From the use of the phrase '*eka-jātiya-dravyeṣu*'—'from among a number of things belonging to the same class', and the subsequent explanation of the two kinds of direct knowledge it will appear that '*piṇḍa*' should mean 'individual instance' in this context. Raṅgācārya's rendering would have been correct, if by non-reflective direct knowledge the author had meant the apprehension of a thing at the first moment of cognition, as the other philosophers do, but he evidently means by it the apprehension of the first instance.

tion of the first instance is indeterminate, for in that there is no (cognition of.) *pervasiveness* of cowhood, etc. in the form of the configuration of the object as characterised by the dewlap, etc.; and not because there is no cognition of the generic character in the form of configuration (of the thing); for the generic character etc. also in the form of configuration is not different (in so far as its cognition goes) from objects cognised by sense. And as without its configuration it is impossible to have the cognition of a thing, even in the cognition of the first instance of it, it is its configuration which is cognised as the thing of such and such a nature¹. In the case of the cognition of the second and the subsequent instances, it is the configuration, the thing possessing the configuration and the special characteristic of the pervasiveness of (the generic character of) cowhood, etc. when are always cognised, and, therefore, their cognition is

The terms '*anuvrtti*' and '*anuvrttitvam*' have presented a difficulty to the translators. Thibaut interprets it as 'extension' or 'continuation', while Raṅgacārya renders it as 'continued persistence' or 'the property of continued persistence'. These renderings, as will appear from the translations of the passage by these authors, do not make an intelligible sense. Vivṛtti's explanation: '*anuvrttitvam caika-rūpeṇānekatrāvasthitvam*'—'*Anuvrttitva*' is the pervasiveness of the same form (lit. by means of the same form) in a number of instances—appears to be the best and correct, and the same I have adopted.

1. '*saṁsthānam eva vastu ittham iti gṛhyate*'.

determinate. Hence, sense-cognition has never for its object that which is attributeless¹.

Like direct knowledge, inference and other means of knowledge also pertain to the cognition of things as characterised by some attribute or attributes. For, inference is based upon what has been already cognised by direct knowledge, and all judgements of knowledge indicate a distinction between the thing denoted by the subject and its character denoted by the predicate. 'In all cases' says Rāmānuja, 'whenever we cognise the notion of an attribute and the substance to which it belongs, the fact that they are entirely distinct from each other is clearly evident from the very act of apprehension'².

After having discussed the nature of the *pramāṇas* so as to show that all reality cognised through them appears as possessing some kind of character, Rāmānuja refutes the view that the plurality of things

1. 'Viśeṣa' has been translated as 'difference' by Thibaut. The context of the whole passage will show, however, that is 'attribute' which the term denotes, for the author establishes the 'viśeṣatva' of things maintaining that they are always cognised as possessing some *attribute* or other. Raṅgācārya has translated the term as 'attribute' and this rendering is also supported by the Vivṛtti—e. g. 'viśeṣa-rahitasya vastuno rūpādyabhāvaṁ nā tatra pratyakṣaṁ kramate' p. 33.
2. Sarvatra viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva-pratipattau tayoṛ aty-anta-bhedaḥ pratītyaiva suvyaktaḥ Śrī B. p. 30.

as it is found in ordinary experience is unreal. He says that this doctrine is based upon a failure to understand correctly the notion of that which is to be sublated (*bādhya*) and that which sublates (*bādhaka*) and the act of sublating the one by means of the other¹. It is only when there is some contradiction about the existence of things in relation to one another, e.g. one and the same thing cannot both exist and not exist at one and the same place and time, or one and the same thing cannot be both a snake and a rope, that there is room for one thing being sublated by another. But it is not so in the case of such things as a jar, a piece of cloth, etc., and hence all of them are real without any contradiction. For the same reason consciousness and being are also not the same. That the two are distinct from each other is proved by experience ; for one stands as subject to the other, which is its object².

As against the view held by Saṃkara's School that sense-cognition itself, which testifies to the existence of things, is false, because it is based upon illusion and is contradicted by scripture, Rāmānuja maintains that sense-cognition cannot be regarded as illusory simply because it is contradicted by scripture. For, in the first place, there is no reason to believe that

1. *Tad-anālocita-bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva-vyāvṛtti-anuvṛtti-viśeṣasya bhrānti-kalpitaṃ. Śrī. B. p. 30.*

2. *Anubhūti-siddha-viśeṣayos ca viśaya-viśayi-bhāvena bhedasya pratyakṣa-siddhātvāt, Śrī B. p. 33.*

knowledge obtained through sense-cognition is necessarily fallacious ; and in the second place, if it be said that it is false, because it is contradicted by scripture, it is to be noted that, according to Śaṃkara, scripture itself belongs to the phenomenal world of illusion, and hence it is no better than sense-cognition as a means of knowledge. Further, if it be said that the knowledge obtained through scripture is not false, because it is not contradicted [by any other authority, the objection is that the mere fact that some knowledge is not contradicted by any other authority can be no guarantee of its truth. This Rāmānuja illustrates by a simile : ‘Let us imagine’ says he, ‘a community of men suffering from defective vision due to darkness, without being aware of this defect, and dwelling in some remote mountain caves inaccessible to all other men possessed of sound vision. As all of them are assumed to be suffering from the same kind of defective vision, all of them will equally perceive, say, a double moon, and there will be no other perception (*pratyaya*) to contradict it. But all the same, however, it is not true that their cognition is not false, or that the double moon is not false¹. Similarly there is no guarantee that the falsity of sense-experience and undifferentiated Brahman as taught by scripture is necessarily true. Following the same line of argument Rāmānuja maintains that Śaṃkara’s

1. *Srī B.* p. 55.

doctrine of *avidyā* is false. He hits at the right point when he says that there is no analogy between self appearing as the phenomenal world and a shell appearing as a piece of silver. For he says 'apprehension (*khyāti*), activity (*pravṛtti*), sublation (*bādha*), illusion (*bhramatva*) are possible only when one thing appears as another, and it is not possible to imagine something which is altogether unperceived and groundless¹; for such a thing, when imagined, would be inexplicable. Silver, when it is perceived, is not inexplicable²; on the other hand, it is perceived as real silver. Were it perceived as something inexplicable, there would be no room for either error or its negation, or again for an effort (to get it)'. The whole difficulty about Śaṅkara's doctrine of *avidyā* is that it is regarded by him as something objective and yet such as can be removed by knowledge, which is by its nature subjective³.

The essential characteristic of consciousness, according to Rāmānuja, which distinguishes it from other things is that it is capable of illumining itself to itself on the basis of its own being serving as an object⁴. For in the case of other things such as a jar,

1. As *avidyā* is.

2. "atyantāparipṛṣṭākāraṇaka-vastu-kalpanā-yogāt, kalpya-mānam hīdam anirvacanīyam". p. 94.

3. Cf. *IIP*. pp. 134 and 135.

4. *anubhūtitvaṃ nāma vartamānatā-daśāyām sva-sattyaiva svāśrayam prati prakāśamānatvam*.

etc., although they are objects of consciousness, they do not illumine themselves to themselves; that is to say, they do not appear as objects to themselves. As against Saṃkarācārya, Rāmānuja maintains that consciousness can be an object of knowledge; for example, it is so when another person infers about the existence of consciousness in another person on the basis of certain outward signs of speech or action; or when one's own past states of consciousness become an object of one's cognition.

Having proved that consciousness can appear as an object Rāmānuja proceeds to show that it is not eternal but changing. One consciousness (*anubhūti*) lasts so long as its object is cognised, neither before nor after it; otherwise, if consciousness were eternal, all things would be cognised eternally and all at once. On the ground of this changing nature of consciousness he further maintains that there must be, besides consciousness, another permanent agent to which the different cognitions belong and which could explain the facts of memory and recognition. This he calls self (*ātman*), the existence of which, he says, is directly known to everybody in the form of 'I'; for example when one says: 'I know the jar'; 'I understand this matter', etc.¹ Just as consciousness implies the existence of self as the agent or the subject, it also nece-

1. '*Ghaṭam aham jānāmi, imam artham avagacchāmi ghaṭam aham samvedmīti sarveṣāṃ ātma-sākṣikaḥ prasiddhaḥ*'. Śrī. B. p. 39.

ssarily implies the existence of an object; for consciousness is inconceivable as apart from an object, and it is its very nature that it makes some object known. Further, it is itself known only through an object which is cognised by means of it.¹

Rāmānuja's criticisms of the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism in his Commentary on *Ved. S. II, 2* are substantially on the same lines as those of Śaṅkarācārya and hence need not be repeated here.

From what has been said above it will appear that the chief contribution of Rāmānuja to the philosophical thought in India was his criticism of Śaṅkara's theory of false reality and false knowledge. While trying to maintain that there is nothing like mere being Rāmānuja makes a careful analysis of direct knowledge and its two divisions, viz. non-reflective direct knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) and reflective direct knowledge (*savikalpaka*). His explanation of the distinction between the two is different from that given by another writers in so far as he restricts the non reflective direct knowledge to the cognition of the first individual instance out of a number of things belonging to a certain class, and also in so far as he denies that there is no cognition of the attributes con-

1. *Na ca nirviṣayā saṃvit kācid asti, anupalabdheḥ ; viṣaya-prakāśana-svabhavatayaivopalabdher eva hi samvidāḥ svayam-prakāśata samarthitā. Sri B. p. 36.*

stituting the generic character of the object cognised for the first time. According to Rāmānuja, what distinguishes non-reflective direct knowledge from reflective direct knowledge is not the absence in the former of the cognition of the attributes of the object cognised whether generic or specific, but a failure to see, on account of its being the cognition of the first instance, that the generic qualities cognised in that object are possessed by it in common with other objects of the same class. For instance, to take his own example, even in the cognition of a cow for the first time by a person, the generic feature of the animal, e. g. the dewlap and triangular face, etc., will be perceived along such as colour, size etc., but they will not be known to be the generic qualities of a cow for the simple reason that no other cows have been perceived as yet.

Rāmānuja's criticism of Śaṃkara's doctrine of illusion might be regarded as unfair and off the point, in so far as the claim may be made that Śaṃkara did not deny the phenomenal existence of the world, but on the other hand, maintained the reality and permanence of external things as against the Buddhist doctrines of subjective idealism and momentariness. True, but it is equally true that Śaṃkara's reality, permanence and diversity of the external world are illusory after all, the result of *avidyā*, something to be sublated by the ultimate and the only reality of Brahman on the arising of *vidyā* or true knowledge;

and in so far as Śaṃkara holds this doctrine of illusion Rāmānuja's criticisms of it are not irrelevant at all. In fact, once Śaṃkara holds and admits that the phenomenal world is only an illusion, the only alternative left open to him, and to all those who hold views similar to his, is to keep silent on the nature of reality. Rāmānuja rightly emphasises the point that in so far as we know the world by means of the various means of knowledge, it is real and diverse; and as there is nothing to contradict this experience of ours, there is no reason to believe that it is false. In the case of scriptural testimony too, Rāmānuja maintains that, in the first place, it does not lend support to Śaṃkara's doctrines; and in the second place, even if it did so, the scripture itself, according to Śaṃkara, belongs to the illusory world, and hence its testimony is untrustworthy.

**(iv) The Doctrine of mind-dependent
existence, and a restatement of
Gaudapāda's position in the
Vedānta-muktavali of
Prakāśānanda.**

A consistent exposition of the logical consequences of the illusion-theory of Gaudapāda is to be found in the VSM. of Prakāśānanda. We have seen how Śaṃkarācārya failed to reconcile the reality and permanence of the world of experience with the doctrine

of illusion which he had adopted from Gauḍapāda, and how consequently he was criticised on this subject by Ramānuja. The author of the VSM. holds a complete and consistent doctrine of mind-dependent existence in so far as he declares without any reservations that things exist only in so far and so long as they are perceived (*dr̥ṣṭi-mātra*); that fresh objects are cognised in recognition; and that there is no difference whatsoever between the world of dreams and that of waking experience. It must be remembered, however, that this doctrine is typically Vedantic in so far as all appearance, even such as is present in cognition, is regarded as illusory and Brahman is considered to be the only reality.

A good summary of the doctrines of the VSM. is to be found in verses 18-23¹, which it will not be out of place here to reproduce with a translation:—

*Pratyetaṇḍya-pratītyoś ca bhedaḥ prāmāṇikaḥ kutaḥ
Pratīti-mātram evaitad bhāti viśvaṁ carācaram—18*

Whence is there is a distinction capable of proof between cognition and the cognisable? This universe, moving and non-moving, appears as mere cognition. 18.

*Jñāna-jñeya-prabhedenā yathā svapnam pratīyate,
Vijñāna-mātram evaitat tathā jagat-carācaram—19.*

As a dream is cognised with a distinction between

1. VSM. pp. 51, 52 (Reprint from the *Pandit*, Benaras).

cognition and the cognisable¹, even so is the moving and non-moving world which is mere cognition (cognised with a distinction between cognition and the cognisable)—19.

*Tantor bhede paṭo yadvac chūnya eva svarūpataḥ
Atmanopi tathaivedam bhāna-mātram carācaram—20.*

Just as a piece of cloth is void in its real nature when there is separation from the threads; so is this world a mere appearance when there is separation from the self—20.

*Rajjur yathā bhrānta-dṛṣṭyā sarpa-rūpā prakāśate
Ātmā tathā mūḍha-budhyā jagad-rūpaḥ prakāśate—21.*

As through erroneous vision a rope appears to have the form of a snake, so through a deluded intellect the self appears to have the form of the world—21.

*Atmany eva jagat sarvaṃ dṛṣṭi-mātram satattvakam
Udbhūya sthītim āsthāya vinaśyati muhur muhuḥ—22.*

It is in the self that the whole world with all its elements, which exists only in so far as it is seen, takes its rise, stays and perishes again—22.

*Pūrṇānandādvaye śuddhe pāpma-doṣādi-varjite
Pratibimbam ivābhati dṛṣṭi-mātram jagattrayam—23*

In that which is perfect bliss, one without a second, pure, and free from sin and other defects, the threefold world, which exists only in so far as it is seen, appears like a reflection—23.

1. Although there is really no such duality.

The doctrine contained in the above verses is seen more clearly in the discussion in the preceding sections of the work. I shall deal here with only such portions as are concerned with the *dr̥ṣṭi-mātra-vāda*—the view that the world exists only in so far as it is perceived. That our author does maintain this view is proved beyond doubt by verse to which contains an objection of an opponent to the doctrine:—

*Ajñāta-sattvaṃ neṣṭam ced vyavahārah katham bhavet,
Na hy adarśana-mātreṇa viṣaṇṇo nāśa-niścayāt—10*

If uncognised existence be not accepted, how can one get on in the world? For no one grieves for an object through thinking that it is destroyed, merely because it is not seen.

The discussion on the subject is started as the result of the assertion that in the state of emancipation there is no unperceived order of duality (*ananubhāya-mānam dvaitam*), and in the above verse the first objection to the theory of *dr̥ṣṭi-mātra* is put forth.

The essential answer to the above objection is contained in the assertion that so long as error lasts or a man remains under the influence of illusion the usual belief in the existence of things continues. A man does not grieve for an object which is not perceived for he continues to believe in its existence, just as a man believes in the existence of things in a dream. 'Nor can it be urged that there is a difference between the states of dreaming and waking, in that the former is destroyed by waking knowledge; for in neither case, while the error lasts, in any nega-

tion (of either state) admitted.¹ Nor is there inconsequence in holding that there is a negation of error on the application of evidence; for none would say that, when the error has been removed, there can be any further dealings with the erroneously surmised object'.

In reply to the further objection that in case the existence of things be admitted only in so far as they are perceived there can be no recognition of things (as identical with those cognised previously), as for example, of the world of walking experience as identical with that cognised before one went to sleep, it is said that all such recognition is due to error, and is similar to the illusory perception of a rope as a snake by a number of persons at the same time. "When a man passes from waking consciousness into the state of dreamless sleep from which he again awakes, his present consciousness relates to a different series of objects; and as for his recognition it is simply due to error"².

The perception of things by means of the sense-organs in the state of wakefulness, which is supposed to differentiate such cognition from that of dreams is

1. p. 28, 'na ca tatra bādho'stiti vaiṣamyam, bhramāvasthāyām kutrāpi bādhasyānangikārāt, etc.
2. p. 30, 'evam jāgrad-avasthāyām prapañcam anubhūya suṣuptim gatvā punar utthāya yo' yam prapañcānubhavaḥ, sa prapañcāntaram eva viṣayikaroti pratyabhijñānam tu-avivekād eva.

maintained to be as illusory as that in the state of dreams¹.

Lengthy dialectical arguments have been given to show that there is no difference between cognition and the objects cognised into which we need not enter here. It is evident that the basic principle of the VSM is the illusory nature of the world of experience and the position of the author of this work is much the same as that of Gauḍapāda. It is to be noted further that although such expressions as 'pratīti-mātram', 'vijñāna-mātram', 'arṣṭi-mātram', etc. clearly indicate that the author of the VSM held the doctrine that things exist only in so far as they are perceived, this principle is not of much consequence in his system as a whole; and what he ultimately wants to establish is the essence of things is the absolute Brahman. In other words, it is not so much an idealistic theory of existence which he holds as that of a spiritualistic absolutism, and this can be said of almost all Vedānta philosophers who have been usually regarded as idealists.

1. *Indriyāṇām kāraṇatve bhaved codyam tadā tava Svapna-bhrame yathā teṣām anvaya-vyatireka-dhiḥ. 14.*

V. Treatment of Epistemology as a separate subject in the new school of Logic (*Navya-nyaya*).

The characteristic feature of the New School of Logic is that it confines its treatment to the theory of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) as a subject by itself. This practice of considering the means of knowledge separately from the objects of knowledge (*prameya*) had already its precedent in the works of such Buddhist logicians *Diñnāga* and *Dharmakīrti*, or Jaina writers as *Māṇikya Nandi* and *Deva Sūri*; and it was in fact due to the influence of these that the Hindu authors departed from their usual custom of dealing with the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge together. This departure in the method of treatment, however, simply means that the theory of knowledge came to be regarded as a distinct subject. It does not signify that the New School held the view that the theory of knowledge could be discussed without assuming the objects of knowledge. Neither the existence of knowledge nor that of the object of knowledge was ever questioned by these logicians. Hence the change in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* treatment of the subject, with the advent of the New School, is more of a methodological rather than logical or epistemological nature.

The first Hindu logician who dealt with the theory of knowledge as a subject by itself in his work

was Bhāsarvajña, the author of the *Nyāya sāra*. Next to him was Gaṅgeśa, the author of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, and the reputed founder of the New School of logic. The main tendency of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians of the later period was : *firstly*, to make such modifications in their theories as were found necessary in the light of the criticisms by the philosophers of the other schools and as could be made consistently with the essential tenets of their own; and *secondly*, to refute such doctrines of their opponents as they found impossible to subscribe to. An instance of the first we have already seen in the case of the modified definitions and classification of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) in the works of the later writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School. An example of the second is to be found in the refutation of such doctrines of the Mīmāṃsa School as the self-validity of knowledge (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) by logicians like Śrīdhara and Gaṅgeśa, the authors of the *Nyāya-kandalī* and the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* respectively.

From the point of view of epistemology it is unnecessary to enter into a detailed survey of the doctrines of the New School of Logic. There is absolutely nothing new or remarkable in the *Nyāya-sāra* of Bhāsarvajña beyond the fact that in the history of the Nyāya School it was the first work to treat the theory of knowledge as an independent subject, and that he did not accept knowledge by similarity

(*upamāna*) as a separate means of knowledge. The *Nyāya-sāra* is not treated as a work of the New School either, although there is no reason why it should not be regarded as really the first work of that school. As regards the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* it will appear that a good deal of the epistemological matter found in this work, including the refutation of the *Mīmāṃsā* theory of knowledge, is already present in such previous work as the *Nyāya-kandalī*¹ of *Srīdhara* ; and so far as I can see the usual claim for the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* that it is an epoch-making work can be substantiated on no other ground than that in the history of *Nyāya* School it was the first systematic and elaborate work which confined its treatment to the theory of the *pramāṇas* alone. For the sake of completeness of the treatment of the subject I shall give here in outline the main points in the theory of knowledge as expounded by the author of this work.

Gaṅgeśa accepts the usual four means of knowledge of the *Nyāya*, viz. direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*); inference (*anumāna*) ; knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*) ; and verbal testimony (*śabda*), and deals with each of them in the four sections into which the *Tatt-*

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1. This work is a commentary on the *Praśasta-pādashāstra* ; and I have not considered it necessary to devote a separate section to it. Reference to the treatment of certain topics common to the *NK.* and the *TC.* have been given in the footnotes in the following pages.

va cintāmaṇi is divided¹.

Cognition is classified as right cognition (*pramā*) and wrong cognition (*apramā*), and these are defined in the usual way². In this connection the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the self-validity (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) of knowledge is criticised mainly on two grounds: *firstly*, that the validity of knowledge is conditional in so far as it depends upon the requisite conditions of a correct sense-cognition, inference, etc.; as for example, upon the absence of obstruction or defect in the sense-organs in the case of sense-cognition; and the presence of the right premises in the case of inference; and *secondly*, that we are sure of the validity of our knowledge only when our knowledge leads to a successful activity prompted by it³.

While dealing with the nature of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) Gaṅgeśa criticises the definition of *pratyakṣa* as given in the NS.⁴ on the ground that *firstly*, it is too wide in so far as, because the mind is

1. TC. I, p. 538.

2. PTC. I, p. 401 ff. 'yatra yad asti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramā ; tadvati tat-prakāṛakānubhavo vā. Yatra yan nāsti tatra tasya jñānam tad-abhhāvavati tat prakāṛaka-jñānam, vā prama.

3. TC. I, pp. 189 ff ; 401 ff ; Cf ; NK. (Viz. SS.) pp. 217 ff.

4. NS. I. 1, 4—indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam pratyakṣam, avyapadeśyam, avyabhicāri, vyavasāyāt-makam.

also a sense-organ, it includes the inference of soul, and remembrance; and *secondly*, it is too narrow in so far as it excludes cognition by God¹. According to him direct knowledge is that which is not caused by another cognition—*jñānākaraṇakam jñānam iti tu vayam*². We have seen already that the condition of the contact of the object with the sense-organs (*indriyārtha-sannikarṣa*) had been deleted from the definition of direct knowledge much earlier by the Buddhist and the Jaina logicians and also by Praśastapāda in one of his alternative definitions of *pratyakṣa*. Gaṅgeśa's definition, however, is remarkably expressive of the essential nature of direct knowledge viz. that it is free from every other kind of, and all previous knowledge.

Gaṅgeśa criticises Prabhākara's doctrine of the three-fold direct knowledge—the *Tri-puti-pratyakṣa*³ on the ground that it is not true that we are acquainted with the apprehending subject (*pramātr*) in the act of sense-cognition itself. In this connection he draws a distinction between the (first) determination

1. TC. I, p. 539 ff. 'ātmanumiti-smṛtyor jñāna-mātre cātivyaṇṭeḥ ātmano 'rthasya manasendriyeṇa saṃyogād utpatteḥ.
2. TC. I, p. 552.
3. TC. I, p. 788, *tatrātmā kaṛtrtvena, jñeyam karmatayā, jñānam kriyātvena bhāsate, to jñātr-jñeya-eva-viṣayam jñānam anubhūyata iti tri-puti-pratyakṣa-vādinah.*

(*vyavasāya*) and the after-determination (*anu-vyavasāya*) in the act of cognition. The first determination consists of the cognisance of the object as a mere 'this' — '*nanv idam iti vyavasāyah*' ; and the after-determination which follows the first consists of the cognition 'I know this' — '*tad uttaram idam aham jñānamīty anu-vyavasāyah*'¹. It is shown thus that it is only at the *anu-vyavasāya* stage of cognition that there is consciousness of the self or subject ; and this cognition is mental, and not sensuous².

Direct knowledge is divided into the non-reflective (*nirvikalpaka*) and the reflective (*savikalpaka*) in the usual way ; and the definitions of these two kinds of knowledge are essentially the same as those given by the previous writers³.

1. TC. I, p. 789.

2. Cf. *Nyāya-Kandalī*, pp. 91 and 92. "*apare punar evam āhuḥ, jñāna-samsargād viṣaye prakāśamāne prakāśa-sva-bhāvatvāt pradīpavad vijñānam prakāśate prakāśaśrayatvāt pradīpa-vartivad ātmāpi prakāśate iti tripuṭi-pratyakṣateti ; tad apy asat ; ghaṭo 'yam ity etasmin pratiyamāne jñātr-jñānayoḥ apratibhāsanāt yatra tu anayoḥ pratibhāso ghaṭam aham jñānamīti tatrotpanne jñāne jñātr-jñāna-viśiṣṭasyārthasya mānasa-pratyakṣatā na tu jñātr-jñānayoḥ cakṣuṣa-jñāne pratibhāsaḥ tayoḥ api cākṣuṣatva-prasangāt.*"

3. I, TC. pp. 809 ff. "*tatra nāma jātyādi-yojanārahitam vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhi niṣprakāṛakam nirvikalpakam*", p. 806 ; *savikalpakañ ca viśeṣa-jñānam yathā gaur ayam iti*, p. 839.

Inference (*anumāna*) is defined as the instrument of that inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) which is the result of the knowledge of the middle term as being in invariable concomitance with the major term, and as abiding in the minor term¹. It is maintained that inference is a means of knowledge distinct from sense-cognition². A number of definitions of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) are discussed at length, and the nature of the various parts of a syllogism is explained in detail. The classification of inference into (i) *kevalānvayi*, (ii) *kevala-vyatireki* and (iii) *anvaya-vyatireki*³; or again into (i) *svārtha* and (ii) *parārtha*⁴ is the same as in the works of the previous writers. *Arthāpatti* is shown to be an act of inference⁵.

Knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*) is defined in the same way as by the previous Nyāya logicians, viz. that by means of which through resemblance an object is identified as *bearing a certain name*. It is shown again in the usual way that knowledge by similarity is not a case of sense-cognition or inference. The Mīmāṃsā view on the subject is criticised.

Verbal testimony (*śabda*) is defined as that means of knowledge which is the result of a true

1. TC. II, p. 2 *Tatra vyāpti-viśiṣṭa-paśka-dharmatā-jñāna-janyaṃ jñānam anumitis tat-karaṇam anumānam.*

2. TC. II. p. 21 ff.

3. Ibid, p. 552 ff.

4. TC. II. p. 689.

5. TC. II. p. 645.

knowledge of the meaning of words according to usage¹. Gaṅgeśa does not appear to draw any real distinction between verbal *testimony* in the sense of reliable authority and verbal *knowledge* in the sense of meaning conveyed by words. In fact it is the latter which he discusses at length in the chapter on *śabda*, and hence most of the treatment is grammatical rather than epistemological.

1. TC. IV. p. 1. *prayoga-hetu-bhūtārtha-tattva-jñāna-janyaḥ śabdaḥ pramāṇam*.

Modern Developments

It is really not possible to write anything on the Modern Developments in the History of Indian Epistemology, as there has been no original contribution to Indian Philosophy for centuries. In modern times scholars like Dr. Radhakrishnan, Dr. Das Gupta, Professors Ranade and Belvalkar, Prof. Bhattacharya, and a few others have written works on Indian Philosophy in English, which are either historical in nature or expositions of the old systems of Indian Thought and they have their own value so far as they interpret these in modern terminology. But they do not fall in line with or make contributions to Indian Philosophy itself as it has come down to us through the original works in Sanskrit, Pali or Prakrit. The only book written and published recently on the Nature of Knowledge and Reality in Sanskrit is the present author's own Treatise called *Tattva-Darśana*¹ which has attempted a synthesis of the Indian and the Western Thought with the writer's own contributions where possible. The text of this book has been written in the form of simple Sūtras (aphorisms) with the author's own commentary on the same. We therefore venture to give a brief summary of the chapters of this book dealing with Epistemology and also the English

1. *Tattva-Darśana*—Sanskrit Text with English translation by Achārya Jwala Prasad, published by the Shri Shivaji Loka Vidyapitha, Amravati, India, 1955.

Translation of some portions of the Text and Commentary for the benefit of our readers. We hope they will find these interesting.

Tattva-Darsana by Acharya Jwala Prasad.

The First Part of Tattva-Darśana deals with Knowledge and Reality and consists of Nine Topics which are as follows :—

First Topic—The Nature of Philosophy.

Second Topic—The Valid Means of Knowledge.

Third Topic—The Nature of Knowledge.

Fourth Topic—Relation between Language and Knowledge.

Fifth Topic—Objects of Knowledge.

Sixth Topic—The Nature of Objects of Knowledge.

Seventh Topic—The ultimate principle of the Universe.

Eighth Topic—The Nature of the World.

Ninth Topic—The Nature of Deity.

In the First Topic it is said that the aim of Philosophy is to 'show truth' and that Truth is known by the Valid Means of Knowledge. Therefore it is necessary to expound the Valid Means of Knowledge. This exposition follows mainly in the Second and the Third Topics, the English translation of which with that of the commentary on the same is reproduced here for giving a detailed and clear idea of the epistemological position of this book. The text and commentary of the First Topic are also given below by way of introduction of this subject.

FIRST TOPIC

The Nature of Philosophy.

Now the nature of Philosophy is being explained 1.

Now the nature, the subject, and the aim of Philosophy are being explained.

There are several sciences in literature which expound different subjects. Philosophy is one of them. What is its subject, and what is its aim?—this is being explained in this Topic.

Philosophy is that which shows truth. 2.

The science which explains truth, that is the real nature of an object, is Philosophy.

What is this world? What is its cause? What is its fundamental principle? What is its real nature? All these questions fall within the scope of Philosophy. A proper discussion of the subject is undertaken in this science. 'Ānviksiki' is another name for Darśana (Philosophy) and this has been said to be a lamp to all the branches of knowledge by the learned, as has been said in the Arthaśāstra of Kautilya—"Virtue (Dharma) and vice (Adharma) are dealt with in the Vedas, wealth and non-wealth in Economics (Vārtā), the lawful and the unlawful in Political Science (Daṇḍanīti), Ānviksiki (Philosophy) benefits people by discussing the merits and demerits of these sciences with arguments, it helps them to keep their mind steady during prosperity and adversity, and gives them skill in their intelligence and speech."

"A lamp to all the branches of knowledge and means to all action,

A support to all the virtues—such is the Ānviksiki".
Therefore, this science of Philosophy is that which dis-

cusses the subject of all sciences, shows truth and benefits people of the world.

The thoughtful have a desire to know truth. 3.

The thoughtful among men have a desire to know truth, that is to say, to know the real nature of an object ; and this desire to know truth is natural to them.

The origin of Philosophy is that (desire to know truth) and its aim is truth. 4.

That desire on the part of the thoughtful to know truth is the origin of Philosophy and its aim is the knowledge of truth.

Except the Philosophy of Atheism, the aim of Philosophy in all other systems of Philosophy has been said to be salvation. This view is in accordance with their own doctrines and need not be accepted by all.

Truth is the real nature of an object. 5.

The meaning of the Sūtra is quite clear.

And that is known by the Valid Means of Knowledge (pramāṇa). 6.

That real nature of an object is known by the Valid Means of Knowledge such as perception and others.

Therefore, the Valid Means of Knowledge are being explained. 7.

Therefore, the definition of the Valid Means of Knowledge and their various kinds are being explained in detail in the Second Topic.

Here ends the First Topic dealing with the Nature of Philosophy.

SECOND TOPIC

The Valid Means of Knowledge.

That by means of which truth, or true nature of an object, is known, is the Valid Means of Knowledge. 1.

The means by which truth, i. e. the real nature of an object, is known as the Valid Means of knowledge.

The Valid Means of Knowledge does not require any other proof, like a lamp, and on account of the defect of regress ad infinitum. 2.

The Valid Means of Knowledge is self-evident. Just as a lamp shows other objects and also itself, the Valid Means of Knowledge proves the existence of other objects and also its own existence. Further, if the Valid Means of Knowledge should require another proof for itself, there will be the defect of regress ad infinitum ; for one Means of Knowledge will require a second, that a third and the third a fourth proof, and thus there will be infinite progress.

Perception (Pratyaksa), Direct Knowledge (Anubhūti) and Reasoning (Tarka) are the three Valid Means of Knowledge. 3.

Perception is knowledge resulting from the presentation of an object to sense-organs, e. g. the knowledge of a pot or cloth results from the sight of a pot or cloth.

Direct knowledge is that which results from the presentation of an object to mind and is devoid of sense-cognition e. g. the knowledge of such states of mind as one's pleasure and pain, or such knowledge as 'I am', 'I am happy', 'I am unhappy' 'I am angry', etc.

Reasoning is knowledge in which an unknown object is known from some known object by means of a known relation (between them). That (Reasoning) is of various kinds such as inference, Knowledge by Similarity, etc. e. g. having seen smoke somewhere, the knowledge that there must be fire there.

An explanation of the Means of Knowledge is being given in detail in the sequel.

Other Valid Means of Knowledge such as Inference,

Knowledge by Similarity, Testimony, etc. stated in the other systems of Philosophy, are included in these. 4.

Other Valid Means of Knowledge stated in the other systems of Philosophy, such as Inference, Knowledge by Similarity, Testimony, etc. are included in perception. Direct Knowledge and Reasoning. Therefore, they are not being enumerated separately in this work of Philosophy.

It is only after the co-existence of smoke and fire has been seen previously that the existence of fire is deduced from (the existence of) smoke.

The knowledge of a gayal, which results from its resemblance to a cow, is obtained thus : Having previously seen a cow by perception and having heard that gayal is like a cow, when one sees an animal like that in the forest, it is argued by one that it must be a gayal. Therefore, this knowledge results from Perception and Reasoning only.

Similarly, Testimony also is not a separate Valid Means of Knowledge ; because having heard or read a word or words, its meaning is inferred. Further Testimony is not always a Valid means of knowledge, because Testimony other than that derived from a reliable source is liable to be false.

Perception is knowledge resulting from the presentation of objects to the sense-organs. 5.

Now the nature of Perception is being explained. Knowledge which is produced by the presentation of objects to the sense organs is Perception. Because knowledge is not obtained through the organs of action. therefore "that obtained through sense-organs" has been stated here. Similarly, knowledge is not produced by a mere nearness between the objects and the sense organs. Therefore, the words "produced by presentation" have been used here. For this reason the definition of Perception as given in the Nyāya Sūtras is inappropriate.

The sense-organs, which are five, grasp their objects only in combination with mind. 6.

The five sense-organs, grasp their respective objects only in combination with mind. Without (the association of) mind, by a mere nearness between the objects and their sense organs, knowledge of those objects never results.

Therefore, Perception is knowledge resulting not merely from nearness of objects to the sense-organs, but from presentation of objects to the sense-organs. 7.

The meaning of the Sūtra has already been explained, Presentation of an object to the sense-organs is accompanied by the action of mind. But (a mere) nearness of an object to its sense-organ is not like that.

For the same reason Perception is reflective, inferential and describable—it is not non-reflective—except in consciousness in the first moment of a newly born child. 8.

As knowledge by perception is accompanied by the action of mind and mind is a reflective organ, the knowledge (by perception) is also reflective (Savikalpaka) and not non-reflective (Nirvikalpaka). It is also inferential and describable, for reflective knowledge is accompanied by inference and can be described in words. It is only consciousness of an object in the first moment of a newly born child which can be non-reflective, non-inferential and indescribable. After that all perception is reflective.

It is only Perception free from the defect of obstruction to the presentation of objects to their sense-organs which is a Valid Means of Knowledge. 9.

It is only Perception which is free from the defects of sense-organs and objects which is valid as means of knowing truth. The defects of sense-organs are their debility, disease, etc., while the defects of objects are obstruction, darkness, distance etc. And these (defects), being an obstacle in the way of pre-

sentation of objects to the sense organs, render the perceptual knowledge defectives.

Knowledge resulting from the (direct) presentation of objects to mind and devoid of sense-cognition is Direct Knowledge. 10.

Different from Perception, devoid of sense-cognition and resulting from (direct) presentation to mind, is Direct Knowledge (*anubhūti*). That knowledge is in the form of consciousness of one's own self and cognition of states of mind such as pleasure, pain, etc. 'I am angry', 'I am satisfied', 'I am happy', 'I am unhappy',—knowledge like this, which is devoid of sense-cognition and free from reasoning, is called Direct Knowledge here.

Reasoning is knowledge of the unknown (resulting) from that which is known. 11.

Reasoning is knowledge of unknown from some known object, by means of a known relation.

Where knowledge of the unknown results from what is known through some known relation (between them)—that is Reasoning (*tarka*), That is of different kinds, such as Inference, Knowledge by Similarity, and Testimony, etc.

Reasoning based upon (invariable) concomitance (*Vyapāti*) is Inference. 12.

And concomitance is between cause and effect, or between the whole and its parts 13.

Concomitance between the whole and its parts is either among classes or among individuals. 14.

Invariable co-existence is concomitance. Where by means of the relation of that (concomitance), knowledge of the unknown is derived from that which is known—that is Inference. And concomitance is either the co-existence of cause and effect or relation between the whole and its parts. Relation

between the whole and its parts is either among classes or among individuals.

‘Wherever there is smoke, there is fire’.—this is a case of concomitance of effect and cause. Therefore, having seen smoke at a place, it is inferred that there must be fire there.

“All men are mortal, therefore Devadatta is also mortal”.—this is a case of the inference based upon concomitance in a class. Whatever qualities are found in a class are also found in its parts—this is the concomitance here.

Having seen somewhere only the foot or tail of an elephant, when it is known that the animal must be an elephant—this inference is based upon concomitance between the individual and its parts. Whenever there is such a foot or a tail, that belongs to an elephant this is the concomitance here.

In all cases, where a certain subject in thought comes within the scope of inference, knowledge of the particular results from that of the general or the universal.

Only Inference based upon concomitance is a Valid Means of Knowledge. 15.

“Wherever there is smoke, there is fire”—only an inference like this based upon concomitance is a Valid Means of Knowledge. Where there is no concomitance, or too wide concomitance, or defect of conditional concomitance, the inference is not valid.

“Wherever there is water, there is smoke”—this is a case of non-concomitance.

“This man is white, therefore he is an Englishman”—this is a case of too wide concomitance, because it is not only Englishmen who are white, but people of other countries are also white.

“Where there is fire, there is smoke”—this is a case of conditional concomitance, because without the presence of wet fuel there is no existence between fire and smoke. Here the presence of wet fuel is the condition.

Because concomitance is based upon agreement or upon difference, Inference is either by agreement or by difference, or by both. 16.

Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, there must be fire on this smoky hill—in this case the inference is by agreement, because the concomitance is based upon agreement.

“Wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke, therefore, in this pond, because there is no fire, there is no smoke”—in this case the inference is by difference because the concomitance is based upon difference.

“Wherever fire is accompanied with wet fuel, there is smoke; wherever fire is not accompanied with wet fuel, there is no smoke”—in such a case the inference is by agreement and difference, because it is based upon agreement and difference.

The three kinds of inference stated in the other schools of philosophy are included in these, therefore they are not being enumerated here separately. The examples of three kinds of inference given in the Nyāya Philosophy have the defect of (wrong) concomitance. Having seen clouds in the sky, (to infer) that there will be rain—this (example of) Antecedent Inference (*pūrvavad anumāna*) is defective because of non-concomitance, because: “Wherever there are clouds, there is rain,”—this is not a case of invariable concomitance, therefore, having seen clouds in the sky, it is not possible to infer that there will be rain. Similarly, “Because there is a flood in the river, there must have been rainfall on the banks of the river”—this example of the Consequent Inference (*s'esavad anumāna*) has the defect of too wide concomitance. Flood in

a river can be caused also by the melting of snow on the mountains which form its source. In the case of Inference by Generalisation (*sāmānyato drastānumāna*), from a known (seen) effect, there is inference of a cause which is unknown (unseen), for example, having seen in the sky that the sun changes its position, it is inferred that the sun moves, because the position of objects does not change without their movement. Here also, as is known to the students of Geography, the cause of the change of position of the sun in the sky is the daily rotation of the earth and not the movement of the sun—and therefore in this example, there is too wide concomitance.

Positive Inference (*Vīta*) and Negative Inference (*avīta*) also are included in the Inference by agreement and that by difference. Therefore they have not been stated separately here.

Inference about a sub-class (species) or about a particular (individual) from the general is Deduction (*Nigamana*). 17.

Where from the general (*sāmānya*) is inferred knowledge about a sub-class (*upasāmānya*) or about a particular (*vis'esa*) that is deductive Inference.

For example,

All men are rational,

Indians are men,

Therefore, Indians are rational,

Here the inference is from the general about a sub-class.

Again—

All Indians are civilised.

Devadatta is an Indian.

Therefore, Devadatta is civilised.

Here the inference is from the general about a particular (individual).

Deductive Inference usually consists of three parts (propositions). 18.

Usually Deductive Inference consists of three parts (propositions), and the parts (propositions) are :—

- (1) That which states the concomitance. (2) That which states that in which the concomitance is found, and (3) That which states the conclusion.

That which states the relation of concomitance is called the "Proposition stating concomitance" (Major Premise—Vyāpati—vācaka-avayava). For examples, 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire'.

The sentence in which the object with concomitance is stated, is the Proposition stating the object of concomitance (Minor Premise-vyāpya-vācaka-avayava). For example. 'This hill has smoke on it'.—here the hill is the object of concomitance.

Where the proved relation between the concomitant (vyāpaka) and the object of concomitance (vyāpya) is stated, that proposition is the conclusion (siddha-vacaka-avayava). For example, "Therefore this hill has fire on it".

Inference is either for oneself or for others. When it is for oneself, it consists of three parts as explained above. And when it is for others, it has five parts, which are as follows:—

- (1) PROBANDUM—for example,
This hill has fire on it ;
- (2) PROBANS—for example,
Wherever there is smoke, there is fire ;
- (3) EXAMPLE—for example,
As it is in the kitchen, etc.,
- (4) APPLICATION—for example,
This hill has smoke on it ;
- (5) CONCLUSION—for example,
Therefore, this hill has fire on it.

There are three terms in the three parts (propositions) 19.

In the three parts (propositions) stated above, there are three terms. And these are :—(1) that which states the concomitant (Major term—vyāpaka-vācaka-padam) ; (2) that which states the object of concomitance (Minor Term—vyāpaka-vācaka-padam) ; and (3) that which states the mark or sign (Middle Term—linga-vācaka-padam).

Whatever is smoky, is fiery,

This hill is smoky,

Therefore, this hill is fiery.

Here 'fiery' is the term stating the concomitant (Major Term); 'this hill' is the term stating the object of concomitance (Minor Term) and 'smoky' is the term stating the mark or sign (Middle Term).

On account of the difference in position of the parts (propositions) and the terms, inference consisting of three parts has several forms. 20.

On account of the difference in position of the parts and the terms as stated above, inference consisting of three parts (syllogism) has several forms. Difference in the position of the parts is only in the case of the Major and the Minor premises. Difference of position of the terms in propositions is only of the Middle Term which is either the subject or the predicate.

In a sentence, that about which something is said is the subject (uddes'ya), and the term which expresses that is the Subject Term (uddes'ya-vācaka-padam). What is said about the subject is the predicate, and the term which expresses that is the Predicate Term (vidheya-vācaka-padam).

Inference of the general from the particulars is Induction (udgamanam). 21.

And that is based either upon the concomitance of cause and effect or upon the attributes of objects. 22.

Where having observed the concomitance of certain common qualities in particulars, there is inference about the character of the general—that is Induction; for example, “Wherever there is fire, there is observed heat (in it); therefore, fire has the attribute of heat”.

“Whichever men have been observed, have been found to be rational; therefore, all men have the attribute of rationality”.

This kind of inference is not merely based upon enumeration, but it depends either upon the concomitance of cause and effect, or upon the attributes of objects. An inference merely based upon enumeration, and devoid of concomitance, is defective, for example. “All the parrots that I have seen are green; therefore, all the parrots are green”. This inference would be invalid, if some other persons might have seen parrots which are white. Here the green colour of parrots is not an invariable and natural attribute of theirs, as heat of fire, or rationality of men.

Observation (Preksaṇa), Experiment (Prayoga) and Hypothesis (Kalpanā-tarka) (reasoning based upon assumption) are its means (of inference) 23.

The means of inference by Induction are these : Observation which consists of scrutiny of the attributes of objects; Experiment which consists of examination of attributes of objects with a particular aim under particular circumstances and with special means and methods; and Hypothesis which consists of examination and verification of a particular assumption with regard to the relation of cause and effect in a particular case.

For example, water is cold; fire is hot; the sun is full of light;—this is Observation. What is the cause of smoke, or whether wet fuel is the cause of smoke or not?—in order to

find out this, one makes fire without wet fuel and sees that there is no smoke; and then again one makes fire with wet fuel and finds that there is smoke—this is Experiment. Having seen a dead body somewhere, it is surmised that poison may be the cause of death ; then it is argued that if poison be the cause of death in this case, there must be poison present in the stomach or in some other parts of the body of the dead person; and subsequently if, after an examination of the body, poison is found in it, it is concluded definitely that poison is the cause of death—this is Reasoning by Hypothesis.

Of these Agreement and Difference are the chief methods of investigation. 24.

Of these, that is of Observation, Experiment and Reasoning by Hypothesis, Agreement and Difference are the chief methods of investigation in the examination of the relation of cause and effect, and in the scrutiny of attributes of objects.

The co-existence of attributes or of objects is Agreement, and the contrary of that, that is, the absence of their co-existence is Difference. In the examination of cause and effect either one of these or both of them are used. For example, having seen the co-existence of fire with wet fuel and smoke at several places, it is argued that wherever there is fire with wet fuel, there is smoke, and therefore fire with wet fuel is the cause of smoke—here the Method of Agreement has been used.

Where having observed at several places the co-existence of fire with wet fuel and smoke, and at other places the absence of their co-existence i. e. of fire and smoke, it is argued that where there is wet fuel with fire, there is smoke, and where there is no wet fuel with fire, there is no smoke ; therefore fire with wet fuel is the cause of smoke—here both the Method of Agreement and the Method of Difference have been employed.

Deduction and Induction are inferences dependent upon each other. 25.

Where the inference is about the particular from the

general—that is Deduction ; and where the inference is about the general from particulars—that is Induction. These two are dependent upon each other ; for in Deduction the general, which forms the basis of inference, is the result of Induction. For example, having observed a number of (particular) men who are rational, it is inferred that all men are rational. And again in the case of Reasoning by Hypothesis in Induction, deductive inference is used — for example, having formed a hypothesis that the cause of death of a certain person is poison, in order to test that hypothesis it is argued that wherever poison is the cause of death, these kinds of particular symptoms of death are observed ; those (symptoms) are seen in this case or not ; therefore (accordingly) poison is or is not the cause of death in this case,—here deductive inference is employed in Induction.

Reasoning based upon the meaning of sentences is Education (Anugamana). 26.

Where on the basis of meaning of a certain sentence, meanings of other sentences are inferred—that is Education. For example, from the meaning of the sentence : 'All men are rational', it is argued that : "Some rational beings are men", or "No man is irrational", or again "No irrational being is man". All this will be explained in detail in the topic dealing with the relation between thought and language.

Reasoning based upon similarity is Analogy (upamāna). 27.

Where from resemblance between the known and the unknown, some knowledge about the unknown is derived—that is Analogy. It is usually fallacious. It is only when resemblance is based upon the relation of cause and effect, that Analogy is valid, for example, Devadatta died after eating poison; therefore Yajñadatta also, who has eaten poison, may have died. Where resemblance is not based upon the relation of cause and effect Analogy is not valid ; for example, This black horse has a swift speed ; therefore the other horse also, who is black, must be of

swift speed—this kind of inference is wrong, because merely from the resemblance of black colour, the inference of swift speed does not follow.

THIRD TOPIC

The Nature of Knowledge.

Knowledge is grasping (the nature of) an object, and its instrument is the intellect (Buddhi). 1.

Knowledge is that action in which the grasping (of the nature) of an object takes place. Its instrument, i.e. the means of acquiring it, is the intellect. The intellect is that faculty of consciousness by means of which the nature of an object is grasped.

The intellect has two forms : Experience (Anubhava) and Memory (Smṛti). 2.

The intellect, which is the instrument of knowledge, has two forms: Experience and Memory. The definitions of these follow.

The intellect in the forms of Perception, Direct Knowledge and Reasoning is Experience. 3.

Experience is that in which knowledge is obtained through Perception, Direct Knowledge or Reasoning. That kind of knowledge has been already explained in the Topic dealing with the Valid Means of Knowledge.

The intellect which has its basis in the impressions of (left by) previous Experience is Memory. 4.

Memory is that faculty of revival of knowledge in consciousness which has its basis in the impressions of (left by) previous Experience in the forms of Perception, etc. In that, although the object is absent, its knowledge is revived in the intellect, for example, I had seen Devadatta with Yajñadatta yesterday on the bank of the Yamunā—this is Memory, the contrary of that is forgetfulness.

Knowledge obtained by Experience is usually mixed with Memory. 5.

Knowledge obtained by Experience has usually in it the element of recognition ; and in recognition there is the memory of previous Experience. Therefore often, particularly in the case of Perception, knowledge obtained by Experience is mixed with Memory. This is Devadatta, and this is Yajñadatta ; this is water, and this is fire ;—in perceptions such as these there is the revival in memory of knowledge experienced previously ; and that is the cause of recognition such as: This is Devadatta ; that is Yajñadatta ; this is water ; and that is fire. Even in the case of an object which is perceived for the first time, there is the revival in memory of qualities like colour, taste, smell, etc. experienced previously and recognition of the same in the (present) object of perception. Similarly in the case of Direct Knowledge and Reasoning there is the revival in memory of knowledge obtained previously through Experience.

Knowledge is either Valid or Invalid. 6.

Valid knowledge is that in Experience, or in Memory, which accords with the nature of an object. The contrary of that is invalid knowledge.

Valid Knowledge is either with regard to existence (bhāvātmakam) or non-existence (abhāvātmakam). 7.

Valid knowledge with regard to existence is that which relates to an object which exists, for example, knowledge of a conchshell which exists. Valid knowledge with regard to non-existence is that which relates to an object which does not exist, for example, knowledge of the non-existence of a conchshell which does not exist. Similarly in the case of Memory, there is valid knowledge with regard to existence when there is revival of an object (in memory) exactly corresponding to that as perceived previously, while there is valid knowledge with regard to non-existence when there is revival (in memory) of the non-existence of an object which was not perceived previously.

Invalid Knowledge is of three kinds : Non-perception of the existent (bhāvābhāvātmakam). Perception of the non-existent (abhāvābhāvātmakam), and Erroneous perception of the existent (anyathā-bhāvātmakam). 8

Invalid knowledge of the form of Non-perception of the existent is that in which an object is not perceived although it exists, e.g. the non-perception of a snake although it lies on the road. The cause of that is the defect of sense-organs, or obstruction of an object through darkness or long distance, etc., or inattention.

Invalid knowledge of the form of Perception of the non-existent is that in which there is perception of an object although it does not exist, e.g. perception of a snake although it does not exist, the hearing of a sound although there is none, etc. In the state of wakefulness, that is usually due to derangement of mind as in the case of a person who has a deranged or insane mind, or one who is suffering from disease like high fever etc., and also in dreams when that is caused by the revival of mental impressions accumulated in the past.

Invalid knowledge of the form of Erroneous perception of the existent is that in which there is erroneous perception of an object which exists, e.g., when a conchshell is perceived as silver. This also is caused by the defect of sense-organs or the obstruction of objects.

Knowledge belongs to an individual, and its validity is proved by its steadiness in one's own mind and its correspondence to the knowledge of others (other minds). 9.

Whatever knowledge is produced, is in an individual, that is, it is in an individual mind. The truth or falsity of that is proved by its steadiness in the individual's mind and by its correspondence to the knowledge in other minds. Whatever knowledge is true, remains fairly steady in the mind and its validity is established by its being confirmed by other minds.

When some one perceives a thing as a conchshell and wants to make sure whether his perception is true or not, he scrutinises it and finds that it is a conchshell only and nothing else this is steadiness of the object in the mind. If even after this there should remain any doubt with regard to the perception of the object as a conchshell, he inquires from others: "Is this a conchshell or anything else?", and when others also confirm that it is a conchshell only and nothing else, the truth of that knowledge is established. The contrary of that is false knowledge, that is the knowledge of an object which does not remain steady in the mind, or which is not confirmed by the mind of others, is false.

The falsity of knowledge in dreams is also proved in the same way, because that knowledge is not steady in one's own mind, nor does it correspond to the knowledge of other minds. The knowledge of a person with a deranged or insane mind is also of the same kind, that is, there is no steadiness about it, nor is there any confirmation of the same by other minds. After a person is awake, knowledge of a dream and its object disappear, and therefore they are false. Similarly knowledge which belongs to the mind of a deranged or insane person only and not to others is false.

Knowledge is valid so long as it remains steady in one's own mind and corresponds to the knowledge of other minds. 10.

Here the question may be...What is the (true) validity of knowledge after all? If some knowledge is accepted as true first, and then later on it may turn out to be false, what knowledge is really true? Knowledge of a dream at first appears to be true during the state of dream, while later on it turns out to be false after one is awake. What proof is there that even the knowledge of the state of wakefulness may not be false? It is said here that there is validity of knowledge so long as it remains steady in one's own mind and it corresponds to that of

other minds. It becomes false only after it has been proved to be false.

The Validity or Invalidity of Knowledge in Memory is of the same kind as that of Experience. 11.

The validity of knowledge in memory consists in the revival of the same in memory exactly in the same way as it was previously in the experience of an object. The contrary of that is its invalidity. Thus when there is steadiness of knowledge in memory in one's own mind and correspondence of it to that of other minds, that is valid. When Devadatta remembers that he saw Yajñadatta yesterday on the bank of the Yamuna in the morning, and on there being a doubt about it, he remembers it again and again and inquires from Yajñadatta and others who were with him whether that was true, and when they also confirm that it was really true, that knowledge in memory is proved to be valid.

(Here ends the Third Topic dealing with the Nature of Knowledge.)

APPENDIX I

Is there 'Acquaintance' or 'Simple Apprehension' ?¹

In this paper I propose to take up a discussion on the subject at the point it was left in Dr. Broad's paper published in 'Problems of Science and Philosophy' (Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. II, 1919). In the four papers, which form the symposium on the subject in this volume, the main basis of discussion is the Hon. Bertrand Russell's theory of 'knowledge by acquaintance', which is altogether rejected by Dr. Hicks and Dr. Edgell, and partially supported by Prof. Moore and Dr. Broad. The kind of immediate awareness which is meant to be expressed by the phrase 'knowledge by acquaintance' has, however, been advocated by other writers even before Bertrand Russell, the foremost of whom, I think, is the late lamented L. T. Hobhouse. He discusses this under the title 'Simple Apprehension' in the first two chapters of his 'Theory of Knowledge', and tries to meet such objections to it as were urged, for example, by T. H. Green, or are urged, at present, by Dr. Hicks. Among contemporary British thinkers,

1. This paper was originally read by the author at a meeting of the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club during the Easter Term of 1930.

besides Prof. Moore and Dr. Broad, another advocate, of this kind of immediate experience is Prof. Stout, who also calls it Simple Apprehension. What is also interesting is that this theory of immediate awareness has been advocated by some of the mediaeval Indian philosophers, and we find some very suggestive and parallel notions in the definitions and descriptions of such experience as given by these thinkers of the Orient independently of the philosophers of the West.

It will appear that some of those who have advocated the theory of knowledge by acquaintance or simple apprehension, or the same, or a similar theory under a different name, believe that there is such an experience as consists of a *mere* cognisance on the part of the subject of an object, which is *merely* presented to it. In other words, they believe in the existence of a subject-object relation which consists of *mere* cognisance and *mere* presentation of an object. For example, consider Hobhouse, who, as I have already said, is one of the foremost among the modern thinkers who have discussed and advocated the theory of immediate experience in this sense. He says : 'Thought relations never constitute a content of immediate apprehension. Such contents do stand in manifold relations which are unfolded by judgements about them; but the apprehension of them is not the thought of their relations, nor does it depend for its existence in consciousness upon these relations. The judgments themselves would have no meaning if they did not

refer to the data as apprehended. Apprehension, therefore, does not depend on any hitherto assigned mental activities¹. And again : 'I conclude, then, that the consciousness in which we are directly or immediately aware of the content present to us, a state which I venture to call apprehension, is a primitive or underived act of knowledge'. Prof. Stout speaks of this immediate experience in similar language. 'Simple apprehension', says he, 'is the term which seems most suitable for naming this bare presence of an object to consciousness without indicating any more special relation in which the mind may stand to this subject'². Bertrand Russell too, inspite of his frequent use of the phrase 'knowledge by acquaintance' means by it the same kind of experience as is meant to be expressed by 'simple apprehension' in the works of Hobhouse and Stout, that is to say, he really means 'acquaintance' and not knowledge based upon acquaintance. He has, in fact, used the very term 'acquaintance' at times to express this. For example, in the following statements : 'We shall say that we have *acquaintance* with any thing of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths'⁴; and again, "All our knowledge, both knowledge of

1. Theory of Knowledge, p. 31.

2. *Ibid*, p. 35.

3. Manual of Psychology, 3rd edition, p. 103.

4. Problems of Philosophy, p. 73. (*italics are mine*)

things and knowledge of truths, rest upon *acquaintance* as its foundation'¹. Among the Indian philosophers Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya school and the author of the Nyāya-Sūtras, defines direct knowledge (*Pratyakṣa*) as that which is the result of the contact of the sense-organs with the object, which is not inferential, not discrepant from its object, and definite. Later on, in the school of Hindu Logic, direct knowledge was divided into two kinds : (1) non-reflective and non-descriptive; (*nirvikalpaka*), corresponding to 'simple apprehension'; and (2) reflective and descriptive (*savikalpaka*), corresponding to ordinary perception. The Buddhist philosophers admit only the first kind of cognition as direct knowledge, for they say that the second kind of cognition is also inferential. That this first kind of cognition corresponds to 'simple apprehension' or 'acquaintance' will be clear from Kumābila's description of it. 'At first', says he, 'there is cognition² which is mere apprehension (*ālocana-jñānam*); free from reflection and description (*nirvikalpakam*); that which resembles the cognition of a child or the dumb; and is caused by the mere object (*śuddha-vastujam*)³. Similarly, Bhāsarvajña describes this kind of direct cognisance as 'that

1. Problems of Philosophy, p. 75 (*italics are mine*)

2. Kumābila, as also most of the other Indian philosophers, regarded such experience as knowledge.

3. Ślokavārtika, IV. 112.

which manifests the mere form of an object (*vastu-svarūpamātrāvabhāśakam*); for example, such cognition as produced at the first glance at an object (*prathamākṣasannipātajam*)¹. Another significant definition of direct knowledge, in the history of Indian philosophy, is that given by *Gaṅgeśa* the founder of the New School of Indian Logic. He defined it as the direct apprehension which is not the result of (previous) knowledge.

Thus we find a number of European and Indian philosophers agree in holding that there is a kind of direct experience in which the object is *merely* presented to, and taken cognisance of, by the subject. In order to decide whether this view is correct or not I think the crucial point to consider is whether there is, or there can be, a cognisance of the various qualities which constitute the sense-data (called an object), such as a red patch, an extended patch, or a hard patch, etc. without thinking at the same time that it is red, it is extended, or it is hard; or even that we know a red patch, an extended patch, or a hard patch. And if there is, or there can be such a cognisance, when and under what conditions does it take place? It will appear that it is really a satisfactory answer to this latter question which will establish the validity of the claim to the existence of such cognisance as

1. *Nyāyasāra*, (Calcutta, 1910) p. 4.

2. *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Bibl. Indica, p. 552.

is alluded to in the first question; and it will further appear that although all the advocates of such direct experience agree in admitting that there is, and there can be, such a simple cognisance as described above, they differ with regard to its exact status in relation to cognition. There are, *firstly*, those who seem to think that such direct experience is not to be had in adult life, and that it is simply a factor in the complex cognitive act revealed by analysis. Hobhouse, for example, says: 'For our purpose it is indifferent whether an act of apprehension ever exists by itself in the sense of forming the whole state of consciousness for the time being. We are contending merely that such an activity is to be found on *analysis* in many of our mental states; that it is a condition of knowledge; and that by itself it takes us a certain distance and no further'¹. On this point Bertrand Russel also agrees with Hobhouse. He says: 'Knowledge of things, when it is of the kind we call knowledge by acquaintance, is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths, and logically independent of knowledge of truths, *though it would be rash to assume that human beings ever, en fact, have acquaintance with things without at the same time knowing some truth about them*'². *Secondly*, there are others who think that such immediate experience as is expressed by the terms 'acquaintance' or 'simple apprehension', and which consists of simply a subject-object relation, does exist at the first moment of con-

1. Theory of Knowledge, p. 36. (*italics are mine*)

2. Problems of Philosophy, p. 72. (*italics are mine*)

tact of the object with the sense-organs as a condition and substratum of the later cognition which may be called 'knowledge by acquaintance'. This seems to be the view held by Prof. Stout and Dr Broad, and by most of the Indian philosophers. 'It is a precondition', says Prof. Stout, 'of the cognitive attitude, the feeling attitude, and the conative attitude that there should be something before the mind with which they are concerned', and the 'bare presence' of this 'something' to consciousness he calls simple apprehension¹. Similar is the view of Dr. Broad, according to whom, if I understand him rightly, there is acquaintance every time a fresh object, or parts of an object, comes into contact with the sense-organs. 'Indeed', says he, 'the following seem to me to be plain facts: (a) That when I suddenly look at a landscape or hear a gun fired, I enter into a special kind of relation with a visual field or a noise ; that this relation probably begins to subsist before I begin to judge or discriminate ; and that, at any rate, it is present in full force at a time when my acts of discrimination and judgment have hardly begun to enter the field ; (b) That when I have discriminated and recognised various parts of the landscape, one at least of the relations which I have to these parts is of precisely the same kind as that which I originally had to the whole. And this relation is what I understand by acquaintance with sense-data'². The same conception

1. Manual of Psychology, p. 103.

2. Problems of Science and Philosophy, p. 2. 1.

appears in the works of a number of Indian philosophers, 'At first', says Kumāṛila, 'there is cognition which is mere apprehension (*ālocanajñānam*), which resembles the cognition of a child or the dumb, and is caused by the mere object (*śuddhavastujam*). And, according to Bhāsarvajña, this cognition, which manifests the mere appearance of an object, is such as is produced at the first glance (*prathamākṣasannipātajam*). Rāmānuja, another well-known Indian teacher, seems to think that it is only when a particular sense-datum is presented to an individual *for the first time in life* that there is such an immediate experience as we have called 'acquaintance' or 'simple apprehension'; otherwise, in all cognition, there is present the subject-predicate relation of the form 'This is so'.

It is rather difficult to convince another of the truth of what one finds in one's own experience. All that can be done is to appeal to certain facts, which may or may not be seen by others as one sees them. Some facts, however, to which I should appeal in connection with the problem under consideration are as follows :—

(1) Before I know, or can know, an object as 'This is A', 'This is B', or even as 'This is something' (which I do not exactly know), there should first be a presentation of the sense-data of A or B, or of the something as mere sense-data, and the mere cognisance of these at the first moment of their presentation in what is meant by acquaintance or simple apprehension. That is why such cognisance was

called by Indian philosophers as that caused by the mere object (*śuddhavastujam*). This distinction between the object as it is presented at the first moment and as it is perceived later on should come home more clearly by considering the fact that there is no reason why the object as it is presented at the first moment of the contact of the sense-organs with the object in adult life, should be different from what it would be like to a child at the first moment of its perception, it being granted, of course, that the sense-organs of the child are structurally similar to those of a grown up person, and function in the same way so far as the mere apprehension of the sense-data is concerned. A red patch, as it is in itself, should appear as such even to a child the first time it is presented to it, although the child would not be able to perceive it as 'This patch is red'.

(2) All such judgments as 'This is red' ; 'This is green', etc. which are symbolical of a descriptive perception involve the identification of a familiar notion e. g., of redness or greenness with a particular sense-datum 'red' or 'green', which ought to be present, presented and taken cognisance of first as the condition of such identification.

(3) So far as I can see while acquaintance with sense-data is altogether non-inferential, their perception as having a certain character and the descriptive judgment, which follows from it, are inferential. The patch which is presented to my sight is perceived as red because I am familiar with other patches having that appearance as red.

From what I have said above with regard to the nature of acquaintance it should be clear that I do not mean by it a vague or primitive kind of knowledge as some have characterised it to be. What is known by acquaintance may represent a *thing* vaguely or distinctly, but so far as the presented sense-datum goes it is bound to be definite. When I hear a voice, I may not be able to make out whose it is, or may not be sure whether it is, or is not, of a particular friend of mine whose it might be, but the voice, whatever it is, is definite *in its own character*. Similarly there is no question of acquaintance being a primitive kind of knowledge. In so far as it is a mere presentation and mere cognisance of sense-data, devoid of all interpretation, it is the same in the case of a child and in that of an adult; in the case of a primitive savage and in that of a civilised man of our modern times.

So far I have considered the nature of acquaintance with sense-data only. A further question is whether there are other kinds of acquaintance also, and if so, what they are. What have we to say to the following observations of Bertrand Russell in this connection? 'We have acquaintance in sensation', says he, 'with the data of the outer senses, and in introspection with the data of what may be called the inner sense-thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.; we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either of the outer sense or of the inner-sense. Further it is probable, though not certain, that we have acquaintance with self, as that which is aware of things or has desires towards things. In addition to

our acquaintance with particular existing things ; we also have acquaintance with what we shall call *universals*, that is to say, general ideas such as *whiteness*, *diversity*, *brotherhood*, and so on¹. By a happy coincidence an Indian philosopher of about the 7th Century, Dharmakīrti, has also included more than the acquaintance of sense-data in his definition of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), and has classified it into four kinds ; (1) Sense-apprehension (*indriyajñānam*), corresponding to acquaintance with sense-data ; (2) Mental apprehension (*manovijñānam*), corresponding to Russell's acquaintance with the data of the inner sense ; (3) Self-consciousness (acquaintance with self) ; and (4) Mystic intuition (*yogijñānam*²). The essential and common characteristics of all these kinds of direct knowledge are : *firstly*, that they do not admit of description (*Kalpanābodham*), that is to say, there is no subject-predicate relation in them ; and *secondly*, that there is no mistake about them (*abhrāntam*). Now I shall make these two classifications of direct knowledge, which are very similar to each other, the basis of my further discussion of the subject.

After a sense-datum has ceased to be presented I can have an image of it in my mind, and there is as much acquaintance with it as there was with the original sense-datum ; and hence memory images may be said to be known by acquaintance. Similarly, that I am acquainted with all my feelings and emotions is also evident from introspection. In the case of

1. Problems of Philosophy pp. 80, 81.

2. Nyāyabindu, Bibl. Indica, p. 1.

memory, I think, we have to draw a distinction between the remembrance of concrete sense-data and that of mere abstract facts. When we remember a mere fact, to me it appears it is not the fact but the remembrance of that fact with which we have acquaintance; and hence, Russell's statement that we have acquaintance in memory with *things* which have been data either of the outer sense or of the inner sense will not be strictly correct. In fact, I think, in memory, we *never* have acquaintance with *things* which have been data either of the outer sense or of the inner sense. What we have acquaintance with is either the image of concrete things, or simply the remembrance of abstract facts. Along with the remembrance of abstract facts it happens, however, that there are also some images of concrete things associated with them, for example, along with the memory of the fact that yesterday I read about the disturbances in Bombay there may also appear, and they usually do appear, the images of the page of the paper in which I read the news, some pictures which appeared on that page, and so on. That besides acquaintance with the external and the internal data, we have also an ever-present immediate consciousness of the existence of a subject or self to which this acquaintance and the other mental processes belong, is also a fact which, I think, may be granted.

A rather more complex question than the others is whether we can claim acquaintance with universals; and if we can, with what kind of universals and in what sense? 'It is obvious, to begin with', says

Bertrand Russell, 'that we are acquainted with such universals as white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard etc. i.e. with qualities which are exemplified in sense-data. When we see a white patch, we are acquainted, in the first instance, with the particular patch ; but by seeing many white patches, we easily learn to abstract the whiteness which they all have in common, and in learning to do this we are learning to be acquainted with whiteness'¹. Similarly he claims to have acquaintance with what he calls time-relations and space-relations, and also with resemblance. Now the question is : In what form are we acquainted with these universals ? Are we acquainted with such universals as whiteness, redness, blackness, etc., in sense-presentation, or otherwise ? Some philosophers, for example, in the history of Indian philosophy, Kumāṛila, Prabhākara and Rāmānuja, seem to think that they are present as a part of the sense-data; while others seem to hold that they are simply exemplified in the sense-data. It will appear, however, that we are acquainted with these universals neither in sense-representation nor otherwise as purely abstract notions. Whatever we have in sense is a particular sense-datum,—a particular red-patch, or a black-patch. We simply identify our notion of redness or blackness with the particular instance of it in sense-representation. Redness or blackness as universals cannot be said to be presented in sense, nor are we acquainted with them as sense. Nor can there be an acquaintance

1. Problems of Philosophy, p. 158, 159.

with them as abstract notions, for, so far as I can see, the content of abstract notions remains altogether unrepresented and uncognised until they are analysed, and all analysis implies something more than mere acquaintance. In fact, it is questionable whether there is anything at all like a purely abstract notion of such simple sensible qualities as redness or blackness. What we have of these by generalisation is a sort of generic image, and it is this with which we are acquainted. Whenever I think of redness independently of a red patch presented in sense it is a sort of generic image of redness which is presented to my mind, and I may be said to be acquainted with this in the same sense as with a particular red patch presented in sense. The same may be said of space and time relation. What is presented in sense is so many particular situations in space. By generalisation we get generic images of 'right' and 'left'; 'above' and 'below', etc., and it is these generic images with which I am acquainted when I think of space relations independently of objects in sense experience which stand in these relations. Similarly, with regard to time relations, in sense we have only particular sequence, and out of these by generalisation we get generic images of 'before', 'after', etc., and it is these with which I am acquainted when I think of time relations independently of particular sequence presented in sense. As regards more abstract and complex universals, such as brotherhood, virtue, etc., I do not think we even have a generic image of these or

an acquaintance with it. All that we can get is a sort of image of an indifferent concrete instance of brotherhood, virtue, etc. All that I say is that we cannot be said to have acquaintance with them as such abstract notions.

The question whether acquaintance is knowledge or not is, as Dr. Broad says, mainly a verbal one. If by knowledge we mean only that which consists of a subject-predicate relation, acquaintance is not knowledge ; but if we use the term 'knowledge' in a wider sense so as to include even mere awareness or cognisance of a sensum, acquaintance is knowledge. By most of the Indian philosophers it has been regarded as a mode of knowledge.

All knowledge based upon acquaintance and having acquaintance as one of the factors at the time cognition may be called knowledge by acquaintance. It is also knowledge by description. It corresponds to the second kind of direct knowledge in Indian philosophy, viz., that which is reflective and descriptive (*savikalpaka*).

I agree with Dr. Broad when he says that acquaintance is incorrigible, or as the Sanskrit term '*avyabhicāri*' literally means: 'that which is not discrepant'. It cannot be different from what it is as presented to an individual at a particular moment. By its very nature it is free from the distinction of truth and error, for it is not of the nature of a judgement.

APPENDIX II.

List of abbreviations used in this work.

Ait.	Aitareya Upaniṣad.
ASP.	Aristotelian Society Proceedings.
AŚ.	Artha-śāstra (of Kautilya).
Asta.	Asta-sāhasrikā.
Brhad.	Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
BSS.	Bombay Sanskrit Series.
CBN.	Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa.
Chānd.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
CS.	} Caraka-Samhitā.
C. Samhitā.	
CSS.	Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series.
CSUP.	Constructive Survey of the Upanisadic Philosophy.
FD.	Fragments from Dinnāga.
HIL.	History of Indian Logic.
HIP.	History of Indian Philosophy.
HOS.	Harward Oriental Series.
HPIP.	History of Pre-buddhistic Indian Philosophy.
IIP.	Introduction to Indian Philosophy.
ILA.	Indian Logic and Atomism.
IP.	Indian Philosophy.
JAOS.	Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JASB.	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.
JAS. Bomb.	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay.
JBTS.	Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.
JGD.	Jaina Gem Dictionary.
JPTS.	Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JRAS.	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
K.	Kārikā.

LS.	Lañkāvatāra-sutra.
MB.	Mahābhārata.
MDS.	Mānava-dharma-śāstra.
MK.	Mādhyaṃika-kārikās.
MS.	Mīmāṃsā-sutras.
MSV.	Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārtika.
Muṇḍ.	Muṇḍaka Upanisad.
NA.	Nyāyāvatāra.
NB.	Nyāya-bhāṣya.
N. Bindu.	Nyāya-bindu.
NBT.	Nyaya-bindu-tīka.
NK.	Nyāya-kandalī.
NS.	Nyāya-sutras.
NV.	Nyāya-vartika.
NVT.	} Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-tīka.
NVTT.	
OJ.	Outlines of Jainism.
OST.	Original Sanskrit Texts (Muir's).
PB.	Praśastapāda-bhāṣya.
PMS.	Parīkṣa-mukha-sutra.
PNT.	Pramaṇa-naya-tattvālokalankāra.
PP.	Prajña-Paramitas.
P. Pancika.	Prakaraṇa-pañcika.
PPM.	Prabhakara School of Purva-mīmāṃsa.
Ram.	Rāmāyaṇa.
RPV.	Religion and Philosophy of the Veda.
SBE.	Sacred Books of the East Series.
SBH.	Sacred Books of the Hindus.
SBJ.	Sacred Books of the Jains.
SDS.	Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha.
SK.	Saṃkhya-kārika.
SKGB.	Saṃkhya-karika-gaudapada-bhāṣya.
SPS.	Saṃkhya-pravacana-sutras.
STK.	Saṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī.
ŚB.	Śabara-bhāṣya.

Srī. B.	Śrī-bhāṣya.
Śvet.	Śvetaśvatara Upanisad.
Taitt.	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka.
TC.	Tattva-cintāmaṇi.
TS.	Tattvārthadhigama-sutra.
Vaj. cched.	Vajra-cchedika.
Vaj. Sam.	Vajasaneya-saṃhita.
VB.	Vidyabhusaṇa.
Ved. S.	Vedānta-sūtras.
Viz. SS.	Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.
VM.	Vācaspati Miśra.
VS.	Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.
VSM.	Vedānta-siddhānta-muktavali.
YS.	Yoga-sūtras.
ZDMG.	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.

APPENDIX III

List of Works Consulted.

N. B. (1) The following list contains the name of only those works to which there are references in this Thesis.

(2) The transliteration of Sanskrit titles as given by the editors has been preserved.

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8. *Aṣṭaviṃśatyupaniṣadaḥ*, edited by Vasudeva Laxman Shastri Phansikar, Bombay 1904.

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6. *The Nyāya-Vārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā* of Vacaspati Miśra (Viz. SS.), Benares, 1898.

7. *The Nyāya-manñjarī* of Jayanta (Viz. SS.) Benares, 1895.

8. *The Nyāya-sāra* of Bhasarvajña, with the *Nyāya-tātparyā-dīpikā* by Jayasinha Suri (Bibl. Indica), 1910.

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(v) The Purva-mīmāṃsa System.

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4. *The Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* of Sālikanātha Miśra (CSS.) Benares, 1904.

(vi) The Vedānta System.

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(viii) Buddhism.

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3. *The Lalita Vistara* or Memoirs of the Early life of Sākya Sinha, edited by Rajendralal Mitra, (Bibl. Indica), Calcutta, 1877.

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